MOORE v. COLVIN, No. 1:2014cv00381 - Document 14 (M.D.N.C. 2015)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE signed by MAG/JUDGE JOE L. WEBSTER on 8/13/2015; that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment reversing the Commissioner (Docket Entry 10 ) be DENIED, Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 12 ) be GRANTED, and the final decision of the Commissioner be upheld. (Sheets, Jamie)
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MOORE v. COLVIN Doc. 14 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA JMES R. MOORE, Plaintiff, V CAROLYN !ø. COLVIN, Acting Commissionet of Social Secutity, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 1:14CY381 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Plaintiff, James R. Moote, brought this action pursuant 1,631.(c)Q) of the 1383(c)(3)), Social Security ,A.ct (the to Sections 205(9) and "Act'), as amended (42 U.S.C. $$ a05(g) and to obtain teview of a fir'al decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying his claims for a Pedod of Disability ("POD"), Disability Insutance ("DIB"), and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Tides II and Benefits XVI of the Act. The Coutt has befote it the certified administtative record and cross-motions for judgment. I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintjff protectively filed applications for 7,201,1,, alleging a disability onset date a POD, DIB, and SSI benefits on February of Octobet 1.0,2009. (It. 15, 186-194.)1 The applications v/ere denied initially and upon reconsideration. (Id. at1,21-28,132-49.) Plaintiff tequested aheartng befote an Administtative LawJudge 1 (.'ALJ'). (Id. at 150-51.) Present at Ttanscrþt citations refer to the administrative record. Dockets.Justia.com the January 16,201,3 hearing were in his Match Plaintiff and his attorney 11,,201,3 decision that Qd. ^t 25.) The ALJ detetmined Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. (Id. at 1,5-24.) On April 5,201,4 the Appeals Council denied PlaintifPs request for teview, making the ALJ's determination the Commissioner's final decision fot teview. (Id. at 1,-4.) II. FACTUAI BACKGROUND Plaintiff was forty-eight years old on the alleged disability onset date, had a high school diploma, and was able to communicate in English. (Id. at 23.) III. STANDARD FOR REVIEW The Commissionet held that Plaintiff was not undet a disability within the meaning of the Act. Undet 42U.5.C. $ 405(9), the scope of judicial teview of the Commissionet's fìnal decision is specific and narrow. Smith u. Schweiker,795 F.2d 343,345 (4th Cir. 1986). This Court's teview of that decision is limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence in the recotd to support the Commissioner's decision. 42 U.S.C. $ a05(g); Haøter Sulliuan,993F.2d31,34 (4th Cir. 1.992);Hay Substantial evidence adequate u. u. Sulliuan,907 tr.2d1,453,1.456 (4th Cir. 1990). is "such televant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as to support a conclusion." Hanter,993 F.2d at 34 (citing Nchardson u. Perales,402 U.S. 389, 401, (1,971)). It "consists of more than a mere scintilla" "but may be somewhat less thana prepondetance." Id. (quolngLaws u. Celebreçe,368F.2d640,642 (4th Cir. 1,966)). The Commissionet must make findings of fact and tesolve conflicts in the evidence. Ha1t, 907 F.2d ^t 1,456 (citing King u. Califarco, 599 does not conduct a de novo review Schweiker, 795 F.2d ^t 345. In of the teviewing F.2d 591 , 599 (4th Cir. 1,979)). The Coutt evidence nor for 2 of the Commissioner's findings. substantial evidence, the Coutt does not undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, to make credibility determinations, or to substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Craig u. Chater,76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Ctr. 1,996) (citing Hryt,907 F.2d ^t 1,456). "Where conflicting evidence allows teasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the tesponsibility fot that decision falls on the fCommissioner] (or the fCommissionet's] designate, the (quoting ll/alker tevetsed only u. Bowen,834 See C*tg,76tr.3d at 589 F.2d 635, 640 (7th Cir. 1987). The denial of benefits will be if no reasonable determination. A{)." mind could accept the record as adequate to suppott the Nchard¡on, 402 U.S. at 401. The issue befote the Court is not whethet Plaintiff is disabled, but whether the Commissionet's finding that Plaintiff is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was teached based upon a correct application of the relevant law. See id.; Cofman u. Bowen,829 F.2d 514,517 (4th Cir. 1,987). IV. THE ALJ'S DISCUSSION The Social Security Regulations define "disability" for the purpose of obtaining disability benefits undet the Act as the "inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical ot mental impaitment2 which can be expected to result in death ot which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 1.2 1,382c(a)(3)(A). makes it months." 