Harris v. Daniels et al, No. 2:2022cv00293 - Document 132 (D. Nev. 2024)
Court Description: ORDER Denying 98 Motion for Summary Judgment, Granting 106 Motion for Summary Judgment, Overruling 113 Objection/Appeal Magistrate Judge Order/Ruling LR IB 3-1, Denying 114 Motion to Waive Privacy, Striking 119 Motion to Modify, Denying as moot 124 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, and Denying as moot 125 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Judge Cristina D. Silva on 1/12/2024. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - RJDG)
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Harris v. Daniels et al Doc. 132 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA 2 3 4 Ammar Harris, Plaintiff 5 6 Case No: 2:22-cv-00293-CDS-NJK 7 Charles Daniels, et al., 8 Omnibus Order Resolving Pending Motions v. [ECF Nos. 98, 106, 113, 114, 119, 124, 125] Defendants 9 10 Pro se plaintiff Ammar Harris brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to 11 redress constitutional violations that he allegedly suffered while incarcerated by the Nevada 12 Department of Corrections (NDOC). See generally ECF No. 15. He filed a motion for summary 13 judgment and motion to modify his motion for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 98, 119. Defendants 14 Charles Daniels, Jaymie Cabrera, Calvin Johnson, Michael Minev, and Brian Williams also move 15 for summary judgment. ECF No. 106. 16 Also pending are objections to an order issued by Magistrate Judge Nancy J. Koppe (ECF 17 No. 113), a motion to “waive privacy” (ECF No. 114), and a motion for a preliminary injunction 18 and temporary restraining order (ECF Nos. 124, 125). 19 I. 20 Relevant background The parties are familiar with the facts of this case. I only address relevant background 21 information to this order. 22 Harris suffers from right upper and lower spasticity as a result of an injury he sustained 23 while housed at Ely State Prison. Medical Records Submitted Under Seal, Defs.’ Ex. A, ECF No. 24 103-2 at 2. In October 2021, prison officials sent Harris to Las Vegas Neurology Center (LVNC) 25 to be examined for traumatic brain injury, headaches, and syncope. ECF. No. 1-1 at 6. His doctor 26 created a medical plan consisting of treating Harris with 50 mg of Lyrica for pain and physical Dockets.Justia.com 1 therapy and Botox for Harris’ spasticity. Id. The NDOC followed all recommendations except 2 Botox, and scheduled appointments for Harris for the recommended tests. Medical Records 3 Submitted Under Seal, Defs.’ Ex. A, ECF No. 103-2 at 7–8, 11–15, 17, 20–24, 27–29, 37–48. 4 However, Harris has missed several of these appointments—including a physical therapy 5 evaluation—because he refused to transport. Id. at 16, 21, 27–29. 6 On February 8, 2022, Harris filed an emergency grievance regarding the lack of medical 7 care following his October 19th appointment at LVNC. Emergency Grievance, Defs.’ Ex. B, ECF 8 No. 106-2. In the emergency grievance, Harris sought “Lyrica medication, physical therapy, 9 declaratory relief, [and] injunctive relief.” Id. at 3. The grievance was denied the same day. Id. at 2. 10 The grievance form indicates that “[a] formal grievance may be pursued in the event the inmate 11 disagrees.” Id. 12 Harris filed a complaint in February of 2022, suing multiple defendants, seeking 13 declaratory and injunctive relief. ECF No. 1-1. In June of 2022, this court performed a mandatory 14 screening and allowed Harris to proceed on one Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to 15 serious medical need claim against defendants. ECF No. 14. 16 Months later, on October 10, 2022, Harris filed an informal grievance regarding his 17 medical treatment. Grievance History, Defs.’ Ex. C, ECF No. 106-3 at 7. On October 21, 2022, an 18 early mediation conference was held but no settlement was reached. ECF No. 28. Only after the 19 meditation conference, and well after commencing suit, did Harris attempt to proceed through 20 the formal grievance process. See Inmate Grievance History, Defs.’ Ex. C, ECF No. 106-3 at 7 21 (Harris indicates that he is “proceeding to the next level.”). 22 II. Analysis 23 A. Harris’ objection to the magistrate judge’s order is overruled. 