Reyes v. The City of New York et al, No. 1:2010cv01838 - Document 18 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)
Court Description: ORDER granting 12 Motion to Dismiss. Ordered by Senior Judge I. Leo Glasser on 1/6/2012. (Green, Dana)
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Reyes v. The City of New York et al Doc. 18 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ------------------------------------------------------x NOEL REYES Plaintiff, Mem orandum and Order 10 -cv-1838 - against THE CITY OF NEW YORK, et al. Defendants. ------------------------------------------------------x GLASSER, United States District J udge: Plaintiff Noel Reyes (“plaintiff” or “Reyes”) brought this action against the City of New York (“NYC”), the New York City Police Departm ent (“NYPD”), and two unidentified police officers (“Officer Doe 1” and “Officer Doe 2”) (collectively, “defendants”), pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986, alleging false arrest, false im prisonm ent, and m alicious prosecution. Before the Court is defendants’ m otion for judgm ent on the pleadings, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Defendants argue: (1) plaintiff failed to tim ely serve Officers Doe 1 and 2 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m ) and those claim s are now barred by the statute of lim itations; (2) NYPD is a non-suable entity; and (3) plaintiff has failed to state a claim as a m atter of law. For the following reasons, defendants’ m otion is GRANTED. 1 Dockets.Justia.com BACKGROU N D The following facts are undisputed and drawn from the com plaint and docum ents of which the Court m ay take judicial notice.1 At 1:35 p.m . on May 15, 20 0 7, police received a report of an arm ed robbery of the Grand Com m unity Laundrom at at 30 2 Grand Street in Brooklyn. Declaration of Sum it Sud dated March 3, 20 0 9 (“Sud Decl.”), Ex. C (Arrest Record & Com plaint Report). Officers responded to the scene and spoke with two witnesses: Daniel Boentoro, a Laundrom at em ployee, and J ohnny Morales, a custom er. Sud Decl. Ex C (Com plaint Report). The witnesses reported that the perpetrators brandished a silver handgun, took the Laundrom at cash box, and then fled on a bicycle. Sud Decl. Ex. C (Arrest Record & Com plaint Report). One m inute later, at approxim ately 1:40 p.m ., police officers stopped Reyes and another Hispanic m ale at the intersection of Roebling Street and South 1st Street in Brooklyn, New York, approxim ately two blocks from the Laundrom at. Com pl. ¶ 15; Sud Decl., Ex. C (Arrest Record & Arrest Worksheet). Shortly thereafter, officers brought the witnesses to the scene, where they m ade a “show up” identification of Reyes and his com panion as the m en who robbed the Laundrom at. Sud Decl. Ex. C (Com plaint Inform ational Report). Reyes was taken to the 90 th Precinct station house, and charged with burglary, arm ed robbery, and m enacing in the third degree. Com pl. ¶ 18; Sud Decl. Ex C (Arrest Record). Reyes was detained for two days at the station house before being transferred 1 In deciding a m otion for judgm ent on the pleadings, the court m ay consider “the pleadings and exhibits attached thereto, statem ents or docum ents incorporated by reference in the pleadings, m atters subject to judicial notice, and documents subm itted by the moving party, so long as such docum ents either are in the possession of the party opposing the m otion or were relied upon by that party in its pleadings.” McCrary v. Cnty. of Nassau, 493 F. Supp. 2d 581, 587 (E.D.N.Y. 20 0 7) (citing Brass v. Am . Film Tech., Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir. 1993). This includes public records from plaintiff’s crim inal file. See, e.g., Vasquez v. City of New York, 99 CV 460 6 (DC), 20 0 0 WL 869492, at *1 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. J une 29, 20 0 0 ). 2 to the Kings County Crim inal Court, where he was arraigned. Id. Because he was unable to m ake bail, Reyes was then jailed at Rikers Island Correctional Facility. Id. On J une 13, 20 0 7, Reyes was indicted by the Grand J ury on charges of Robbery in the First Degree, Robbery in the Third Degree, and Petit Larceny. Sud Decl. Ex. C (Indictm ent). Prior to his crim inal trial, plaintiff m ade a m otion to dism iss the indictm ent based on the insufficiency of the evidence presented to the Grand J ury. Id. Ex. E. On Septem ber 6, 20 0 7, the Suprem e Court, Kings County, denied the m otion. Id. Prior to trial, plaintiff also challenged the lawfulness of his arrest, claim ing the police lacked probable cause, m oved to suppress the “show-up” witness identification as unduly suggestive and a violation of his constitutional rights, and sought to suppress evidence seized at the tim e of his arrest (a blue bicycle). Id. Ex. F. On Novem ber 27, 20 0 7, this m otion was denied. Id. At Reyes’s crim inal trial on Decem ber 12, 20 0 7, the Assistant District Attorney called two witnesses to the