Holland v. Prince George's County, Maryland et al, No. 8:2009cv02737 - Document 24 (D. Md. 2011)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 2/8/11. (sat, Chambers)
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Holland v. Prince George&#039;s County, Maryland et al Doc. 24 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND : ALLIN HOLLAND : v. : Civil Action No. DKC 09-2737 : PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND, et al. : MEMORANDUM OPINION Presently Plaintiff Allin pending and Holland’s ready motion for for resolution summary are judgment (1) (ECF No. 20) and (2) the cross-motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Prince George’s County’s (ECF No. 21). The issues are fully briefed and the court now rules pursuant to Local Rule 105.6, no hearing being deemed necessary. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment will be denied and Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment will be granted in part and denied in part. I. Background The noted. following facts are uncontroverted unless otherwise Plaintiff Allin Holland has been disabled since 2005 when his right leg was amputated below the knee. Holland Dep., at 13). (ECF No. 21, Plaintiff walks with the assistance of a prosthesis and also regularly uses crutches. (Id. at 13–14). On January 22, 2007, Plaintiff arrived at the Prince George’s Dockets.Justia.com (Id. at 10).1 County Correctional Center. medical disability, observation the room. county (Id.). Due to Plaintiff’s assigned Plaintiff him was to told the medical that Prince George’s County does not allow inmates to have crutches, but while in the medical observation Plaintiff with a wheelchair. room, the county provided (Id. at 16; ECF No. 21-5, Pl.’s Answer to Def.’s Interrog., at 3–4). On January 25, 2007, Plaintiff was transferred to housing unit H-12, which was not a handicap accessible (ECF No. 21-2, at 12; ECF No. 21-5, at 4). facility, Plaintiff wheelchair. did not have access facility. While in this to crutches or a (ECF No. 21-2, at 16–17; ECF No. 21-5, at 4). Plaintiff claims that he notified unnamed correctional staff on at least two occasions that he needed facilities with handicapped access and on both occasions was told to “step away from his desk.” After attempted (ECF No. 21-2, at 17; ECF No. 21-5, at 8). notifying to ECF No. 21-5, take at the a 4). staff shower. The of his (ECF parties concerns, No. 21-2, disagree as Plaintiff entered the shower with his prosthesis. Plaintiff at to 17–18; whether Defendant claims that Plaintiff left his prosthesis by his bedside and 1 The summary judgment record contains no details to explain the reason for Plaintiff’s detention. The complaint recites that Plaintiff came from the Calvert County Jail. 2 entered the shower on one leg. Plaintiff claims that he entered the shower area with his prosthesis on, and once inside, he removed the prosthesis and placed it outside the shower so that it would not get wet. (ECF No. 21-2, at 19). In any event, Plaintiff did not have his prosthesis when he left the shower stall and, as a result, had to “hop” out of the shower. While hopping over the shower ledge, Plaintiff slipped and suffered temporary loss of consciousness, pain in his back and hips, a headache, and pain throughout his left leg. (ECF No. 21-5, at 5). On September 22, 2009, Plaintiff commenced this three-count action for damages arising from his treatment while incarcerated against Prince George’s County, Maryland, and two unidentified individuals referred to as Officer “John Doe” and Dr. “Richard Roe” in the (ECF No. 2). Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. Plaintiff had been released from the detention center by this time and listed his address in the complaint in Lusby, Maryland. acts of all (Id.). Defendants In count I, Plaintiff claims that the violated his rights guaranteed Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Plaintiff claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § under In count II, 1983 that the Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff claims that Defendants 3 violated the In count III, Americans with Disabilities maintaining Act (“ADA”) inaccessible in designing, showers. On constructing, October 21, and 2009, Defendant Prince George’s County, Maryland, removed this case to the United States District Court pursuant to federal question jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1). On May 17, 2010, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on liability. (ECF No. 20). On June 3, 2010, Defendant Prince George’s County filed a crossmotion for summary judgment, a motion to dismiss the unnamed Defendants, and a response in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. II. (ECF No. 21). Standard of Review. It is well established that a motion for summary judgment will be granted only if there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2008). In other words, if there clearly exists factual issues “that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved party,” summary judgment is inappropriate. in favor of either Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); JKC Holding Co. LLC v. Washington Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir. 2001). 4 When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007); Emmett, 532 F.3d at 297. A party who bears the burden of proof on a particular claim must factually support each element of his or her claim. 323. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element Id. ... necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Thus, on those issues on which the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof, it is his or her responsibility to confront the motion for summary judgment with an affidavit or other similar evidence in order to show the existence of a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254; Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. “A mere scintilla of proof, however, will not Jenney, suffice 327 F.3d to 307, prevent 314 summary (4th Cir. judgment.” 2003). Peters There must v. be “sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249-50 (citations omitted). When faced with cross-motions for summary judgment, as in this case, the court must consider “each motion separately on its own merits to determine whether 5 either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law.” Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 822 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also havePower, LLC v. Gen. Elec. Co., 256 F.Supp.2d 402, 406 (D.Md. 2003)(citing 10A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Procedure § 2720 (3d ed. 1983)). Miller, Federal Practice & The court reviews each motion under the familiar standard for summary judgment. The court must deny both motions if it finds there is a genuine issue of material fact, “[b]ut if there is no genuine issue and one or the other party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law, the court will render judgment.” 10A Federal Practice & Procedure § 2720. III. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant Prince George’s County entitled to summary judgment because: asserts that it is (1) Plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, (ECF No. 21, at 9–10); (2) Plaintiff has failed to establish discriminatory intent for his ADA claim, (id. at 8); (3) Plaintiff has failed to plead a policy, practice, or custom that would attach liability to the county cannot under 42 U.S.C. demonstrate § that 1983, and anyone even acted if pled, with Plaintiff deliberate indifference to his medical needs, (id. at 5); and (4) Plaintiff 6 has failed to plead sufficiently a due process violation under the Maryland Constitution. (id. at 7–8). A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The prisoner Prison Litigation confined in Reform jail, Act prison, (PLRA) or requires other any correctional facility to exhaust all administrative remedies before bringing an action under Section 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). A prisoner “means any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, diversionary program.” probation, pretrial 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h). release, or A former prisoner who has been released is no longer considered incarcerated or detained for the purposes of this section. Cofield v. Bowser, 247 F.App’x. 413, 414 (4th Cir. 2007)(unpublished opinion)(citing Norton v. City of Marietta, 432 F.3d 1145, 1150 (10th Cir. 2005) as collecting cases concluding that plaintiffs bringing civil actions to challenge prison conditions after their release are do not have to satisfy the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA); accord, Cantley v. West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority, 783 F.Supp.2d 803, 819-820 (S.D.W.Va. 2010). It is the plaintiff’s status at the time when the complaint is filed that is determinative. Cofield, 7 247 F.App’x at 414; Norton, 432 F.3d at 1150. plaintiff apparently In Cofield, for example, although the had signed the complaint while incarcerated, because it was not filed until after his release and because it listed a private street address as his mailing address, the court concluded requirement did not apply to him. Failure to exhaust that the PLRA exhaustion 247 F.App’x at 414. administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, and the burden is on the defendant to show that it applies. Here, Defendant prisoner at Jones v. Black, 549 U.S. 199, 211–212 (2007). presents the time no he evidence filed that his Plaintiff complaint. was a Plaintiff maintains that he was not incarcerated at the time when the complaint was filed. (ECF No. 22, at 6). And indeed Plaintiff’s complaint lists an address in Lusby, Maryland, which is not the address of the Correctional Center. will not be dismissed for failure to exhaust The complaint administrative remedies. B. Count III – Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Pursuant to Title II of the ADA, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subject to discrimination by any 8 such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 2132. To establish a violation under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) he has a qualifying disability; (2) he is otherwise qualified to receive the benefits of a public service, program, or activity; and (3) he was excluded from the benefit based on his disability. Constantine v. George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 498 (4th Cir.2005)(citing Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir. 1999)). The parties do not recognized disability. dispute that Plaintiff has an ADA In addition, as an inmate in Prince George’s County, he was entitled to access to the prison showers and other facilities. The Supreme Court has held that the phrase “services, programs, or activities” in 42 U.S.C. § 12132 includes recreational, prison programs. 