24 Harris objects Magistrate Judge Koppe’s order denying his motion for appointment of 25 counsel. ECF No. 113. This district’s local rules provide that any party wishing to object to a 26 magistrate judge’s order on a pretrial matter must file and serve specific written objections, and 2 1 the deadline to file and serve any objections to a magistrate judge’s order is 14 days after service 2 of the order. LR IB 3-1(a). A district judge may reconsider any pretrial matter referred to a 3 magistrate judge in a civil or criminal case under LR IB 1-3, when it has been shown that the 4 magistrate judge’s order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Id. 5 Harris timely filed his objection but failed to demonstrate that Magistrate Judge Koppe 6 committed clear error or that her decision was contrary to the law. Rather, the entirety of his 7 motion is one paragraph, which states: “Plaintiff hereby objects to this court liberally construed 8 factual determination of ECF No. 96 and request[s] additional review by Judge Silva pursuant to 9 LR IB 3-1.” ECF No. 113. But Harris fails to demonstrate how Judge Koppe’s decision violated 10 Local Rule IB 3-1, that is, it fails to show how her order was “clearly erroneous or contrary to 11 law.” LR IB 1-3. The motion also fails to include specific, written objections as required by LR IB 12 1-3. Id. Though Harris cited the local rule that allows me to review and reconsider a magistrate 13 judge’s order, even a liberal construction of Harris’ objection does not demonstrate that the 14 order either was clearly erroneous or contrary to the law. While I am not required to conduct a 15 de novo review of the magistrate judge’s decision because Harris failed to provide specific 16 written objections, I nonetheless conduct a de novo review and agree with her findings. 17 Magistrate Judge Koppe correctly determined that Harris can competently represent himself in 18 this matter as the case history shows that he is able to litigate his case successfully. ECF No. 99. 19 Accordingly, I overrule Harris’ objection and affirm Magistrate Judge Koppe’s order denying 20 Harris’ motion for appointment of counsel in full. 21 B. Harris’ motion to waive privacy is denied. 22 In July 2023, I granted defendants’ motion to file Harris’ medical records under seal. ECF 23 No. 105. Harris then moved “to waive privacy.” ECF No. 114. In the motion, Harris stated that he 24 waives his “privacy protection” pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(h) and the 25 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA), and that he requests defendants 26 file medical related information without redaction and not under seal. ECF No. 114 at 1. 3 1 I liberally construe 1 his motion to be a motion to reconsider my decision to allow defendants to 2 file his medical records under seal. Defendants oppose the motion, arguing that Harris has failed 3 to set forth a basis for reconsideration. ECF No. 116. I agree. 4 Motions for reconsideration offer “an extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the 5 interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 6 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Indeed, ‘a motion for 7 reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district 8 court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an 9 intervening change in the controlling law.’” Id. (quoting Kona Enterprises, Inc. v. Est. of Bishop, 229 10 F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2000)). A motion to reconsider must provide a court with valid grounds 11 for reconsideration. Valid grounds include showing some valid reason why the court should 12 reconsider its prior decision and setting forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to 13 persuade the court to reverse its prior decision. See Frasure v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 14 1183 (D. Nev. 2003) (citing All Hawaii Tours, Corp. v. Polynesian Cultural Ctr., 116 F.R.D. 645, 648–49 15 (D. Haw. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 855 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1988)). Further, motions for 16 reconsideration are improper if used “to ask the [c]ourt to rethink what the [c]ourt had already 17 thought through—rightly or wrongly.” Ramsey v. Arizona, 2006 WL 2711490, at *1 (D. Ariz. Sept. 18 21, 2006) (quoting Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E. D. Va. 1983)). 19 Here, as defendants point out, even liberally construing the motion, Harris failed to 20 identify any newly discovered evidence, failed to allege a clear error or manifest injustice, and 21 failed to allege an intervening change in law. See generally ECF No. 114. And none of the 22 authorities Harris cites support reconsideration. 2 That is likely because plaintiffs have a right to 23 1 24 Courts must liberally construe documents filed by pro se litigants and afford them the benefit of any doubt. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). 25 2 Hudson v. Palmer pertains to inmates’ reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell. 468 U.S. 517 (1984). Benson v. Terhune pertains to inmates’ right to informed consent. 