Mays v. Lane et al, No. 1:2010cv04810 - Document 33 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)
Court Description: ORDER denying 23 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Ordered by Judge I. Leo Glasser on 6/25/2012. (Green, Dana)
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Mays v. Lane et al Doc. 33 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ------------------------------------------------------x LATISHA MAYS, Plaintiff, Mem orandum an d Order 10 Civ. 4810 - against FREDERICK LANE and RYAN LANE, Defendants. ------------------------------------------------------x GLASSER, United States District J udge: Plaintiff, Latisha Mays (“Mays” or “plaintiff”), com m enced this action August 9, 20 10 against Ryan Lane (“Lane”) and Frederick Lane (collectively, “defendants”) pursuant to New York Insurance Law § 510 4 (the “No Fault Statute”), seeking to recover for personal injuries she allegedly sustained as a result of a car accident with defendant Ryan Lane. Plaintiff also alleges negligent entrustm ent against defen dant Frederick Lane. The case was com m enced in the Suprem e Court of the State of New York, Kings County, and on October 20 , 20 10 was rem oved on the basis of diversity jurisdiction to this Court. Plaintiff seeks partial sum m ary judgm ent on the issue of liability. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s m otion is den ied. BACKGROU N D The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. On the afternoon of J anuary 12, 20 10 , Mays was driving her 20 0 6 J eep Liberty northbound in the left lane of the three-lane Hutchison River Parkway in the Bronx, New York. Affidavit of Alexander Ogden dated Apr. 23, 20 12 (“Ogden Aff.”) Ex. C (“Pl.’s Dep.”), at 17-23. A green J aguar car broke down, blocking the lane in front of Mays. Ogden Aff. Ex. D (“Lane Dep.”), at 1 Dockets.Justia.com 17. Mays cam e to a com plete stop a few cars behind the J aguar. Lane Dep. at 14; Pl.’s Dep. at 27. Defendant Ryan Lane was also driving northbound on the Hutchinson River Parkway in the left lane. Lane Dep. at 21; Pl.’s Dep. at 25. Although it was winter, the day was sunny an d the roads were clear; traffic was m oving at the speed lim it. Lane Dep. at 11-12; Pl.’s Dep. at 23. Lane was driving a 20 0 4 Volkswagen J etta owned by his father, Frederick Lane. Lane Dep., at 7-8. It is undisputed that there were two cars behind Mays and ahead of Lane and that those cars switched lanes to avoid and pass Mays. Lane Dep. at 20 -22; Pl.’s Dep. at 25-26. Lane alleges that his view was blocked by the cars, one of which was a sport utility vehicle, and therefore he could not see Mays until the cars ahead abruptly switched lanes. Lane Dep. at 11, 20 -21. Because the parkway lacked a left-hand shoulder and there was traffic in the lane to the right of him , he was unable to also switch lanes, Lane Dep. at 13, 21-22, and, despite braking, he struck the rear bum per of Mays’ stopped car. Id. at 15. Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the im pact she suffered pain and injuries, necessitating physical therapy and surgeries on her shoulder and neck. Pl.’s Dep. at 41-44, 53-74. JU RISD ICTION Diversity of citizen ship, which is not disputed, provides a basis for jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Plaintiff is a citizen of New York. Notice of Rem oval ¶ 3(a). Defendant Frederick Lane is a citizen of the District of Colum bia. Id. ¶ 3(b). Defendant Ryan Lane was a citizen of Connecticut at the tim e this action was com m enced and currently resides in Massachusetts. Id. ¶ 3(c). Plaintiff seeks m ore than $ 75,0 0 0 .0 0 in dam ages. 2 D ISCU SSION I. Pla in tiff’s Failu re to File a Ru le 56 .1 State m e n t As an initial m atter, defendants argue plaintiff’s m otion should be denied because plaintiff failed to file a Local Rule 56.1 Statem ent or a response to defendants’ Rule 56.1 Statem ent. Local Rule 56.1 requires that a party m oving for sum m ary judgm ent subm it a list of the m aterial facts as to which there is no genuine issue to be tried, along with “citation to eviden ce which would be adm issible, set forth as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e).” Loc. Civ. R. 56.1. “The requirem ent is strict; failure to subm it a Rule 56.1 statem ent with a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent m ay result in the m otion’s denial.” T.Y. v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., 584 F.3d 412, 417 (2d Cir. 20 0 9) (citing Loc. Civ. R. 56.1(a)); see, e.g., Mu Yan Lin v. Burlington Ins. Co., No. 11 Civ. 33 (PGG), 20 12 WL 967633, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 20 12) (collecting cases denying m ovant’s sum m ary judgm ent m otion for failure to subm it a Rule 56.1 statem ent). However, “[a] district court has broad discretion to determ ine whether to overlook a party’s failure to com ply with local court rules. . . . [and] m ay in its discretion opt to conduct an assiduous review of the record even where one of the parties has failed to file such a statem ent.” Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., Inc., 258 F. 3d 62, 73 (2d Cir. 20 0 1). The purpose of Local Rule 56.1 is “to aid the courts in deciding sum m ary judgm ent m otions by quickly identifying disputed m aterial facts.” T.Y., 584 F.3d at 417. Here, the record essentially consists of two short depositions: that of plaintiff Latisha Mays an d that of defendant Ryan Lan e. The m aterial facts are clear. Plaintiff’s failure to file a Rule 56.1 statem ent will be overlooked and the Court will not deny the m otion on these grounds. 3 II. Su m m ary Ju d gm e n t Sta n d ard Sum m ary judgm ent is appropriate “if the m ovant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any m aterial fact and the m ovant is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). As an initial m atter, the m oving party has the burden of dem onstrating that no genuine dispute of m aterial fact exists for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 10 6 S. Ct. 1348, 8 9 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986). “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed m ust support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of m aterials in the record, including depositions, docum ents, electronically stored inform ation, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those m ade for purposes of the m otion only), adm issions, interrogatory answers, or other m aterials; or (B) showing that the m aterials cited do not establish the absen ce or presen ce of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce adm issible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Once the m oving party has m et this burden, the opposing party “‘m ust do m ore than sim ply show that there is som e m etaphysical doubt as to the m aterial facts. . . . [T]he nonm oving party m ust com e forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 20 0 2) (em phasis in original) (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87). “If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court m ay . . . grant sum m ary judgm ent if the m otion and supporting m aterials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that the m ovant is entitled to it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The Court is com pelled to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonm oving party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, and a genuine dispute exists if a 4 reasonable jury could find in favor of the non-m oving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 10 6 S. Ct. 250 5, 2510 , 91 L. Ed. 2d 20 2 (1986). However, “[i]f the eviden ce is m erely colorable, or is not significantly probative, sum m ary judgm ent m ay be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249– 50 (citations om itted). “[T]he m ere existen ce of som e alleged factual dispute between the parties” alone will not defeat a properly supported m otion for sum m ary judgm ent. Id. at 247– 48 (em phasis in original). “Thus, the nonm oving party m ay n ot rest upon m ere conclusory allegations or denials but m ust set forth ‘concrete particulars’ showing that a trial is needed.” R.G. Grp., Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69, 77 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting S.E.C. v. Res. Autom ation Corp., 585 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1978)). “[S]um m ary judgm ent is ‘highly unusual’ in a negligence case, because such a case requires a determ ination of the reasonableness of a party’s conduct, and ‘the assessm ent of reasonableness is generally a factual question to be addressed by the jury.’” Maizous v. Garaffa, No. 0 0 Civ. 4895 (ILG), 20 0 2 WL 1471556, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30 , 20 0 2) (citations om itted) (quoting King v. Crossland Sav. Bank, 111 F.3d 251, 259 (2d Cir. 1997)). Nonetheless, “‘the m ere fact that a case involves a claim of negligence does not preclude a granting of sum m ary judgm ent.’” Id. (quoting Cum m insky v. Chandris, S.A., 719 F. Supp. 1183, 1186 