RADLINGER v. CAMDEN COUNTY et al, No. 1:2012cv06862 - Document 41 (D.N.J. 2014)
Court Description: OPINION. Signed by Judge Joseph H. Rodriguez on 10/15/2014. (tf, )
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
RADLINGER v. CAMDEN COUNTY et al Doc. 41 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW J ERSEY WALTER RADLINGER, : : Plaintiff, v. Hon. J oseph H. Rodriguez Civil Action No. 12-6862 : OPINION CAMDEN COUNTY and CAMDEN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant. : : This m atter is before the Court on cross-m otions for sum m ary judgm ent on the sole rem ain ing count of Plaintiff s Com plaint. Upon agreem ent of the parties, only Count Five alleging violation of the Fam ily Medical Leave Act ( FMLA ) has survived discovery. The Court has considered the subm issions of the parties pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78 (b), and for the reasons set forth here, Defendant s m otion for sum m ary judgm ent will be granted and Plaintiff s m otion for sum m ary judgm ent will be denied. Background Plaintiff Walter Radlin ger has sued his form er em ployer Defendant Cam den County for wrongful term ination in violation of the FMLA. Plaintiff was em ployed as a corrections officer at the Cam den County Corrections Facility from J une 24, 20 0 0 until he was term in ated on J uly 12, 20 12. In March of 20 11, Eric Taylor, Warden of Cam den County Correctional Facility, approved Plaintiff s request for interm ittent leave during the period of March 10 , 20 11 to Septem ber 10 , 20 11. Walters Cert., Ex. F. On May 24, 20 11, however, Plaintiff was notified that he had exhausted his entitlem ent to FMLA leave as he had taken a total of twelve weeks of leave in the previous twelve m onths. Id. Defendant advised Plaintiff, 1 Dockets.Justia.com therefore, that he would be subject to discipline for any future sick days taken, which would be characterized as absent without leave ( AWOL ). Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff s absences on May 25, 26, 27, 30 , 31, an d J une 1 were characterized as AWOL an d he was subject to discipline. Walters Cert., Ex. C. Plaintiff was served with a Notice of Disciplin ary Action dated J une 15, 20 11, an d the parties subsequently entered into a Settlem ent Agreem ent and Release whereby, in lieu of term ination, Plaintiff agreed to accept a ninety-day staggered suspension and a one-year probationary period. Gray Cert., Ex. F; Walters Cert, Ex. B. The Agreem ent also provided, If any abuse of sick leave policy, FMLA, or any other absenteeism and/ or lateness policy violations occur the Em ployer will be seeking term ination. Id., p. 2. On March 16, 20 12, Plaintiff subm itted an application for FMLA leave from February 11, 20 12 through February 22, 20 12. Gray Cert., Ex. H; Walters Cert, Ex. E, N. The application was accom panied by a certification signed by Dr. Carl Vitola, who wrote that Plaintiff was unable to perform his job functions for the period indicated due to a kidney stone, but he was cleared to return to work at the tim e the application was com pleted. Id. On March 22, 20 12, Plaintiff was notified that his FMLA leave request for February 11 through February 22, 20 12 was approved. Gray Cert., Ex. G; Walters Cert, Ex. F. The approval letter was signed by Lt. J ohn Vernon. Id. Plaintiff also used sick tim e on February 27, March 20 , 21, 24, 25, and 31, for a total of 15 sick days in 20 12, the m axim um allowed. Id. See also Taylor Dep., Gray Cert., Ex. A, Walters Cert., Ex. M, p. 24-25. [A]nything thereafter he would be absent without leave . . . [u]nless it was design ated as FMLA. Taylor Dep., Gray Cert., Ex. A, Walters Cert., Ex. M, p. 25. Plaintiff called out sick on J une 4 an d J une 24, 20 12, during his probationary period, and on J uly 8 and 9, 20 12. Gray Cert., Ex. Y; Walters Cert., Ex. C. On J uly 12, 2 20 12, at the direction of the Warden, Plaintiff was served by disciplinary officer Sgt. Earl W. O Connor with a Prelim inary Notice of Disciplinary Action (31-A) signed by Deputy Warden Fosler. Gray Cert., Ex. I; Walters Cert, Ex. G, H; Gray Cert., Ex. C, Blackwell Dep., p. 17; Ex. T, Taylor Dep., p. 22; Ex. U, O Connor Dep., p. 21-35. The Notice indicated that Plaintiff was suspended with the possibility of term ination effective J uly 11, 20 12 for absences without leave on J une 5, J une 24, J uly 8, and J uly 9. Id. The docum ent also noted that the m ajority of Plaintiff s sick tim e was adjacent to approved tim e off creating patterns of abuse. Id. The following day, on J uly 13, 20 12, Plaintiff subm itted an application for interm ittent FMLA leave signed by Dr. Carl Vitola. Gray Cert., Ex. G; Walters Cert, Ex. J . The doctor indicated on the form that Plaintiff had suffered from kidney stones since 20 0 7, m ost recently from J une 5 through J uly 9, 20 12. Id. When sym ptom atic, Plaintiff was unable to perform his