Braun v. Village of Palatine et al, No. 1:2018cv04850 - Document 134 (N.D. Ill. 2020)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman on 10/15/2020: For the reasons stated in the attached opinion and order, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment 122 is denied for Counts III and V. Defendants 9; motion for summary judgment 118 is granted for Counts III, IV, and V. The court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims in Counts I, II, VI, VII, VIII, IX. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Status hearing set for 10/30/2020 is stricken. Civil case terminated. Mailed notice (cn).
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Braun v. Village of Palatine et al Doc. 134 Case: 1:18-cv-04850 Document #: 134 Filed: 10/15/20 Page 1 of 10 PageID #:1744 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION CHASE M. BRAUN, ) ) Plaintif, ) ) v. ) ) VILLAGE OF PALATINE, a municipal ) corporation, and MICHAEL LICARI, individually ) and as agent of the Village of Palatine, ) ) Defendants. ) Case No. 18 C 4850 Judge Robert W. Gettleman MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER Plaintif Chase Braun brought a nine count complaint against the Village of Palatine (“Village”) and Oicer Michael Licari, alleging malicious prosecution under state law (Count I), civil battery (Count II), false arrest under Illinois law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts III and IV, respectively), failure to provide necessary medical care under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count V), willful and wanton conduct (Count VI against Licari, Count VII against the Village), indemniication (Count VIII), and respondeat superior (Count IX). Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all counts. Plaintif cross-moved for summary judgment on Counts I, III, and V. For the reasons discussed below, plaintif’s motion is denied for Counts III and V, and defendant’s motion is granted for Counts III, IV, and V. he court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. BACKGROUND 1) Preliminary Issues Before addressing the parties’ arguments, there are two preliminary issues the court must address. First, plaintif’s response to defendants’ statement of material facts fails to comply with 1 Dockets.Justia.com Case: 1:18-cv-04850 Document #: 134 Filed: 10/15/20 Page 2 of 10 PageID #:1745 Local Rule 56.1. Local Rule 56.1 provides that a response to a statement of material facts must contain, among other things, “numbered paragraphs, each corresponding to and stating a concise summary of the paragraph to which it is directed.” L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(A). Plaintif failed to provide a concise summary of the paragraphs in defendants’ statement of material facts to which it was responding. (Doc. 130). he Seventh Circuit has “consistently upheld district judges’ discretion to require strict compliance with Local Rule 56.1.” Flint v. City of Belvidere, 791 F.3d 764, 767 (7th Cir. 2015). However, for purposes of expediency, the court will consider plaintif’s response, despite plaintif’s failure to comply with the Local Rule. Next, plaintif’s response brief cites to no legal authority, despite making legal arguments. (Doc. 130). he only citation provided is “City of Canton.” (Doc. 130, 6). Plaintif fails to provide either the citation or the full name of the case. It is not the role of the court to construct legal arguments for the parties, especially when the parties are represented by counsel. Duehning v. Auror E. Uniied School Dist. 131, No. 13 C 5617, 2015 WL 500876, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (a court is not required to conduct legal research and construct arguments for a represented party); United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (judges are not “like pigs, hunting for trules in briefs”). While the court understands that plaintif iled his own motion for summary judgment, plaintif is still required to provide arguments and legal citations in a response brief. Further, plaintif cites to several depositions in his statement of material facts, motion for summary judgment, and response brief, but failed to attach those exhibits for the court to review. he court should not have to parse through the parties’ exhibits and documents to construct undisputed facts. Rather, it is “[a]n advocate’s job to make it easy for the Court to rule in his client’s favor.” Dal Pozzo v. Basic Machinery Co., Inc., 463 F.3d 609, 613 (7th Cir. 2006). 