REARDON v. LEASON, et al
Filing
172
ORDER denying 171 Pltf's current motion for relief from this Court's previous rulings. Signed by Judge Mary L. Cooper on 9/7/2011. (gxh)
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JOHN E. REARDON,
Plaintiff,
v.
JAMES LEASON, et al.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 92-2433 (MLC)
O R D E R
PLAINTIFF moving for relief from this Court’s previous
rulings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”)
60(b)(4) and Rule 60(d)(3) (dkt. entry no. 171); and Plaintiff
having previously moved for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4)
(dkt. entry no. 144, 6-3-10 Mot.); and the Court having denied
that motion (dkt. entry no. 157, 7-1-10 Order); and Plaintiff
having appealed (dkt. entry no. 159, Not. of Appeal); and the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals having affirmed the Court’s
decision (dkt. entry no. 160, 3d Cir. Op.);1 and Plaintiff having
moved again before this Court for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)
(dkt. entry no. 161); and the Court having treated the motion as
a motion for reconsideration and having denied the motion (dkt.
entry no. 168, 5-31-11 Order); and the Court thus intending, for
the reasons stated in (1) the 5-31-11 Order, (2) the 7-1-10
1
The Court notes, once again, that the Plaintiff’s petition
for a writ of certiorari is pending in the United States Supreme
Court. See U.S. Supreme Ct. Dkt. No. 10-1382.
Order, and (3) the 3d Cir. Op., to deny the current motion
insofar as it seeks relief under Rule 60(b)(4); and
THE COURT noting that Rule 60(d)(3) states that “[t]his rule
does not limit a court’s power to . . . set aside a judgment for
fraud on the court,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(d)(3); and the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals stating that the Court “did not enter judgment
in [Plaintiff’s] criminal case” (3d Cir. Op. at 4); and the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals further noting that Plaintiff “is
effectively asking the District Court to void a state court
conviction,” but that “he is barred from doing so under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine” (id. at n.3.); and the Court thus
determining that, insofar as Plaintiff alleges fraud upon the
state court in the underlying state court proceeding, he cannot
use Rule 60(d)(3) to set aside a state court conviction (see 3d
Cir. Op.), see Fed.R.Civ.P. 60; and
THE COURT further determining that, insofar as Plaintiff
alleges fraud upon this Court, Plaintiff has not alleged, much
less demonstrated, any egregious, intentionally fraudulent,
conduct, see Gagliardi v. Courter, No. 02–2035, 2011 WL 710221,
at *2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2011) (noting a party must show by clear
and convincing evidence: “(1) an intentional fraud; (2) by an
officer of the court; (3) which is directed at the court itself;
and (4) that in fact deceives the court,” and that “[t]his is a
‘demanding standard’, reserved for ‘egregious misconduct’”)
2
(citing Herring v. United States, 424 F.3d 384, 390 (3d Cir.
2005)); see also Rigaud v. Broward Gen. Med. Ctr., 404 Fed.Appx.
372, 373-74 (11th Cir. 2010) (discussing Rule 60(d)(3) and
recusal); Parkhurst v. Pittsburgh Paints Inc., 399 Fed.Appx. 341,
342 (10th Cir. 2010) (same); and the Court thus also intending to
deny the current motion insofar as it seeks relief under Rule
60(d)(3); and for good cause appearing:
IT IS THEREFORE on this
7th
day of September, 2011,
ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s current motion for relief from this
Court’s previous rulings (dkt. entry no. 171) is DENIED.
s/ Mary L. Cooper
MARY L. COOPER
United States District Judge
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