304 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2002). And Powell v. 26 Schriver pertains to inmate medical records, holding that prisoners have a privacy right of confidentiality in their medical conditions that, if disclosed, are likely to provoke hostility and intolerance from others. 175 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 1999). 4 1 privacy in the confidentiality of their medical records. Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 618 2 (N.D. Cal. 1995). The right to privacy is not a recognized privilege, nor it is an absolute bar to 3 discovery. Rather, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the right to privacy is subject to the 4 balancing of needs. See Seaton v. Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 539 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, the NDOC has 5 established administrative regulations that, in part, prevent inmates from accessing other 6 inmates’ medical records. See AR 639.02(2) (“Offenders are only allowed access to their medical 7 file, and will not be allowed access to any other offender’s medical record.”). Granting Harris’ 8 requested relief would undermine the aforementioned AR. In addition to finding no basis for 9 reconsideration, I also find there is insufficient reason to undermine the AR. Harris still has 10 access to his medical records. If he is denied access to the records after following the proper 11 procedure to review them, he may file a motion with the court. Accordingly, Harris’ motion to 12 waive privacy is denied. 13 C. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted. 14 Defendants move for summary judgment, arguing that summary judgment is appropriate 15 because Harris failed to properly exhaust administrative remedies, and because he failed to state 16 a claim upon which relief can be granted. ECF No. 106. The record shows that Harris failed to 17 exhaust his administrative remedies, so I grant summary judgment in favor of defendants. 18 19 1. Legal standard Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and admissible evidence “show 20 that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment 21 as a matter of law.” See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 22 56(c)). The court’s ability to grant summary judgment on certain issues or elements is inherent 23 in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “By its very terms, this 24 standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties 25 will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement 26 is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 5 1 248–49 (1986). A fact is material if it could affect the outcome of the case. Id. at 249. At 2 the summary-judgment stage, the court must view all facts and draw all inferences in the light 3 most favorable to the nonmoving party. Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 4 1103 (9th Cir. 1986). The movant need only defeat one element of a claim to garner summary 5 judgment on it because “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the 6 nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 7 322. 8 9 10 2. Summary judgment is appropriate because Harris did not exhaust his administrative remedies. Because Harris is a prisoner suing over the conditions of his confinement, the Prison 11 Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this action. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “In an effort to 12 address the large number of prisoner complaints filed in federal court, Congress enacted the 13 [PLRA].” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 202 (2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e). Under the PLRA, a 14 prisoner may not file any section 1983 civil rights suit unless they have first exhausted the 15 administrative remedies at the facility. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Rodriguez v. Cnty. Of Los Angeles, 891 16 F.3d, 776, 792 (9th Cir. 2018). The exhaustion requirement gives an agency the opportunity to 17 correct its own mistakes before being dragged into federal court, and it promotes greater 18 efficiency and economy in resolving claims. McBride v. Lopez, 807 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2015). 19 However, “a prisoner is excused from the exhaustion requirement in circumstances where 20 administrative remedies are effectively unavailable, including circumstances in which a prisoner 21 has reason to fear retaliation for reporting an incident.” Rodriguez, 891 F.3d at 792 (citing McBride, 22 807 F.3d at 987). Exhaustion “demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical 23 procedural rules because no adjudication system can function effectively without imposing some 24 orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90–91 (2006). 