Bradford v. USA, No. 1:2009cv00075 - Document 13 (N.D. Iowa 2012)
Court Description: ORDER denying 1 MOTION to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence (2255) ( Criminal Action CR 05-85 LRR) filed by Steven Bradford. A certificate of appealability is denied. Signed by Chief Judge Linda R Reade on 4/18/12. Copy w/NEF to Plf) (ksy)
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Bradford v. USA Doc. 13 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA CEDAR RAPIDS DIVISION STEVEN BRADFORD, Movant, No. C09-0075-LRR No. CR05-0085-LRR vs. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. ORDER ____________________________ This matter appears before the court on Steven Bradford’s motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (civil docket no. 1). Steven Bradford (“the movant”) filed such motion on June 1, 2009. On March 8, 2011, the court directed the government to respond to the movant’s claims (civil docket no. 3). On May 11, 2011, the government complied with the court’s order by filing a resistance (civil docket no. 9). On May 24, 2011, the movant filed a reply (civil docket no. 10). The court now turns to consider the movant’s motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. A district court is given discretion in determining whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See United States v. Oldham, 787 F.2d 454, 457 (8th Cir. 1986). In exercising that discretion, the district court must determine whether the alleged facts, if true, entitle the movant to relief. See Payne v. United States, 78 F.3d 343, 347 (8th Cir. 1996). “Accordingly, [a district court may summarily dismiss a motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 without an evidentiary hearing] if (1) the . . . allegations, accepted as true, would not entitle the [movant] to relief, or (2) the allegations cannot be accepted as true because they are contradicted by the record, inherently incredible, or conclusions rather than statements of fact.” Engelen v. United States, 68 F.3d 238, 240-41 (8th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); see also Delgado v. United States, 162 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary Dockets.Justia.com where allegations, even if true, do not warrant relief or allegations cannot be accepted as true because they are contradicted by the record or lack factual evidence and rely on conclusive statements); United States v. Hester, 489 F.2d 48, 50 (8th Cir. 1973) (stating that no evidentiary hearing is necessary where the files and records of the case demonstrate that relief is unavailable or where the motion is based on a question of law). Stated differently, a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion can be dismissed without a hearing where “the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255; see also Standing Bear v. United States, 68 F.3d 271, 272 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). The court concludes that it is able to resolve the movant’s claims from the record. See Rogers v. United States, 1 F.3d 697, 699 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding “[a]ll of the information that the court needed to make its decision with regard to [the movant’s] claims was included in the record . . . .” and, therefore, the court “was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing”) (citing Rule Governing Section 2255 Proceedings 8(a) and United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 674, 100 S. Ct. 2406, 65 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1980)). The evidence of record conclusively demonstrates that the movant is not entitled to the relief sought. Specifically, the record indicates that the movant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims are meritless. As such, the court finds that there is no need for an evidentiary hearing. With respect to the merits of the movant’s original claims, the court deems it appropriate to deny the movant’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion for the reasons stated in the government’s resistance. The government’s brief adequately sets forth the law that is applicable to the facts in the movant’s case. Specifically, the government correctly relied on defense counsel’s affidavit, and it correctly concluded that defense counsel provided professional and effective assistance to the movant and the movant suffered no prejudice as a result of counsel’s actions. 2 Moreover, the court thoroughly reviewed the record and finds that the denial of the movant’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion results in no “miscarriage of justice” and is consistent with the “rudimentary demands of fair procedure.” Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428, 82 S. Ct. 468, 7 L. Ed. 2d 417 (1962); see also United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for a narrow range of injuries that could not have been raised for the first time on direct appeal and, if uncorrected, would result in a complete miscarriage of justice.” (citing Poor Thunder v. United States, 810 F.2d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 1987))). The court concludes that the conduct of counsel fell within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), and counsel’s performance did not prejudice the movant’s defense, id. at 692-94. Considering all the circumstances and refraining from engaging in hindsight or second-guessing counsel’s strategic decisions, the court finds that the record belies the movant’s claims and no violation of the movant’s constitutional right to counsel occurred. Nothing the movant states