job functions, but was cleared to return to work with no restrictions on J uly 13, 20 12 due to passage of third kidney stone. Id. Plaintiff m aintains that he had not exhausted his entitlem ent to FMLA leave at that tim e, and therefore applied for FMLA leave to convert the alleged absences without leave into FMLA days, using available non-sick leave tim e. The J uly 13, 20 12 application was denied on August 23, 20 12 by Lt. J am es Blackwell, Director of Hum an Resources. Gray Cert., Ex. J ; Walters Cert, Ex. L; Taylor Dep., Gray Cert., Ex. A, Walters Cert., Ex. M, p. 16. The den ial letter stated: On Thursday, J uly 12, 20 12, you were served with a 31a and subsequently suspended pending rem oval due to abuse of sick tim e. On Friday, J uly 13, 20 12 you went to your treating physician, had a FMLA certification filled out and then hand delivered the FMLA application/ certification to Deputy Warden Fosler outside of the facility that sam e m orning. 3 As you subm itted the FMLA request in an untim ely m anner and after you were suspended pending rem oval, a review and subsequent processing of your request at this point and tim e would be m oot, as the need for leave no longer exists; however a review of the FMLA paperwork you subm itted reveals the following: Your FMLA application/ certification was subm itted (38) days after the first recorded absence (AWOL) on J une 5, 20 12, without previous indication of your need for leave or reason for the delay. As such, even if your request was not m oot, your attem pt to cover your absences as FMLA retroactive to J une 5, 20 12 would not have been approved. Gray Cert., Ex. J ; Walters Cert, Ex. L. The record indicates that a disciplinary hearing was conducted on August 28 , 20 12 and resulted in a Septem ber 2, 20 12 recom m en dation to the Warden that Plaintiff be term inated. Gray Cert., Ex. Y. An undated Final Notice of Disciplin ary Action indicates that Plaintiff was term inated effective J uly 12, 20 12. Walters Cert., Ex. I. While the Septem ber 2 recom m endation acknowledged that retroactively granting FMLA leave was a com m on Facility practice, (Gray Cert., Ex. Y), Plaintiff had run out of available sick tim e an d violated his own Settlem ent Agreem ent. (Id.) The hearing officer found: The Respon dent was well aware of the FMLA procedures. Had he suffered a kidney stone event on or about J une 5, 20 12, which would require further FMLA leave, he should have m ade a tim ely FMLA application. This would especially be required in the light of his probationary status and the settlem ent agreem ent notice that a n y absentee or laten ess violations would lead to the Facility seeking term in ation of em ploym ent. Radlinger s attem pt to salvage the situation by subm itting an application after his em ploym ent was term inated was a futile effort. It is noted that Respondent s argum ent that other leave tim e was available to apply to FMLA is rejected. General Order 0 0 7 m akes clear that only paid sick tim e m ay be substituted or used during FMLA leave, so that the availability of other types of leave is irrelevant. Gray Cert., Ex. Y. 4 Sum m ary J udgm ent Standard Sum m ary judgm ent is proper if there is no genuine issue of m aterial fact and if, viewing the facts in the light m ost favorable to the non-m oving party, the m oving party is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law. Pearson v. Com ponent Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 48 2 n.1 (3d Cir. 20 0 1) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (198 6)); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (a). The Court will enter sum m ary judgm ent in favor of a m ovant who shows that it is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law, and supports the showing that there is no genuine dispute as to any m aterial fact by citing to particular parts of m aterials in the record, including depositions, docum ents, electronically stored inform ation, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . adm ission s, interrogatory answers, or other m aterials. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c)(1)(A). An issue is genuine if supported by evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in the nonm oving party s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is m aterial if, under the governing substantive law, a dispute about the fact m ight affect the outcom e of the suit. Id. In determ ining whether a genuine issue of m aterial fact exists, the court m ust view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in the light m ost favorable to the nonm oving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Initially, the m oving party has the burden of dem onstrating the absence of a genuine issue of m aterial fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the m oving party has m et this burden, the n onm oving party m ust identify, by affidavits or otherwise, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.; Maidenbaum v. Bally s Park Place, Inc., 8 70 F. Supp. 1254, 1258 (D.N.J . 