McDaniel v. Commissioner of Social Security, No. 3:2008cv00076 - Document 10 (S.D. Ga. 2009)

Court Description: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS that the Commissioner's final decision be Affirmed, that this civil action be Closed and that a final judgment be Entered infavor of the Commissioner - re 1 Complaint filed by Ramona McDaniel Objections to R&R due by 8/17/2009. Signed by Magistrate Judge W. Leon Barfield on 7/31/09. (cmr)

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McDaniel v. Commissioner of Social Security Doc. 10 ORIGINAL IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 2009 JUL 31 AM 857 DUBLIN DIVISION RAMONA MCDANIEL, Plaintiff, V. CV 308-076 MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security Administrations Defendant. MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Ramona McDaniel ("Plaintiff') appeals the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her application for supplemental security income ("S SF') benefits under the Social Security Act. Upon consideration of the briefs submitted by counsel, the record evidence, and the relevant statutory and case law, the Court REPORTS and RECOMMENDS that the Commissioner's final decision be AFFIRMED, that this civil action be CLOSED, and that a final judgment be ENTERED in favor of the Commissioner. I. BACKGROUND Based upon claims of disability dating back to March 31, 2004, Plaintiff applied for Dockets.Justia.com SSI benefits based on a protective filing date of April 1, 2004.' 2 Tr. ("R"), pp. 20, 87-88. The Social Security Administration denied her initial claim (R. 59-61) and her request for reconsideration. R. 46. Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("AU"). After two hearings at which Plaintiff testified and was represented by counsel, the AU issued an unfavorable decision dated December 18, 2007. R. 20-27. Applying the five step sequential process required by 20 CFR § 416.920, the AU found: The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of disability. 2. The claimant has the following severe impairments: degenerative disc/joint disease of the cervical and lumbar spine, status-post fusions of them, and depression/dysthyinia (20 CFR § 416.920(c)). 3. The medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments do not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments in Appendix 1, Subpart P of Regulations No. 4. 4. The claimant's degenerative jointldise disease of the neck and lower back limit her to a residual functional capacity of performing light exertional work activities that never require climbing ladders, ropes, 'Plaintiff argues in her brief that she became disabled on January 1, 1996, and implies that the ALT improperly focused on whether Plaintiff was disabled from the date of her S S I application in 2004. (PL's Br., p. 3). However, the record reflects that prior to Plaintiff's hearing with the ALJ on March 28, 2008, she amended her disability onset date to March 31, 2004. R. 185. 'The Court notes that Plaintiff had previously filed an application for SSI benefits that alleged a disability onset date of January 1, 1996. R. 101-04, 214. The Social Security Administration denied her application initially, and on reconsideration. R. 68-71, 73-75. Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge; however, she later withdrew that request. R. 45, 76-77. or scaffolding.' She can individually sit, stand, walk, push and/or pull for at least six of eight hours each eight-hour workday. She can lift/carry 20 pounds occasionally (2 Y2 hours per eight-hour workday) and 10 pounds frequently (up to 5 '/2 hours per eight-hour workday). She has no postural or environmental limitations. Her depression limits her to performing work activities with a specific vocational preparation of 1-3. Her concentration may drift from 0-2 '/2 hours during an eight-hour workday if the work is repetitive, routine, or boring; however, she can pay enough attention to details to meet the general productivity requirements of the job(s) within the same workday. The claimant is able to perform her past relevant work of a route driver which is exertionally light, semi-skilled work as performed by claimant, and knitting machine operator which is light, semi-skilled work. R. 22-27. Because the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work, the sequential evaluation process stopped, and the AU concluded that Plaintiff "was not under a 'disability' as defined in the Social Security Act, since April 1, 2004 (20 CFR § 416.920(f)), the date the application was filed. R. 27. When the Appeals Council ("AC") denied Plaintiff's request for review, the Commissioner's decision was "final" for the purpose ofjudicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Having exhausted her administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed this civil action in the United States District Court for the Southern SLight work involves: lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do substantially all of these activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.697(b). District of Georgia requesting a reversal of that adverse decision. Plaintiff now argues that the ALJ erred by failing to properly evaluate the medical evidence regarding Plaintiff's spinal problems, and erred by failing to properly evaluate Plaintiff's mental impairments and resulting functional limitations. H. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW Judicial review of social security cases is narrow and limited to the following questions: (1) whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U. S. 389,390(1971); Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1991); and (2) whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). When considering whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the reviewing court may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its judgment for the Commissioner's. Cornelius, 936 F.2d at 1145. Notwithstanding this measure of deference, the Court remains obligated to scrutinize the whole record to determine whether substantial evidence supports each essential administrative finding. Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (llthCir. 1983). The Commissioner's factual findings should be affirmed if there is substantial evidence to support them. Barron v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 227, 230 (11th Cir. 1991). Substantial evidence is "more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance: '[iJt is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cii. 1990) (quoting Blloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239). Ifthe Court finds substantial evidence exists to support the Commissioner's factual 4 findings, it must uphold the Commissioner even if the evidence preponderates in favor of the claimant. Id. Finally, the Commissioner's findings of fact must be grounded in the entire record; a decision that focuses on one aspect of the evidence and disregards other contrary evidence is not based upon substantial evidence. McCruter v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 1544, 1548 (llthCir. 1986). The deference accorded the Commissioner's findings of fact does not extend to his conclusions of law, which enjoy no presumption of validity. Brown v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1233, 1236 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that judicial review of the Commissioner's legal conclusions are not subject to the substantial evidence standard). If the Commissioner fails either to apply correct legal standards or to provide the reviewing court with the means to determine whether correct legal standards were in fact applied, the Court must reverse the decision. Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982). III. DISCUSSION As noted above, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to properly evaluate the medical evidence regarding Plaintiff's spinal problems, and erred by failing to properly evaluate Plaintiffs mental impairments and resulting functional limitations. Although Plaintiff's arguments raised in her brief hinge on the Al's determination of her credibility, she does not specifically address this issue. However, because Plaintiff's arguments hinge on the AL's determination of Plaintiff's credibility, the Court must first address the AL's findings concerning her credibility. A. The AL's Determination of Plaintiff's Credibility The AU found that Plaintiff has severe degenerative disc/joint disease of the cervical and lumbar spine, status-post fusions of them. R. 22. Thus, the AU concluded that the objective evidence substantiates Plaintiff's severe musculoskeletal impairment. However, the AILJ also concluded that the objective evidence did not substantiate the degree of limitation alleged by Plaintiff. In reaching this conclusion, the AU explained: [Plaintiff] alleges that she has constant pain in her neck and lower back. Her neck pain goes from her neck down her left side with left arm numbness. However, lumbar and cervical spine MRI(s) conducted on March 2, 2004, showed L5-S- 1 disc protrusion with only slight effect upon the thecal sac as well as mild disc protrusion at L4-5 (Exhibit B-2F/37B). Also shown was moderate disc protrusion at C6-7 with mild to moderate effect upon the cord as well as a smaller disc protrusion at C5-6 (Exhibit B-2F/37A). In December 2004 x-rays of her right shoulder were normal and cervical spine x-rays showed no acute process (Exhibit B-7). There were no complaints of left arm pain or numbness. When seen for a physical therapy session in January 2007 claimant reported a pain level of 8/10, yet she showed up wearing high heel boots that would ordinarily cause crippling pain to an individual with true low back pain. She reported that she was unable to go back home to get her tennis shoes to wear to treatment because she had been out that morning doing a lot of errands and just ran out of time (Exhibit B7F). These objective medical findings and observations do not substantiate claimant's allegations of inability to sit, stand, walk or lie down over 15 minutes at a time and constantly having to change positions all day. [Plaintiff's] credibility is further diminished by the following: (1) she lied to Dr. Huthwaite about not using any illegal drugs. She has used marijuana in the past per her mother's statement to Dr. Long and claimant's self admitted testimony at Judge Davenport's hearing; (2) [Plaintiff] alleges illiteracy and special education classes, but school records and her previous statements show scores in the 80's for typing, a 90 in science back in 1982/83 [Exhibit B-402]; (3) [Plaintiff] alleges illiteracy but worked for a few months as her ex-husband's receptionist, which required taking notes, writing down appointments, and handling either paper records or computerized records; (4) she claims she does not handle a check book but her mother said she does regularly; (5) she alleged she could not sit longer than 10 minutes but sat for over 30 minutes at Judge Davenport's first hearing; [and] (6) she told Judge Davenport she did no lifting on her knitting machine job but told Dr. Fluthwaite she had to carry 80 pounds. rel R. 26. The Eleventh Circuit has established a three-pronged test for evaluating a claimant's complaints of pain and other subjective symptoms. bit v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). Under the Eleventh Circuit's pain standard, Plaintiff must show: (1) evidence of an underlying medical condition, and either (2) objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged pain or the restriction arising therefrom, or (3) that the objectively determined medical condition is such that it can reasonably be expected to give rise to the claimed pain or restriction. Id. When discrediting a claimant's subjective allegations of disabling pain, the ALJ must articulate "explicit and adequate" reasons for doing so, or "the implication must be so clear as to amount to a specific credibility finding." Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561-62 (11th Cu-. 