Mitchel et al v. Crosby Corporation et al, No. 8:2010cv02349 - Document 81 (D. Md. 2012)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 9/10/12. (Attachments: #1 - Notice of Collective Action Lawsuit and #2 - Consent to Join)(sat, Chambers)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND : DONNA MITCHEL, et al., : v. : Civil Action No. DKC 10-2349 : CROSBY CORPORATION, et al. : MEMORANDUM OPINION Presently Standards Act pending and ( FLSA ) ready case is for review this Fair Labor the motion for conditional certification of a collective action and facilitation of notice filed by Plaintiffs Donna Mitchel, Kenya Farris, Sylvia Wheeler, and Christina Wilson.1 (ECF No. 57). The issues have been fully briefed, and the court now rules pursuant to Local Rule 105.6, no hearing being deemed necessary. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs motion for conditional certification of a collective 1 Defendants contend that Donna Mitchel should be barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel from asserting her claims and from representing the purported class because she failed to disclose her involvement in this lawsuit in a subsequent filing for bankruptcy. The court will not address this argument now, because it is not relevant to the motion pending, and the parties have not briefed the issue. See Calafiore v. Werner Enter. Inc., 418 F.Supp.2d 795, 797 (D.Md. 2006) (noting that the Fourth Circuit apparently has not addressed the application of judicial estoppel to a case in which a debtor fails to schedule a potential claim in a bankruptcy filing but later asserts that claim, and requires a close examination of the legal test for intent in this context ). action and facilitation of notice will be granted in part and denied in part. I. Background A. Factual Background For present purposes, the facts are taken as follows: Defendant Crosby Corporation ( Crosby ) provides temporary staffing services to corporate clients, including The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ( Freddie Mac ). Plaintiffs are loan underwriters who were hired by Crosby to work for Freddie Mac in its McLean, Virginia facility beginning in May 2009. Plaintiffs and other loan underwriters reviewed previously underwritten loan files, and were supervised by both Freddie Mac and Crosby employees. Freddie Mac in its Crosby also provided underwriters for Chicago and Atlanta facilities. These temporary employees were paid an hourly wage for their work. Plaintiffs allege that both Crosby and Freddie Mac have implemented a nationwide policy wherein paid minimum wage or overtime pay. underwriters are not (ECF No. 57, at 4). As part of this policy, Defendants required underwriters to meet certain production quotas. Plaintiffs assert that both Freddie Mac and Crosby supervisors told underwriters that they must meet their required weekly loan review quotas, or risk losing their jobs. work Defendants were aware that underwriters would need to more than forty hours per 2 week to meet these quotas. Crosby and Freddie Mac supervisors instructed underwriters not to submit time sheets reflecting more than forty hours worked in a week, because they would not pay employees for overtime hours. This policy working resulted uncompensated in Plaintiffs overtime and hours to other meet underwriters their quotas. Plaintiffs aver that they can demonstrate that they routinely worked more than forty hours a week and were not paid for those excess hours. Finally, Plaintiffs declare that they have personal knowledge of other underwriters who have been victims of the same policy. B. Procedural Background Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Crosby on August 25, 2010, on behalf of themselves and similarly situated others. In the complaint, they sought to bring an FLSA overtime claim as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), as well as state overtime and unpaid wage claims as class actions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiffs amended the complaint on October 19, 2011 to include Freddie Mac as a Defendant. (ECF No. 39). Defendants then answered the complaint, and the parties began limited discovery. 44, 47). (ECF Nos. On February 15, 2012, Plaintiffs moved for conditional certification of a collective action for all underwriters employed by either Crosby or Freddie Mac nationwide, since June 28, 2007, who have not been properly 3 compensated for their overtime work or have not been paid a minimum wage for all hours worked. (ECF No. 57). They also requested facilitation of notice to potential opt-in plaintiffs.2 On February 27, 2012, the for parties discovery. entered a joint (ECF No. 59). motion proposed limited The court held a telephone conference on April 24, 2012, at which time it limited the scope of the potential assigned class to to work underwriters for Freddie employed Mac. by The Crosby parties who were then took depositions of