STANLEY v. ATLANTIC COUNTY JUSTICE FAC et al
Filing
4
MEMORANDUM, OPINION, ORDER IFP is GRANTED and Clerk shall file the Complaint. ORDERED Clerk shall serve this document upon the Attorney General of NJ, the Petitioner and the Warden of Petitioners place of confinement. ORDERED Complaint is DISMISSED and Clerk shall administratively terminate this case. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 9/14/2011. (nz, )n.m.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
_______________________________
:
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
ACJF et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
_______________________________:
ALPHONSO STANLEY,
Civil Action
10-5511 (RMB)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
Bumb, District Judge:
Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee confined at the Atlantic County
Justice Facility (“ACJF”), Mays Landing, New Jersey, seeks to bring
this action in forma pauperis, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging violations of his constitutional rights.
affidavit
of
indigence
and
the
absence
of
Based on his
three
qualifying
dismissals, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), the Court
will grant Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), and will order the Clerk of the
Court to file the Complaint.1
1
Plaintiff’s initial in forma pauperis application
expressed his willingness to accept assessment of the $120 filing
fee. See Docket Entry No. 1. In response to this Court’s order
informing Plaintiff of the current filing fee, see Docket Entry
No. 2, Plaintiff submitted a letter expressing his willingness to
accept assessment of the current $350 filing fee. See Docket
Entry No. 3.
Page -1-
At this time, the Court must review the Complaint to determine
whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff named one individual and one entity as defendants in
this action: (a) warden of the ACJF; and (b) the ACJF itself.
See
Docket Entry No. 1, at 1.
The allegations stated in Plaintiff’s Complaint are subdivided
into two sections; the first section asserts, in generic terms,
insufficient supervision on the part of the warden, while the
second elaborates on these challenges by alleging that the warden
failed to ensure cleanliness of the ACJF showers and ventilation
pipes.
See id. at 3.
The latter statement asserts, in addition,
that some inmates are sleeping on mattresses placed on the floor or
nine inches above the floor, and that these mattresses are located
near toilets.
See id. at 4.
The Complaint closes with a request
for an order directing the warden to: (a) supervise the ACJF
better; (b) ensure that the inmates, in general, would “receive .
. .
proper medical care.”
II.
Id. at 5.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In determining the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court
must be mindful to construe the facts stated in the complaint
Page -2-
liberally in favor of the plaintiff.
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); United
States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).
Indeed, it is
long established that a court should “accept as true all of the
[factual] allegations in the
complaint and reasonable inferences
that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.”
Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist.,
132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).
However, while a court will
accept well-pled allegations as true, it will not accept bald
assertions, unsupported conclusions, unwarranted inferences, or
sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual
allegations.
See id.
Addressing the clarifications as to the litigant's pleading
requirement stated in the United States Supreme Court in Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit provided the courts in this Circuit with
detailed and careful guidance as to what kind of allegations
qualify as pleadings sufficient to pass muster under the Rule 8
standard.
See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,
230-34 (3d Cir. 2008).
Specifically, the Court of Appeals
observed as follows:
“While a complaint . . . does not need detailed
factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation [is] to
provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief'
[by stating] more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action . . . ." Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65 . . .
Page -3-
Rule 8 “requires a 'showing,' rather than a blanket
assertion, of entitlement to relief." Id. at 1965
n.3. . . . “[T]he threshold requirement of Rule
8(a)(2) [is] that the 'plain statement [must] possess
enough heft to 'sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to
relief.'" Id. at 1966. [Hence] "factual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level." Id. at 1965 & n.3. . . . [Indeed,
it is not] sufficient to allege mere elements of a
cause of action; instead “a complaint must allege
facts suggestive of the proscribed conduct." Id.
Id. at 230-34 (original brackets removed).
This pleading standard was further refined by the United
States Supreme Court in its recent decision Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009):
[In any civil action, t]he pleading standard . . .
demands more than an unadorned [“]the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me[”] accusation. [Twombly, 550
U.S.] at 555 . . . . A pleading that offers “labels
and conclusions" or “a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” [Id.] at
555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
“naked assertion[s]" devoid of “further factual
enhancement." Id. at 557. . . . A claim has facial
plausibility [only] when the plaintiff pleads factual
content . . . . Id. at 556. [Moreover,] the
plausibility standard . . . asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.
