Morgan v. SSA, No. 6:2008cv00327 - Document 14 (E.D. Ky. 2009)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION: The administrative decision should be affirmed. Signed by Judge G. Wix Unthank on 7/23/2009.(EHM)cc: COR

Download PDF
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY SOUTHERN DIVISION at LONDON CIVIL ACTION NO. 08-327-GWU ERIC MORGAN, VS. PLAINTIFF, MEMORANDUM OPINION MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, DEFENDANT. INTRODUCTION Eric Morgan brought this action to obtain judicial review of an unfavorable administrative decision on his application for Supplemental Security Income. The case is before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment. APPLICABLE LAW The Commissioner is required to follow a five-step sequential evaluation process in assessing whether a claimant is disabled. 1. Is the claimant currently engaged in substantial gainful activity? If so, the claimant is not disabled and the claim is denied. 2. If the claimant is not currently engaged in substantial gainful activity, does he have any severe impairment or combination of impairments--i.e., any impairments significantly limiting his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities? If not, a finding of non-disability is made and the claim is denied. 3. The third step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant s severe impairment(s) or combination of impairments meets or equals in severity an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 (the Listing of 1 08-327 Eric Morgan Impairments). If so, disability is conclusively presumed and benefits are awarded. 4. At the fourth step the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant retains the residual functional capacity to perform the physical and mental demands of his past relevant work. If so, the claimant is not disabled and the claim is denied. If the plaintiff carries this burden, a prima facie case of disability is established. 5. If the plaintiff has carried his burden of proof through the first four steps, at the fifth step the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform any other substantial gainful activity which exists in the national economy, considering his residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520; 416.920; Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984); Walters v. Commissioner of Social Security, 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997). Review of the Commissioner's decision is limited in scope to determining whether the findings of fact made are supported by substantial evidence. Jones v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 945 F.2d 1365, 1368-1369 (6th Cir. 1991). This "substantial evidence" is "such evidence as a reasonable mind shall accept as adequate to support a conclusion;" it is based on the record as a whole and must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. Garner, 745 F.2d at 387. One of the issues with the administrative decision may be the fact that the Commissioner has improperly failed to accord greater weight to a treating physician 2 08-327 Eric Morgan than to a doctor to whom the plaintiff was sent for the purpose of gathering information against his disability claim. Bowie v. Secretary, 679 F.2d 654, 656 (6th Cir. 1982). This presumes, of course, that the treating physician's opinion is based on objective medical findings. Cf. Houston v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 736 F.2d 365, 367 (6th Cir. 1984); King v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 968, 973 (6th Cir. 1984). Opinions of disability from a treating physician are binding on the trier of fact only if they are not contradicted by substantial evidence to the contrary. Hardaway v. Secretary, 823 F.2d 922 (6th Cir. 1987). These have long been wellsettled principles within the Circuit. Jones, 945 F.2d at 1370. Another point to keep in mind is the standard by which the Commissioner may assess allegations of pain. Consideration should be given to all the plaintiff's symptoms including pain, and the extent to which signs and findings confirm these symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (1991). However, in evaluating a claimant's allegations of disabling pain: First, we examine whether there is objective medical evidence of an underlying medical condition. If there is, we then examine: (1) whether objective medical evidence confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising from the condition; or (2) whether the objectively established medical condition is of such a severity that it can reasonably be expected to produce the alleged disabling pain. Duncan v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 801 F.2d 847, 853 (6th Cir. 1986). 