ING Investment Plan Services, LLC v. Barrington, No. 1:2009cv03788 - Document 52 (N.D. Ill. 2010)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Blanche M. Manning on 8/24/2010:Judicial staff mailed notice(gl, )

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ING Investment Plan Services, LLC v. Barrington Doc. 52 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION )NG )NVESTMENT PLAN SERV)CES, LLC f/k/a CitiStreet, LLC, Plaintiff, v. DONNA M. BARR)NGTON, No. CV Judge Blanche M. Manning Defendant MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Plaintiff )NG )nvestment Plan Services, LLC is the administrative service provider for the Avaya, )nc. Pension Plan for Salaried Employees. )NG )nvestment directed Avaya, )nc. to disburse a lump sum payment from the Plan to defendant Donna Barrington on August , . Three years later )NG )nvestment discovered that it had miscalculated the lump sum payment and that Barrington had received an overpayment. )NG )nvestment filed suit against Barrington to recover the overpayment. Barrington has moved to dismiss )NG )nvestment’s complaint. For the reasons that follow, the state law claims are dismissed and )NG )nvestment is granted leave to file an amended complaint stating claims under the Employee Retirement )ncome Security Act of ER)SA . BACKGROUND The following facts are taken from )NG )nvestment’s second amended complaint, the Benefit Administration Agreement, and correspondence between Avaya and Barrington, which the complaint references. See Tierney v. Vahle, F. d , th Cir. motion to dismiss, court can take into account documents central to the claims of the on Dockets.Justia.com complaint even if not attached to the complaint . The court accepts these facts as true for purposes of this motion to dismiss. Id. )n April , Avaya entered into the Benefit Administration Agreement BAA with CitiStreet, LLC. See Benefit Administration Agreement attached as Ex. A to Tracy Aff. . According to the BAA, Avaya is the Plan Administrator, as defined in ER)SA, and CitiStreet is the administrative service provider and not authorized to take any action that would make it a fiduciary of the Plan. Id. § . . . The BAA identifies Avaya and CitiStreet as independent contractors who are not agents or principles of the other. Id. § . . On July , , )NG )nvestment acquired CitiStreet and became the administrative service provider for the Plan. Barrington was an employee of Avaya and participated in the Plan. When she retired, she opted to receive her pension benefits as a lump sum payment. )NG )nvestment calculated the lump sum payment due Barrington to be $ her on August , , . , which the Plan paid to . Unbeknownst to anyone, )NG )nvestment had miscalculated the payment due Barrington and, as a result, the lump sum payment she received exceeded the amount she was due by $ )n March , . . , an audit of Avaya’s books and records revealed the mistaken overpayment to Barrington, which Avaya then brought to the attention of )NG )nvestment. )NG )nvestment reimbursed the Plan $ Meanwhile, on June , , . , the amount of the overpayment. , Avaya wrote to Barrington to tell her of the mistaken overpayment. The letter also directed Barrington to reimburse the Plan for the overpayment. Barrington has made no attempt to do so. Page 2 )NG )nvestment has now sued Barrington in an attempt to recover the $ , . that it paid to Avaya to cover the amount of the overpayment. )n its complaint, it alleges two state law claims: quantum meruit Count ) and money had and received Count )) . Barrington has moved to dismiss both state law claims on three grounds. First, she contends that )NG )nvestment cannot clear the threshold hurdle of standing because the overpayment can be recovered only by Avaya, the party who made it. Second, she contends that the state law claims are preempted by ER)SA because they involve an ER)SA governed plan. Finally, she contends that the allegations of the complaint do not meet the standards of notice pleading set out in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and, therefore, fail to state a claim. I. ANALYSIS STANDING The court shall first address the threshold issue of standing. To meet the requirements of standing under Article ))) of the U.S. Constitution, a plaintiff must establish that it is the proper party to bring suit. See Raines v. Byrd, U.S. Standing exists when each of the following elements is satisfied: , . an injury in fact; causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and a a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. See Rawoof v. Texor Petroleum Co., F. d , th Cir. . General factual allegations of injury resulting from defendant's conduct may suffice to establish standing. See Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, F. d Roebuck & Co., , th Cir. . Barrington argues that )NG )nvestment has failed to