Plaintiffs Donna Mitchel, Kenya Farris, Sylvia Wheeler, Freddie and Mac Christina Wilson; supervisor Ronald Defendant Fiegles. Howard They Crosby, also and obtained declarations of a number of current underwriters working for Crosby and Freddie Mac. (See ECF No. 75-1 through 75-13). Plaintiffs filed a motion for extension of time to respond to Defendants oppositions to their motion for conditional certification of the class without first meeting and conferring with opposing counsel. (ECF No. 77). by Defendant Freddie Mac. II. This motion was unopposed (ECF No. 78). Motion for Conditional Certification and for CourtFacilitated Notice Under action the against FLSA, their plaintiffs employer for 2 may maintain violations a collective under the act On September 23, 2010, one additional Crosby underwriter working at Freddie Mac Vonnese Masembwa - filed a consent form seeking to opt-in as a plaintiff. (ECF No. 8). 4 pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Inc., 532 F.Supp.2d 762, 771 Quinteros v. Sparkle Cleaning, (D.Md. 2008). Section 216(b) provides, in relevant part, as follows: An action . . . may be maintained against any employer . . . in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated. No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought. This provision potential establishes plaintiffs must an opt-in affirmatively scheme, notify their intentions to be a party to the suit. the whereby court of Quinteros, 532 F.Supp.2d at 771 (citing Camper v. Home Quality Mgmt., Inc., 200 F.R.D. 516, 519 (D.Md. 2000)). When pursuant to process. 2010). deciding the whether FLSA, to courts certify generally a collective follow a action two-stage Syrja v. Westat, Inc., 756 F.Supp.2d 682, 686 (D.Md. In the first stage, commonly referred to as the notice stage, the court makes a threshold determination of whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated that potential class members are similarly situated, such that court-facilitated notice to the putative class members would be appropriate. Camper, 200 F.R.D. at 519). close of discovery, the Id. (quoting In the second stage, following the court 5 conducts a more stringent inquiry to similarly determine situated, whether as the required plaintiffs by § are 216(b). in fact Rawls v. Augustine Home Health Care, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 298, 300 (D.Md. 2007). At this later stage, referred to as the decertification stage, the court makes a final decision about the propriety of proceeding as a collective action. Syrja, 756 F.Supp.2d at 686 (quoting Rawls, 244 F.R.D. at 300). Plaintiffs here have moved for conditional certification of a collective action, and they have requested court-facilitated notice to potential opt-in plaintiffs. A. Conditional Certification Is Appropriate Because Plaintiffs Have Made a Modest Factual Showing that Underwriters Hired by Crosby to Work at Freddie Mac s McLean, Virginia Facility Are Similarly Situated Determinations of the appropriateness of conditional collective action certification . . . are left to the court s discretion. Id.; see also Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 169 (1989). The threshold issue in determining whether to exercise such discretion is whether Plaintiffs have demonstrated that situated. Camper, 216(b)). potential 200 opt-in F.R.D. at plaintiffs 519 are (quoting 29 similarly U.S.C. § Similarly situated [does] not mean identical. Bouthner v. Cleveland Constr., Inc., No. RDB-11-0244, 2012 WL 738578, at *4 (D.Md. Mar. 5, 2012) (citing Hipp v. Liberty Nat l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1217 (11th Cir. 2001)). 6 Rather, a group of potential FLSA plaintiffs is similarly situated if its members can demonstrate that they were victims of a common policy, scheme, or plan that violated the law. Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., No. CCB-08-0273, 2008 WL 4735344, at *3 (D.Md. Oct. 14, 2008); Quinteros, 532 F.Supp.2d at 772. To satisfy this standard, plaintiffs generally need only make a relatively modest factual showing that such a common policy, scheme, or plan exists. Marroquin v. Canales, 236 F.R.D. 257, 259 (D.Md. 2006). To meet this burden and demonstrate that potential class members are similarly situated, Plaintiffs must set forth more than vague allegations with meager factual support regarding a common policy to violate the FLSA. D Anna, v. M/A COM, Inc., 903 F.Supp. 889, 894 (D.Md. 1995); Bouthner, 2012 WL 738578, at *4. Their evidence need not, however, enable the court to determine conclusively whether a class of similarly situated plaintiffs exists, Bouthner, 2012 WL 738578, at *4, and it need not include evidence that the company has a formal policy of refusing to pay overtime, Quinteros, 756 F.Supp.2d at 772. Plaintiffs may rely on [a]ffidavits or other means, such as declarations showing. and deposition testimony, to make the required Williams v. Long, 585 F.Supp.2d 679, 684-85 (D.Md. 2008); Essame v. SSC Laurel Operating Co., --- F.Supp.2d ---, 2012 WL 762895, at *3 (D.Md. Mar. 12, 2012). 