Harris v. Granite State Management et al - Document 6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F O R THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA D A V ID J. HARRIS, Plaintiff, v. G R A N IT E STATE MANAGEMENT, a n d SALLIE MAE, D e f e n d a n ts . ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 8 :0 9 C V 4 2 5 M EM ORANDUM AND ORDER P la in tif f filed his Complaint in this matter on November 25, 2009. (Filing No. 1.) P la in tif f has previously been given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Filing No. 5.) The c o u r t now conducts an initial review of the Complaint to determine whether summary d ism issal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). I. S U M M A R Y OF COMPLAINT P lain tiff filed his Complaint on November 25, 2009, against Granite State M a n a g e m e n t and Sallie Mae. (Filing No. 1 at CM/ECF p. 1.) Plaintiff is a nonprisoner re s id in g in Valentine, Nebraska. (Id.) Condensed and summarized, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated federal law w h e n they asked him to provide "additional information" on his request for federal loan re lie f . (Id. at CM/ECF p. 2.) Plaintiff believes he is entitled to federal loan relief because h e has a disability. (Id.) Plaintiff has federal student loans and a federal loan with Sallie M a e . (Id.) Plaintiff asks the court to forgive these loans. (Id. at CM/ECF p. 5.) II. A P P L IC A B L E LEGAL STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW T h e court is required to review in forma pauperis complaints to determine whether s u m m a ry dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must dismiss a  c o m p lain t or any portion thereof that states a frivolous or malicious claim, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant w h o is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A pro se plaintiff must set forth enough factual allegations to "nudge[] their claims a c ro s s the line from conceivable to plausible," or "their complaint must be dismissed" for f a ilin g to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U .S . 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) ("A claim h a s facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."). R eg ard less of whether a plaintiff is represented or is appearing pro se, the plaintiff's c o m p la in t must allege specific facts sufficient to state a claim. See Martin v. Sargent, 780 F .2 d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985). However, a pro se plaintiff's allegations must be construed lib e ra lly. Burke v. North Dakota Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 294 F.3d 1043, 1043-44 (8th Cir. 2 0 0 2 ) (citations omitted). III. D I S C U S S I O N OF CLAIMS A s best as the court can tell, Plaintiff's claims relate to a discharge application for re lie f from federally guaranteed student loans. Plaintiff appears to have filed this application b e c au s e of a disability. (Filing No.1 at CM/ECF p. 2.) A person seeking disability relief from federally guaranteed student loans must follow th e procedures set forth in 34 C.F.R. § 682.402. These procedures require the borrower to n o tif y their lender of their disability. 34 C.F.R. § 682.402(c)(1)(2). Thereafter, the borrower is required to submit a discharge application to the lender. Id. This application must contain a certification, from a physician, that the borrower is in fact totally and permanently disabled. Id. After the lender receives the application, it is submitted to the Department of Education (" D O E " ) for review. McCullough v. Sallie Mae, Inc., No. 08-932, 2009 WL 1788543, at *2 (W .D . La. June 19, 2009). If the DOE determines that the borrower is totally and p e r m a n e n tly disabled, then the borrower's loan is placed on a conditional discharge status f o r three years where no payment is due. Id.; see also 34 C.F.R. § 682.402(c)(3)(ii). "After th is three year period, the balance of the loan is discharged." McCullough, No. 08-932, 2009 2  W L 1788543, at *2; see also 34 C.F.R. § 682.402(c)(4)(iii). p a ya b le . See 34 C.F.R. § 682.402(c)(3)(iv). However, if the DOE d e te rm in e s that the borrower is not totally and permanently disabled, the loan is due and It is unclear whether Plaintiff filed his application with his lender or the DOE. (Filing N o . 1 at CM/ECF p. 2.) However, it is clear that the application was returned with a request f o r "additional information." (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that this request violates federal law. (Id .) Because Plaintiff's application was returned for "additional information," the DOE has n o t yet determined whether Plaintiff is entitled to loan relief. Stated another way, Plaintiff h a s not yet exhausted the administrative remedies discussed above. This court may not re v ie w Plaintiff's claims until his administrative remedies are exhausted. See, e.g., Myers v . Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51, 58 (1938) ("[N]o one is entitled to ju d ic ia l relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy h a s been exhausted."). Therefore, Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed without prejudice. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: 1. 2. O rde r. DATED this 25 th day of January, 2010. B Y THE COURT: P la in tif f 's Complaint (filing no. 1) is dismissed without prejudice. A separate judgment will be entered in accordance with this Memorandum and s / Joseph F. Bataillon Chief United States District Judge *This opinion may contain hyperlinks to other documents or Web sites. The U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska does not endorse, recommend, approve, or guarantee any third parties or the services or products they provide on their Web sites. Likewise, the court has no agreements with any of these third parties or their Web sites. The court accepts no responsibility for the availability or functionality of any hyperlink. Thus, the fact that a hyperlink ceases to work or directs the user to some other site does not affect the opinion of the court. 3