210 (1998). further educational, and vocational Pa. Dept. of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, In United States v. Georgia, the Supreme Court elaborated officials medical, to that the accommodate “deliberate [a refusal prisoner’s] needs of prison in such fundamentals as mobility, hygiene, [and] medical care . . . constituted” exclusion from participation in or denial of benefits of “the prison’s services, programs, or activities.” 546 U.S. has also recognized prisoners’ rights to conduct personal hygiene. See Miller 902 v. (4th Cir. 151, 157 Hinton, (2006). 2008 2008)(finding WL The Fourth 3849765, that 9 the 288 Circuit F.App’x. defendant 901, reasonably accommodated the plaintiff by giving him the opportunity to receive such services as conducting personal hygiene or engaging in recreation); see also Brown v. Va. Dept. of Corr., No. 6:07CV-00033, 2009 (dismissing WL the 87459, plaintiff’s at *9 ADA (W.D.Va. claim in Jan. part 9, 2009) because the defendants did not deny the plaintiff the opportunity to receive services, such as conducting personal hygiene). Defendant contends that Plaintiff cannot show that he was excluded from a benefit based on his disability because he has not shown that the prison officials had a discriminatory intent. (ECF No. 21, at 8). Although Plaintiff must show intentional discrimination to recover compensatory damages under the ADA, Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n., 527 U.S. 526, 533–34 (1999), Plaintiff need not show that Defendant harbored a discriminating animus towards him. Proctor v. Prince George’s Hosp. Ctr., 32 F.Supp.2d 820, 829 (D.Md. 1998)(quoting Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Exam’rs., 970 F.Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)). “Rather, intentional discrimination is shown by an intentional, or willful, violation of the Act itself.” summary judgment, “willfully Plaintiff with[eld] . . . must the Id. demonstrate reasonable that has submitted sufficient Defendant accommodations which [Plaintiff] was entitled to under the law.” Plaintiff To survive evidence to Id. to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant willfully 10 withheld the reasonable hygiene accommodations to which he was entitled. First, Plaintiff’s evidence would support a finding that Defendant knew of his disability and his request for an accommodation. least two Plaintiff testified that he timely notified at correctional officers accessible shower facilities.2 that he needed handicapped In addition, the prison facility was well aware that Plaintiff’s right leg had been amputated, and, thus, was on notice that he would likely need an accommodation to access certain facilities. A prison reasonable facility, however, accommodations to an is not inmate required if to doing provide so would fundamentally alter the prison’s services or impose an undue burden. Dade Miller, 288 F.App’x. at 903 (quoting Bircoll v. Miami- Cnty., 480 Plaintiff’s reasonably F.3d evidence 1072, 1082 indicates accommodated Plaintiff (11th Cir. 2007)). that Defendant by returning Here, could him to have the medical unit. Defendant does not contend that such a move was not but possible, instead argues that it did requisite discriminatory intent in not doing so. not have the Defendant’s argument is unavailing because, as noted, the requirement of 2 While Plaintiff has failed to produce the names of either of the two correctional officers, the veracity of Plaintiff’s assertions is decided by the fact finder, and thus, is sufficient to survive summary judgment. 11 discriminatory intent is satisfied intentional violation of the Act. C. by a showing of an Proctor, 32 F.Supp.2d at 829. Count II – 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) a deprivation of a constitutional right or some right secured by the laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a state actor.” (1988). A governmental West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 entity cannot be held liable Section 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior. under Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Instead, to find a municipality liable as a tortfeasor, its official policy or custom must have inflicted the injury. Id. at 694. The government policy or custom need not have received formal decision making liability. 518, 522 approval channels through to the subject government’s the official municipality to Riddick v. Sch. Bd. of City of Portsmouth, 238 F.3d (4th Cir. 2000). Rather, a municipality will be adjudged liable if the “alleged constitutional deprivation is caused by the official actions of those individuals whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” Id. at 523 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). To establish that the deprivation was caused by a state actor, Plaintiff must provide adequate notice to Defendant by pleading a specific policy or custom as the cause of his injury. 