FARTHING v. HAUCK, No. 2:2010cv00572 - Document 14 (D.N.J. 2011)
Court Description: OPINION. Signed by Judge Esther Salas on 12/7/11. (dc, )
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY JAMIE FARTHING, Civil Action No. 10 0572 (CCC) Petitioner, v. WILLIAM HAUCK, OPINION et al., Respondents. APPEARANCES: Petitioner se Jamie Farthing #18567 Edna Mahan Correctional P.O. Box 4004 NH Clinton, NJ 08809 Counsel for Respondents Annmarie Cozzi Bergen County Prosecutor s Office Bergen County Justice Center 10 Main Street Hackerisack, NJ 08809 Facility - CECCHI, District Judge Petitioner Jamie Farthing, a prisoner currently confined at Edna Mahan Correctional Facility, has submitted a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The respondents are William Hauck and the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey. For the reasons stated herein, the Petition must be denied. 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A state court decision is contrary to Supreme Court precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in cases, or if the [Supreme Court] state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of th[e] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court s] Williams v. Taylor, for the Court, 529 U.S. Part II). 362, 405 06 (2000) precedent. (O Connor, J., A state court decision involve[s] an unreasonable application of federal law if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme] Court s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner s case, and may involve an unreasonable application of federal law if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from Court s] [the Supreme precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context 3 (although the Supreme Court expressly where it should apply, declined to decide the latter) at 407-09. Id. . To be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, the state court s application must be objectively unreasonable. In determining whether the state court s application at 409. of Supreme Court precedent was objectively unreasonable, a habeas court may consider the decisions of inferior federal courts. Superintendent, Matteo v. 171 F.3d 877, 890 (3d Cir. 1999) Even a summary adjudication by the state court on the merits deference. of a claim is entitled to § 2254(d) Janecka, 302 F.3d 107, 528 U.S. Angelone, presented to, 116 (2000) ) 237 225, (citing Weeks v. 2002) (3d Cir. Chadwick v. With respect to claims . the state courts, but unadjudicated by, however, a federal court may exercise pre-AEDPA independent judgment. cert. denied, 1523144, 532 U.S. *6 n.4 290 E.3d 831, 924 (D.N.J. 842 cases discussed therein) (2001); 2000) (6th Cir. . 248 212 F.3d 226, State of Delaware, Hameen v. . Purnell v. 2000), (3d Cir. Hendricks, See also Schoenberger v. 2002) (Moore, J., In such instances, 2000 WL Russell, concurring) (and the federal habeas court must conduct a de novo review over pure legal questions and as a court would have done prior mixed guestions of law and fact, to the enactment of AEDPA. Appel v. Cir. 2001) 1999) ) . Vaughn, (citing McCandless v. Cir. However, Horn, § 2254 Ce) (1) 4 250 F,3d 203, 172 F.3d 255, 260 210 (3d still mandates that the (3d state court s factual determinations are presumed correct unless 2009) (3d Cir. 165 581 F.3d q158, Beard, Simmons v. rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. The deference required by § 2254 (d) applies without regard to whether the state court cites to Supreme Court or other as long as the reasoning of the state court federal caselaw, Priester does not contradict relevant Supreme Court precedent. v. 382 F.3d 394, Vaughn, Packer, (3d Cir. (citing Early v. 2004) (2002); Woodford v. Visciotti, 3 537 U.S. 398 19 537 U.S. (2002)). Although a petition for writ of habeas corpus may not be granted if the Petitioner has failed to exhaust his remedies in a petition may be denied on the merits state court, notwithstanding the petitioner s failure to exhaust his state See 28 U.S.C. court remedies. 387 F.3d 210, Blackwell, Pinchak, 348 F.3d 355, Finally, § 2254(b) (2); 260 n.42 357 (3d Cir. (3d Cir. Lambert v. 2004); Lewis v. 2003) a pro se pleading is held to less stringent standards than more formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. v. Gamble, 519, 520 429 U.S. (1972) . 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, Estelle 404 U.S. A pro se habeas petition and any supporting submissions must be construed liberally and with a measure of tolerance. Lewis v. See Royce v. Hahn, Attorney General, 151 F.3d 116, 878 F.2d 714, 5 118 721-22 (3d Cir. (3d Cir. 1998); 1989); United States v. cert. denied, 414 Brierley, 399 U.S. 912 555 1969), (3d Cir. (1970) III. A. F.2d 552, ANALYSIS Claims Reardin Hearsay Testimony 1, (Grounds 2, 3) Petitioner claims that the trial court erred with respect to admission of certain hearsay testimony. It is well established that the violation of a right created by state law is not cognizable as a basis for federal habeas Estelle v. relief. McGuire, stated many times that (1990) ) ) 680 . 62, (quoting Lewis v. Petitioner cannot obtain relief Accordingly, to the level of a deprivation of due process. unless they rise Estelle, 502 U.S. ( the Due Process Clause guarantees fundamental elements of fairness in a criminal trial ) U.S. 497 U.S. Jeffers, for any errors in state law evidentiary rulings, at 70 ( We have (1991) 67 68 federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law. 764, 502 U.S. 554, 563 64 (quoting Spencer v. Texas, 385 (1967) For a habeas petitioner to prevail on a claim that an evidentiary error amounted to a deprivation of due process, he must show that the error was so pervasive as to have denied him a fundamentally fair trial. Keller v. Larkins, 251 F.3d. Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence regarding co defendant statements. issues, the Appellate Division did, 6 in fact, As to these hold that the State v. prosecutor improperly elicited hearsay testimony. Farthinq, 751 A.2d 123, 131-137 (N.J. Super. A.D. 2000) The Appellate Court concluded its analysis of this issue by holding: We are satisfied the errors we have described were capable of producing an unjust result with respect to the But we are convictions for purposeful or knowing murder. equally convinced that these errors did not taint the The evidence overwhelmingly remaining convictions. establisfed that defendant purposely participated in the The State s proofs established kidnaping and robbery [...] . in the felony-murder beyond any defendant s complicity The erroneously admitted evidence focused possible doubt. primarily on the issue whether defendant intended to kill Our reversal of defendant s conviction for [the victim]. purposeful or knowing murder thus fully vindicates defendant s rights. Id. at 137. The Appellate Court carefully considered Farthing s contentions regarding the improperly admitted hearsay and its consequences and did in fact grant partial relief where the court found relief to be appropriate by reversing Farthing s conviction for purposeful or knowing murder. Petitioner has thus previously received the only relief that she is entitled to on this issue, namely the Appellate Court s partial reversal. The decision of the Appellate Division is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, federal law, clearly established nor is it a decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 7 B. Claims Rearding Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 4,5) (Grounds Petitioner argues ineffectiveness of counsel at both the trial and PCR levels. The Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that a criminal defendant shall enjoy the right Assistance of Counsel for his defence. ... U.S. to have the Const. amend. VI. The right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of McMann v. counsel. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (emphasis added). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a habeas petitioner must show both that his counsel s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional assistance and that there is a reasonable probability that, for counsel s unprofessional errors, different. (1984) . Strickland v. Washington, but the outcome would have been 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland at 694. Counsel s errors must nave been so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, at 687. a trial whose result is reliable. When a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt. jj at 695. 8 The performance and prejudice prongs of Strickland may be addressed in either order, and [i]f it is easier to dispose of ent an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of suffici prejudice .. . at 697. that course should be followed. There is a strong presumption that counsel s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. strategic As a general matter, the choices made by counsel after a thorough investigation of ic facts and law are virtually unchallengeable, though strateg choices made after less than complete investigation are ional reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable profess at 690- judgments support the limitations on investigation. 91. If counsel has been deficient in any way, however, the habeas court must determine whether the cumulative effect of g of counsel s errors prejudiced the defendant within the meanin Strickland. Cir. See Berryman v. Morton, 100 F.3d 1089, 1101-02 (3d 1996) In this case, the state courts examined and rejected . Petitioner s numerous ineffective assistance of counsel claims was A review of the state court record reflects that Petitioner not denied effective assistance of counsel. The Appeliate Division, in its February 14, 20C7 Opinion, examined a number of Petitioner s individual claims regarding alleged ineffective assistance of counsel including the 9 allegations that trial counsel did not adequately conduct an investigation, make a motion for mistrial regarding the jury s alleged ridicule of a defense witness, negotiations and secure a plea bargain, engage in plea request a court order and object to the that Farthing receive psychiatric medication, jury charge regarding accomplice liability. That court concluded that Petitioner was not denied effective assistance of counsel on any of those grounds raised, holding that [t]he record is devoid of any proof of trial counsel s deviation or that a different course of action would have probably changed the result of the trial. State v. Farthi, 2007 WL 460982 (N.J. Super.A.D. at *2). Petitioner s final allegation regarding ineffective assistance of trial counsel is that trial counsel did not present to the jury a diminished capacity defense related to voluntary intoxication. While the Appellate Court did not analyze that claim specifically, in its July 29, 2009 Opinion, noted the allegations as to this claim and held, other grounds raised, were without merit. Super.A.D. that Court as to those and that the contentions presented by Farthing State v. Farthing, 2009 WL 2243843 (N.J. at *3) As to Petitioner s allegations that she received ineffective assistance from her PCR counsel, available on this issue, habeas corpus relief is not pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 10 § 2254(i) which provides that ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during Federal or State collateral post conviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254. Since Petitioner s claims on this issue are without merit, all claims regarding ineffective assistance of counsel will be denied. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY IV. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken from a final order in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A certificate of appealability may issue only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2). A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 Miller El v. (2003) When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner s underlying constitutional claim, at least, a COA should issue when the prisoner shows, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of che denial of a 11 constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its Slack v. procedural ruling. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The Court denies a Certificate of Appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253 because jurists of reason would not find it debatable that dismissal of the petition is appropriate. V. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, denied. the Petition must be An appropriate order follows. Claire C. Cecchi United States District Judge Dated: cLee 7 12
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