Beard v. Louisville Metro Police Department, No. 3:2009cv00978 - Document 6 (W.D. Ky. 2010)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION signed by Judge John G. Heyburn, II on 2/23/2010. For the reasons set forth, the Court will dismiss the action by separate Order. cc: Counsel; Plaintiff, pro se (AEP)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY AT LOUISVILLE TAKETA BEARD PLAINTIFF v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09CV-978-H LOUISVILLE METRO POLICE DEPARTMENT DEFENDANT MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter is currently before the Court for screening of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997). For the reasons that follow, the complaint will be dismissed. I. Plaintiff Taketa Beard filed a pro se, in forma pauperis civil action against the Louisville Metro Police Department alleging violations of the Fourth Amendment and human/civil rights and alleging an illegal strip search and use of excessive force. She alleges that on October 10, 2007, she was involved in an incident where I had legally defended myself against a stranger. She reports that a Metro Police officer was there but did not follow policy to protect me or uphold the law. She reports that several male officers inappropriately touched her and conducted a strip search. Those officers, she claims, also were negligent in securing her safety while escorting her, a disabled woman, to the police car as they allowed her to fall which resulted in scrapes, bruises, and a dislocated left shoulder among other unspecified injuries. As relief, she seeks damages and asks that the officers be reprimanded and given jail time. II. Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, this Court must review the instant action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); McGore, 114 F.3d at 604-05. Upon review, this Court must dismiss a case at any time if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, -- U.S. -- , 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). [A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). But the district court need not accept a bare assertion of legal conclusions. Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 2 of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). Although this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), the duty does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations, McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979), or to create a claim for a plaintiff. Clark v. Nat l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise would require the Court to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). III. Because Plaintiff sues a municipal entity for alleged violations of her federal constitutional rights, the Court construes the action as being brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Thomas v. Shipka, 818 F.2d 496, 500 (6th Cir. 1987) (explaining that § 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for constitutional claims brought against state and local officials and local units of government), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 488 U.S. 1036 (1989). Defendant Louisville Metro Police Department is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983. See Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that the county police department is not an entity which may be sued); Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d 117, 120 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that a police department may not be sued under § 1983). Rather, it is 3 the municipality itself that is the proper defendant. Smallwood v. Jefferson County Gov t, 743 F. Supp. 502, 503 (W.D. Ky. 1990) (construing claims brought against the Jefferson County Government, the Jefferson County Fiscal Court, and the Jefferson County Judge Executive as claims against Jefferson County itself). In the instant case, the proper defendant is the Louisville Metro Government. When a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality, this Court must analyze two distinct issues: (1) whether Plaintiff s harm was caused by a constitutional violation; and (2) if so, whether the municipality is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). The Court will address the issues in reverse order. [A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor -- or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. Monell v. New York City Dep t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994); Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1345 (6th Cir. 1994). [T]he touchstone of official policy is designed to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-480 (1986)). A municipality cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Deaton v. Montgomery County, Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir. 1993). To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff must (1) identify the municipal 4 policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury was incurred due to execution of that policy. Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)). Where a government custom has not received formal approval through the body s official decisionmaking channels, such a custom may still be the subject of a § 1983 suit. Alkire, 330 F.3d at 815 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91). The policy or custom must be the moving force of the constitutional violation in order to establish the liability of a government body under § 1983. Searcy, 38 F.3d at 286 (quoting Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (citation omitted)). In the instant case, Plaintiff has not alleged that the police officers acted pursuant to a county policy or custom in causing her alleged harm. In fact, she alleges that they failed to follow policy, and she describes an isolated occurrence. See Fox v. Van Oosterum, 176 F.3d 342, 348 (6th Cir. 1999) ( No evidence indicates that this was anything more than a one-time, isolated event for which the county is not responsible. ). Nothing in the complaint demonstrates that any officers action or inaction occurred as a result of a policy or custom implemented or endorsed by the Louisville Metro Government. Accordingly, the complaint fails to establish a basis of liability against the municipality and fails to state a cognizable § 1983 claim. Additionally, Plaintiff s claims are time-barred. The statute of limitations for § 1983 actions is governed by the limitations period for personal injury cases in the state in which the cause of action arose. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). In Kentucky § 1983 actions are limited by the one-year statute of limitations found in Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.140(1). Collard v. Ky. Bd. of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 182 (6th Cir. 1990). Although state law establishes the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions, federal law controls on the issue of when the statute 5 of limitations begins to run. Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir. 1984). Federal law establishes that the § 1983 statute of limitations accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury that forms the basis of the claim alleged in the complaint. Ruff v. Runyon, 258 F.3d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 2001). When the face of the complaint shows that an action is time barred, the case may be dismissed summarily upon screening. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 21516 (2007). Plaintiff alleges that the incident involving the Metro Police Officers occurred on October 10, 2007. The statute of limitations expired one year later on October 10, 2008. Because Plaintiff did not file the complaint until December 17, 2009, her claims are time-barred and must be dismissed. For these reasons, the Court will dismiss the action by separate Order. Date: February 23, 2010 cc: Plaintiff, pro se Jefferson County Attorney 4412.005 6
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