Keyes #440164 v. Rapelje, No. 1:2009cv00714 - Document 6 (W.D. Mich. 2009)
Court Description: OPINION ; signed by Chief Judge Paul L. Maloney (Chief Judge Paul L. Maloney, aeb)
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION LEIGH KEYES, Petitioner, Case No. 1:09-cv-714 v. Honorable Paul L. Maloney LLOYD RAPELJE, Respondent. ____________________________________/ OPINION This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Promptly after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a preliminary review of the petition to determine whether it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court. Rule 4, RULES GOVERNING § 2254 CASES; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the petition must be summarily dismissed. Rule 4; see Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (district court has the duty to screen out petitions that lack merit on their face). A dismissal under Rule 4 includes those petitions which raise legally frivolous claims, as well as those containing factual allegations that are palpably incredible or false. Carson v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434, 436-37 (6th Cir. 1999). After undertaking the review required by Rule 4, the Court will dismiss the petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust available state-court remedies. Discussion I. Factual allegations Petitioner Leigh Keyes presently is incarcerated at the Saginaw Correctional Facility. On May 12, 2003, he pleaded guilty in the Kent County Circuit Court to assault with intent to commit murder, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.83; and first-degree home invasion, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.110a(2). He was sentenced to respective prison terms of fourteen to fifty years and ten to twenty years. (Pet. at 2., docket #1.) After his sentencing, Petitioner requested the appointment of appellate counsel but the trial court denied the request under then-existing Michigan law. (See Keyes v. Renico, No. 2:05cv-71160, Sept. 2, 2005 Op. & Order, 2, docket #14.) Petitioner then filed a pro se application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Court of Appeals. Petitioner again requested the appointment of appellate counsel. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied Petitioner s leave to appeal on June 15, 2004. (Id.; Pet. at 3.) Petitioner then filed a pro se application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, requesting the appointment of appellate counsel. The Michigan Supreme Court denied Petitioner leave to appeal on December 29, 2004. (Pet. at 3.) Eventually, Petitioner filed an application for habeas corpus relief in the Eastern District of Michigan. See Keyes, No. 2:05-cv71160 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 23, 2005). On September 2, 2005, the Eastern District of Michigan conditionally granted Petitioner s application and ordered the State of Michigan to appoint appellate counsel to Petitioner or release Petitioner from custody. (See Keyes, No. 2:05-cv-71160, Sept. 2, 2005 Op. & Order, 9, docket #14.) Eventually, Petitioner was appointed appellate counsel. Petitioner s appellate counsel filed a motion for resentencing or plea withdrawal in the trial court, which was denied on December 15, 2006. (Pet. at 4.) Petitioner then appealed his convictions to the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court. The Michigan -2- Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal on January 28, 2009. (Id.) The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal on June 23, 2009. (Id. at 5.) In his habeas application, Petitioner raises the following three grounds for habeas corpus relief: I. PETITIONER S PLEA SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN AS THE FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE GUILTY PLEA WAS LACKING FOR ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO MURDER, AND PETITIONER WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. II. PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO RESENTENCING BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SCORING POINTS FOR OFFENSE VARIABLE 7. III. THE MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS AND MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT DENIED PETITIONER EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTION[S] WHEN THEY RUBBERSTAMPED PETITIONER S APPEAL. (Pet. at 7.) II. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies Before the Court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust remedies available in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); O Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). Exhaustion requires a petitioner to fairly present federal claims so that state courts have a fair opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon a petitioner s constitutional claim. See O Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 842; Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-77 (1971), cited in Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995), and Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982). To fulfill the exhaustion requirement, a petitioner must have fairly presented his federal claims to all levels of the state appellate system, including the state s highest court. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Silverburg v. Evitts, 993 F.2d 124, 126 (6th Cir. 1993); Hafley v. Sowders, 902 F.2d 480, 483 (6th Cir. 1990). [S]tate prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve -3- any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State s established appellate review process. O Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845. The district court can and must raise the exhaustion issue sua sponte when it clearly appears that habeas claims have not been presented to the state courts. See Prather v. Rees, 822 F.2d 1418, 1422 (6th Cir. 1987); Allen, 424 F.2d at 138-39. Petitioner bears the burden of showing exhaustion. See Rust v. Zent, 17 F.3d 155, 160 (6th Cir. 1994). In his application for habeas corpus relief, Petitioner claims that he exhausted all of his grounds for habeas corpus relief. (Pet. at 7-8, docket #1.) In his brief, however, Petitioner alleges that he added his third ground for habeas corpus relief for the first time in his application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court. (Br. in Supp. of Pet. at 6, docket #3.) Presentation of an issue for the first time on discretionary review to the state supreme court does not fulfill the requirement of fair presentation. