BINDER MACHINERY COMPANY v. SQUARE D COMPANY
Filing
43
MEMORANDUM ORDER granting as to Count 1 and denying without prejudice as to Counts 2 and 3 Defendant's 36 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 4/25/2012. (TH, )
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
[Docket No. 36]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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SQUARE D COMPANY,
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Defendant.
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________________________________:
BINDER MACHINERY COMPANY,
Civil Action No. 09-6379
(RMB/KMW)
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Appearances:
Jordan S. Tafflin, Esquire
Robert M. Cavalier, Esquire
Lucas & Cavalier LLC
126 White Horse Pike, Third Floor
Haddon Heights, New Jersey 08035
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Stephen M. Capriotti, Esquire
W. Matthew Reber, Esquire
Kelley Jasons McGowan Spinelli & Hanna
50 South 16th Street
Two Liberty Plaza, Suite 1900
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102
Attorneys for Defendant
BUMB, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Binder Machinery Company (“Plaintiff”) brought
this action against Defendant Square D Company (“Defendant”),
alleging that it sustained property damage as a result of a fire
that occurred on January 22, 2007.
1
Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant’s transformer caused the fire.
Defendant denies the
allegations and has moved for summary judgment on all claims.
[Docket No. 36.]
Defendant asserts several arguments.
First,
Defendant contends that Plaintiff has failed to prove its strict
product liability claim (Count 2) because its experts’ opinions
contain bare conclusions, unsupported by factual evidence, which
are inadmissible under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 702 and
Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Defendant further argues that Plaintiff’s claims asserting
negligence (Count 1) and “malfunction theory” (Count 3) are not
viable causes of action.
Finally, Defendant contends that
Plaintiff has failed to provide any admissible evidence to
substantiate its claimed damages.
Plaintiff responds that (1) its experts’ opinions are
admissible, (2) its malfunction theory claim is not subsumed by
its product liability claim, and (3) that it has produced
substantial evidence to support its claimed damages.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment shall be granted if “the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
P. 56(a).1
Fed. R. Civ.
A fact is “material” if it will “affect the outcome
1
Pursuant to amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in December 2010, the oft-cited summary judgment standard is now
located in Rule 56(a) rather than 56(c). Although the wording of
the standard has changed slightly, replacing the word “issue”
2
of the suit under the governing law . . . .”
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Anderson v. Liberty
A dispute is “genuine” if
it could lead a “reasonable jury [to] return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.”
Id. at 248.
When deciding the existence of a genuine dispute of material
fact, a court’s role is not to weigh the evidence: all reasonable
“inferences, doubts, and issues of credibility should be resolved
against the moving party.”
Meyer v. Riegel Products Corp., 720
F.2d 303, 307 n.2 (3d Cir. 1983).
However, a mere “scintilla of
evidence,” without more, will not give rise to a genuine dispute
for trial.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
In the face of such
evidence, summary judgment is still appropriate “where the record
. . . could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
non-moving party . . . .”
Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
“Summary judgment
motions thus require judges to ‘assess how one-sided evidence is,
or what a ‘fair-minded’ jury could ‘reasonably’ decide.’”
Williams v. Borough of West Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d
Cir. 1989) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 265).
The movant “always bears the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions,
with “dispute”, this change does not affect the substantive
standard or the applicability of prior decisions construing the
standard. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) advisory committee’s note.
3
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)).
Then, “when a properly supported motion for summary
judgment [has been] made, the adverse party ‘must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
The
non-movant’s burden is rigorous: it “must point to concrete
evidence in the record”; mere allegations, conclusions,
conjecture, and speculation will not defeat summary judgment.
Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 484 (3d Cir.
1995).
ANALYSIS
As an initial matter, the Court notes that it does not
appear that Defendant disputes Plaintiff’s briefed argument that
Count 3 (malfunction theory) is a viable claim.
Accordingly, the
Court assumes Defendant has conceded this issue, and summary
judgment will be denied on that claim.
As for Count 1
(negligence), Plaintiff has not disputed Defendant’s argument
that a negligence claim is not cognizable.
It appears Plaintiff
has conceded this claim, and the Court therefore grants summary
judgment on it.2
2
If the Court has misconstrued the parties’ positions, the
parties may inform the Court at the Daubert hearing. See infra.
4
What remains then are Defendant’s objections to Count 2
(strict product liability), specifically with respect to the
admission of Plaintiff’s experts and calculation of damages.
Because the resolution of this motion requires a Daubert hearing
to determine the admissibility of expert testimony, the Court
will deny it without prejudice and permit Defendant the
opportunity to renew such motion prior to trial, at which time
the Court will conduct a hearing.
See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589
(recognizing district court’s role as gatekeeper to ensure that
all expert testimony and evidence is relevant and reliable);
Martin v. Blaser Swisslube, Inc., Civ. No. 03-6116, 2005 WL
3454291, *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2005) (“A motion for summary
judgment should be denied without prejudice pending the outcome
of a Daubert hearing, when disposition of the motion depends on a
determination of the admissibility of expert testimony.”).
As to the issue of damages, the Court construes all facts
and reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff and finds that a
genuine dispute of material fact precludes summary judgment.
ORDER
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ON THIS 25th day of April 2012, hereby
ORDERED that Defendant’s motion is granted as to Count 1 and
denied without prejudice as to Counts 2 and 3.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge
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