3 08-327 Eric Morgan Another issue concerns the effect of proof that an impairment may be remedied by treatment. The Sixth Circuit has held that such an impairment will not serve as a basis for the ultimate finding of disability. Harris v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 756 F.2d 431, 436 n.2 (6th Cir. 1984). However, the same result does not follow if the record is devoid of any evidence that the plaintiff would have regained his residual capacity for work if he had followed his doctor's instructions to do something or if the instructions were merely recommendations. Id. Accord, Johnson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 794 F.2d 1106, 1113 (6th Cir. 1986). In reviewing the record, the court must work with the medical evidence before it, despite the plaintiff's claims that he was unable to afford extensive medical workups. Gooch v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 833 F.2d 589, 592 (6th Cir. 1987). Further, a failure to seek treatment for a period of time may be a factor to be considered against the plaintiff, Hale v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 816 F.2d 1078, 1082 (6th Cir. 1987), unless a claimant simply has no way to afford or obtain treatment to remedy his condition, McKnight v. Sullivan, 927 F.2d 241, 242 (6th Cir. 1990). Additional information concerning the specific steps in the test is in order. Step four refers to the ability to return to one's past relevant category of work. Studaway v. Secretary, 815 F.2d 1074, 1076 (6th Cir. 1987). The plaintiff is said to make out a prima facie case by proving that he or she is unable to return to work. 4 08-327 Eric Morgan Cf. Lashley v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 708 F.2d 1048, 1053 (6th Cir. 1983). However, both 20 C.F.R. § 416.965(a) and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563 provide that an individual with only off-and-on work experience is considered to have had no work experience at all. Thus, jobs held for only a brief tenure may not form the basis of the Commissioner's decision that the plaintiff has not made out its case. Id. at 1053. Once the case is made, however, if the Commissioner has failed to properly prove that there is work in the national economy which the plaintiff can perform, then an award of benefits may, under certain circumstances, be had. E.g., Faucher v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 17 F.3d 171 (6th Cir. 1994). One of the ways for the Commissioner to perform this task is through the use of the medical vocational guidelines which appear at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2 and analyze factors such as residual functional capacity, age, education and work experience. One of the residual functional capacity levels used in the guidelines, called "light" level work, involves lifting no more than twenty pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to ten pounds; a job is listed in this category if it encompasses a great deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls; by definition, a person capable of this level of activity must have the ability to do substantially all these activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). "Sedentary work" is defined as having 5 08-327 Eric Morgan the capacity to lift no more than ten pounds at a time and occasionally lift or carry small articles and an occasional amount of walking and standing. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a), 416.967(a). However, when a claimant suffers from an impairment "that significantly diminishes his capacity to work, but does not manifest itself as a limitation on strength, for example, where a claimant suffers from a mental illness . . . manipulative restrictions . . . or heightened sensitivity to environmental contaminants . . . rote application of the grid [guidelines] is inappropriate . . ." Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 926 (6th Cir. 1990). If this non-exertional impairment is significant, the Commissioner may still use the rules as a framework for decision-making, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, Rule 200.00(e); however, merely using the term "framework" in the text of the decision is insufficient, if a fair reading of the record reveals that the agency relied entirely on the grid. Ibid. In such cases, the agency may be required to consult a vocational specialist. Damron v. Secretary, 778 F.2d 279, 282 (6th Cir. 1985). Even then, substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's decision may be produced through reliance on this expert testimony only if the hypothetical question given to the expert accurately portrays the plaintiff's physical and mental impairments. Varley v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 820 F.2d 777 (6th Cir. 1987). 