2 Case: 1:18-cv-04850 Document #: 134 Filed: 10/15/20 Page 3 of 10 PageID #:1746 2) Facts for Summary Judgment Plaintif is a practicing pharmacist residing in Cook County, Illinois. On September 12, 2017, plaintif was 32 years old with a medical history that included traumatic brain injury, epileptic seizures, anxiety, depression, and ADHD. Defendant Licari is a Village police oicer who began working as an oicer on December 26, 2016. he Village is a municipality in the Northern District of Illinois. Plaintif states that on September 12, 2017, he felt unwell after having worked seven consecutive overnight shifts. After completing his inal shift, plaintif went to his parents’ house and slept until 4:00 p.m. Plaintif then went to his girlfriend’s house in Palatine. He attempted to eat, but threw up shortly thereafter. He did not consume any alcohol or drugs. After his girlfriend went to sleep, plaintif left to drive home to Chicago. Plaintif cannot recall any events between leaving his girlfriend’s house and waking up to two police oicers shining lashlights in his car. Defendant Licari and Oicer Baker were the two police oicers on scene. he parties agree that plaintif crashed his car into a utility pole. We now know that plaintif sufered a seizure while driving, which resulted in the crash and a head injury. However, when questioned at the scene, plaintif was unable to report how the crash occurred. Indeed, plaintif made strange and false statements at the scene, such as misstating his age, saying “I was not in an accident,” “I live in Chicago-Miami,” and “I had one beer with Scott.”1 Plaintif also repeatedly stated that he was “ine.” Defendant Licari, who had been on active patrol duty for about nine months, testiied that he observed that plaintif was confused, slurred his speech, had red, bloodshot eyes, and was unable to balance. Defendants assert that there was no indication of any injury or physical harm Scott is plaintif’s brother and was not in Chicago on the night in question. Plaintif had not, in fact, had any alcohol or drugs that day. 1 3 Case: 1:18-cv-04850 Document #: 134 Filed: 10/15/20 Page 4 of 10 PageID #:1747 to plaintif. After these initial observations, Licari and Baker dismissed the ambulance on scene. No medical personnel spoke with, or evaluated, plaintif. According to plaintif, neither Licari nor Baker had been trained on how to recognize a person sufering from a medical condition or head injury. Licari testiied that he thought plaintif’s statements “didn’t make sense and there had to have been more going on with him.” Licari assumed that plaintif was intoxicated. Licari performed a standard ield sobriety test, which plaintif failed. he second oicer on the scene searched plaintif’s car and did not ind any evidence of alcohol or drug consumption. Licari further testiied that he did not smell alcohol on plaintif, and that Village police oicers do not carry portable breathalyzer devices. Licari subsequently placed plaintif under arrest for driving under the inluence of alcohol (“DUI”) and took him to the Village police department. At the police department, an oicer administered a breathalyzer test. he parties dispute whether plaintif consented to the breathalyzer. he result of that test was .000. Despite that result, Licari charged plaintif with a DUI for alcohol. Licari then transported plaintif to Northwest Community Hospital for a blood test and DUI kit. A nurse at the hospital asked plaintif if he needed to see a doctor. Plaintif responded that he did not. After the hospital performed the DUI kit, Licari took plaintif back to the Village police department for processing. Plaintif asserts that processing plaintif at this time violated Village policies.2 Defendants claim that plaintif was released from custody and then had another seizure he relevant policy states that if a person blows a .000 breath test, the oicer “must notify a supervisor and a decision should be made about whether to take the person to the hospital for a blood draw or not.” (Doc. 123, 7). he policy further states “DO NOT process the person in the system” and reminds oicers that even if a court later “nolle pros” the charge, it still afects the person’s record as it shows an arrest for a DUI, “which we all know can be hazardous to one’s livelihood and future, when they didn’t really do anything to deserve such a label.” (Id.). Plaintif faults Licari for failing to notify a supervisor of plaintif’s .000 breath test, making the decision himself to take plaintif to the hospital for a DUI kit without speaking to a supervisor, and processing and charging plaintif despite the .000 breath test. 2 4 Case: 1:18-cv-04850 Document #: 134 Filed: 10/15/20 Page 5 of 10 PageID #:1748 while waiting for a taxi. Plaintif disputes this claim, and instead asserts that plaintif sufered another seizure while being processed by Oicer Christudhas for the DUI. Oicer Christudhas testiied that he was with plaintif during the booking process and that he saw plaintif fall of his stool and start to twitch. Oicer Christudhas called an ambulance, and plaintif was taken to the hospital. he results of the DUI kit did not arrive until December 