-MF MONSERRATE v. VEALE, No. 2:2010cv02318 - Document 2 (D.N.J. 2010)
Court Description: OPINION - The Court grants ifp status, dismisses the Federal Claims, and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims arising under New Jersey law. The Court will enter an appropriate Order. re 1 Complaint Received. Signed by Judge William J. Martini on 5/19/10. (dr, )
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY ROBERT MONSERRATE, Plaintiff, v. VRONDA VEALE, et al., Defendants. : : : : : : : : : : : Civil No. 10-2318 (WJM) OPINION APPEARANCES: ROBERT MONSERRATE, #230986, Plaintiff Pro Se Hudson County Correctional Center 35 Hackensack Avenue Kearny, New Jersey 07032 MARTINI, District Judge: Robert Monserrate, a pretrial detainee, seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis without prepayment of fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Based on his affidavit of poverty, prison account statement1 and the apparent absence of three prior qualifying dismissals, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), this Court will grant Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis as a prisoner, and direct the Clerk to file the Complaint without prepayment of the filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). Having thoroughly reviewed Plaintiff s allegations, this Court will dismiss the federal claims raised in the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 1 See Monserrate v. Rabbitt, Civ. No. 10-2260 (WJM) (D.N.J. filed May 3, 2010), Docket Entry # 1-1. I. BACKGROUND The Complaint seeks damages and injunctive relief against Vronda Veale for allegedly ma[king] false complaints against [Plaintiff] 5 times, three times, using someone else[ s] name[]. (Docket Entry #1 at p. 4.) In the section of the form complaint instructing the plaintiff to state the facts, Plaintiff alleges: Ms. Vronda Veale made five false complaints against me by using false names, including her own name twice. On three above date 3-4-09, under Ms. Veale, made a false report. Charge later was dismissed. On 6-7-09, made another complaint by using the name Demetrie Fuller, that was later dismiss[ed.] Then on 7-26-09 made another complaint in Essex County under Keisha Murrel, that was later dismissed. Then under Ms. Veale again, on 11-04-09 made a complaint, that was later dismissed, and now under Adriana Smith made another complaint, on 1-30-2010. (Docket Entry #1 at p. 5.) Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and damages of $300,000 for alleged violation of his constitutional rights under § 1983. (Docket Entry #1, p. 6.) II. STANDARD FOR DISMISSAL The Prison Litigation Reform Act (?PLRA ), Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires the Court, prior to docketing or as soon as practicable after docketing, to review a complaint in a civil action in which a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis or a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental agent or entity. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A. The PLRA requires the Court to sua sponte dismiss any claim if the Court determines that it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. 2 A claim is frivolous if it "lacks even an arguable basis in law" or its factual allegations describe "fantastic or delusional scenarios." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989); see also Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194 (3d Cir. 1990). Addressing the clarifications as to the litigant's pleading requirement stated by the United States Supreme Court in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit provided the district courts with guidance as to what pleadings are sufficient to pass muster under Rule 8. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230-34 (3d Cir. 2008). Specifically, the Court of Appeals observed as follows: While a complaint . . . does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation [is] to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' . . . ." Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65 . . . [T]he threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) [is] that the 'plain statement [must] possess enough heft to 'sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 1966. [Hence] "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 1965 & n.3. Id. at 230-34 (original brackets removed). This pleading standard was further refined by the Supreme Court in its recent decision Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), where the Supreme Court clarified as follows: [In any civil action, t]he pleading standard . . . demands more than an unadorned [ ]the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me[ ] accusation. [Twombly, 550 U.S.] at 555 . . . . A pleading that offers labels and conclusions" or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. [Id.] at 555. [Moreover,] the plausibility standard . . . asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. [Indeed, even w]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, [the so-alleging complaint still] stops short of [showing] plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.' Id. at 557 (brackets omitted). [A fortiori,] the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions [or to t]hreadbare recitals of the 3 elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements [, i.e., by] legal conclusion[s] couched as a factual allegation [e.g.,] the plaintiffs' assertion of an unlawful agreement [or] that [defendants] adopted a policy 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group. . . . . [W]e do not reject these bald allegations on the ground that they are unrealistic or nonsensical. . . . It is the conclusory nature of [these] allegations . . . that disentitles them to the presumption of truth. . . . [Finally,] the question [of sufficiency of] pleadings does not turn [on] the discovery process. Twombly, 550 U.S.] at 559 . . . . [The plaintiff] is not entitled to discovery [where the complaint asserts some wrongs] generally," [i.e., as] a conclusory allegation [since] Rule 8 does not [allow] pleading the bare elements of [the] cause of action [and] affix[ing] the label general allegation [in hope of developing actual facts through discovery]. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-54. The Third Circuit observed that Iqbal hammered the final nail-in-the-coffin for the no set of facts standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957),2 which was applied to federal complaints before Twombly. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009). Since Iqbal, the Third Circuit has required the district courts to conduct, with regard to Rule 8 allegations, a two-part analysis when reviewing a complaint for dismissal for failure to state a claim: First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. [See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50]. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a plausible claim for relief [in light of the definition of plausibility provided in Iqbal.] In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's 2 The Conley court held that a district court was permitted to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim only if it appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. at 45-46. 4 entitlement to relief. A complaint has to show such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234-35. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, [w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not 'show[n]'-'that the pleader is entitled to relief.' Iqbal, [129 S. Ct. at 1949-50 (emphasis supplied)]. This plausibility determination will be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Id. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11 (emphasis supplied). The Court is mindful that the sufficiency of this pro se pleading must be construed liberally in favor of the plaintiff, even after Iqbal. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007). With these precepts in mind, the Court will determine whether the Complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. III. DISCUSSION A. Federal Claim A district court may exercise original jurisdiction over Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority. U.S. Const. art. III., § 2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code authorizes a person such as Plaintiff to seek redress for a violation of his federal rights by a person who was acting under color of state law. Section 1983 provides in relevant part: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 5 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show two elements: (1) a person deprived him or caused him to be deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) the deprivation was done under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970); Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1107 (3d Cir. 1989). Here, Plaintiff sues Vronda Veale, a private person, for falsely complaining to the police on five different occasions that Plaintiff committed a crime, where the charges were dismissed at least four times. The problem with this § 1983 claim is that, on the facts alleged in the Complaint, Vronda Veale was not acting under color of state law when she allegedly made false complaints regarding Plaintiff. "[T]he under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach 'merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.'" American Manufacturers Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. 977, 985 (1999) (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)). State action exists where the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right is "fairly attributable to the State." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). Plaintiff s claims against Ms. Veale fail because a private person's false statement to the police (or in a criminal proceeding) is not, without more, state action under § 1983. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 329-330 (1983); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. at 152; Cruz v. Donnelly, 727 F.2d 79, 82 (3d Cir. 1989). Under these circumstances, Plaintiff s § 1983 claims will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because the defendant was not acting under color of state law.3 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 3 The dismissal is with prejudice because amendment of the Complaint would be futile. 6 B. Supplemental Jurisdiction "Supplemental jurisdiction allows federal courts to hear and decide state-law claims along with federal-law claims when they are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy." Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 387 (1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Where a district court has original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over federal claims and supplemental jurisdiction over state claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), the district court has discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, Pennsylvania, 983 F.2d 1277, 1284-1285 (3d Cir. 1993). In exercising its discretion, ?the district court should take into account generally accepted principles of <judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants. Growth Horizons, Inc., 983 F.2d at 1284 (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)). Where the federal claims are dismissed at an early stage in the litigation, courts generally decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state claims. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726; Growth Horizons, Inc., 983 F.2d at 1284-1285. In this case, the Court is dismissing every claim over which it had original subject matter jurisdiction at an early stage in the litigation and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 7 IV. CONCLUSION The Court grants in forma pauperis status, dismisses the federal claims, and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims arising under New Jersey law. The Court will enter an appropriate Order. s/William J. Martini WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J. Dated: May 19 , 2010 8
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