Id. [Indeed, even w]here a complaint pleads facts that
are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability,
[the so-alleging complaint still] “stops short of
[showing] plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'”
Id. at 557 (brackets omitted). [A fortiori,] the tenet
that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable
to legal conclusions [or to t]hreadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements [,i.e., by] legal conclusion[s]
couched as a factual allegation [e.g.,] the
plaintiffs' assertion of an unlawful agreement [or]
that [defendants] adopted a policy “'because of,' not
merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group." . . . . [W]e do not reject these
Page -4-
bald allegations on the ground that they are
unrealistic or nonsensical. . . . It is the
conclusory nature of [these] allegations, rather than
their extravagantly fanciful nature, that disentitles
them to the presumption of truth. . . . [Finally,] the
question [of sufficiency of] pleadings does not turn .
. . the discovery process. Twombly, 550 U.S.] at 559
. . . . [The plaintiff] is not entitled to discovery
[where the complaint alleges any of the elements]
“generally," [i.e., as] a conclusory allegation
[since] Rule 8 does not [allow] pleading the bare
elements of [the] cause of action [and] affix[ing] the
label “general allegation" [in hope to develop facts
through discovery].
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-54.
III. SECTION 1983 ACTIONS
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for certain violations of his constitutional rights. Section 1983
provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory
. . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the
alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting
under color of state law.
See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir.
1994).
Page -5-
IV.
DISCUSSION
A.
CLAIMS AGAINST ATLANTIC COUNTY JUSTICE FACILITY
Here, Plaintiff names, as a defendant in this action, the
Atlantic County Justice Facility, but the facility is not an entity
cognizable as “person” for the purposes of a § 1983 suit.
See Will
v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989); Grabow v.
Southern State Correctional Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538-39
(D.N.J. 1989); see also Marsden v. Federal BOP, 856 F. Supp. 832,
836 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s allegations against
this Defendant must be dismissed with prejudice.
B.
CLAIMS AGAINST THE WARDEN
Plaintiff’s allegations against the warden are expressly based
on the sole fact that the warden supervises the staff employed at
the ACJF.
See Docket Entry No. 1.
While Plaintiff appears to
allege that this fact renders the warden liable to him for the
alleged wrongs, see id., the existing law does not provide any
basis for such liability.
The holding of Iqbal, while applicable to all types of civil
claims, is particularly relevant to allegations based solely on
supervisory liability: a litigant does not state a cognizable claim
if he asserts nothing but a claim based on the respondeat superior
theory.
See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-54; Monell v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
“‘A[n individual government] defendant in a civil rights action
Page -6-
must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing; liability
cannot
be
superior.’”
predicated
solely
on
the
operation
of
respondeat
Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005)
(quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.
1988)).
Facts showing personal involvement of the defendant must
be asserted; such assertions may be made through allegations of
specific facts showing that a defendant expressly directed the
deprivation of a plaintiff's constitutional rights or created such
policies where the subordinates had no discretion in applying the
policies in a fashion other than the one which actually produced
the alleged deprivation: supervisory liability may attach if the
supervisor's actions were “the moving force” behind the harm
suffered by the plaintiff.
See Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099,
1117-118 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-54;
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989);
Monell, 436 U.S. at
694-95; Heggenmiller v. Edna Mahan Corr. Inst. for Women, 128 Fed.
App’x 240 (3d Cir. 2005); cf. Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d
525, 534 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d
624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990), for the observation that a pleading must
indicate “'the who, what, when, where, and how: the first paragraph
of any newspaper story”); accord Junne v. Atl. City Med. Ctr., 2008
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
34147,
at
*27-37
(D.N.J.
Apr.
25,
2008)
(discussing invalidity of respondeat superior claims against the
county and its freeholders, warden and other prison supervisors).
Page -7-
Since, here, Plaintiff’s allegations against the warden are
expressly and solely based on the warden’s supervisory authority,
these claims shall be dismissed with prejudice.
B.
CLAIMS BASED ON OTHERWISE INVALID ASSERTIONS
Even if a litigant's claims are not based on the doctrine of
respondeat superior, the litigant must assert facts amounting to a
viable claim.
Plaintiff’s Complaint, however, fails to state such
allegations.
1.
Here,
Jus Tertii Claims
Plaintiff’s
claims,
in
addition
to
being
set
in
generalities, assert claims on behalf of other inmates. Plaintiff,
however, has no standing to assert such claims.
Under the “next friend” doctrine, jus tertii,
standing
allows a third person to file and pursue a claim in court on behalf
of someone who is unable to do so on his or her own.