12 Flanagan v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 593 F.Supp.2d 803, 810 (D.Md. 2009). A plaintiff may demonstrate a policy or custom by showing either: (1) “an express policy, such as a written ordinance or regulation;” (2) “the decisions of a person with policymaking authority;” (3) “an omission, such as a failure to properly train officers, that manifests a deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens;” or (4) “a practice that is so persistent and widespread as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003). The complaint alleges that “[t]he acts of the defendants,” specifically placing Plaintiff in a non-handicapped accessible housing unit without his crutches, “constituted conduct under color of state law which deprived plaintiff of rights, privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” liberal notice Leatherman v. (ECF No. 2 ¶¶ 8, 17). pleading standard Tarrant Cnty. for Even under the section Narcotics 1983 actions, Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993), a plaintiff must adequately plead and prove the existence of an official policy or custom. Jordan (4th Cir. 1994). insufficient to by Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 338 Failure to point to such a policy or custom is state a claim 13 because it does not provide Defendant with adequate notice with which to frame a response. Flanagan, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 810. The complaint alleges that Prince George’s County is responsible for operating the Correctional Center in compliance with federal and state constitutions, and applicable laws and regulations. It also alleges that Plaintiff arrived at the center with crutches, but was not allowed to have them or a wheelchair while in a regular housing unit. In his opposition, Plaintiff submits that Defendant’s policy or custom “was placing handicapped individuals into a non-handicapped accessible unit.” (ECF No. 22, at 2). The allegations concerning the responses of those to whom Plaintiff complained indicate that they had no discretion to do other than direct Plaintiff to make do in the situation. Thus, the policy alleged was one of the County to assign people like Plaintiff to a regular housing unit, but deprive them of crutches or wheelchair assistance. Plaintiff argues that the County’s adherence to this policy constituted deliberate indifference to a serious medical need in violation of his Fourteenth and/or Eighth Amendment rights. Claims of deliberate indifference to medical needs have both an objective and subjective component. F.3d 164, 167 (4th Cir. 1998). the medical serious. condition Id.; Hudson Johnson v. Quinones, 145 First a plaintiff must prove that or injury v. McMillian, 14 at issue 503 was U.S. 1, objectively 9 (1992); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). need’ is ‘one that has been diagnosed A “‘serious medical by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily attention.’” Iko recognize v. the necessity 535 F.3d Shreve, for 225, a doctor's (4th 241 Cir. 2008)(quoting Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 846 (7th Cir. 1999)). Second, component by a showing indifference. plaintiff that must government satisfy the subjective acted with deliberate Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991). The subjective standard of deliberate indifference requires that a government “must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and it must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The Fourth Circuit has held that to satisfy this requirement a plaintiff must show that the officials had “actual knowledge of the risk of harm” and “must also have recognized that his actions were insufficient to mitigate the risk of harm to the inmate arising from his medical needs.” Iko, 535 F.3d at 241. As discussed above, the County was aware of Plaintiff’s condition argument and is the that limitations despite its of his mobility. knowledge thereof, Plaintiff’s the County policy resulted in his placement in a facility that was not equipped to accommodate his status and this action demonstrated deliberate indifference to his needs. 15 Defendant has not shown that there is no evidence upon which a reasonable jury could agree with Plaintiff. D. Count I – Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides “[t]hat no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land.” process and Amendment. (2008). the Article 24 is Maryland’s counterpart to both the due equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Alvarez v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 402 Md. 727, 737 As a result, Article 24 is read in pari materia with Fourteenth Amendment, and considered highly persuasive. 415 Md. 475, 499 (2010). Supreme Court precedent is Tyler v. City of College Park, There is not complete overlap between this claim and the Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim because under Maryland law, doctrine of a municipality respondeat may superior be for held liable violations of under the the state constitution committed by the municipality’s agents or employees within the scope of their employment. Md. 18, 51-52 (1999). See DiPino v. Davis, 354 Thus in addition to potential liability under Article 24 for its policy, the County may be liable for the acts its employees. 16 Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s Article 24 claim still fails because only pretrial detainees can bring claims alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, or its Maryland state law counterpart Article 24, and Plaintiff was not a pretrial detainee. (ECF No. 21-1, at 5-7). Defendant argues that Plaintiff can only bring his claim under the Eighth Amendment, whose protections do not overlap with those provided by Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.3 (Id.). Defendant does note that the same standard, whether a government official has been serious deliberately medical needs, indifferent is to applied any to of the evaluate plaintiff’s medical needs claims under both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at n. 1)(citing Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 388 (4th Cir. 2001). and Plaintiff has not directly responded to this argument simply maintains that because he presented sufficient evidence of a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to preclude summary judgment on the Section 1983 claim summary judgment must also be denied on his claim under Article 24. (ECF No. 22, at 4). 