crim e, including Daniel Boentoro. Com pl. ¶¶ 12, 23. Both witnesses testified that Reyes did not com m it the crim e. Id. Reyes was acquitted by the jury and released from custody on Decem ber 12, 20 0 7. Id. ¶¶ 24-25; Declaration of David M Harrison dated April 1, 20 11, Ex. 1. D ISCU SSION Defendants argue judgm ent on the pleadings is warranted because: (1) plaintiff failed to tim ely serve Officers Doe 1 and 2 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m ) and those claim s are now barred by the statute of lim itations; (2) NYPD is a non-suable entity; and (3) plaintiff has failed to state a claim as a m atter of law. Because the Court finds that 3 plaintiff has failed to state a claim, it is unnecessary to address defendants’ other argum ents. I. Stan d ard o f Re vie w Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party m ay m ove for judgm ent on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). In deciding a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(c), the Court applies the sam e standard as that applicable to a m otion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), accepting the allegations contained in the com plaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonm oving party. Ziem ba v. Wezner, 366 F.3d 161, 163 (2d Cir. 20 0 4); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957). J udgm ent on the pleadings “is appropriate where m aterial facts are undisputed and where a judgm ent on the m erits is possible m erely by considering the contents of the pleadings.” Sellers v. M.C. Floor Crafters Inc., 842 F.2d 639, 642 (2d Cir. 1988). “While a com plaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) m otion to dism iss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlem ent to relief requires m ore than labels and conclusions, and a form ulaic recitation of the elem ents of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twom bly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (20 0 7) (alteration, citations, and internal quotation m arks om itted). Instead, “[f]actual allegations m ust be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not perm it the court to infer m ore than the m ere possibility of m isconduct, the com plaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” 4 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 , 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (20 0 9) (second alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). II. Th e Civil Righ ts Act Plaintiff’s Com plaint cites a laundry list of provisions of the Civil Rights Act: 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986. See Com pl. ¶ 1. However, plaintiff fails to plead any section 1981, 1985 or 1986 claim s with specificity and plaintiff does not raise any argum ents against their dism issal. See Pl.’s Mem . of Law in Opposition. Accordingly, these claim s are dism issed and the Court considers only plaintiff’s § 1983 claim s. Section 1983 governs civil rights actions against a person acting under color of state law who “subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im m unities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” See Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 20 6, 225 (2d Cir. 20 0 4). “The statute itself is not a source of substantive rights but m erely provides ‘a m ethod for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Fowlkes v. Rodriguez, 584 F. Supp. 2d 561, 572 (E.D.N.Y. 20 0 8) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3, 99 S. Ct. 2689, 61 L. Ed. 2d 433 (1979)). Here, plaintiff claim s a violation of his Fourth Am endm ent rights and New York law provides the elem ents of the applicable section 1983 causes of action. See Singer v. Fulton Cnty. Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110 , 118 (2d Cir. 1995) (false arrest); Cook v. Sheldon, 41 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1994) (m alicious prosecution). 5 III. Plain tiff’s Claim s fo r Fals e Arre s t an d Fals e Im p ris o n m e n t are Barre d by Co llate ral Es to p p e l Under New York law, the elem ents of a false arrest or false im prisonm ent claim are “(1) the defendant intended to confine [the plaintiff], (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinem ent, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinem ent and (4) the confinem ent was not otherwise privileged.” Singer, 63 F.3d at 118. Only the fourth elem ent is in dispute: plaintiff claim s he was arrested and im prisoned without probable cause, in violation of his Fourth Am endm ent rights. Com pl. ¶ 17. Collateral estoppel bars plaintiff from m aking this claim . “The Suprem e Court has long since rem oved any doubt that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to actions brought under § 1983,” Green v. Kadilac Mortg. Bankers, 936 F. Supp. 10 8, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 , 10 4-0 5, 10 1 S. Ct. 411, 66 L. Ed. 2d 30 8 (1980 )), and a court m ay dism iss a claim sua sponte on grounds of collateral estoppel. Doe v. Pfrom m er, 148 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1998). Courts in this circuit have repeatedly barred § 1983 plaintiffs from relitigating in federal court issues decided against them in state crim inal proceedings. