Thompson v. SSA, No. 6:2008cv00082 - Document 15 (E.D. Ky. 2008)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION: The administrative decision should be affirmed. Signed by Judge G. Wix Unthank on 12/10/2008.(EHM)cc: COR
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY SOUTHERN DIVISION at LONDON CIVIL ACTION NO. 08-82-GWU JOY THOMPSON, VS. PLAINTIFF, MEMORANDUM OPINION MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, DEFENDANT. INTRODUCTION Joy Thompson brought this action to obtain judicial review of an unfavorable administrative decision on her application for Disability Insurance Benefits. The case is before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment. APPLICABLE LAW The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has set out the steps applicable to judicial review of Social Security disability benefit cases: 1. Is the claimant currently engaged in substantial gainful activity? If yes, the claimant is not disabled. If no, proceed to Step 2. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). 2. Does the claimant have any medically determinable physical or mental impairment(s)? If yes, proceed to Step 3. If no, the claimant is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1508, 416.908. 3. Does the claimant have any severe impairment(s)--i.e., any impairment(s) significantly limiting the claimant's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities? If yes, proceed to Step 4. If no, the claimant is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(c), 404.1521, 416.920(c), 461.921. 1 08-82 Joy Thompson 4. Can the claimant's severe impairment(s) be expected to result in death or last for a continuous period of at least 12 months? If yes, proceed to Step 5. If no, the claimant is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. 404.920(d), 416.920(d). 5. Does the claimant have any impairment or combination of impairments meeting or equaling in severity an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (Listing of Impairments)? If yes, the claimant is disabled. If no, proceed to Step 6. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(d), 404.1526(a), 416.920(d), 416.926(a). 6. Can the claimant, despite his impairment(s), considering his residual functional capacity and the physical and mental demands of the work he has done in the past, still perform this kind of past relevant work? If yes, the claimant was not disabled. If no, proceed to Step 7. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). 7. Can the claimant, despite his impairment(s), considering his residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience, do other work--i.e., any other substantial gainful activity which exists in the national economy? If yes, the claimant is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1505(a), 404.1520(f)(1), 416.905(a), 416.920(f)(1). Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). Applying this analysis, it must be remembered that the principles pertinent to the judicial review of administrative agency action apply. Review of the Commissioner's decision is limited in scope to determining whether the findings of fact made are supported by substantial evidence. Jones v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 945 F.2d 1365, 1368-1369 (6th Cir. 1991). This "substantial evidence" is "such evidence as a reasonable mind shall accept as adequate to 2 08-82 Joy Thompson support a conclusion;" it is based on the record as a whole and must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. Garner, 745 F.2d at 387. One of the detracting factors in the administrative decision may be the fact that the Commissioner has improperly failed to accord greater weight to a treating physician than to a doctor to whom the plaintiff was sent for the purpose of gathering information against his disability claim. Bowie v. Secretary, 679 F.2d 654, 656 (6th Cir. 1982). This presumes, of course, that the treating physician's opinion is based on objective medical findings. Cf. Houston v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 736 F.2d 365, 367 (6th Cir. 1984); King v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 968, 973 (6th Cir. 1984). Opinions of disability from a treating physician are binding on the trier of fact only if they are not contradicted by substantial evidence to the contrary. Hardaway v. Secretary, 823 F.2d 922 (6th Cir. 1987). These have long been well-settled principles within the Circuit. Jones, 945 F.2d at 1370. Another point to keep in mind is the standard by which the Commissioner may assess allegations of pain. Consideration should be given to all the plaintiff's symptoms including pain, and the extent to which signs and findings confirm these symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (1991). However, in evaluating a claimant's allegations of disabling pain: First, we examine whether there is objective medical evidence of an underlying medical condition. If there is, we then examine: (1) 3 08-82 Joy Thompson whether objective medical evidence confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising from the condition; or (2) whether the objectively established medical condition is