in support of his request for relief leads the court to conclude that a violation of the Sixth Amendment occurred. Here, the movant asserts that he never specifically or directly denied distributing heroin to J.H. and, consequently, should not have lost a reduction in his sentence for acceptance of responsibility, and he maintains that counsel could have done more to establish that heroin did not contribute to J.H.’s death. The movant’s assertions as to what counsel should have done prior to sentencing, during his sentencing and on direct appeal do not establish a constitutional violation. Defense counsel raised suitable arguments, made tactical decisions, objected when warranted and performed admirably in light of the record. Nothing suggests that there is a reasonable likelihood that the movant would have received a lower sentence or obtained appellate relief had defense counsel pursed a different course. The record reveals that the movant knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently pleaded guilty pursuant to an agreement that he entered into with the 3 government. It also reveals that the movant received a 210 month term of imprisonment after the court decided he did not qualify for a reduction under USSG §3E1.1, departed upward and varied downward. Given the record, the court concludes that neither the conviction nor the sentence are subject to being challenged on the basis that counsel rendered ineffective assistance and the movant suffered prejudice as a result of his actions. Counsel’s strategic decisions with respect to what witnesses to call, how to cross-examine the government’s witnesses and what arguments to present on direct appeal do not deviate from prevailing professional norms. In an attempt to lower the movant’s sentence, choices were made, and, although a better course of action may have been to stipulate that he distributed heroin to J.H. and such heroin contributed to J.H.’s death, the movant opted to dispute the government’s assertion that he should be held accountable for J.H.’s death. Those strategic choices are not subject to being challenged in this action, especially considering that cross-examining the government’s witnesses on non-core issues, calling a defense expert who could bolster the government’s case and raising another appellate argument would not have changed the outcome. Lastly, counsel is not required to file a frivolous motion that seeks the recusal of the presiding judge based on the court’s findings. The movant’s claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance because he failed to file a motion to recuse is frivolous. In sum, the alleged errors that are asserted by the movant do not warrant relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The movant’s claims are meritless. Based on the foregoing, the movant’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion shall be denied. In a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding before a district judge, the final order is subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a). Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A district court possesses the authority to issue certificates of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) and Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). See Tiedeman v. Benson, 122 F.3d 4 518, 522 (8th Cir. 1997). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), a certificate of appealability may issue only if a movant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1039, 154 L. Ed. 2d 931 (2003); Garrett v. United States, 211 F.3d 1075, 1076-77 (8th Cir. 2000); Carter v. Hopkins, 151 F.3d 872, 873-74 (8th Cir. 1998); Cox v. Norris, 133 F.3d 565, 569 (8th Cir. 1997); Tiedeman, 122 F.3d at 523. To make such a showing, the issues must be debatable among reasonable jurists, a court could resolve the issues differently, or the issues deserve further proceedings. Cox, 133 F.3d at 569 (citing Flieger v. Delo, 16 F.3d 878, 882-83 (8th Cir. 1994)); see also Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 335-36 (reiterating standard). Courts reject constitutional claims either on the merits or on procedural grounds. “‘[W]here a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy [28 U.S.C.] § 2253(c) is straightforward: the [movant] must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.’” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 146 L. Ed. 2d 542 (2000)). When a federal habeas petition is dismissed on procedural grounds without reaching the underlying constitutional claim, “the [movant must show], at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. Having thoroughly reviewed the record in this case, the court finds that the movant failed to make the requisite “substantial showing” with respect to the claims that he raised in his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). Because he does not present a question of substance for appellate review, there is no reason to grant a certificate of appealability. Accordingly, a certificate of appealability shall be denied. If he desires further review of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, the movant 5 may request issuance of the certificate of appealability by a circuit judge of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in accordance with Tiedeman, 122 F.3d at 520-22. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 1) The movant’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion (docket no. 1) is denied. 2) A certificate of appealability is denied. DATED this 18th day of April, 2012. 6
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