25 In Nevada, the remedies available to inmates are promulgated under Nevada Department 26 of Corrections Administrative Regulation 740 (AR 740). AR 740’s purpose is to “set forth the 6 1 requirements and procedures of the administrative process that [Nevada Department of 2 Corrections (NDOC)] inmates must utilize to resolve addressable grievances and claims 3 including . . . any [] tort or civil rights claim relating to conditions of confinement.” Welch v. 4 Liggett, 2023 WL 158603, at *3 (D. Nev. Jan. 11, 2023). “An inmate whose grievance is denied in its 5 entirety may appeal the grievance to the next level.” Id. The grievance structure is essentially a 6 multi-level dispute resolution mechanism, under which an inmate must satisfy each level’s 7 substantive and procedural requirements before filing a higher-level grievance. Id. It requires 8 inmates to first pursue resolution via alternative means, “such as discussion with staff or 9 submitting an inmate request form.” Id. Once an inmate has exhausted alternative means, he may 10 file an informal grievance. Id. If that fails to provide the requested relief, the inmate may file a 11 first-level grievance, and if that fails, a second-level grievance. Id. An inmate exhausts his 12 administrative remedies either after a denial of the second-level grievance, or “if the [g]rievance 13 is ‘[g]ranted’ at any level.” Id. 14 Harris failed to fully exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing the instant suit. 15 Specifically, Harris only filed one grievance pertaining to his medical treatment plan, that is the 16 February 8, 2022, emergency grievance, which he failed to appeal. See Emergency Grievance, 17 Defs.’ Ex. B, ECF No. 106-2; see also Inmate Grievance History, Defs.’ Ex. C, ECF No. 106-3; ECF 18 No. 15. This action was filed on February 16, 2022, eight days after filing his emergency 19 grievance. Harris did not file another grievance about his medical treatment plan until October 20 2022. See Inmate Grievance History, Defs.’ Ex. C, ECF No. 106-3 at 7–8; Grievance 2006-31-3421 197, Defs.’ Ex. A, ECF No. 117-1 at 2. Although Harris appealed this grievance, the grievance and 22 appeal occurred months after he filed this action. In Nevada, administrative exhaustion requires 23 an inmate to appeal a denied first-level grievance, and if that fails, to file a second-level grievance 24 before filing suit. AR 740. Harris failed to meet this requirement. 25 In opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Harris states that he did 26 exhaust his administrative remedies and that “defendants are in violation by failing to produce 7 1 actual grievances but provided selective summaries.” ECF No. 115 at 2. The court notes that 2 defendants did attach his emergency grievance and grievance history to their motion for 3 summary judgment. See Emergency Grievance, Defs.’ Ex. B, ECF No. 106-2; Grievance History, 4 Defs.’ Ex. C, ECF No. 106-3 at 7–8. Then, in their reply to Harris’ opposition, defendants filed the 5 actual grievances. See Grievance 2006-31-34-197, Defs.’ Ex. A, ECF No. 117-1. In reviewing this 6 documentation, there is no evidence that Harris properly exhausted prior to filing suit. See 7 Emergency Grievance, Defs.’ Ex. B, ECF No. 106-2; Grievance History, Defs.’ Ex. C, ECF No. 1068 3 at 7–8; Grievance 2006-31-34-197, Defs.’ Ex. A, ECF No. 117-1. Thus, this information 9 undermined Harris’ only argument in his attempt to overcome defendants’ argument that he 10 failed to properly exhaust. Because Harris is pro se, I conducted an independent assessment of 11 the record, I also note that there is no evidence nor suggestion that the administrative remedies 12 were effectively unavailable to Harris as a matter of law. Indeed, the prison duly provided a 13 response with a justification for each of Harris’ denied grievances, and there is no evidence that 14 suggests he would have been unable to properly appeal and exhaust the remaining steps of the 15 process. See Emergency Grievance, Defs.’ Ex. B, ECF No. 106-2; Grievance History, Defs.’ Ex. C, 16 ECF No. 106-3 at 7–8; Grievance 2006-31-34-197, Defs.’ Ex. A, ECF No. 117-1. Consequently, I find 17 that Harris has not exhausted his administrative remedies and that summary judgment is thus 18 appropriate. 19 Because I find that Harris’ claim is barred by the PLRA, I do not address defendants’ 20 remaining arguments and grant their motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust 21 administrative remedies. 22 23 24 25 26 8 1 D. Harris’ motion for summary judgment and/or declaratory judgment is denied, 2 and the motion to modify or correct his motion for summary judgment is 3 stricken. 