establish that it has standing to recover the $ , . overpayment because the overpayment was made by the Plan. Page 3 (owever, )NG )nvestment has alleged that it is the injured party, not the Plan, because it has succeeded to the rights of Avaya and [the Plan] to recover from Barrington the amount of the overpayment. Barrington argues that the allegations are insufficient because )NG )nvestment has failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that it has succeeded to the rights of the Plan. (owever, as discussed above, general factual allegations of injury are sufficient to establish standing. See Apex Digital, F. d at . )NG )nvestment’s allegations have detailed the circumstances that gave rise to its alleged injury and, therefore, it has sufficiently established standing for purposes of the motion to dismiss. II. PREEMPTION Next, Barrington argues that )NG )nvestment’s state law claims are completely preempted by ER)SA. Any examination of whether a state law claim is preempted by ER)SA begins with a look to ER)SA itself: U.S.C. § Except as provided in subsection b [the savings clause] of this section, the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter ))) of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section a of this title and not exempt under section b of this title. a . Thus, preemption under ER)SA is aggressive and its breadth is wide. See Sharp Elec. Corp. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., F. d , th Cir. . )t reaches generally applicable laws, not just laws aimed exclusively at employee benefit plans. See Ingersoll­Rand Co. v McClendon, U.S. , . ER)SA was enacted to provide a uniform regulatory regime for employee benefits plans, and the goal of uniformity would be undermined if questions involving plan interpretation could be decided under both ER)SA and state law. See Trustees of AFTRA Health Fund v. Biondi, F. d , th Cir. . Page 4 ER)SA preempts only those claims that implicate relations among the principal ER)SA entities, which are: the employer, the plan itself, the plan fiduciary, and the beneficiaries. See Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. William M. Mercer, Inc., N.D. )ll. F.R.D. , . )NG )nvestment contends that because it is merely an administrative services provider and not one of the principal ER)SA entities, its claims are not preempted. (owever, )NG )nvestment seeks reimbursement of the overpayment the Plan made to Barrington. Therefore, its claims implicate the relationship between two principal ER)SA entities, the Plan and its beneficiary, Barrington. See Kolbe & Kolbe Health & Welfare Benefit Plan v. Medical College of Wisconsin, Inc., No. Apr. , CV , WL , at * W.D. Wis. ER)SA preempts state law claim that implicates the relationship between principal ER)SA entities . )ndeed, )NG )nvestment itself alleges that the rights it asserts are those it obtained upon succeed[ing] to the rights of Avaya and [the Plan] to recover from Barrington the amount of the overpayment. Second Amended Complaint [ ] ¶ Determining whether Barrington was overpaid, and what rights Avaya and the Plan had to recover that overpayment, will necessarily require consulting the terms of the Plan itself. See Ingersoll­Rand, U.S. at claim is preempted if its resolution requires interpretation of an ER)SA governed benefit plan . Accordingly, the court concludes that )NG )nvestment’s state law claims for quantum meruit and money had and received are preempted by ER)SA. III. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM Alternatively, Barrington argues that the state law claims should be dismissed because )NG )nvestment has failed to allege sufficient facts in support of those claims. Page 5 Because the court has concluded that )NG )nvestment’s state law claims are preempted by ER)SA, it need not address Barrington’s alternative argument for dismissal. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated, the court concludes that )NG )nvestment’s state law claims are preempted by ER)SA. (owever, the parties have yet to brief the issue of whether the relief )NG )nvestment seeks is available under ER)SA, and the court hesitates to act on an issue not raised by the parties. Given the remaining uncertainty, the court determines in its discretion that it would be prudent to give )NG )nvestment leave to file an amended complaint if it so chooses. Accordingly, the court grants the motion to dismiss the state law claims, and grants leave to )NG )nvestment to file an amended complaint no later than September , . )f no amended complaint is filed by that date, the court’s dismissal of the Second Amended Complaint will be with prejudice and the clerk will enter a Rule the case from the court’s docket. ENTER: DATE: August , judgment and terminate Blanche M. Manning United States District Judge Page 6

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