SHERMAN v. COUNTY OF HUDSON et al - Document 7

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY CARLTON SHERMAN, Painiifr, MEMORANDUM OPINION COUNTY OF HUDSON, et al,, Defendants. APPEARANCES: Plaintiff se Canton Sherman 215019 Hudson County Correctional Center 35 Hackensack Avenue Kearny, NJ 07032 CHESLER, District Judge a prisoner confined at Hudson New Jersey, seeks to bring § 1983, Based on his Plaintiff Carlton Sherman, County Correctional Center in Kearny, this action in forma pauperis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. alleging violations of his constitutional rights. affidavit of indigence and the absence of three qualifying dismissals within 28 U.S.C. §1915(g), the Court will rant I' s aoiioanion no croceed in forma paupenis our suant no 28 U.S.C. Complaint. At this time, the Court must review the Complaint to § 1915(a) and order the Clerk of the Court to file the determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or Dockets.Justia.com Civil Action Nc. 10--2081 (MAS  CD H- Cl) C) Z CD Cl) it C) C) 0 Cl) CD C)) HCl) C) C) CD C) C) C) C) CD CD it C) C) C) NJ CD Hit C) 0 0 C) it C) CD 0 0 C) it C) CD C) C) CD it CD C) C) CD C) CD C) H- HC) C) C) C) C) C) it. CD CD C) CD it it CD C) C) C) CD C) C) CD C) it C) 0 C) C) NJ CD CD NJ NJ C!) 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STANDARDS FOR A SNA SP1\TE DiSNISSAL at the earliest practicab.le time, This Court must dismiss, certain in forma pauperis and prisoner actions that are fr rclc.s, arc_s, fa_ to state a ola]c1, ro s or see c'etar See 28 ef irD-- a uef aat 5.5.5. § 1 9 l5 A § 19i5:e)(2) e :ror or reof in forma nauceris actions); 23 U.S.C. (actions in which prisoner seeks redress from a 42 U.S.C. § l997e (prisoner actions governmental defendant); brought with respect to prison conditions) In determining the sufficiency of a nro se complaint, the Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the plaintiff. States v. Haines v. Day, Kerner, 42 404 U.S. (3d Cir. 519, 520-21 . (1972); United 969 P.2d 39, 1992) The Court must `accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. and view them Lower Morse v. 1997). A complaint is frivolous if it `slacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." 325 (1 8 9 ) Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, the (interpreting the predecessor of § 1915(e) (2), . former § 1915 (d) ) The standard for evaluating whether a Deutsch v. United complaint is frivolous" is an objective one. States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1086-87 (3d Cir. 1995)  In addition, any complaint, must comply with the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a) (2)' requires that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." A complaint must plead facts sufficient at least to Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F,3d "suggest" a basis for liability. 218, 236 n.12 (3d Cir.... 2004). "Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only the v. .., `give the defendant fair notice of what claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson 127 S.Ct, 2197, ... Pardus, 2200 (2007) (citations omitted) While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the "grounds" of his "entitle[ment] to relief" requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (on a motion to dismiss, courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation") Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level Bell Atlantic Corp. (citations omitted) v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964--65 (2007) The Supreme Court has demonstrated the application of these general standards to a Sherman Act conspiracy claim. In applying these general standards to a § 1 [conspi racy] claim, we hold that stating such a cam requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made. Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of 4  illegal agreement. And, of course, a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and "that a recovery is very remote and unlikely." ... It makes sense to say, therefore, that an allegation of parallel conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy will not suffice. Without more, parallel conduct does not suggest conspiracy, and a conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point does not supply facts adequate to show illegality. Hence, when allegations of parallel conduct are set out in order to make a § 1 claim, they must be placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be independent action. The need at the pleading stage for allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with) agreement reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a) (2) that the "plain statement" possess enough heft to "sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief." A statement of parallel conduct, even conduct consciously undertaken, needs some setting suggesting the agreement necessary to make out a § 1 claim; without that further circumstance pointing toward a meeting of the minds, an account of a defendant's commercial efforts stays in neutral territory. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965--66 (citations and footnotes omitted). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held, in the context of a § 1983 civil rights action, that the Twombly pleading standard applies outside the § 1 antitrust context in which it was decided. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 ("we decline at this point to read F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) Twoniblv so narrowly as to limit its holding on plausibility to the antitrust context"). Context matters in notice pleading. Fair notice under Rule 8(a) (2) depends on the type of case some complaints will require at least some factual allegations to make out a "showing that the pleader is -- 5  entitled to relief, in order to aive the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Indeed, taking Twombly and the Court's contemporaneous opinion in Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S.Ct. 2197 (2007), together, we understand the Court to instruct that a situation may arise where, at some point, the factual detail in a complaint is so undeveloned that it does not provide a defendant the type of notice of claim which is contemplated by Rule 8. Put another way, ir light of lwo1y, Rule 8 a) çZ) requires a "showing" rather than a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief. We caution that without some factual allegation in the complaint, a claimant cannot satisfy the requirement that he or she provide not only "fair notice," but also the "grounds" on which the claim rests. ·.. Phillips, 515 P.3d at 232 (citations omitted). when More recently, the Supreme Court has emphasized that, assessing the sufficiency of y civil complaint, distinguish factual contentions part of the defendant that, -- a court must which allege behavior on the would satisfy one or more if true, ---- elements of the claim asserted and "[t]hreadbare recitals of supported by mere conciusory 1937, 1949 (2009). the elements of a cause of action, statements." Ashcroft v. Igbal, 129 S.Ct, Although the Court must assume the veracity of the facts asserted in the complaint, it is "not bound to accept as true a legal Id. at 1950. Thus, conclusion couched as a factual allegation." "a court considerino a motion to dismiss can choose to becin by identifying pleadings that, conclusions, because they are no more than Id. are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Therefore, after Igbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis.  First, ihe factual and lecal elements of a claim should ce separated. Inc District uour must accept au or the complaint's well--pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a "plausible claim for relief." In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to "show" such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234--35. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, "[w]here the well--pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not `show[n]'-'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" This "plausibility" determination will be "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210--11 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted) Where a complaint can be remedied by an amendment, a but 34 (3d district court may not dismiss the complaint with prejudice, must permit the amendment. (1992); C ir. v. Grayson v. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 108 Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 2002) (dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 213 F.3d 113, 116-17 (3d Cir. § 1915(e) (2)); (dismissal Harrisburg Shane Fauver, 2000) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. County Police Dept., § l997e(c) (1)); 91 F.3d 451, 453 Urrutia v. (3d Dir. 1996). III. SECTION 198.3 ACT1CNS A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights. 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