1994). Thus, to withstand a properly supported m otion for sum m ary judgm ent, the nonm oving party 5 m ust identify specific facts and affirm ative evidence that contradict those offered by the m oving party. Andersen, 477 U.S. at 256-57. A nonm oving party m ay not rest upon m ere allegations, general denials or . . . vague statem ents . . . . Trap Rock Indus., Inc. v. Local 8 25, Int l Union of Operating Eng rs, 982 F.2d 8 84, 8 90 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 50 0 (3d Cir. 1991)). Indeed, the plain language of Rule 56(c) m andates the entry of sum m ary judgm ent, after adequate tim e for discovery and upon m otion, against a party who fails to m ake a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an elem ent essential to that party s case, an d on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. That is, the m ovant can support the assertion that a fact cannot be genuin ely disputed by showing that an adverse party can not produce adm issible evidence to support the [alleged dispute of] fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). In deciding the m erits of a party s m otion for sum m ary judgm ent, the court s role is not to evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the m atter, but to determ ine whether there is a gen uine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Credibility determ in ations are the province of the factfinder. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am ., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). The Fam ily and Medical Leave Act Generally The Fam ily and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 260 1, ( FMLA ) was enacted to provide leave for workers whose personal or m edical circum stances require that they take tim e off from work in excess of what their em ployers are willing or able to provide. Victorelli v. Shadyside Hosp., 128 F.3d 184, 186 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 8 25.10 1). The Act is intended to balan ce the dem ands of the workplace with the needs 6 of fam ilies . . . by establishing a m inim um labor standard for leave that lets em ployees take reasonable leave for m edical reasons, for the birth or adoption of a child, and for the care of a child, spouse or parent who has a serious health condition. Churchill v. Star Enters., 183 F.3d 184, 192 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 260 1(b)(1), (2)). The FMLA guarantees eligible em ployees 12 weeks of leave in a one-year period following certain events: a serious m edical condition; a fam ily m em ber s serious illness; the arrival of a new son or daughter; or certain exigencies arising out of a fam ily m em ber s service in the arm ed forces. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). Leave m ust be granted, when m edically necessary, on an interm ittent or part-tim e basis. § 2612(b)(1). Upon the em ployee s tim ely return, the em ployer m ust reinstate the em ployee to his or her form er position or an equivalent. § 2614(a)(1). The Act m akes it unlawful for an em ployer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of these rights, § 2615(a)(1); to discrim inate against those who exercise their rights under the Act, § 2615(a)(2); and to retaliate again st those who file charges, give inform ation, or testify in any inquiry related to an assertion of rights under the Act, § 2615(b). To trigger the application of the FMLA, an em ployee m ust provide his em ployer with notice that leave is necessary. J ohnson v. Thru Point, Inc., 160 Fed. Appx. 159, 162 (3d Cir. 20 0 5) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 8 25.30 3 and holding that the plaintiff had not put his em ployer on notice of his need for health-related leave because he neither advised his em ployer of a m edical condition nor provided the em ployer with an opportunity to discover it). To evoke the requirem ent for unpaid FMLA leave, however, an eligible em ployee n eed not specifically assert his rights under the Act, or even m ention the Act itself. 29 C.F.R. § 8 25.20 8 (a)(2). All that is required is that the em ployee state an FMLA qualified reason for the leave. Id. 7 [T]he critical question is whether the inform ation im parted to the em ployer is sufficient to reasonably apprise it of the em ployee s request to take tim e off for a serious health condition. Holpp v. Integrated Com m c ns Corp., Civ. No. 0 3-338 3, 20 0 5 WL 347968 2, at *5 (D.N.J . Decem ber 20 , 20 0 5) (quoting Brohm v. J H Props., 149 F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir. 1998)). Moreover, 29 C.F.R. § 8 25.30 2(c) requires an em ployer to inquire further of the em ployee if it is necessary to have m ore inform ation about whether FMLA leave is being sought by the em ployee, and obtain the necessary details of the leave to be taken. 