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)). III. N e glige n ce o f D e fe n d an t Ryan Lan e Plaintiff seeks partial sum m ary judgm ent on the issue of liability on the grounds that the undisputed facts establish defendant Ryan Lane was negligent as a m atter of law because he struck Mays’ stopped vehicle from behind. Under New York law, “a driver is expected to drive at a sufficiently safe speed and to m aintain enough distan ce between him self and cars ahead of him so as to avoid collisions with stopped vehicles, 5 taking into account the weather an d road conditions.” Malone v. Morillo, 6 A.D.3d 324, 325, 775 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1st Dep’t 20 0 4) (internal quotation m arks and citations om itted). 1 This duty is codified in New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129(a), which provides that “[t]he driver of a m otor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle m ore closely than is reasonable and prudent, havin g due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon and the con dition of the highway.” Consequently, “when a defendant operates a vehicle that strikes another vehicle in the rear, the defendant is subject to a presum ption that he or she was n egligent in failing to keep a safe distance between the vehicles,” Abram ov v. Cam pbell, 30 3 A.D.2d 697, 697, 757 N.Y.S.2d 10 0 (2d Dep’t 20 0 3), and “the injured occupants of the front vehicle are entitled to sum m ary judgm ent on liability, unless the driver of the following vehicle can provide a nonnegligent explanation, in evidentiary form , for the collision,” J ohnson v. Philips, 261 A.D.2d 269, 271, 690 N.Y.S.2d 545 (1st Dep’t 1999) (collecting cases). “The duty of providing an explanation is im posed upon the operator of the m oving vehicle ‘because he or she is in the best position to explain whether the collision was due to a m echanical failure, a sudden stop of the vehicle ahead, an unavoidable skidding on a wet pavem ent, or som e other reasonable cause.’” Perez v. Guerrero, No. 10 Civ. 4287 (GWG), 20 11 WL 1794352, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 20 11) (quoting Leal v. Wolff, 224 A.D.2d 392, 393, 638 N.Y.S.2d 110 (2d Dep’t 1996)). The parties do not dispute that Ryan Lane collided with the rear of plaintiff’s car. Thus, plaintiff has m ade out a prim a facie claim of negligen ce and the rem ain ing issue is whether defen dants have raised a m aterial issue of fact as to 1 The Court agrees with the parties that New York law applies. “A federal court sitting in diversity applies the law of the forum state and, in tort actions, New York courts generally apply the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred.” Maizous, 20 0 2 WL 1471556, at *3 (citing Velez v. Sebco Laundry Sys., Inc., No. 0 0 CIV 50 27 (SHS), 20 0 1 WL 4360 9, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. J an. 18, 20 0 1); Franklin v. Krueger Int’l, Inc., No. 96 CIV 240 8 (DLC), 1997 WL 691424, at *3 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 1997)). 6 the existence of a non-negligent explanation. A. Co n tribu to ry N e glige n ce Defendants argue sum m ary judgm ent should be denied because plaintiff stopped abruptly, contributing to the accident. Defs.’ Mem . at 2. There is som e dispute as to whether, under New York law, an allegation that the front vehicle stopped suddenly or abruptly can constitute a non-negligent explanation sufficient to rebut the presum ption of negligence arising from a rear-en d collision. See, e.g., Hong v. Maher, No. 0 2 Civ. 78 25 (RWS), 20 0 4 WL 771127, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. April 13, 20 0 4) (noting conflicting cases within the Second Departm ent, alone). As defendants correctly note, this Court previously held that a sudden stop by a plaintiff m ay constitute negligence and raise a triable issue of fact. See Maizous, 20 0 2 WL 1471556, at *3-4 (collecting cases). The Court observed that an instructive exam ple is where a plaintiff, following too closely behind the car in front of him and at too great a speed, com es to a sudden stop, causing the car to the rear to strike him . Id. at *6. Contributory negligence would be appropriate because each driver “should be a sufficient distance behind the forward car and each should be traveling at a sufficiently low rate of speed so that he will not cause dam age to the car ahead if he stops or to the car behin d by stopping suddenly.” Id. (em phasis in original) (quotation om itted). In Maizous, this Court denied sum m ary judgm ent on