20 C.F'.R. S 404.1505(a); see also 42 U.S.C. $$ a%(d)(l)(a), To meet this definition, a claimant must have a severe impairment which impossible to do ptevious work or substanttal gainful acnvity3 that exists in the ' A "physical ot mental impairment" is n impairment resulting from "anatomical, physiological, or psychologicalabnormalities which are demonstlable by medically acceptable clinical ar.dlabotatory diagnostic techniques. " 42 U .S.C. $S 423 (dX3), 1,382c(a)(3XD). t "substantial gainful act)vily" is work that (1) involves performing significant ot ptoductive physical J national economy. 20 C.F.R. S 404.1505 (a); see also A. 42 U.S.C. SS 423(dX2)(A),1,382c(a)(3)(B). The Five-Step Sequential Analysis The Commissionet follows a five-step sequential analysis to ascettain disabled, which is set fotth in 20 C.F.R. SS 404.1520, 41.6.920. See Albright Sec.4dmin.,1.74tr.3d 473,475 n.2 (4th Cit. 1999). The (1) If so, the claimant is the claimant is a. Comm'r of Soe AIJ must detetmine in sequence: \ü/hether the claimant is engaged in substanttal gainful activity claimant is working). Q) if (2.ø., whether the not disabled and the inquiry ends. IØhether the claimant has a severe impafument. If not, then the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. (3) IØhether the impairment meets or equals to medical criteÅa of 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, ppendix 1, which sets fotth a list of impairments that w^ttant a finding of disability without considering vocational criteria. If so, the claimant ¿l'disabled and the inquiry is halted. (4) Whether the impaitment prevents the claimant from perfotming past relevant work. If not, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry is halted. (5) \X/hethet the claimant is able to perfotm any other work considedng both her residual functional capacitya and her vocational abilities. If so, the claimant is not disabled. ormentalduties, andQ) isdone (orintended) fotpay orprofit. 20C.F.R. S$404.1510,41,6,91,0, "Residual functional capacity" is the most a claknantcan do in a work setting despite the physical and mental limitations of his impairment and any related symptom (e.g., pan). See 20 C.F.R. S$ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(uXt); see also Hines u Barnhart,453 F.3d 559, 562 (4th Cir. 2006). The RFC includes both a "physical exettional ot strength limitation" that assesses the claimant's "ability to do sedentary, Iight, medium, heavy, or vely heavy work," as well as "nonexettional limitations (mental, sensory or skin impairments);' Ha// u. Hariq 658 F.2d 260,265 (4th Cir. 1981). a 4 20 c.F'.R. SS 404.1520,41.6.920. Here, the ALJ írst determined that Plaintiff had not engaged acttvity since his alleged onset date of October 10,2009. in substantial gainful (It. 17.) The AIJ next found in step two that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: history of back injury, remote history of ankle injury, and depression. (d) At step three, the AIJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed in, or medically equal to, one listed in ,A.ppendix 1. (Id.) At the fouth step of the sequence, the ALJ detetmined that Plaintiff was not disabled ftom October L0, 2009, through the date of the decision because he could perform his past relevant work as a machine operator and an automobile mechanic. (Id. at 22-23.) At step fìve, the LJ alternatively concluded that Plaintiff could petfotm other jobs in the national economy. (Id. at 23-24.) B. Residual Functio nal Capacity Determination Prior to step fout, the AIJ determined PlaintifPs RFC based on his evaluation of the evidence. (Id. at 1,9-22.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff tetained the RFC to perform range a of medium wotk with exceptions. (Id. at 1,9.) Specifically, the AIJ concluded that Plaintiff may only occasionally climb ramps, stairs, ladders, topes and scaffolds. (Id.) Additionally, Plaintiff may occasionally petfotm acts of balancing and crouching, and he may ftequently perfotm acts of stooping. (Id.) The AIJ also concluded that Plaintiff may have only occasional interaction with supervisors and co-wotkers due to his mental impairment. Qd.) C. Past Relevant Work The ALJ found in step four that Plaintiff could petform his past televant work as a 5 machine operator ^nd ^î automobile mechanic as generally petformed and that this work does not tequire the petformance of wotk-related activities precluded by the claimant's residual functional capacity. (Id. at22-23.) V. ANALYSIS Plaintiff raises two issues. First, Plaintiff contends that "[s]ubstantial evidence does not support the ALJ's finding at step four of sequential evaluation that Moote retains the ability to perform his past relevant jobs as they are generally petfotmed." (Docket Entty ^t 4-1,1.) "[A] claimant will be found 'not disabled' if 11 he is capable of petforming his past relevant work either as he performed it in the p^st 0r as it is generally