7 Here, through Plaintiffs declarations, they have made a modest factual showing that they are similarly situated to other Crosby-employed underwriters working at Freddie Mac s McLean facility who have worked more than forty hours per week since May 1, 2009,3 but have not received appropriate proper compensation, Kenya including Farris, submitted Wheeler, declarations underwriters certain Sylvia working production overtime and attesting for Freddie quotas. pay. (ECF First, Christina Donna Wilson that they and Mac were Mitchel, have required Nos. 57-1 other Crosby to through all meet 57-4). Second, Plaintiffs assert that supervisors told all underwriters that they must meet their required weekly loan review quotas, or risk losing their jobs. (Id.). Third, Plaintiffs all attest that the Defendants were aware that underwriters could not meet their quotas in a forty-hour workweek. (Id.). Fourth, all four Plaintiffs who submitted declarations contend that Crosby and Freddie Mac not submit to supervisors time affirmatively sheets reflecting 3 instructed underwriters more forty than hours Plaintiffs proposed notice requests certification for a class of Crosby underwriters who began work after both June 28, 2007 and June 27, 2008. (ECF No. 57-8, at 1-2). Neither of these dates relate to the facts of this case. The earliest date that the Plaintiffs suggest prospective class members began working for Crosby at Freddie Mac s McLean facility is May 1, 2009. (ECF No. 80, at 2). Therefore, the proposed class may only include those Crosby-employed underwriters working at Freddie Mac s McLean facility after May 1, 2009. 8 worked in a week, because they would not pay the underwriters for that additional time. (Id.). Finally, Plaintiffs all aver that they were not fully compensated by the Defendants for all hours worked, and that they have personal knowledge of other underwriters who also were not paid overtime. (Id.). Taken together, these facts attested to in Plaintiffs declarations establish the modest factual showing necessary for conditional certification of a class of underwriters who worked for Crosby in Freddie Mac s McLean facilities since May 1, 2009. Plaintiffs contend that the class should include all Crosby-employed underwriters working at Freddie Mac facilities nationwide. Because Plaintiffs have offered no evidence of Defendants failure to pay overtime at any other Freddie Mac facilities, they have failed to meet their burden with respect to Defendants facility. policies outside of the McLean, Virginia See Faust v. Comcast Cable Comms. Mgmt., LLC., No. WMN-10-2336, (limiting 2011 WL conditional 5244421, at *4 (D.Md. certification of FLSA Nov. class 1, to 2011) one of eight Maryland call centers because even though employees at all call centers perform the same tasks and are subject to the same company policies, concrete facilities Plaintiffs evidence had been have demonstrating victims of failed that the to provide employees same illegal at any other policies); Camper, 200 F.R.D. at 520-21 (holding that although plaintiffs 9 preliminarily established the existence of a company-wide policy concerning use of time clocks, notice to the potential class was warranted with respect to only the one facility where the plaintiffs made a factual showing); see also Shabazz v. Asurion Ins. Serv., No. 3:07-0653, 2008 WL 1730318, at *5 (M.D.Tenn. Apr. 10, 2008) (denying certification for Houston facility when evidence only demonstrated violations at Nashville locations); Hens v. ClientLogic Operating Corp., No. 05-CV-381S, 2006 WL 2795620, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2006) (limiting certified class to employees from eight of the defendant s fifty-two call centers, because the plaintiffs only presented evidence, in the form of declarations from employees working at these locations, that potential FLSA violations occurred). As in Faust and Camper, absent some evidentiary showing of FLSA violations at other Freddie Mac facilities, this court will not enlarge the opt-in class as Plaintiffs request. Defendants present several counterarguments in an effort to avoid that conditional Crosby s certification formal policy entirely. has First, always been consultants for all hours worked and submitted. at 4). Essame, to argue pay its (ECF No. 76, [I]t is well-settled, however, that the promulgation of written policies, employer they from 2012 conduct WL per se, is insufficient to immunize an that 762895, otherwise at *6); 10 contravenes see also the FLSA. Espenscheid v. DirectSAT USA, LLC, No. 09-cv-625-bbc, 2010 WL 2330309, at *7 (W.D.Wis. June 7, 2010) (finding that the defendants formal wage and hour policies, which complied with the FLSA, did not preclude conditional certification where there was evidence of an informal 785.13)). policy to deny overtime (citing 29 C.F.R. § By affirming in their declarations that Defendants refused to pay overtime hours and instructed Plaintiffs not to record all of their work on timesheets, Plaintiffs have adduced enough evidence to establish, preliminarily, that a common policy existed at the McLean facility. Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs situations are so factually distinct both from one another and from all other Crosby-employed underwriters at the Freddie Mac facility McLean that they require individualized treatment. 75, at 36-44; 76, at 12). should not be unmanageable: under varying in (ECF Nos. Specifically, they note that a class conditionally certified because it would be underwriters worked at different time periods, policies, different amounts of time. for different (Id.). managers, and for Defendants cite Syrja v. Westat, Inc. to support these arguments. 756 F.Supp.2d 682. Syrja is inapposite to this case because the Syrja court denied conditional certification to a group of independent employees who worked in multiple geographic locations around the country, over different time periods, in 11 offices run by different managers, without any showing of a national policy. Id. at 688. Here, conditional certification will be granted to a group of employees who have worked in a single location, in identical positions, under a single management structure. Tyson Foods, Inc., 256 F.R.D. 97, 102 See Robinson v. (S.D.Iowa 2008) (conditionally certifying a class of meat processors who worked in a single location under a single management structure). Further, this argument delves too deeply into the merits of the dispute at this initial notice stage. Essame, 2012 WL 762895, at * 4 (refusing to conclude that numerous dissimilarities in the plaintiffs evidence counseled against granting conditional certification); see also, e.g., Wlotkowski v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 267 F.R.D. 213, 219 (E.D.Mich. 2010) ( Defendant s arguments about the predominance of individualized inquiries and dissimilarities between plaintiff and other employees are properly raised after the parties have conducted discovery and can present a more detailed factual record for the court to review. ); De Lune-Guerrero v. N.C. Growers Ass n, Inc., 338 F.Supp.2d 649, 654 (E.D.N.C. 2004) ( Differences as to time actually worked, wages actually due and hours involved are . . . not significant determination. ). that [i]ndividual collective action. to [the conditional certification] Defendants argument also fails to recognize circumstances are inevitably present Espenscheid, 2010 WL 2330309, at *4. 12 in a To proceed as a collective action at this stage, Plaintiffs need only make a modest factual showing that they were victims of a common policy or practice that violated the FLSA. WL 762895, at *4. Essame, 2012 Based on their declarations asserting that they were instructed not to record all of their overtime work and that they did not regularly receive overtime compensation despite working more than forty hours per week, Plaintiffs have made that showing. Defendants Plaintiffs next request argue for that the conditional court should certification deny because Plaintiffs declarations are not credible and because Defendants have submitted declarations and testimony of other class members to contradict Plaintiffs assertions. 75, at 29). potential (ECF No. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have each given multiple versions of their experiences as a Crosby [underwriter] in sworn declarations, interrogatory (Id. at depositions responses, 11). It is and not other entirely under oath, statements or clear the that verified writings. purported incongruity actually exists between Plaintiffs declaration and deposition testimony, because personal knowledge of facts may be inferred from Plaintiffs statements of first-hand experience and their observations. See Sjoblom v. Charter Commc ns, LLC, 571 F.Supp.2d 961, 968-69 (W.D.Wisc. 2008) (refusing to discard plaintiffs evidence for lack 13 of personal knowledge and inconsistencies between declarations and deposition testimony where declarants did not actually know whether coworkers were actually paid for overtime work because this fact could be inferred from declarants observations and personal experience of not being paid for overtime) (citing Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 772 (7th Cir. 1991) (concluding that personal knowledge includes reasonable inferences grounded in observation or firsthand experience)). For example, Defendants posit that Ms. Mitchel s declaration affirms personal knowledge that coworkers were not paid for overtime work, yet Ms. Mitchel later admitted that she did worked. not (ECF know No. what 75, at hours other Crosby Ms. Mitchel s 18). underwriters deposition testimony evinces that she did not know the specific number of overtime hours worked numerous conversations