the grounds that both defendant and plaintiff had violated that duty. Id. at 5. Maizous and the cases upon which it relied are plainly distinguishable because there is nothing in the record that indicates plaintiff was in any way negligent in her driving. Plaintiff cam e to a controlled stop due to a broken-down car in her lane and had been at a com plete stop for several seconds before the accident. Her actions were 7 not unlawful or negligent. See Gregson v. Terry, 35 A.D.3d 358, 8 27 N.Y.S.2d 181 (2d Dep’t 20 0 6) (sum m ary judgm ent appropriate on liability where “[t]he presence of [a] stationary vehicle directly ahead of [plaintiff], and the heavy flow of traffic in the adjacent lane, provided [him ] with a lawful reason for stopping (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 120 0 [a]), and there is no allegation that he stopped short or was otherwise negligent in bringing his vehicle to a halt.”). According to Ryan Lane’s testim ony, it was not plaintiff’s actions that were sudden but his own discovery of the obstacle, due to the cars in front of him blocking his view. Consequently, plaintiff bears no com parative fault and sum m ary judgm ent will not be denied on these grounds. B. Obs tru ctio n o f Vie w Defendants also argue sum m ary judgm ent should be denied because Ryan Lane was unable to see Mays’ stopped car until the two vehicles ahead of him abruptly changed lanes, presenting an unexpected hazard that he was unable to avoid—a nonnegligent explanation for the collision. In support, defendants cite to Ortiz v. Rosner, 8 17 F. Supp. 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). There, the defendant was driving in m oving traffic through a green light, and glanced to his right in order to safely m ove lanes. “When he looked forward, the car that he had been following was no longer there and, instead, he saw Ortiz’s vehicle stopped in his lane. [Defendant] then hit the brakes but was unable to com e to a com plete stop.” Id. at 352 (internal citations and quotation om itted). The court denied sum m ary judgm ent on liability, finding that “the jury could rationally infer that the car traveling in front of defendant’s taxi was blocking [plaintiff’s] stationary van from his sight an d that the car abruptly changed lanes to avoid Ortiz’s van, only then revealing the van to [defendant]. . . . Under these circum stances, the presence of [plaintiff’s] van, stopped at a green light, could have been unforeseeable and could have 8 occurred without warning to defendant.” Id. at 352-53. Sim ilarly, in Torres v. WABC Towing Corp., 282 A.D.2d 40 6, 724 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1st Dep’t 20 0 1), defendant was traveling below the speed lim it when he suddenly observed plaintiff about 50 feet away, stopped around the bend of a curve in the road. Defendant attem pted to change lanes, and, when he could not do so, slam m ed on his brakes, but skidded into plaintiff. The court noted that there was adequate evidence for the jury to find that the collision was attributable to causes other than defen dant’s negligence. Based upon the eviden ce, viewed in the light m ost favorable to the defendants, a reasonable jury could find that Ryan Lane was traveling within the speed lim it and driving with appropriate caution under the prevailing traffic conditions: he was on a parkway, it was m id-afternoon, the weather was clear, and traffic was m oving at an ordinary rate. A jury could find that, as in Ortiz and Torres, he had no reason to expect a car stopped in the m iddle of the road. A reasonable jury could find that the car in front of Lane, a sport utility vehicle, is significantly higher off the ground than a VW J etta and effectively blocked Lane’s view of the road ahead. A reasonable jury could also find that Mays’ stopped car was only revealed to Lane when the cars in front of him abruptly changed lanes to avoid her and that Lane was unable to take evasive action because of the road divider to the left of him and traffic to the right of him . Because a reasonable jury could find that the collision occurred without negligence on Ryan Lan e’s part, a m aterial issue of fact exists an d sum m ary judgm ent cannot be granted for plaintiff. 9 CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies plaintiff’s m otion for sum m ary judgm ent. SO ORD ERED . Dated: Brooklyn, New York J une 25, 20 12 _ _ _ / s/ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I. Leo Glasser United States District J udge 10
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