Doest v. Van Buren County Sheriffs Department et al, No. 1:2022cv00239 - Document 10 (W.D. Mich. 2022)
Court Description: OPINION; signed by Magistrate Judge Sally J. Berens (jln)
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Doest v. Van Buren County Sheriffs Department et al Doc. 10 Case 1:22-cv-00239-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.31 Filed 06/30/22 Page 1 of 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______ AARON JAMES DOEST, Plaintiff, v. Case No. 1:22-cv-239 Honorable Sally J. Berens VAN BUREN COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT et al., Defendants. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 7.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997). Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros. Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is Dockets.Justia.com Case 1:22-cv-00239-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.32 Filed 06/30/22 Page 2 of 10 fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov’t, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”). Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States magistrate judge conducting all proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a 2 Case 1:22-cv-00239-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.33 Filed 06/30/22 Page 3 of 10 consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1 Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Discussion Factual Allegations Plaintiff is presently detained at the Gibson County Jail in Trenton, Michigan. The events about which he complains, however, occurred while Plaintiff was detained at the Van Buren County Jail in Paw Paw, Michigan. Plaintiff sues the Van Buren County Sheriff’s Department, Lieutenant Chad Hunt, Sergeant Mike Shannon, and Corrections Officer Unknown Kozel. Plaintiff indicates that he is suing Defendants in their official capacities only. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) 1 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a United States magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)); Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207 n.26 (3d Cir. Feb. 10, 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”). 3 Case 1:22-cv-00239-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.34 Filed 06/30/22 Page 4 of 10 Plaintiff alleges that he filed multiple grievances during his incarceration at the Van Buren County Jail. (Id., PageID.3.) Those grievances concerned a “wide range of issues.” (Id.) Plaintiff avers that the jail initially had an electronic grievance system in place, but that the administration stopped opening and responding to grievances in that system in January of 2022. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, the administration stated that there “was an issue with the system.” (Id.) In February of 2022, the jail began issuing paper grievances. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that these consist of “single page grievances with no receipt or [copies] given to inmates, making it impossible to track the status of a given grieved issue.” (Id.) Plaintiff argues that he has “several unanswered grievances in physical form that have come up missing.” (Id.) When he asked about them, he was told to file them electronically. (Id.) Plaintiff avers that when he did so, the administration began “deleting them from the system unanswered.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends that there is no adequate grievance procedure at the Van Buren County Jail. (Id.) Based on the foregoing, the Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint to assert First and Fourteenth Amendment claims based upon the alleged inadequacy of the grievance procedure. As relief, Plaintiff seeks damages, as well as enforcement of a “proper grievance procedure.” (Id.) Failure To State a Claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the 4 Case 1:22-cv-00239-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.35 Filed 06/30/22 Page 5 of 10 plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because Section 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under Section 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). As noted supra, the Court has construed Plaintiff’s complaint to assert a violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. As an initial matter, Plaintiff cannot maintain suit against the Van Buren County Sheriff’s Department because sheriff’s departments are not legal entities subject to suit pursuant to Section 1983. See Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d 117, 120 (6th Cir. 1991); Vine v. Cnty. of Ingham, 884 F. Supp. 1153, 1158 (W.D. Mich. 1995). The Sheriff’s Department is simply an agency of Van Buren County. See Vine, 884 F. Supp. at 1158. Plaintiff’s claims against the Van Buren County 5 Case 1:22-cv-00239-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.36 Filed 06/30/22 Page 6 of 10 Sheriff’s Department will, therefore, be dismissed. The Court, however, will liberally construe Plaintiff’s allegations and assume that Plaintiff intended to sue Van Buren County. Van Buren County may not be held vicariously liable for the actions of its employees under Section 1983. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989); Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Instead, a county is liable only when its official policy or custom causes the injury. Connick, 563 U.S. at 60. This policy or custom must be the moving force behind the alleged constitutional injury, and the plaintiff must identify the policy or custom, connect it to the governmental entity, and show that his injury was incurred because of the policy or custom. See Turner v. City of Taylor, 412 F.3d 629, 639 (6th Cir. 2005); Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003). A policy includes a “policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated” by the sheriff’s department. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has explained that a custom “for purposes of Monell liability must be so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d 495, 507 (6th Cir. 1996). “In short, a ‘custom’ is a ‘legal institution’ not memorialized by written law.” Id. at 508. Here, Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of any allegations suggesting that his alleged constitutional injury was a result of an official policy or custom employed by the Van Buren County Sheriff’s Department. Thus, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Van Buren County. See Bilder v. City of Akron, No. 92-4310, 1993 WL 394595, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 6, 1993) (affirming dismissal of Section 1983 action when plaintiff’s allegation of custom or policy was conclusory, and plaintiff failed to state facts supporting the allegation). Plaintiff also names Defendants Hunt, Shannon, and Kozel in their official capacities. Official-capacity lawsuits “generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an 6 Case 1:22-cv-00239-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.37 Filed 06/30/22 Page 7 of 10 entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, n. 55). An official-capacity suit is to be treated as a suit against the entity itself. Id. at 166 (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471–72 (1985)); see also Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). “Individuals sued in their official capacities stand in the shoes of the entity they represent,” and the suit is not against the official personally. Alkire, 330 F.3d at 810; Graham, 473 U.S. at 165–66. Here, because Defendants Hunt, Shannon, and Kozel represent Van Buren County, Plaintiff’s suit intends to impose liability on the county. However, “[g]overnmental entities cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged violation of constitutional rights.” Watson v. Gill, 40 F. App’x 88, 89 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 692). As described supra, Plaintiff has failed to describe any county policy or custom that resulted in his alleged injuries, and Plaintiff cannot maintain suit against Van Buren County merely because it employed Defendants Hunt, Shannon, and Kozel. Plaintiff, therefore, cannot maintain official capacity claims against Defendants Hunt, Shannon, and Kozel. For these reasons alone, Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal. Even if the Court were to liberally construe Plaintiff’s complaint as asserting individual capacity claims against Defendants Hunt, Shannon, and Kozel, the complaint still fails to state a claim for relief. As noted above, Plaintiff takes issue with the adequacy of the grievance procedure at the Van Buren County Jail, asserting that it violated his constitutional rights because he did not receive receipts or a way to track the status of his submitted grievances. As an initial matter, the courts repeatedly have held that there exists no constitutionally protected due process right to an effective prison grievance procedure. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983); Walker v. 7 Case 1:22-cv-00239-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.38 Filed 06/30/22 Page 8 of 10 Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 128 F. App’x 441, 445 (6th Cir. 2005); Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80 F. App’x 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2003); Young v. Gundy, 30 F. App’x 568, 569–70 (6th Cir. 2002); Carpenter v. Wilkinson, No. 99-3562, 2000 WL 190054, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 7, 2000); see also Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases). Michigan law does not create a liberty interest in the grievance procedure. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983); Keenan v. Marker, 23 F. App’x 405, 407 (6th Cir. 2001); Wynn v. Wolf, No. 93-2411, 1994 WL 105907, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 28, 1994). Because Plaintiff has no liberty interest in the grievance process, Defendants’ conduct did not deprive him of due process. Additionally, Plaintiff’s right to petition government is not violated by Defendant’s failure to process, act on, or provide a tracking system for his grievances. The First Amendment “right to petition the government does not guarantee a response to the petition or the right to compel government officials to act on or adopt a citizen’s views.” Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Minnesota State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984) (holding the right to petition protects only the right to address government; the government may refuse to listen or respond). Moreover, Defendants’ actions have not barred Plaintiff from seeking a remedy for his grievances. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972). “A prisoner’s constitutional right to assert grievances typically is not violated when prison officials prohibit only ‘one of several ways in which inmates may voice their complaints to, and seek relief, from prison officials’ while leaving a formal grievance procedure intact.” Griffin v. Berghuis, 563 F. App’x 411, 415–16 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 130 n.6 (1977)). Indeed, Plaintiff’s ability to seek redress is underscored by his pro se invocation of the judicial 8 Case 1:22-cv-00239-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.39 Filed 06/30/22 Page 9 of 10 process. See Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Even if Plaintiff had been improperly prevented from filing a grievance, his right of access to the courts to petition for redress of his grievances (i.e., by filing a lawsuit) cannot be compromised by his inability to file institutional grievances, and he therefore cannot demonstrate the actual injury required for an access-to-the-courts claim. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996) (requiring actual injury); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821–24 (1977). The exhaustion requirement only mandates exhaustion of available administrative remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). If Plaintiff were improperly denied access to the grievance process, the process would be rendered unavailable, and exhaustion would not be a prerequisite for initiation of a civil rights action. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 640–44 (2016) (reiterating that, if the prisoner is barred from pursuing a remedy by policy or by the interference of officials, the grievance process is not available, and exhaustion is not required); Kennedy v. Tallio, 20 F. App’x 469, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff simply has no Constitutional right to the receipts and tracking he desires. Therefore, for all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff fails to state cognizable claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments regarding the grievance process at the Van Buren County Jail. Conclusion Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). Although the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court does not conclude that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). Accordingly, the Court does not certify that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Should 9 Case 1:22-cv-00239-SJB ECF No. 10, PageID.40 Filed 06/30/22 Page 10 of 10 Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to Section 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum. This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered. Dated: June 30, 2022 /s/ Sally J. Berens SALLY J. BERENS U.S. Magistrate Judge 10
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