by her with colleagues, them regularly working overtime hours. Therefore, for purposes of to but discuss that that she they had were (ECF No. 75-3, at 41-42). conditional certification, Plaintiffs assertions of personal knowledge seem to be grounded in reasonable experience. inferences based on their observations and Sjoblom, 571 F.Supp.2d at 968-69; Pauley, 337 F.3d at 772. Even if purported discrepancies did cast some doubt on Mitchel, Farris, Wheeler, and Wilson s credibility, conditional certification would not be denied on that basis alone because 14 credibility determinations are usually inappropriate for the question of conditional certification. Essame, 2012 WL 762895, at *3 (citing Colozzi v. St. Joseph s Hosp. Health Ctr., 595 F.Supp.2d 200, 205 (N.D.N.Y. 2009)). purported discrepancies between Defendants reliance on Plaintiffs declarations and deposition testimony is, therefore, unavailing. Defendants presentation of other Crosby underwriters working for Freddie Mac who were not aware of any policy or practice at Freddie Mac or Crosby Corporation where they were encouraged or required to work overtime hours without accurately recording the hours or receiving unpersuasive at this stage. fact that [Plaintiffs ] [D]efendants does not payment (ECF No. 76 at 12). allegations mean for that are is Indeed, [t]he disputed [P]laintiffs them, have by . . failed . to establish a colorable basis for their claim that a class of similarly situated plaintiffs exist[s]. Quinteros, 532 F.Supp.2d at 772; Essame, 2012 WL 762895, at *3 (noting that the court does not . . . resolve factual disputes at the conditional certification stage (quoting Colozzi, 595 F.Supp.2d at 205)); Lewis v. Wells Fargo & Co., 669 F.Supp.2d 1124, 1128 (N.D.Cal. 2009) (conditionally certifying a collective action even though the defendant had submitted fifty-four declarations many from current employees plaintiffs evidence). 15 that contradicted the Defendants argue that if a class is conditionally granted, that class should be limited only to those underwriters who worked for Crosby contemporaneous to at the Freddie named Mac s McLean Plaintiffs. facility Making this determination inquires too deeply into the merits of the case and is best addressed after the facts have developed with the benefit of full discovery. been more fully Defendants point out that since the Plaintiffs have left its employ, Crosby has issued a new formal policy regarding overtime pay. Plaintiffs argue, however, that Crosby s policy of underpaying underwriters was informal, and a change in formal policy may have no bearing on its actual practices. Plaintiffs require discovery to determine whether and when Defendants policies and practices changed. Therefore, the class will not be as limited at this stage as the Defendants suggest. Despite evidence Defendants presented by assertions Plaintiffs is to the contrary, sufficient to make the the minimal evidentiary showing that a common policy or scheme to violate the FLSA existed for Crosby-employed working at Freddie Mac s McLean, Virginia facility.4 4 underwriters Rawls, 244 Defendants also argue that Crosby has already paid Plaintiffs and other underwriters for any potential overtime that they may have worked for Freddie Mac. (ECF Nos. 75, at 4142). Because this argument cuts directly to the heart of the 16 F.R.D. at 300. in this This conclusion is in line with numerous cases district and throughout the country that have conditionally certified collective actions based on analogous circumstances. (granting See, e.g., conditional Essame, 2012 certification WL 762895, where the at *3-4 plaintiffs submitted declarations that the defendant required them to work through their unpaid meal breaks); Faust, 2011 WL 5244421, at *5 (finding that the plaintiffs had made the modest factual showing necessary regarding an unlawful compensation policy by submitting evidence that they were encouraged to work off the clock, [were] supervisor s in fact working knowledge, and of the [were] clock not with being their properly compensated for that time ); Espenscheid, 2010 WL 2330309, at *7-8 (conditionally certifying a nationwide class of technicians where the plaintiffs submitted affidavits from several putative class members that the defendants did not compensate them for overtime involving pre- and post-shift work and affidavits from company managers Premier Commc ns, (concluding showing that affidavits that and acknowledging 504 the they this F.Supp.2d plaintiffs were deposition practice); 685, had similarly testimony 689 made a situated Kautsch (W.D.Mo. modest by indicating v. 2007) factual submitting that their merits of the case, the court will not consider it at this stage. 