The doctrine
dates back to the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 and provides a
narrow exception to the “case in controversy” requirement set forth
in the Article III of the Constitution.
495 U.S. 149, 154-55 (1990).
See Whitmore v. Arkansas,
In Whitmore,
the Court set out two
requirements that should be met by the one seeking to qualify for
“next friend” standing: (1) “the 'next friend' must be truly
dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf [he]
seeks to litigate” (and it has been further suggested that a “'next
friend' must have some significant relationship with the real party
Page -8-
in interest”); and (2) “the 'next friend' must provide an adequate
explanation--such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other
disability--why the real party in interest cannot appear on his own
behalf to prosecute the action.”
Id. at 163-64.
Furthermore, the burden is on the “next friend” to justify
his/her status and, thereby, to obtain the jurisdiction of the
federal courts.
See id. at 164.
In view of these requirements,
this Court cannot recognize Plaintiff as “next friends” of other
inmates held at the ACJF.
Therefore, all Plaintiff’s claims
asserted on behalf of other inmates should be dismissed with
prejudice.
2.
Conditions of Confinement Claims
Moreover, even if the Court were to ignore the fact that
Plaintiff’s Complaint named defendants not personally liable for
the
alleged
wrongs
and
asserted
solely
jus
tertii
claims,
Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement challenges are substantively
deficient.
As a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff is protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Reynolds v.
Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 173 (3d Cir. 1997) (the Due Process Clause
provides protections for pre-trial detainees similar to those
protections afforded to sentenced prisoners); see also Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 544 (1979). The Eighth Amendment sets forth
the minimum standard by which claims of pretrial detainees rights
Page -9-
should
be
evaluated.
See
Bell,
441
U.S.
at
544
(“pretrial
detainees, who have not been convicted of any crimes, retain at
least those constitutional rights that we have held are enjoyed by
convicted prisoners”); see also City of Revere v. Massachusetts
Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (a pretrial detainee's due
process rights are said to be “at least as great as the Eighth
Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner”).
However, “the protections of the Due Process Clause, whether
procedural or substantive, are just not triggered by lack of due
care by prison officials.”
Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348
(1986); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
Here,
Plaintiff
asserts
that
some
inmates
sleep
mattresses placed on the floor near toilet bowls.
on
the
Even if this
Court were to assume, for screening purposes, that Plaintiff is
among
these
inmates,
Plaintiff’s
assertions
fail
to
state
have
found
a
cognizable claim.
The
district
courts
of
this
Circuit
that
temporarily forcing inmates to sleep on the floor with a mattress
located near a toilet bowl does not, by itself, give rise to a
claim of constitutional magnitude.
See Renn v. Taylor, 2001 WL
657591 (D. Del. 2001) (examining the issue in light of the Eighth
Amendment); Dickinson v. Taylor, 2000 WL 1728363 (D. Del. 2000)
(same); Jackson v. Brewington-Carr, 1999 WL 27124 (D. Del.1999)
(same); Randall v. City of Philadelphia, 1987 WL 14383 (E.D.
Page -10-
Pa.1987) (same); Huttick v. Philadelphia Prison System, 1986 WL
10558 (E.D. Pa.1986)
(same).
Moreover, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit recently addressed this practice in the context of a
Fourteenth Amendment (applicable to pretrial detainees).
See
Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Hubbard II”).
Hubbard
II,
the
Third
Circuit
held
that
requiring
In
pretrial
detainees to sleep on a mattress on the floor for three to seven
months did not constitute punishment in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
See id. at 234-35.
The court rejected the previously
existing per se ban on the practice and instead considered it “as
part
of
the
institution.’”
‘totality
of
the
circumstances
within
[the]
Id. at 235 (quoting Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d
150, 160 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Hubbard I”)).2
The court then concluded
that although the plaintiffs “did spend a substantial amount of
time on floor mattresses,” they had access to large day rooms and
the record did not substantiate plaintiffs’ claims that the use of
floor mattresses caused disease.
See id.
Here, Plaintiff’s allegations do not depict conditions worse
than those addressed in Hubbard II.
2
All Plaintiff asserts is his
Hubbard I was the predecessor to Hubbard II. In Hubbard
I, the Third Circuit remanded plaintiffs’ case to the district
court to apply the correct standard for a conditions of
confinement claim by a detainee under the Fourteenth Amendment.
See 399 F.3d at 166-67. The district court subsequently ruled in
defendants’ favor and plaintiffs appealed, resulting in Hubbard
II. See 538 F.3d at 230.
Page -11-
displeasure with the fact that some inmates might have to sleep on
the floor mattress, with a toilet bowl being nearby.