of such a severity that it can reasonably be expected to produce the alleged disabling pain. Duncan v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 801 F.2d 847, 853 (6th Cir. 1986). Another issue concerns the effect of proof that an impairment may be remedied by treatment. The Sixth Circuit has held that such an impairment will not serve as a basis for the ultimate finding of disability. Harris v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 756 F.2d 431, 436 n.2 (6th Cir. 1984). However, the same result does not follow if the record is devoid of any evidence that the plaintiff would have regained his residual capacity for work if he had followed his doctor's instructions to do something or if the instructions were merely recommendations. Id. Accord, Johnson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 794 F.2d 1106, 1113 (6th Cir. 1986). In reviewing the record, the Court must work with the medical evidence before it, despite the plaintiff's claims that he was unable to afford extensive medical work-ups. Gooch v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 833 F.2d 589, 592 (6th Cir. 1987). Further, a failure to seek treatment for a period of time may be a factor to be considered against the plaintiff, Hale v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 816 F.2d 1078, 1082 (6th Cir. 1987), unless a claimant simply has no way 4 08-82 Joy Thompson to afford or obtain treatment to remedy his condition, McKnight v. Sullivan, 927 F.2d 241, 242 (6th Cir. 1990). Additional information concerning the specific steps in the test is in order. Step six refers to the ability to return to one's past relevant category of work. Studaway v. Secretary, 815 F.2d 1074, 1076 (6th Cir. 1987). The plaintiff is said to make out a prima facie case by proving that he or she is unable to return to work. Cf. Lashley v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 708 F.2d 1048, 1053 (6th Cir. 1983). However, both 20 C.F.R. § 416.965(a) and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563 provide that an individual with only off-and-on work experience is considered to have had no work experience at all. Thus, jobs held for only a brief tenure may not form the basis of the Commissioner's decision that the plaintiff has not made out its case. Id. at 1053. Once the case is made, however, if the Commissioner has failed to properly prove that there is work in the national economy which the plaintiff can perform, then an award of benefits may, under certain circumstances, be had. E.g., Faucher v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 17 F.3d 171 (6th Cir. 1994). One of the ways for the Commissioner to perform this task is through the use of the medical vocational guidelines which appear at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2 and analyze factors such as residual functional capacity, age, education and work experience. 5 08-82 Joy Thompson One of the residual functional capacity levels used in the guidelines, called "light" level work, involves lifting no more than twenty pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to ten pounds; a job is listed in this category if it encompasses a great deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls; by definition, a person capable of this level of activity must have the ability to do substantially all these activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). "Sedentary work" is defined as having the capacity to lift no more than ten pounds at a time and occasionally lift or carry small articles and an occasional amount of walking and standing. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a), 416.967(a). However, when a claimant suffers from an impairment "that significantly diminishes his capacity to work, but does not manifest itself as a limitation on strength, for example, where a claimant suffers from a mental illness . . . manipulative restrictions . . . or heightened sensitivity to environmental contaminants . . . rote application of the grid [guidelines] is inappropriate . . ." Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 926 (6th Cir. 1990). If this non-exertional impairment is significant, the Commissioner may still use the rules as a framework for decision-making, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, Rule 200.00(e); however, merely using the term "framework" in the text of the decision is insufficient, if a fair reading of the record reveals that the agency relied entirely on the grid. Ibid. 6 08-82 Joy Thompson In such cases, the agency may be required to consult a vocational specialist. Damron v. Secretary, 778 F.2d 279, 282 (6th Cir. 1985). Even then, substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's decision may be produced through reliance on this expert testimony only if the hypothetical question given to the expert accurately portrays the plaintiff's physical and mental impairments. Varley v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 820 F.2d 777 (6th Cir. 1987). DISCUSSION The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that Thompson, a 49-yearold former child monitor and office clerk with a high school equivalent education, suffered