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Hartnett, 262 F. Supp. 2d 153, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 20 0 3) (state court decision collaterally estopped plaintiff from relitigating the lawfulness of his arrest via § 1983 claim ); Boom er v. Bruno, 134 F. Supp. 2d 262, 268-69 (N.D.N.Y. 20 0 1) (dism issing § 1983 m alicious prosecution claim where state court previously determ ined the issue); McBride v. Bratton, 1996 WL 6360 75, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 1996), aff’d 122 F.3d 10 56 (2d Cir. 1997) (dism issing § 1983 false arrest claim where state court previously determ ined officers had probable cause to arrest); Brown v. De Fillipis, 717 F. Supp. 172, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (dism issing § 1983 6 false arrest claim where state court previously determ ined officers had probable cause to arrest). Collateral estoppel applies when: “‘(1) the identical issue was raised in a previous proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated and decided in the previous proceeding; (3) the party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; and (4) the resolution of the issue was necessary to support a valid and final judgm ent on the m erits.’” Ball v. A.O. Sm ith Corp., 451 F.3d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 20 0 6) (quoting Purdy v. Zeldes, 337 F.3d 253, 258 & n.5 (2d Cir. 20 0 3). Here, plaintiff previously challenged his arrest in a pre-trial m otion in state court, arguing the police lacked probable cause to arrest: the sam e issue plaintiff now raises before this Court. Com pare Sud Decl. Ex. F, with Com pl. ¶ 17. It is clear that plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in state court: a hearing was held on Novem ber 26, 20 0 7 before New York Suprem e Court J udge Deborah Dowling at which Officer Olga Mencia, who initially stopped plaintiff, and Officer J oseph Scorcia, the arresting officer, testified under oath as to the events leading to plaintiff’s arrest. Id. Following the hearing, J udge Dowling issued a Mem orandum and Order in which she m ade detailed findings of fact regarding the grounds for plaintiff’s arrest and concluded that “based upon the totality of the circum stances adduced at this hearing . . . probable cause existed for the defendant’s arrest . . . .” Id. Probable cause is a com plete defense to a claim of false arrest and im prisonm ent. Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 10 2 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Zanghi v. Inc. Vill. of Old Brookville, 752 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1985)). 7 Plaintiff cannot now relitigate this issue by filing suit in federal court. The Court finds the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim s for false arrest and im prisonm ent are barred by collateral estoppel and defendants’ m otion is granted as to this claim . IV. Plain tiff Fails to State a Claim fo r Malicio u s Pro s e cu tio n Plaintiff also fails to state a claim for m alicious prosecution. Under New York law, to succeed on a claim of m alicious prosecution, the plaintiff m ust prove four elem ents: (1) the defendant initiated or continued a crim inal proceeding; (2) the proceeding term inated favorably to the plaintiff; (3) there was no probable cause for the crim inal charge; and (4) the defendant acted m aliciously. Rothstein v. Carriere, 373 F.3d 275, 282 (2d Cir. 20 0 4); Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 72 (2d Cir. 20 0 3). Here, plaintiff fails to show there was no probable cause for the crim inal charge. Plaintiff was indicted by a Grand J ury on J une 13, 20 0 7. See Sud Decl., Ex C at 14-15. Prior to his crim inal trial, plaintiff m ade a m otion to dism iss the indictm ent. The State Suprem e Court conducted an in cam era review of the Grand J ury m inutes and, by a Mem orandum and Order dated Septem ber 6, 20 0 7, determ ined the evidence presented to the Grand J ury “legally sufficient to establish the finding of each and every count of the indictm ent.” Sud Decl. Ex E. Where, as here, the plaintiff was indicted by a Grand J ury, New York law provides for a “presum ption of probable cause for the purposes of defending against a m alicious prosecution claim ,” Green v. Montgom ery, 219 F.3d 52, 60 (2d Cir. 20 0 0 ), a presum ption that can only have been enhanced by the State Court’s in cam era review. The existence of probable cause is a com plete defense to a claim of m alicious prosecution. Savino, 331 F.3d at 72. This presum ption of probable cause “m ay only be 8 rebutted by evidence that the indictm ent was procured by ‘fraud, perjury, the suppression of