required by employers in the national economy." Pass u. Chater, Security Ruling ("SSR") 82-61,, 1.982 through the ltst fout steps WL 65 F'.3d 1200, 1207 (4th Cir. 1995); ¡ee Socíal 31387, at x1,-2 (1,982). Plaintiff has the burden of the sequential evaluation process and at the fourth step he must establish that he has an impairment which prevents him ftom performing his past televant wotk. See Ha// u. Harris,658 F.2d 260,264 (4th Cir. 1981). The Social Secutity Rulings and Regulations also speak to the propet procedute for an N,J to follow at step four. SSR 82-62 provides in pertinent patt that: In fìnding that an individual has the capactty to perfotm a past relevant job, the detetmination or decision must contain among the findings the following specific findings of fact: 1,. A finding of fact as to the individual's RFC. 2. A finding of fact as to the physicai and mental demands the past job/occupation. of 3. A finding of fact that the individual's RFC would permit return to his or her past iob or occupation. 6 a SSR 82-62, 1.982 WL 31386, x4 (1982). See al¡o 20 C.F.R. SS 404.1520(e), 416.920(e) ("We use our [RFC] ssessment at the fourth step determine if you of the can do your past relevant work . . . sequential evaluation ptocess to ."). Accotding to SSR 82-62, "[t]he claimant is the primary soutce fot vocational documentation, and statements by the claimant regarding past work àre gerrer^lly sufficient fot detetmining the skill level; demands and nonexertional demands of such 'work." SSR 82-62, at *3; Attrae, Civil Action No. BPG-11.-32,201,2WL 294532, (unpublished); Flofu u. t001 exettional 0.!.t Ta1lor u. ú*9 (D.Md.Jan.31,201,2) Astrwe, Civil No. 3:1,0CY474-FDìø-DSC,201.1WL 494631.1., at*4-5 $X/.D.N.C. June 6, 201,1) (unpublished), adopted fu 201,1 WL 4946270 CX/.D.N.C. Oct. 18, 2011) (unpublished); Shamlee u. Attrwe, Action No. 2:09-cv290,2010 V/L 31.87643, atx5-6 (E.D.Va. }tlay 28,2010) (unpublished), (unpublished); see step, the burden adopted also Hanter u. Salliuaru,993 fu 201,0 WL 31,87609 (E.D.Va. Aug. 11,201,0) F.2d 31,, 35 (4th Cir. 1.992) ("Thtough the fouth of ptoduction and proof is on the claimant."). Here, as noted, after setting forth Plaintiffs RFC for a riattowed range of medium work, the ALJ found in step four that Plaintiff could perform his past relevant work as a machine operator and an automobile mechanic as they ate genetally performed and that this wotk does not tequite the performance of work-telated activities precluded by the claimant's residual functional capacíty. Çr.22-23.) Mote specifically, the AIJ stated: The claimant has past televant work as a machine operator, which requites a medium level of exertion and is semi-skilled. The claimant has past televant wotk as a dry curer, which requites a heavy level of exertion and is unskilled. The claimant has past relevant wotk as an automobile mechanic, which requires a medium level of exefüon, and is skilled. In comparing the claimant's tesidual functional capacity with 7 the physical and mental demands of this work, the undetsigned finds that the claimant is able to petform the positions of machine operatot and automobile mechanic as they are genetally performed. The positions of machine opetator and automobile mechanic tequire a medium level of exertion. As the claimant is capable of performing t^nge of medium work, ^ the undetsigned fìnds that he is capable of petforming these jobs as generally petformed. (Id. at23.) Thus, the LJ met the three ctitetia set fotth in SSR 82-62. He tendeted a finding fact as to Plaintiffls RFC, concluding that he could petfotm a wotk. The ALJ also made a finding of n of trowed tange of medium fact s to the physical and mental demands of PlaintifPs past jobs/occupations as a machine operator, dry curer, and automobile mechanic. Finally, the ALJ made a fìnding past job or occupation. of fact that Plaintiffs RFC would permit him to teturn to his In teaching his step four conclusion, the AIJ compared Plaintiffs RF'C u¡ith the physical and mental demands of his prior relevant work. Çr. 1,9-23.) Plaintiff argues that no vocational expert testified at the headng tegatding his past relevant wotk. To the extent Plaintiff asserts that vocational expett testimony was necessary at step four, this argument fails. Although social secutity tegulations have been amended to allow vocational expett services at step four, they do not require the testimony vocational expett. Martin u. Coluin, No. (E.D.N.C. Mar. 24,201,5) (unpublished); see 7:1,3-CY-273-trL, 2015 WL al¡o 20 C.F.R. S 404.1560(b)(2) 1346990, of at a *1.0 ("!7" rzE vse the services of vocational experts or vocational specialists . . . to obtain evidence we need to help us determine whether you can do your past relevant work, given yout tesidual functional capacity.")(emphasis added); Billingslejt u. Corzm'r of Soc. Jea., 3054269, at*1,8 (1.{.D.!