Singleton v. Entergy Operations Inc, No. 2:2015cv02132 - Document 42 (E.D. La. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER AND REASONS denying 37 Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 8/31/2017. (cg)
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Singleton v. Entergy Operations Inc Doc. 42 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA CARRIE SINGLETON CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 15-2132 ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. SECTION “R” (2) ORD ER AN D REASON S Plaintiff Carrie Singleton m oves the Court to extend the discovery deadline and the deadline for dispositive and non-evidentiary pretrial m otions. 1 Plaintiff requests these extensions to depose J ay Oliver and Barry William s. Defendant Entergy Operations, Inc., opposes plaintiff’s motion. 2 In the alternative, defendant consents to extensions of the discovery and dispositive m otions deadlines if the Court resets the trial date. 3 Because the Court finds that plaintiff has not shown good cause to extend the pretrial deadlines, the Court denies the m otion. 1 2 3 R. Doc. 37. R. Doc. 40 at 4. Id. at 5. Dockets.Justia.com I. BACKGROU N D This is a Title VII case, in which plaintiff alleges that defendant unlawfully term inated and retaliated against her because of her race. Trial in this m atter was originally set for November 7, 20 16. The Court has reset the trial date twice, and trial is now set for December 4, 20 17. The Court has reset pretrial deadlines four times. In its m ost recent scheduling order, the Court extended the discovery deadline to August 19, 20 17, solely to allow plaintiff to depose Oliver and William s. 4 The Court noted that plaintiff had failed to show good cause for any further extension of the discovery deadline. The Court also extended the deadline for dispositive and non-evidentiary pretrial m otions to September 19, 20 17, but m ade clear that the current trial date would not be disrupted. Plaintiff filed this m otion to extend pretrial deadlines—her fifth such m otion—on August 18, the day before the discovery deadline. 5 Plaintiff again requests additional tim e to depose Oliver and William s. According to plaintiff, the parties tentatively scheduled these depositions for August 16, but defendant’s counsel inform ed plaintiff shortly beforehand that Oliver was on vacation until August 20 . Neither deposition went forward. Plaintiff 4 5 R. Doc. 36. R. Doc. 37. 2 now m oves the Court to extend the discovery deadline to September 15 and the dispositive and non-evidentiary pretrial m otions deadline to October 6. In opposing plaintiff’s m otion, defendant contends that plaintiff is at fault for delaying discovery. 6 For exam ple, defendant states that plaintiff canceled the August 16 depositions without providing any excuse or reason. Defendant further asserts that plaintiff has failed to show why these depositions are necessary. According to defendant, plaintiff intends to question William s about the lesser discipline he experienced. Because William s and plaintiff are of the same race, however, defendant argues that any differential treatm ent does not support plaintiff’s racial discrim ination claim . Defendant also states that Oliver, the union steward, was not involved in the decision to term inate plaintiff. Although defendant’s prim ary position is that plaintiff’s motion should be denied, defendant alternatively consents to extending pretrial deadlines if the trial date is also reset. 7 II. D ISCU SSION Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) “authorizes the district court to control and expedite pretrial discovery through a scheduling order.” 6 7 R. Doc. 40 at 2-4. Id. at 5. 3 Geiserm an v. MacDonald, 893 F.2d 787, 790 (5th Cir. 1990 ). Under Rule 16(b), a scheduling order “m ay be m odified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). “To show good cause, the party seeking to m odify the scheduling order has the burden of showing ‘that the deadlines cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party needing the extension.’” Squy res v. Heico Cos., L.L.C., 782 F.3d 224, 237 (5th Cir. 20 15) (quoting Filgueira v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 734 F.3d 420 , 422 (5th Cir. 20 13) (per curiam )). In Geiserm an, the Fifth Circuit described four factors to determ ine whether good cause existed for an untim ely designation of expert witnesses: (1) the explanation for the failure to adhere to the deadline; (2) the im portance of the proposed m odification of the scheduling order; (3) the potential prejudice that could result from allowing the m odification; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure that prejudice. 