evidence or other police conduct undertaken in bad faith.’” Id. (em phasis in original) (quoting Colon v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 78, 83, 468 N.Y.S.2d 453, 456, 455 N.E.2d 1248 (1994)). Plaintiff has not m ade even conjectural allegations that the defendant officers com m itted fraud, perjury, or the like. Instead, plaintiff argues the defendant officers “wrongfully failed to take any reasonable m easures to identify and/ or verify the plaintiff, NOEL REYES, as a ‘perpetrator,’’’ Com pl. ¶ 20 , by failing to conduct a second ‘line up’ identification with Boentoro and Morales and that “the failure of defendants’ officers to properly produce plaintiff for a lineup before such individuals resulted in plaintiff being prosecuted and jailed for a crim e he did not com m it.” Pl.’s Mem . of Law at 9. Plaintiff incorrectly asserts that an acquittal m eans he was wrongly charged with a crim e he did not com m it whereas in fact it m eans only that the governm ent failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Plaintiff asks the Court to infer from the witnesses’ recantation at trial that the identification was flawed and the prosecution lacked probable cause. For the reasons set forth previously, plaintiff is collaterally estopped from relitigating the reliability of Boentoro and Morales’s ‘show-up’ identification. In the prior state court proceedings, plaintiff m oved to suppress that identification as unduly suggestive and, after a full and fair opportunity to be heard, his m otion was denied. See Sud Decl. Ex F. Secondly, the “failure” to con duct a second, line-up identification is not rem otely com parable to the type of m isconduct required for rebuttal. See, e.g., Celestin v. City of New York, 581 F. Supp. 2d 420 , 433-34 (E.D.N.Y. 20 0 8) (collecting cases of 9 m isconduct sufficient to rebut Grand J ury indictm ents). Police officers are not obligated to pursue every possible avenue that m ay exonerate the defendant, Gisondi v. Harrison, 523 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1988), and the failure to conduct an exhaustive investigation is not m isconduct. See, e.g. J ean v. City of New York, 0 8 Civ. 157 (RER), 20 0 9 WL 3459469, at *7-9 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 20 0 9) (rejecting argum ent that officer’s failure to interview other witnesses is com parable to fabricating false evidence), aff’d, J ean v. Montina, 412 F. App’x 352 (2d Cir. 20 11); Gil v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 590 F. Supp. 2d 360 , 370 (E.D.N.Y. 20 0 8) (“[F]ailure to conduct further investigation . . . does not am ount to fraud, bad faith or the suppression of evidence and is insufficient to overcom e the presum ption.”). Having failed to rebut the inference of probable cause created by his indictm ent, plaintiff does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Twom bly, 550 U.S. at 547, and defendants’ m otion is granted as to plaintiff’s m alicious prosecution claim . V. Plain tiff Fails to s tate a Claim fo r Mu n icip al Liability Plaintiff also purports to assert a Monell claim against NYC and the NYPD, alleging that his unlawful arrest, detention, and prosecution was the result of “a pattern and practice of wrongful and unreasonable conduct . . .” which included racial profiling. Com pl. ¶ 29. It is well-settled that the NYPD is not a suable entity, see Maier v. N. Y. City Police Dep’t, No. 0 8 Civ. 510 4 (ILG), 20 0 9 WL 2915211, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 20 0 9) (“The New York City Police Departm ent is an organizational subdivision of the City of New York, lacking independent legal existence and as such is not a suable entity.” (quotation om itted)), and this claim m ay only be brought against NYC. 10 “A Monell claim —arising from the Suprem e Court case of Monell v. Departm ent of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)—is a way to hold a m unicipality liable under Section 1983 for the conduct of its em ployees.” Pugh v. City of New York, 20 0 2 WL 39880 4 (ILG), 2 (E.D.N.Y. J an. 15, 20 0 2). A m unicipality m ay be liable under § 1983 when, by im plem entation of “a policy statem ent, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and prom ulgated by that [m unicipality’s] officers” or through practices that are so “perm anent and well settled” as to constitute governm ental “custom ,” it deprives the plaintiff of a constitutional right. Id. at 690 , 98 S. Ct. 20 18. Because plaintiff has failed, as a m atter of law, to dem onstrate he suffered any violation of his constitutional rights, plaintiff’s Monell claim m ust also fail. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim as a m atter of law and defendants’ m otion for judgm ent on the pleadings is GRANTED. SO ORD ERED . Dated: Brooklyn, New York J anuary 6 , 20 12 _ / s/ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I. Leo Glasser, U.S.D.J . 11
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