ø. Va. July 3,201,4) (unpublished) 8 No. 5:73CY1,26, 201,4 WL ("[]he ALJ is cleatþ not tequired to consider testimony from a vocational expert regarding plaintiffs prior job."); Astrwe, No. 2:10CV30, recoimmendation adoþted CI.J.D.!7. Va. Feb. 201.1, !ØL 399956, at *27 (].J.D.\)7. Ya, Jan. Dauis a. 1,1,, 201.1) reþort and ¡ab nom. Daui¡ u. Comm'r of Soc. Jea., No. 2:1,0-CY-30,20'1.1 WL 4421.1.8 2,2011) ("[4. ,tLJ is not reqaired to obtain vocational expert testimony.") (unpublished). Thus, the AIJ did not ertor in failing to use a vocational expett at step fout. Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ's classification of PlaintifPs past relevant jobs conflicts with his descdption of the jobs. Q)ocket Entry 11 at 5-6.) Plaintjff asserts that the ALJ eroneously relied upon assessments done at the Disability Determination Services level which concluded that Plaintiffls past work corresponded with Dictionary of Occupational Titie ("DOT") occupation listings for "Machine Opetatot (Id. at 6-8.) \X/hile it is apparent II" and "Automobile Mechanic." the ALJ did not specifically list occupational codes in his findings, it is unclear how the ALJ's past iobs classifications conflict wrth Plaintiffs own job desctiptions. In his work history report, Plaintiff indicated a job tide of "machine opetfator]" where he would "stand at a bedlock machine and opetate it" and "other machines." (Tr. 239-240.) The DOT occupation listing "Machine Opetatot II" that the LJ apparently relied upon was desctibed in the state agency disability detetmination. Çr 6a.) Listed undet occupational code 619.685-062, this job title includes operating "fabrtca:Jng machines, such as cutoff saw, shears, rolls, btakes, ptesses, forming machines, [and] spinning machines," and classifies this listing as "medium Opetatot II, L991, WL 68521.7. As work." DOT 61.9.685-062, Machine to anothet relevant job, Plaintiffs wotk history repoÍt furthet indicates that he petformed "general services" in a garage which includes mounting and totating tires, changing oil, unloading úucks, maintaining the shop, and assisting othet 9 mechanics. Qr. 238.) He and alignments. also testified at the hearing that he petformed ftont-end repaits Qt 29.) employment undet the Plaintiffs June 16, 201.1. vocational assessment identifies this DOT occupation tide "Automobile Mechanic," code 620.261,-01,0 which includes repairing and examining vehicles, inspecting patts for weat, petforming ftont-end alignments, and repairing accessories. DOT 620.261,-01,0, Automobile Mechanic, 1991 lfl- 68871,3. This also is classified as medium work. Id. At most, the ALJ's classification of Plaintifls "machine operator" job may be arguably conflicting. Flowever, it is clear that Plaintiff meets the DOT listing for "automobile mech^nlc." The ALJ's failure to cite to specifìc DOT codes does not suggest that his classification conflicts with Plaintiffs description of his past jobs. Jackson u. Coluin, No. 4:12CV0933 TCM, 2013 WL 5291723, at x11 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 19,201,3) (unpublished) (vocational expert's failure to cite specific codes does not undermine the "ALJ's reliance on the fvocational expett's] testimony about . . . past relevant wotk."). PlaintifPs work history report, his vocational assessment and his own testimony at the headng is consistent with this job description relied upon by the ALJ.t Thus, the AIJ's ciassification of at least one of Plaintiffs past relevant jobs as an automobile mechanic is reasonable and his conclusion that Plaintiff could perform past relevant wotk as genetally petfotmed in the economy is supported by substanttal evidence in the record. Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ's altetnative decision at step five is not supported by substantial evidence. Flowever, the Coutt concludes that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's dccision at step four that Plaintiff could perform work s ^s ^rr automobile mechanic as No. 1:10-CV-451,,2013 WL 5423647, at *3 (1\4.D.N.C. Sept. 26,201'3) (Court concluded that the ALJ's decision was not supported by substantial evidence where there was Compare Boler a. Co/uin, no work background sheet, and no testimony of plaintiffs housekeepet position that the AIJ classified as past relevant wotk.) 10 generally petfotmed in the economy. A finding that Plaintiff is not disabled t step four ptecludes a step five analysis. Ma¡tro ,. Apftl,270 F.3d 171,,179-1,80 (4th Cir. 2001). Thus, the Court need not address this issue. VI. CONCLUSION After a careful considetation of the evidence of tecotd, the Coutt finds that the Commissionet's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Accotdingly, this Coutt RECOMMENDS that PlaintifPs Motion fot Judgment revetsing the Commissionet (Docket E.rt"y 10) be (Docket Er,tty 1,2) DENIED, Defendant's Motion fot Judgment on the Pleadings be GRÁNTED, and the final decision of the Commissioner be upheld. U August 1,3,201,5 Durham, Noth Carohna 11 We stef Magistrate Judge
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