893 F.2d at 791 (citing Bradley v. United States, 866 F.2d 120 , 125 (5th Cir. 1989)); accord Squy res, 782 F.3d at 237. The Fifth Circuit has cited the Geiserm an factors when a party seeks to extend discovery on the eve of the discovery deadline. See Squy res, 782 F.3d at 237. Accordingly, the Court will analyze the four Geiserm an factors to determ ine whether plaintiff has shown good cause for 4 her request to extend the discovery deadline and the deadline for dispositive and non-evidentiary pretrial m otions. With regard to the first factor, plaintiff has not provided a convincing explanation for her failure to com ply with the scheduling order. Plaintiff has already asked for, and received, four extensions of the discovery deadline. Plaintiff contends that a further extension is necessary to allow her to depose Oliver and William s. But plaintiff has failed to explain why she could not conduct these depositions within the Court’s existing deadlines. In its previous scheduling order, the Court gave plaintiffs a month to conduct two depositions. Plaintiff neither noticed these depositions nor subpoenaed the witnesses. Thus, the first Geiserm an factor weighs against the extension of the pretrial deadlines. See Hernandez v. Mario’s Auto Sales, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 2d 488, 494 (S.D. Tex. 20 0 9) (finding that a party’s “lack of diligence with regard to scheduling [a] witness’s deposition precludes it from having the opportunity to depose th[e] witness outside of the discovery period”). As to the second factor, plaintiff does not articulate why either Oliver’s or William s’s testim ony is im portant. Defendant argues that Oliver’s testim ony is not im portant because Oliver was not involved in plaintiff’s term ination, and that William s’s testim ony will not help plaintiff because William s is not a suitable com parator. As the party seeking m odification of 5 the Court’s scheduling order, plaintiff bears the burden of dem onstrating good cause. See Squy res, 782 F.3d at 237. Given plaintiff’s failure to explain the im portance of the depositions and defendant’s arguments against their im portance, the second factor weighs slightly against extension of the pretrial deadlines. See Com plete Prop. Res., LLC v. City of N ew Orleans, No. 0 4-3267, 20 0 6 WL 1970 0 6, at *2 (E.D. La. J an. 25, 20 0 6) (denying leave to file untim ely expert report because “[w]hile plaintiff’s dam ages m ay be of im portance to its case, plaintiff has not established that an expert is necessary”). As to the third Geiserm an factor, the proposed extensions would prejudice defendant in two ways. First, defendant would have to expend tim e and resources on depositions it opposes. See Hernandez, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 497 (“Whenever additional depositions are conducted, both parties m ust expend additional resources and invest tim e in conducting them . Thus, prejudice generally results to the party opposing additional depositions.”). Second, defendant has already filed a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent without the benefit of the deposition testim ony. See O’N eal v. Cargill, Inc., No. 157183, 20 16 WL 740 7177, at *2 (E.D. La. Dec. 22, 20 16) (“[G]ranting the m otion would be highly prejudicial to Cargill, which has com plied with its obligations under the court’s scheduling order and the Federal Rules of Civil 6 Procedure and filed a well-supported, tim ely m otion for sum m ary judgm ent.”). The proposed extensions would also prejudice both parties in light of the approaching trial date. Unless the Court resets the trial date, the parties would have to prepare for trial while awaiting the Court’s decision on dispositive m otions. The third factor therefore weighs against extension of the pretrial deadlines. Finally, turning to the fourth Geiserm an factor, the Court finds that continuing the pretrial deadlines as well as the trial itself would cure some, though not all, of the prejudice described earlier. Resetting the trial date, as defendant proposes, would m itigate the prejudice of preparing for trial while awaiting the Court’s decision on dispositive m otions. On the other hand, plaintiff’s requested extension of the discovery deadline would require defendant to expend additional tim e and resources regardless of when trial com m ences. “Moreover, a continuance would not deter future dilatory behavior, nor serve to enforce . . . court im posed scheduling orders.” Geiserm an, 893 F.2d at 792 (citing Bradley v. United States, 866 F.2d 120 , 126 (5th Cir. 1989)). Thus, this factor also weighs against extension of the pretrial deadlines. 7 Because all four Geiserm an factors weigh against extension of the pretrial deadlines in this case, plaintiff has failed to show good cause to m odify the scheduling order. III. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES plaintiff’s m otion to extend the discovery deadline and the deadline for dispositive and nonevidentiary pretrial m otions. 31st New Orleans, Louisiana, this _ _ _ _ _ day of August, 20 17. _____________________ SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT J UDGE 8
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