4 Harris filed a motion for summary judgment and/or declaratory judgment on June 23, 5 2023, and approximately one month later, filed a motion to modify the motion. ECF Nos. 98, 119. 6 The motions are fully briefed. ECF Nos. 101, 112, 121, and 122. 7 8 1. The court denies Harris’ motion for summary judgment. Harris claims that summary judgment is appropriate for his American with Disabilities 9 Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act (RA) claim. ECF No. 98 at 13–22. However, his ADA/RA 10 claim was dismissed without prejudice with leave to amend. See ECF No. 14 at 10. Harris did not 11 timely amend his complaint and so his ADA/RA claim did not move forward. ECF No. 85. 12 Consequently, Harris’s motion for summary judgment is denied as moot. 13 Harris also argues summary judgment is appropriate for his deliberate indifference to 14 serious medical needs claim. ECF No. 98 at 13–22. Defendants argue that Harris’ deliberate 15 indifference claim fails because he failed to properly exhaust before filing suit. ECF No. 101 at 5– 16 6. As discussed above, the record shows Harris failed to properly exhaust under the PLRA, so I 17 granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. For that reason, Harris’ motion for summary 18 judgment on his deliberate indifference claim for relief is denied. 19 20 21 2. The court strikes Harris’ motion to modify or correct his summary judgment motion. “A party may not file supplemental pleadings, briefs, authorities, or evidence without 22 leave of court granted for good cause. The judge may strike supplemental filings made without 23 leave of court.” LR 7-2(g). Here, Harris did not request leave of court, but rather filed what 24 appears to be a supplemental motion to his still-pending motion for summary judgment. See ECF 25 No. 119. While Harris is unrepresented in this matter, I remind him that “[p]ro se litigants must 26 follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 9 1 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012). 2 Because he did not seek leave of court, his motion to modify is improperly filed so I strike the 3 filing as violative of this district’s local rules. 4 E. Harris’ motions for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction are 5 denied. 3 6 Harris also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a motion for a 7 preliminary injunction asking the court to grant preliminary relief requiring defendants to 8 “arrange for an examination and execute a plan of treatment or execute [the doctor’s] medical 9 plan[.]” ECF No. 124 at 3. Defendants oppose the motions, arguing that Harris failed exhaust his 10 administrative remedies and failed to meet the burden necessary to warrant a preliminary 11 injunction or TRO. ECF No. 127. Having already determined that Harris failed to properly 12 exhaust under the PLRA and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, I deny his 13 motion for injunctive relief as moot. I note that even if the motion was not, he would be unable 14 to succeed on the merits. 15 III. Conclusion 16 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 17 1. Harris’ objection to the magistrate judge’s order [ECF No. 113] is OVERRULED. 18 The magistrate judge’s order denying Harris’s motion for appointment of counsel 19 [ECF No. 99] is affirmed in full; 20 2. Harris’ motion to waive privacy [ECF No. 114] is DENIED; 21 3. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 106] is GRANTED; 22 23 Harris filed a single motion titled “Emergency Motion for Preliminary Inju[n]ction / Temp[o]rary Rest[r]aining Order.” Under Local Rule IC 2-2(b), that filing was docketed as two separate entries: ECF 24 No. 125 (preliminary injunction) and ECF No. 124 (temporary restraining order). Both docket entries are thus identical. Because the criteria for granting a temporary restraining order and a preliminary 25 injunction are “substantially similar,” Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001), I discuss them together as “injunctive relief” and cite only ECF No. 124, rather than both 26 124 and 125. Similarly, I discuss defendants’ oppositions together and cite only ECF No. 127, rather than both 127 and 128. 3 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 4. Harris’ motion for summary judgment and/or declaratory judgment [ECF No. 98] is DENIED; 5. Harris’ motion to modify or correct his motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 119] is STRICKEN; 6. Harris’ motion for a temporary restraining order [ECF No. 124] is DENIED as moot; and 7 7. Harris’ motion for preliminary injunction [ECF No. 125] is DENIED as moot. 8 Dated: January 12, 2024 9 ____________________ ____________ Cristina D. Silva United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 11
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