from impairments related to discogenic and degenerative disorders of the spine, hypertension and a generalized anxiety disorder. (Tr. 13, 19). While the plaintiff was found to be unable to return to her past relevant work, the ALJ determined that she retained the residual functional capacity to perform a restricted range of medium level work. (Tr. 17, 19). Since the available work was found to constitute a significant number of jobs in the national economy, the claimant could not be considered totally disabled. (Tr. 20). The ALJ based this decision, in large part, upon the testimony of a vocational expert. (Id.). After review of the evidence presented, the undersigned concludes that the administrative decision is supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the court must grant the defendant's summary judgment motion and deny that of the plaintiff. 7 08-82 Joy Thompson The hypothetical question presented to Vocational Expert William Ellis included an exertional restriction to medium level work restricted from a full range by such non-exertional limitations as (1) an inability to ever climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; (2) an inability to more than occasionally bend; (3) a need to avoid exposure to hazardous or vibrating machinery; (4) a need to avoid exposure to dust, fumes, smoke, chemicals or noxious gases; (5) a "limited but satisfactory" ability to understand, remember and carry out detailed instructions; and (6) a "severely limited but not precluded" ability to deal with work stress. (Tr. 39). In response, the witness identified a significant number of jobs in the national economy which could still be performed. (Tr. 40). Therefore, assuming that the vocational factors considered by Ellis fairly characterized Thompson's condition, then a finding of disabled status, within the meaning of the Social Security Act, is precluded. With regard to the framing of the physical factors of the hypothetical question, the court finds no error. No treating or examining source of record, including the staff at the White House Clinic (Tr. 167-175, 208-214), Dr. Barry Burchett (Tr. 186-192), the staff at the Lake Cumberland Regional Hospital (Tr. 239256), the staff at the Parkway Medical Center (Tr. 257-272) and Dr. Magdy ElKalliny (Tr. 273) identified the existence of physical restrictions greater than those found by the ALJ. Dr. Timothy Gregg, a non-examining medical reviewer, opined that the evidence did not support the existence of a "severe" physical impairment. 8 08-82 Joy Thompson (Tr. 229). These reports provide substantial evidence to support the administrative decision. The ALJ also dealt properly with the evidence of record relating to Thompson's mental status. Dr. Kevin Eggerman examined the plaintiff and diagnosed a generalized anxiety disorder. (Tr. 181). The plaintiff's Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) was rated at 60 to 65. (Id.). Such a GAF suggests the existence of only "mild" psychological symptoms according to the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th Ed.--Text Revision), p. 34. Dr. Eggerman opined that the plaintiff would be "mildly to moderately" impaired in responding to work pressures and "mildly" impaired in dealing with others and responding appropriately to changes. (Tr. 182). The mental factors of the hypothetical question were essentially consistent with this opinion. Psychologists Ed Ross (Tr. 193) and Jan Jacobson (Tr. 215) each reviewed the record and opined that it did not reveal the existence of a "severe" mental impairment. These reports provide substantial evidence to support the administrative decision. Thompson argues that the ALJ erred by failing to properly address her claims of disabling pain. However, the undersigned notes that the ALJ discussed this issue at length noting that the plaintiff did not require aggressive treatment but only routine follow-up following a successful cervical spine discectomy/fusion. (Tr. 18). 9 08-82 Joy Thompson The ALJ noted the conservative nature of the claimant's treatment without further surgery being recommended, and the lack of prescription medication she needed to control her pain symptoms or the use of injection-type therapies such as epidural steroids. (Id.). Pain control devices such as a Tens unit had not been utilized, nor had physical therapy been ordered. (Id.). Her antidepressant medications had been able to control the plaintiff's mental symptoms. (Tr. 19). The ALJ also relied upon pre-hearing documents completed by the claimant in which she reported being able to perform laundry, clean her house, care for her personal needs, and prepare meals. (Id.). The ALJ cited the lack of physical restrictions imposed by the various medical sources. (Id.). Therefore, the ALJ properly considered the issue of pain in this action. The undersigned concludes that the administrative decision should be affirmed. Therefore, the court must grant the defendant's summary judgment motion and deny that of the plaintiff. A separate judgment and order will be entered simultaneously consistent with this opinion. This the 10th day of December, 2008. 10
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