Mock v. Lockheed Martin Corporation, No. 8:2009cv01370 - Document 12 (D. Md. 2009)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiff 10/8/09 sat). Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 10/8/09. (sat, Chambers)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND : ANDREA L. MOCK : v. : Civil Action No. DKC 09-1370 : LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION : MEMORANDUM OPINION Presently pending and ready for resolution in this case is a motion to dismiss and motion for a more definite statement (Paper 10) Plaintiff filed was by notified Defendant by the Lockheed clerk of Martin the pendency motion and the necessity for filing a response. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975). Corporation. of the Roseboro v. No response was filed. The issues are briefed and the court now rules pursuant to Local Rule 105.6, no hearing being deemed necessary. For the reasons that follow, Defendant s motion for a more definite statement will be denied and Defendant s motion to dismiss will be granted without prejudice. Plaintiff will be granted 21 days within which to file an amended complaint. I. Background This case arises from a dispute that Plaintiff Andrea Mock has with her former employer, Lockheed Martin Corporation. Plaintiff, a resident of Clarksville, Maryland, asserts that she filed an administrative charge of discrimination with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ( EEOC ) on March 26, 2008. (Paper 1, at 3). Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint on May 22, 2009, and attached a notice of right to sue from the EEOC, dated April 9, 2009. Using cases, the form Plaintiff complaint alleges Corporation, operating against on her disability. (Paper 1, attach. 2, at 2). the for that in employment Defendant Bethesda, basis of (Paper 1, at 2). her discrimination Lockheed Maryland, race, Martin discriminated color, sex, and Plaintiff states that she was asked to accept pay cuts on two occasions and was not provided with a justification. excluded from average. By team Plaintiff also contends that she was awards reference though to an her performance attachment to the was above complaint, Plaintiff asserts that between March 2005 and October 2007, she was subjected to numerous incidents that involved denigrating and derogatory comments and implication [sic] about [her] appearance that were based on [her] ethnicity, gender and health issues related to [her] disabilities. 1). (Paper 1, attach. 2, at The only facts that Plaintiff alleges regarding incidents of offensive discriminatory conduct that occurred while she was working at Lockheed Martin are as follows: 2 1. I was told that blacks learn by assimilation and whites learn by accommodation, implying that blacks are inferior. I was told that I should not write because it would be all wrong. 2. I was told that the company recruited from a specific gene pool that did not resemble me. And 3. Leaders in my company made comments implying that I was masculine and ugly. My Manager stated to me that I must have been an ugly baby. 4. Additionally, I was not provided proper representation or a timely response for the in-house grievance filed and was forced to resign due to the unbearable conditions. (Id.). Plaintiff surveilling her also and her asserts family, regarding that contention. injunctive relief. that but Defendant does not has been provide facts Plaintiff requests both monetary and Plaintiff asks for monetary damages in the amount of $48 million and $50 million for her mental anguish over the past twenty months, since [her] departure from Lockheed Martin Corporation. the court order (Paper 1, at 4). Defendant to stop Plaintiff also asks that using her name in any capacity, stop surveilling her and her family or to pow[er] down facilities family. (Id.). that enable such access to [her] and [her] Plaintiff finally requests that the court pick-up the criminal charges against employees of the defendant 3 and pursue prosecution for the following acts: Stalking (virtual and physical), Sexual Assault and Battery and Burglary, Breaking and Entering into [her] homes in Maryland. 1 (Id.). Defendant argues that Plaintiff s complaint fails to state a claim under Title VII or the Americans with Disabilities Act for sex or disability discrimination. (Paper 10, at 2). Defendant further asserts that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for constructive discharge from her position.2 Defendant states that the facts alleged by (Id.). Plaintiff only potentially support a claim of hostile work environment race discrimination, and asks the court to order Plaintiff to provide a more definite statement for that claim. Defendant finally argues that Plaintiff fails to identify a cause of action upon which she 1 may state a claim for her allegations regarding Criminal statutes do not create a private right of action absent statutory expression. Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, Plaintiff does not argue that any of the 448 (4th Cir. 2000). crimes she lists create a private right of action under federal or Maryland law. Plaintiff also does not plead facts to support her claims regarding surveillance or criminal activity. Therefore, these claims will be dismissed. 2 Defendant also argues that Plaintiff s potential constructive discharge claim should be dismissed. Given that Plaintiff has not stated any viable claim for discrimination, she has not alleged the facts needed to state a constructive discharge claim. Therefore, the Plaintiff s constructive discharge claim will be dismissed. 