3 Defendant does not mention that Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides the same protection from cruel and unusual punishment as the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff’s complaint did not allege any violations of Article 25, but could be amended to include such claims if appropriate. 17 From the record presented, the court is unable to discern Plaintiff’s status during his stay at the Correctional Center and as a result cannot state conclusively that Plaintiff was not a pretrial detainee. claim was properly If he was a pretrial detainee then his brought under Article 24; if not then Plaintiff may need to amend his complaint to bring a claim under Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration counterpart to the Eighth Amendment. of Rights, the Because the standard for evaluating the claim under either Article is the same, however, summary judgment could only be granted at this juncture if Defendant is correct that Plaintiff has produced insufficient evidence to sustain a medical needs claim under either Article 24 or 25.4 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s condition was not serious and points to the fact that Plaintiff had sufficient mobility to play basketball earlier in the day and was generally mobile with his prosthesis. (ECF No. 21-1, at 5-6). that Plaintiff has not offered 4 any Defendant also contends evidence of deliberate The parties have analyzed the claim under the rubric of a medical needs claim. It may be more appropriately characterized as a condition of confinement claim. See e.g., Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 824 (4th Cir. 1991)(“a two-pronged showing is necessary to demonstrate a . . . violation with respect to prison conditions: (1) a serious deprivation of a basic human need and (2) deliberate indifference to prison conditions on the part of prison officials.) Because the same analysis is used in both contexts, it is unnecessary to make a firm distinction at this point. 18 indifference. condition Plaintiff was serious maintains and notes in response that that Defendant’s his account neglects to mention that Plaintiff could not use his prosthesis while taking a shower because it cannot get wet. (ECF Nos. 20- 2, at 3; 22, at 3-4). In addition to liability stemming from the County policy discussed above, Plaintiff has produced evidence that individual prison officials’ actions may render the County liable under the respondeat superior doctrine. testimony and unidentified showers in discovery guards Housing on Plaintiff has pointed to his own responses two Unit stating occasions H-12 were to not (ECF Nos. 20-3, at 4; 21-2, at 17-18). that the he fact handicap alerted that the accessible. The reasonableness of the guards’ response to that information and whether they were acting within the scope of their employment are questions of fact for the jury to determine. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Prince George’s County will be denied on all counts. E. Motion To Dismiss Officer John Doe and Dr. Richard Roe. Defendant has moved to dismiss Officer John Doe and Dr. Richard Roe as defendants. As Plaintiff has failed to identify these defendants or submit evidence establishing their liability by the close of discovery, Defendant’s cross-motion for summary 19 judgment as to Officer John Doe and Dr. Richard Roe will be granted. See Schiff v. Kennedy, 691, 198 (4th Cir. 1982)(noting that the if discovered true identity through of discovery, an the unnamed court party should cannot dismiss be the action). IV. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability. Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on all three counts of his complaint. While Plaintiff has identified sufficient evidence to defeat Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, there are genuine disputes of fact that preclude judgment for Plaintiff at this time. With respect to Plaintiff’s ADA claim in count III, a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether Prince George’s County accessible shower unit H-12. willfully facilities withheld by access placing to handicapped Plaintiff in housing With respect to Plaintiff's § 1983 claim in count II, a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether Prince George’s Plaintiff to a County regular had a policy housing crutches or wheelchair assistance. Article 24 claim in count I, to unit, assign but people deprive like them of With respect to Plaintiff’s among other issues a genuine dispute of material fact remains regarding Plaintiff’s status during his detention. 20 V. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the motions for summary judgment will be denied. The claims against Officer John Doe and Doctor Richard Roe will be dismissed. A separate Order will follow. /s/ DEBORAH K. CHASANOW United States District Judge 21
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