6 08-327 Eric Morgan DISCUSSION The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that Morgan, a 22-year-old man with no past relevant work and a high school equivalent education, suffered from impairments related to a mood/personality disorder. (Tr. 17, 20-21). Despite the plaintiff's impairments, the ALJ determined that he retained the residual functional capacity to perform a restricted range of work at all exertional levels. (Tr. 17). Since the available work was found to constitute a significant number of jobs in the national economy, the claimant could not be considered totally disabled. (Tr. 21-22). The ALJ based this decision, in large part, upon the testimony of a vocational expert. (Tr. 21). After review of the evidence presented, the undersigned concludes that the administrative decision is supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the court must grant the defendant's summary judgment motion and deny that of the plaintiff. The hypothetical question presented to Vocational Expert Ralph Crystal included no restrictions other than a limitation to low stress work. (Tr. 302). In response, Crystal identified a significant number of jobs which could still be performed. (Tr. 303). Morgan's representative then presented an alternative hypothetical question which included a "poor" ability to follow work rules, relate to co-workers, deal with the public, use judgment, interact with supervisors, behave in an emotionally stable manner and relate predictably in social situations. (Tr. 304305). The question also included a "fair" ability to deal with work stresses, handle 7 08-327 Eric Morgan complex and detailed instructions and to demonstrate reliability. (Id.). The expert indicated that these extensive mental limitations would only minimally reduce the aforementioned job numbers. (Tr. 305-306). Therefore, assuming that the vocational factors considered by Crystal fairly depicted the plaintiff's condition, then a finding of disabled status, within the meaning of the Social Security Act, is precluded. Psychologist William Rigby, an examining consultant, diagnosed an anxiety disorder. (Tr. 148). The plaintiff's Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) was rated at 68. (Id.). Such a GAF suggests the existence of only "mild" psychological symptoms according to the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th Ed.--Text Revision), p. 34. Rigby stated that the claimant would have a "fair" ability to relate to others including fellow workers and supervisors and a "fair" ability to tolerate the stress and pressures of work activity. (Id.). The mental factors considered by the vocational expert were consistent with these limitations. Therefore, this report provides strong support for the administrative decision. The administrative record Freudenberger and Lea Perritt. was reviewed by Psychologists Larry Each reviewer opined that Morgan's mental condition was not a "severe" impairment. (Tr. 150, 196). These reports provide additional support for the administrative denial decision. 8 08-327 Eric Morgan Morgan sought treatment for his mental problems at the Kentucky River Comprehensive Care Center. (Tr. 124-141, 232-234). More severe mental limitations than those found by the ALJ were not noted by the treating source. Psychologist Phil Pack also examined Morgan. (Tr. 220-231). Pack diagnosed a mood disorder, a possible bipolar disorder, a possible cyclothymic disorder and a personality disorder. (Tr. 228). The examiner identified a number of mental limitations on a Mental Medical Assessment of Ability to do Work-Related Activities Form. (Tr. 230-231). The ALJ rejected these restrictions in favor of the opinion of Rigby. (Tr. 20). The plaintiff asserts that this action was erroneous but the court notes that each psychologist was a one-time examiner and the ALJ, in his capacity as fact-finder, could reasonably rely upon Rigby rather than Pack. Furthermore, even if the ALJ had erred, the undersigned notes that the mental limitations identified by Pack were those presented as an alternative hypothetical question by the claimant's own representative. (Tr. 230-231, 304-305). A significant number of jobs could still be done even with these restrictions. Therefore, any error in rejecting Pack's opinion would be harmless. The court notes that Morgan submitted additional medical records directly to the Appeals Council which were never seen by the ALJ. (Tr. 235-294). This action raises an issue concerning a remand for the taking of new evidence before the Commissioner. Cotton v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 1993). A court may order additional evidence be taken before the Commissioner, " . . . but only upon a 9 08-327 Eric Morgan showing that there is new evidence to be taken which is material and there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The statute provides that a claimant must prove that the additional evidence is both "material" and that "good cause" existed for its not having been submitted at an earlier proceeding. Sizemore v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 865 F.2d 709, 710 (6th Cir. 1988). In order to demonstrate "materiality," a claimant must show that a reasonable probability exists that the Commissioner would have reached a different conclusion if originally presented with the new evidence. Sizemore, 865 F.2d at 711. In the present action, the plaintiff has failed to adduce arguments as to why such a remand would be required. The undersigned concludes that the administrative decision should be affirmed. Therefore, the court must grant the defendant's summary judgment motion and deny that of the plaintiff. A separate judgment and order will be entered simultaneously consistent with this opinion. This the 23rd day of July, 2009. 10

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.