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989). Applying Castille, the Sixth Circuit holds that a habeas petitioner does not comply with the exhaustion requirement when he fails to raise a claim in the state court of appeals, but raises it for the first time on discretionary appeal to the state s highest court. See Dunbar v. Pitcher, No. 98-2068, 2000 WL 179026, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 9, 2000); Miller v. Parker, No. 99-5007, 1999 WL 1282436, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 27, 1999); Troutman v. Turner, No. 95-3597, 1995 WL 728182, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 1995); Hafley v. Sowders, 902 F.2d 480, 483 (6th Cir. 1990); accord Parkhurst v. Shillinger, 128 F.3d 1366, 1368-70 (10th Cir. 1997); Ellman v. Davis, 42 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 1994); Cruz v. Warden of Dwight Corr. Ctr., 907 F.2d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 1990); but see Ashbaugh v. Gundy, 244 F. App x 715, 717 (6th Cir. 2007) (declining to reach question of whether a claim raised for the first time in an application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court is exhausted). Unless the state supreme court actually grants leave to appeal and reviews the issue, it remains unexhausted in the state courts. Petitioner s application for leave to appeal was denied, and, thus, the issue was not -4- reviewed. Because Petitioner raised his third ground for habeas corpus relief for the first time in the Michigan Supreme Court, it is unexhausted. An applicant has not exhausted available state remedies if he has the right under state law to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). Petitioner has at least one available procedure by which to raise the issues he has presented in this application. He may file a motion for relief from judgment under MICH. CT. R. 6.500 et seq. Under Michigan law, one such motion may be filed after August 1, 1995. MICH. CT. R. 6.502(G)(1). Petitioner has not yet filed his one allotted motion. Therefore, the Court concludes that he has at least one available state remedy. Because Petitioner has some claims that are exhausted and some that are not, his petition is mixed. Under Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 22 (1982), district courts are directed to dismiss mixed petitions without prejudice in order to allow petitioners to return to state court to exhaust remedies. However, since the habeas statute was amended to impose a one-year statute of limitations on habeas claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), dismissal without prejudice often effectively precludes future federal habeas review. This is particularly true after the Supreme Court ruled in Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-82 (2001), that the limitations period is not tolled during the pendency of a federal habeas petition. As a result, the Sixth Circuit adopted a stay-andabeyance procedure to be applied to mixed petitions. See Palmer v. Carlton, 276 F.3d 777, 781 (6th Cir. 2002). In Palmer, the Sixth Circuit held that when the dismissal of a mixed petition could jeopardize the timeliness of a subsequent petition, the district court should dismiss only the unexhausted claims and stay further proceedings on the remaining portion until the petitioner has exhausted his claims in the state court. Id.; see also Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2007) (approving stay-and-abeyance procedure); Griffin v. Rogers, 308 F.3d 647, 652 n.1 (6th Cir. 2002). -5- Petitioner s application is subject to the one-year statute of limitations provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Under § 2244(d)(1)(A), the one-year limitation period runs from the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Michigan Court of Appeals and Michigan Supreme Court. The Michigan Supreme Court denied his application on June 23, 2009. Petitioner did not petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, though the ninety-day period in which he could have sought review in the United States Supreme Court is counted under § 2244(d)(1)(A). See Bronaugh v. Ohio, 235 F.3d 280, 283 (6th Cir. 2000). The ninety-day period will expire on Monday, September 21, 2009. Accordingly, absent tolling, Petitioner would have one year, until September 21, 2010, in which to file his habeas petition. The Palmer Court has indicated that thirty days is a reasonable amount of time for a petitioner to file a motion for post-conviction relief in state court, and another thirty days is a reasonable amount of time for a petitioner to return to federal court after he has exhausted his statecourt remedies. Palmer, 276 F.3d at 721. See also Griffin, 308 F.3d at 653 (holding that sixty days amounts to mandatory period of equitable tolling under Palmer).1 Petitioner has more than sixty days remaining in his limitations period. Assuming that Petitioner diligently pursues his state-court remedies and promptly returns to this Court after the Michigan Supreme Court issues its decision, he is not in danger of running afoul of the statute of limitations. Therefore a stay of these proceedings is not warranted. Should Plaintiff decide not to pursue his unexhausted claims in the state courts, he may file a new petition raising only exhausted claims at any time before the expiration of the limitations period. 1 The running of the statute of limitations is tolled while a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). -6- Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss the petition for failure to exhaust available state-court remedies. Certificate of Appealability Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the Court must determine whether a certificate of appealability should be granted. A certificate should issue if Petitioner has demonstrated a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This Court s dismissal of Petitioner s action under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases is a determination that the habeas action, on its face, lacks sufficient merit to warrant service. It would be highly unlikely for this Court to grant a certificate, thus indicating to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that an issue merits review, when the Court already has determined that the action is so lacking in merit that service is not warranted. See Love v. Butler, 952 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1991) (it is somewhat anomalous for the court to summarily dismiss under Rule 4 and grant a certificate); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring reversal where court summarily dismissed under Rule 4 but granted certificate); Dory v. Comm r of Corr. of the State of New York, 865 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1989) (it was intrinsically contradictory to grant a certificate when habeas action does not warrant service under Rule 4); Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 n.1 (2d Cir. 1983) (issuing certificate would be inconsistent with a summary dismissal). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has disapproved issuance of blanket denials of a certificate of appealability. Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2001). Rather, the district court must engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim to determine whether a certificate is warranted. Id. at 467. Each issue must be considered under the standards set forth by the Supreme -7- Court in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000). Murphy, 263 F.3d at 467. Consequently, this Court has examined each of Petitioner s claims under the Slack standard. This Court denied Petitioner s application on the procedural ground of lack of exhaustion. Under Slack, 529 U.S. at 484, when a habeas petition is denied on procedural grounds, a certificate of appealability may issue only when the prisoner shows, at least, [1] that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and [2] that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling. Both showings must be made to warrant the grant of a certificate. Id. The Court finds that reasonable jurists could not debate that this Court correctly dismissed the petition on the procedural ground of lack of exhaustion. Where a plain procedural bar is present and the district court is correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could not conclude either that the district court erred in dismissing the petition or that the petitioner should be allowed to proceed further. Id. Therefore, the Court denies Petitioner a certificate of appealability. A Judgment and Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered. Dated: /s/ Paul L. Maloney Paul L. Maloney Chief United States District Judge September 17, 2009 -8-
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