29 C.F.R. § 825.30 2(c) (20 0 6). In all circum stances, it is the em ployer s responsibility to designate leave, paid or unpaid, as FMLA qualifying, based on inform ation provided by the em ployee. Id. § 8 25.20 8(a). The designation generally m ust be m ade before the leave starts, but only in lim ited circum stances can leave be design ated as FMLA-protected after it has ended, usually within two business days. Id. § 8 25.20 8 (e). When the need for leave is unforeseeable, em ployees are obligated to notify their em ployer as soon as practicable, 29 C.F.R. § 8 25.30 3(a), and provide sufficient inform ation for an em ployer to reasonably determ in e whether the FMLA m ay apply, 29 C.F.R. § 8 25.30 3(b). Although em ployers m ay adopt or retain leave policies m ore generous than any policies that com ply with the requirem ents under the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2653, the rights established by the Act m ay not be dim inished by any em ploym ent benefit program or plan, 29 C.F.R. § 8 25.70 0 . Interference In order to assert a claim of interference, an em ployee m ust show that he was entitled to benefits under the FMLA and that his em ployer illegitim ately prevented him from obtaining those benefits. Sarnowski v. Air Brooke Lim ousin e, Inc., 510 F.3d 398, 8 40 1 (3d Cir. 20 0 7). Thus, to survive sum m ary judgm ent on his interference claim , Plaintiff m ust present eviden ce establishing that: (1) he was entitled to FMLA benefits; (2) Defendant violated 29 U.S.C. § 2615 by interfering with, restrain ing, or denying [his] exercise of FMLA rights; and (3) he was prejudiced by the interference. Sconfienza v. Verizon Pennsylvania Inc., 30 7 Fed. App x 619, 621 (3d Cir. 20 0 8) (citing Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 8 1, 8 9 (20 0 2)). [F]iring an em ployee for [m aking] a valid request for FMLA leave m ay constitute interference with the em ployee s FMLA rights as well as retaliation against the em ployee. Erdm an v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 50 0 , 50 9 (3d Cir. 20 0 9). On the other hand, an em ployer is not required to suspend its term ination proceedings just because the em ployee requests m edical leave. See, e.g.. Clark County School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 272 (20 0 1). A contrary holding m ight im pede em ployers from perm issible term inations and encourage em ployees aware of an im pending term in ation to attem pt to create their own severance package. Windfelder v. The May Dep t Stores Co., 93 Fed. Appx. 351, 355 (3d Cir. 20 0 4). Defendant argues that the J uly 20 12 application for FMLA leave was denied because Plaintiff was no longer an em ployee of Cam den County, having been suspended and then term inated for violating the Settlem ent Agreem ent and Release. Defendant points out that its FMLA policy, General Order 0 0 7, provides that in em ergent circum stances, an em ployee can give oral notice of the need for leave but subsequently m ust (prom ptly) provide the departm ent (H/ R) with written notice. Walters Cert., Ex. P, p. 2. Further, the policy provides that [i]t is the em ployee s responsibility to obtain and subm it a fully com pleted Fam ily and Medical Leave Application to the Warden within 15 days of receipt for unforeseeable leave, to have those days designated as 9 Fam ily Leave. Id., p. 3. It was also acknowledged, however, that Defendant s practice was to accept FMLA applications from Plaintiff anywhere from ten days to 48 days. Gray Cert., Ex. C, Blackwell Dep., p. 79. The Court finds that Defendant had already begun term ination proceedings against Plaintiff, and was not required to halt those proceedings because Plaintiff sought to retroactively convert the days he was AWOL to FMLA leave. There is no indication in the record that Defen dant knew or should have known that the absences in question would qualify for FMLA leave. In addition, Plaintiff has provided n o reason for waiting until after term ination proceedings were initiated to apply for FMLA leave. Gray Cert., Ex. C, Blackwell Dep., p. 59, 79. Therefore, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff notified Defendant as soon as practicable with sufficient inform ation of the need for FMLA leave to cover his absences in J une or J uly of 20 12. It follows that the claim for interference cannot stand, as Plaintiff has not established he had a right to FMLA benefits. Accordingly, Plaintiff s m otion for sum m ary judgm ent on Count Five of the Com plaint [29] is denied; Defendant s m otion for sum m ary judgm ent on Count Five of the Com plaint [31] is granted. Plaintiff s m otion to seal certain records [28] will be dism issed as m oot. Dated: October 15, 20 14 s/ J oseph H. Rodriguez J OSEPH H. RODRIGUEZ U.S.D.J . 10
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