4 Defendant s alleged surveillance of Plaintiff and for the other criminal acts she alleges. II. Motion to Dismiss A. Standard of Review The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of the plaintiff s complaint. See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th 1999). Cir. Except in certain specified cases, a plaintiff s complaint need only satisfy the simplified pleading standard of Rule 8(a), Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002), which requires a short and plain statement of the claim showing Fed.R.Civ.P. requires a that the 8(a)(2). is Nevertheless, showing, rather entitlement to relief. 544, 555 n.3 (2007). pleader than a entitled Rule to relief. 8(a)(2) blanket still assertion, of Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. That showing must consist of more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action or naked Ashcroft assertion[s] v. Iqbal, devoid 129 of further S.Ct. 1937, factual 1949 enhancement. (2009) internal citations omitted). In its determination, the court must consider all well-pled allegations in a complaint as true, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 5 266, 268 (1994), rehearing denied, 510 U.S. 1215 (1994), and must construe favorable to all the factual allegations plaintiff. See in Harrison the v. light most Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir. 1999) citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1197 (1994)). The court need not, however, accept unsupported legal allegations, Revene v. Charles County Comm rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989), legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950, or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979). [W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged, but it has not show[n] . . . that the pleader is entitled to relief. S.Ct. at 1950 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). Iqbal, 129 Thus, [d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Id. 6 B. Analysis Plaintiff s complaint states that her action is brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701, et seq. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant discriminated against the her on basis of her race, color, sex, and employer to disability.3 1. Title VII a. Sex Discrimination Title discriminate VII makes against it any unlawful for an individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual s . . . sex . . . . § 2000e-2(a)(1). In all sex discrimination 42 U.S.C. cases, the fundamental question is whether a plaintiff was the victim of 3 Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, and thus her pleadings are accorded liberal construction. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (per curiam). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented. The Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 1999). requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Department of Social Services, 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990). 7 discrimination because of the plaintiff s sex. See Hartsell v. Duplex Prod., Inc., 123 F.3d 766, 772 (4th Cir. 1997). Though Plaintiff has not stated a specific legal theory under which she brings a Title VII sex discrimination claim, Plaintiff appears to allege a hostile work environment claim because she conditions. states that she was subjected to unbearable (Paper 1, attach. 2, at 1). To state a claim under Title VII for sex discrimination based on a hostile work environment, a plaintiff must allege that the offending conduct (1) was unwelcome, (2) was based on her sex, (3) was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive environment, and (4) was imputable to her employer. work Ocheltree v. Scollon Production, Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1177 (2004). Plaintiff has not presented facts to allege a claim of sex discrimination based Plaintiff not unwelcome. has on a alleged hostile that work any environment. offending First, conduct was For example, Plaintiff has not asserted that she complained about any sex-based discrimination while working for Defendant. Next, Plaintiff has not presented facts to show that any offending conduct was based on her sex. 8 Plaintiff s only allegation that seems remotely tied to her sex is that leaders at Lockheed made comments implying that [she] was masculine and ugly. (Paper 1, attach 2, at 1). A plaintiff must show that she is the individual target of open hostility because of her sex. Ocheltree, 335 F.3d 325 at 331 (citing Smith, 202 F.3d at 242-43). Furthermore, Plaintiff does not allege that any offensive conduct based on her sex was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive work environment. though Plaintiff alleges that she For example, resigned because of unbearable conditions, Plaintiff does not allege when or how often the offensive conduct occurred. Finally, Plaintiff has not alleged that any offensive conduct was imputable to her employer. The Supreme Court of established that [a]n employer the is United subject States to has vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate successively higher) authority over the employee. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998). (or Faragher v. Though Plaintiff states that leaders and her manager made comments to her, she does not allege who these people were or what authority they had over her. Because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts necessary to 9 support a hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff s Title VII sex discrimination claim will be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). b. Race Discrimination Title VII also prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee based on race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Again, Plaintiff mentions that she was forced to resign from her job because of unbearable conditions. Thus, the claim will be analyzed as one for race discrimination based on a hostile work environment. To state a claim for race discrimination under a hostile work environment theory, a plaintiff must allege: (1) she experienced unwelcome harassment; (2) the harassment was based on race; (3) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive atmosphere; and (4) there is some basis for imposing liability on the employer. Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 940 (2003). Plaintiff has not alleged hostile work environment claim. sufficient facts to state a Plaintiff only states one fact related to her race, stating that she was told that blacks learn by assimilation and whites implying that blacks are inferior. 10 learn by accommodation, Plaintiff has not alleged that the harassment was unwelcome or that the harassment was based on her race. alleged one statement Furthermore, because Plaintiff has only of harassment that relates to race, Plaintiff has not alleged that the harassment was severe or pervasive. Finally, Plaintiff has not alleged who harassed her on the basis of her race, which she must do in order to impose liability on her employer. Because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts necessary to state a hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff s Title VII race discrimination claim will be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). 2. Americans with Disabilities Act Plaintiff alleges that Defendant discriminated against her on the basis of her disabilities. Plaintiff s complaint states that her disability claim arises under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701, et seq. provides: 11 The Rehabilitation Act No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . . 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). By its express language, . . . the Act applies to all programs and activities which receive [f]ederal financial assistance. McCullough v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., Inc., 844 F.Supp 258, 259 (E.D.N.C. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1151 (1995) (internal marks omitted). not alleged that assistance. her employer Therefore, received Plaintiff s Plaintiff has federal disability financial claim arises instead under the Americans with Disabilities Act ( ADA ), which prohibits private employers from discriminating qualified individuals on the basis of disability. against 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. Though Plaintiff discrimination under has the not specified a legal ADA, Plaintiff appears theory to for bring a hostile work environment claim. Defendant notes that Plaintiff has related not made any allegations to a discriminatory discharge, failure to accommodate, or disparate impact under the ADA. (Paper 10, at 5, n.3). Plaintiff only mentions that she 12 was forced to conditions. resign from her job because of unbearable (Paper 1, attach. 2, at 1.). The requirements for a hostile work environment claim under the ADA mirror those of Title VII. Plaintiff must allege that (1) she is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on her disability; (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive employment; to alter and (5) a term, some liability to the employer. condition, factual basis or privilege exists to of impute Fox v. General Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff fails to state a hostile work environment claim under the ADA because she has not pled facts related to any of the elements for disability discrimination. Plaintiff has not stated how she is disabled, whether her disability is covered under the ADA, who harassed her, or how or when she was harassed based on her disability. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for discrimination under the ADA. 13 III. Motion for a More Definite Statement A. Standard of Review Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a), a complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the grounds for relief. Rule 8(e) directs that each averment is to be simple, concise and direct. Rule 12(e), in turn, provides: If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e). A Rule 12(e) motion is sometimes coupled, as here, with a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, when the complaint is so confusing that it is not possible to determine whether there is or is not a viable claim contained therein. 5C Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1376 (3d ed. 2004). The court should not grant a Rule 12(e) motion when it is appropriate to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion instead. As stated in Wright & Miller: The class of pleadings that are appropriate subjects for a motion under Rule 12(e) is quite small. As the cases make clear, the pleading must be sufficiently intelligible 14 for the district court to be able to make out one or more potentially viable legal theories on which the claimant might proceed; in other words the pleading must be sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Id. The decision of whether to grant a motion for more definite statement is committed to the discretion of the district court. Id. at § 1377; Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 597-98 (1998). B. Analysis The court will deny Defendant s motion for a more definite statement at this time because Plaintiff s pleading has not survived Defendant s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Defendant s motion for a more definite dismiss statement will be will granted be denied without and Defendant s prejudice, with motion leave to for Plaintiff to amend her complaint. /s/ DEBORAH K. CHASANOW United States District Judge 15
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