2017. Plaintif tested negative for both alcohol and drugs. Licari testiied that he did not inform the prosecutor of the DUI kit results. he Circuit Court of Cook County dismissed the case on December 12, 2017, and entered an order of nolle prosequi. Plaintif iled suit, alleging various forms of damages, including that he struggled to ind employment because of the DUI arrest on his record, he sufered a head injury at the police station during his second seizure that resulted in frequent headaches, frequent seizures, nausea, and memory loss, and that he now sufers from PTSD. After taking discovery, the parties iled the instant motions for summary judgment. LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgment is proper where there is “no dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). he party seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must construe all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See CTL ex rel. Trebatosky v. 5 Case: 1:18-cv-04850 Document #: 134 Filed: 10/15/20 Page 6 of 10 PageID #:1749 Ashland Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 2014). But the nonmovant “is only entitled to the beneit of inferences supported by admissible evidence, not those ‘supported only by speculation or conjecture.’” Grant v. Trus. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2017). DISCUSSION 1) Counts III & IV—False Arrest Plaintif brings a state law claim for false arrest (Count III) as well as a § 1983 claim for false arrest (Count IV). Plaintif moved for summary judgment on Count III. Defendants moved for summary judgment on Counts III and IV, arguing that both counts fail because Licari had probable cause to arrest plaintif. he existence of probable cause bars a false arrest claim under both Illinois law and § 1983. Williams v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 2013); Mustafa v. City of Chicago, 442 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Probable cause to arrest is an absolute defense to any claim under Section 1983 against police oicers for wrongful arrest.”). “A police oicer has probable cause to arrest an individual when the facts and circumstances that are known to him reasonably support a belief” that the individual has committed or is about to commit a crime. Holmes v. Vill. of Hofman Estates, 511 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2007). To make this determination, the court must “step into the shoes of a reasonable person in the position of the oicer,” considering the facts known to the oicer at the time. Williams, 733 F3d at 756 (citing Carmichael v. Vill. of Palatine, 605 F.3d 451, 457 (7th Cir. 2010). If defendants had probable cause to believe that plaintif was guilty of a crime, their alleged malicious motives are immaterial. Terket v. Lund, 623 F.2d 29, 31 (7th Cir. 1980). Here, it was reasonable for Licari to arrest plaintif for a DUI. Plaintif was in a car accident but could not relay any details of the accident. Plaintif reported that he was not injured 6 Case: 1:18-cv-04850 Document #: 134 Filed: 10/15/20 Page 7 of 10 PageID #:1750 and was “ine.” He further reported that he had one beer with his brother. At the time, Licari had no way of knowing that this statement was false. Licari testiied that plaintif had red, bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and was unable to balance. Licari performed a standard ield sobriety test, which plaintif failed. Although there was no odor of alcohol and no signs of alcohol or drug consumption in plaintif’s car, there were plenty of other indicators suggesting that plaintif was under the inluence of drugs or alcohol. Given these facts, and considering what Licari knew at the time, defendant Licari had probable cause to arrest plaintif for a DUI. See, for example, People v. Day, 67 N.E.3d 607 (3rd Dist. 2016) (to ind probable cause for a DUI, observations such as bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and odor of alcohol have to be corroborated by other factors such as poor driving, stumbling, falling, or an inability to communicate); People v. Anderson, 1 N.E.3d 54, 60 (2nd Dist. 2013) (oicer had probable cause to arrest defendant for DUI when defendant was swaying and could not explain his car accident). he court grants summary judgment for defendants on Counts III and IV.3 Plaintif’s motion for summary judgment on Count III is denied. 4) Count V—Failure to Provide Necessary Medical Care Plaintif brings a claim under § 1983 for failure to provide necessary medical care. Plaintif brings this claim against both Licari and the Village, asserting diferent theories of relief for each defendant. Plaintif and defendants have moved for summary judgment on this count. Plaintif’s claim for failure to provide necessary medical care against Licari is governed by the Fourth Amendment. Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392, 403 (7th Cir. 2007); Lopez v. City of Chicago, 464 F.3d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 2006) (“he Fourth Amendment governs the period of coninement between arrest without a warrant and the preliminary hearing at which a Having determined that Count IV fails due to probable cause, the court declines to address defendants’ arguments regarding qualiied immunity. 3 7 Case: 1:18-cv-04850 Document #: 134 Filed: 10/15/20 Page 8 of 10 PageID #:1751 determination of probable cause is made….”). he standard under the Fourth Amendment asks whether “an oicer’s conduct was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances.” Williams, 509 F.3d at 403. To determine whether the failure to provide medical care was objectively unreasonable, courts consider four factors: “(1) whether the oicer has notice of the detainee’s medical needs; (2) the seriousness of the medical need; (3) the scope of the requested treatment; and (4) police interests, including administrative, penological, or investigatory concerns.” Ortiz v. City of Chicago, 656 F.3d 523, 530 (7th Cir. 2011). For the irst factor, an oicer can receive notice either by the arrestee’s words or through observation of the arrestee’s symptoms. Williams, 509 F.3d at 403 (citing Sides v. City of Champaign, 496 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2007)). Here, Licari’s failure to provide medical care was not objectively unreasonable. here is no indication in the record that Licari had notice of plaintif’s medical need. When questioned by Licari, plaintif stated that he was “ine.” Plaintif did not report that he had any medical conditions and did not request any medical treatment. Any observations of plaintif’s symptoms, such as strange behavior and inability to balance, were easily explained by plaintif’s statement that he had a beer with his brother. It was accordingly reasonable for Licari to assume that plaintif was acting strangely because he was impaired, and not because he needed medical attention. No reasonable jury could ind for plaintif on this claim. Plaintif’s next theory is that Village is liable under § 1983 for failure to train its police oicers on how to recognize a medical emergency and when an arrestee is sufering from a medical condition. Under City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, “the inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indiference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). “In resolving the issue of a city’s liability, the focus must be on adequacy of the training 8 Case: 1:18-cv-04850 Document #: 134 Filed: 10/15/20 Page 9 of 10 PageID #:1752 program in relation to the tasks the particular oicers must perform…Moreover, for liability to attach in this circumstance the identiied deiciency in a city’s training program must be closely related to the ultimate injury.” (Id.); see also, Larpe v. City of Chicago, 911 F.3d 424, 437 (7th Cir. 2018). Plaintif cites to Baker and Licari’s deposition testimony to show that the Village did not train its oicers on how to recognize medical issues such as seizures or head injuries. Both oicers testiied that they were not trained to recognize medical emergencies and they were not aware of any such training programs. However, plaintif has not provided any evidence from which the court or a jury could infer deliberate indiference. here is no evidence that the Village ignored a recurring problem, and the record does not “relect a ‘deliberate’ or ‘conscious’ choice by a municipality.” 489 U.S. at 389. Consequently, the court grants summary judgment for defendants on Count V. 2) Remaining State Law Claims he court has determined that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all of plaintif’s federal claims. All that remains are strictly state law claims against in-state defendants: Count I, malicious prosecution under state law; Count II, civil battery under state law; Counts VI and VII, willful and wanton conduct under state law; and Counts VIII and IX, indemniication and respondeat superior under state law. As such, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and declines to address the merits of these claims. 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3). CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, plaintif’s motion for summary judgment is denied for Counts III and V. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted for Counts III, IV, and V. 9 Case: 1:18-cv-04850 Document #: 134 Filed: 10/15/20 Page 10 of 10 PageID #:1753 he court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims in Counts I, II, VI, VII, VIII, IX. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). ENTER: __________________________________________ Robert W. Gettleman United States District Judge 10
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