17 managers directed them not to record overtime and prohibited them from recording time spent on several non-production tasks). Conditional certification pursuant to § 216(b) is, therefore, warranted employed for as the class temporary of staff Crosbyy for underwriters Freddie Mac at who its were McLean, Virginia facility since May 1, 2009 and worked more than forty hours a week without receiving proper compensation, including overtime pay. B. Court Supervised Notice to Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs is Proper Because Plaintiffs Crosby-employed have underwriters made a working preliminary showing at Mac s Freddie that McLean facility are similarly situated, notice of this action will be provided to underwriters who currently since May 1, 2009, at that facility. a proposed notice form. work, or have worked Plaintiffs have submitted (ECF No. 50-8). Defendants requested an opportunity to suggest comments to the proposed notice form. (ECF No. 76, at 14 n.2). The district court has broad discretion regarding the details of the notice sent to potential opt-in plaintiffs. Lee v. ABC Carpet & Home, 236 F.R.D. 193, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 171). The overarching policies of the FLSA s collective suit provisions require that the proposed notice provide accurate 18 and timely notice concerning the pendency of the collective action, so that [potential plaintiffs] can make informed decisions about whether to participate. Whitehorn v. Wolfgang s Steakhouse, Inc., 767 F.Supp.2d 445, Heartland Brewery, 2007)). 450 (S.D.N.Y. Inc., 2011) 516 (quoting F.Supp.2d Fasanelli 317, 323 v. (S.D.N.Y. Notice to the proposed class will be approved without receiving additional comments from Defendants. included any comments Defendants request Plaintiffs notice position in the in their the lawsuit opposition. ability because it and They could have to fails to suggest to advise Presumably, comments to assert Defendants potential plaintiffs adequately about the right to join this suit with their own attorney and the possibility of having to participate in the discovery process important. and the trial. These considerations are See, e.g., Wass v. NPC Int l, Inc., No. 09-2254-JWL, 2011 WL 1118774, at *10 (D.Kan. Mar. 28, 2011) (requiring the plaintiffs to amend a notice to include a statement about the defendant s position); Whitehorn, 767 F.Supp.2d at 450-51 (requiring amendment of proposed notice to inform potential optin plaintiffs of the possibility that they will be required to participate in discovery and testify at trial and to state that participating plaintiffs may retain their own counsel ).5 5 Plaintiffs have also requested that the court appoint 19 Accordingly, the court will modify the proposed notice to potential class members to correct these deficiencies.6 The parties do not comment on the length of the notice period, and leave this to the court s discretion. Notice periods may vary, but numerous courts around the country have authorized See, e.g., ninety-day Wass, opt-in 2011 WL periods 1118774, for at collective *11 actions. (denying the defendant s request to shorten the opt-in period to fewer than ninety days); Calderon v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., No. RWT 10cv1958, 2011 WL 98197, at *2, 8-9 (D.Md. Jan. 12, 2011) (authorizing a ninety-day notice period); Pereira v. Foot Locker, Inc., 261 F.R.D. 60, 68-69 (E.D.Pa. 2009) (finding a ninety-day opt-in period to be reasonable). Plaintiffs may, therefore, notify other potential plaintiffs of this action by first-class mail using the court-approved notice appended to this memorandum opinion.7 their counsel as counsel for this collective action. Defendants have not opposed this request. Thus, any potential opt-in plaintiff who does not enter an appearance through his own counsel, or indicate a desire to represent himself, will be represented by Plaintiffs counsel. 6 The notice will also clarify the scope of the collective action to make clear that it covers only underwriters who worked for Crosby at Freddie Mac s McLean, Virginia facility since May 1, 2009. 7 To effectuate this notice, Defendants will be required to produce a file containing the full names and last known home 20 III. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs motion for conditional certification and for court-facilitated notice will be granted in part and denied in part. A separate Order will follow. /s/ DEBORAH K. CHASANOW United States District Judge addresses of potential opt-in plaintiffs within fourteen days of the issuance of the accompanying Order. Defendants will not, however, be required to provide phone numbers for potential optin plaintiffs at this time because Plaintiffs have made no showing of any special need for the disclosure of this information. See Calderon, 2011 WL 98197, at *9 ( [A]bsent a showing by plaintiffs of special need for disclosure of class members telephone numbers, ordering such disclosure is not appropriate. (quoting Arevalo v. D.J. s Underground, No. DKC 09-3199, 2010 WL 4026112, at *2 (D.Md. Oct. 13, 2010))). 21
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