However,
under Hubbard II, these allegations fail to state a claim and must
be dismissed with prejudice.
The same applies to Plaintiff’s
allegations asserting insufficient cleanliness: these claims are
deficient because no fact stated in Plaintiff’s Complaint suggests
that the ACJF conditions exposed Plaintiff, personally, to any
substantial hardship or an actual risk to his health/life.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s allegations based on the conditions of
confinement will be dismissed.3
3.
Medical Care Claims
Finally, the Court takes notice of Plaintiff’s sole sentence
closing with the request to ensure that the ACJF inmates would
“receive . . . proper medical care.”
Docket Entry No. 1, at 5.
This sole sentence, vaguely hinting at nothing but a self-serving
bold conclusion, is facially deficient under the pleading standard
articulated in Iqbal.
However, out of abundance of caution, this Court will construe
this sole sentence as potentially indicative of the fact that
3
However, being mindful of Plaintiff's pro se litigant
status and not ruling out the possibility that Plaintiff
inadvertently omitted to state the facts that might cure the
deficiencies of Plaintiff's own conditions-of-confinement claim
or other Fourteenth Amendment claims that Plaintiff might wish to
assert on the basis of the events that translated into an injury
suffered by Plaintiff personally, this Court finds it warranted
to allow him an opportunity to detail such facts in his amended
pleading.
Page -12-
Plaintiff himself might have actually suffered a serious medical
need
but
officials.
was,
nonetheless,
Therefore,
the
denied
Court
medical
will
care
allow
by
the
Plaintiff
ACJF
an
opportunity to amend his complaint by: (a) detailing the serious
medical need, if any, Plaintiff suffered; (b) specifying the
circumstances under which his requests for medical care were
denied, if at all; and (c) naming the particular ACJF officials who
were personally involved in such hypothetical denial of medical
care.4
IT IS, therefore, on this 14th day of September 2011,
ORDERED that Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma
pauperis is granted, and the Clerk shall file the Complaint without
prepayment of the filing fee; and it is further
ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), the Clerk shall
serve this Memorandum Opinion and Order upon the Attorney General
of the State of New Jersey and upon the Warden of Plaintiff’s
current place of confinement; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff is assessed a filing fee of $350.00
which shall be deducted from his prison account pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2) in the manner set forth below, regardless of
the outcome of the litigation; and it is further
4
The Court, however, takes this opportunity to stress that
Plaintiff’s challenges must be fact-specific and shall reflect
only on Plaintiff’s own injuries, if any.
Page -13-
ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A), Plaintiff
is assessed an initial partial filing fee equal to 20% of the
average monthly deposits to the Plaintiff's prison account for the
six month period immediately preceding the filing of the Complaint;
when funds exist, the New Jersey Department of Corrections shall
deduct said initial fee from Plaintiff’s prison account and forward
it to the Clerk; and it is further
ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2), until the
$350.00 filing fee is paid, each subsequent month that the amount
in Plaintiff's prison account exceeds $10.00, the New Jersey
Department of Corrections shall assess, deduct from the Plaintiff's
account, and forward to the Clerk payments equal to 20% of the
preceding month's income credited to Plaintiff's prison account,
with each payment referencing the docket number of this action; and
it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk shall serve this Memorandum Opinion and
Order upon Plaintiff by regular mail; and it is further
ORDERED that the Complaint is dismissed.
applies to all Defendants named in the Complaint.
Such dismissal
All Plaintiff’s
claims - except for the claim suggesting potential denial of
medical care and conditions of confinement - are dismissed with
prejudice, while Plaintiff’s claim suggesting potential denial of
medical care and conditions-of–confinement claim are dismissed
without prejudice; and it is further
Page -14-
ORDERED that the Clerk shall administratively terminate this
matter by making a new and separate entry on the docket reading
“CIVIL CASE TERMINATED”; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff may have this matter reopened in the
event Plaintiff files, within thirty days from the date of entry of
this Memorandum Opinion and Order, Plaintiff’s amended complaint
detailing,
in
accordance
with
guidance
provided
to
Plaintiff
herein, Plaintiff’s claims, if any, asserting denial of medical
care to Plaintiff and conditions of confinement; and it is finally
ORDERED
that,
if
Plaintiff
timely
files
such
amended
complaint, the Court will direct the Clerk to reopen this matter
and will screen Plaintiff’s amended complaint on merits.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge
Page -15-
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