1995) (per curiam). "Credibility determinations are, of course, for the [Commissioner], not the courts." Ryan v. Heckler, 762 F.2d 939, 942 (11th Cir. 1985). Moreover, this Court is required to uphold the Commissioner's credibility determination if it is supported by substantial evidence. Fortenberrv v. Harris, 612 F.2d 947, 950 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam). As the Eleventh Circuit recently explained: Although this circuit does not require an explicit finding as to credibility,. the implication must be obvious to the reviewing court. The credibility determination does not need to cite particular phrases or formulations but it cannot merely be abroad rejection which is not enough to enable [the district court or this Court] to conclude that [the AU] considered [his] medical condition as a whole. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 7 Here, the AL's written decision clearly reflects the Holt analysis was appropriately followed when reaching the conclusion that Plaintiffs subjective complaints of pain were not credible to the degree alleged and that Plaintiffs objectively determined medical condition was not of such severity that it would reasonably give rise to the degree of limitations alleged. R. 22-26. The AL! addressed each prong of the Holt analysis as described above, and the substantial evidence in the record supports his findings. First, the ALJ acknowledged that there was evidence of an underlying medical condition constituting a severe impairment: degenerative disc/joint disease of the cervical and lumbar spine, status-post fusion." R. 22. Having addressed the first prong of Holt, the ALJ went on to evaluate Plaintiff's allegations of the severity of her pain stemming from that impairment. The AL! reviewed the medical evidence of record, and found that Plaintiff's medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to produce a few of the alleged symptoms, but Plaintiff's statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms were not entirely credible. R. 26. In making this determination, the AIJ considered, in detail, written documents submitted by Plaintiff (R. 11 377),4 as well as her testimony concerning her allegedly disabling pain. R. 25, 633-54, 668-75. The ALJ noted that in the written documents, Plaintiff alleged that she was unable to work due to limitations resulting from her impairments and that she had constant pain and could not hold out to work. R. 25. At her March 2007 hearing, Plaintiff testified: The documents consist of disability reports, a work history report, and function reports that were filled out by Plaintiff between March, 31, 2004 and April 19, 2005. R. 113121, 122-30, 131-39, 140-47, 148-55, 156-59, 160-67, 168-77. 8 Her worst problems are her neck and back pain. Her neck pain goes from her neck down her left side with left arm numbness and they are constant. Her low back pain is also constant. If she sits, stands, walks or lies down too long, over 15 minutes at a time, the pain is worse. She constantly has to change positions all day. She rated her neck and arm pain as a 7 on a pain scale of 1-10 and rated her back pain as a 9. She takes pain medication which is of limited benefit. The pain never goes away, it just eases off some. After taking medications, her back pain would be an 8. She also testified that she has bad migraine headaches, and has nausea and vomiting 4-5 times a day. This started 3-4 months ago. In a 24 hour period she spends most of her time in bed or on the couch about 12-15 hours per day. Finally, she testified that she could not read or write. R. 25, 644-47, 651. Additionally, the AU noted that Plaintiffs mother testified that on Plaintiff's bad days which occurred 2-3 times a week, Plaintiff could not dress herself, and therefore, her daughters had to help her. R. 25,652,655. Plaintiff's mother further testified that after Plaintiff's 2004 surgery, she had been going down hill. R. 25, 656. In discrediting Plaintiff's complaints concerning her pain limitations, the AU noted that the medical evidence did not substantiate the degree of limitation alleged by Plaintiff and her mother. R. 26. Plaintiff complained that she had constant pain in her neck and lower back and that her neck pain goes from her neck down her left side with left arm numbness. R. 26. However, the ALJ concluded that the medical imaging revealed only slight problems during the periods in which Plaintiff alleged the incapacitating symptoms. R. 26. Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiffs lumbar and cervical spine MRI conducted on March 2, 2004, showed L5-S- 1 disc protrusion with only slight effect upon the thecal sac as well as mild disc protrusion at L4-5. R. 26,402. Additionally, the AU found that there was moderate disc protrusion at C6-7 with mild to moderate effect upon the cord as well as a smaller disc protrusion at C5-6. R. 26,404. Furthermore, the AU noted that in December 2004, x-rays of Plaintiff's right shoulder were normal and cervical spine x-rays showed no acute process (Exhibit B-7F). R. 26. The ALJ also noted that there were no complaints of left aim pain or numbness. R. 25. Next, the ALJ observed that despite Plaintiff's claims of disabling pain (Plaintiff reported a pain level of 8/10), when seen for a physical therapy session in January 2007, she showed up wearing high heel boots that would ordinarily cause crippling pain to an individual with true low back pain. R. 25. Additionally, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff reported that she was unable to go back home to get her tennis shoes to wear to treatment because she had been out that morning doing a lot of errands and just ran out of time. It 25. Lastly, the AL! specifically enumerated six discrepancies, noted supra, concerning Plaintiff's credibility with regards to her consultation with Dr. Huthwaite. R. 26. Therefore, in satisfying the requirements ofk jQjS, the AU also sufficiently explained his reasons for discounting Plaintiff's credibility. Here, the AU's credibility determination was based on the record as a whole, and he properly articulated the basis for his determination in his written decision. The ALJ reviewed Plaintiff's medical records and properly considered Plaintiff's own testimony regarding her level of pain under the standard. He also considered Plaintiff's description of her activities and lifestyle and noted incongruities between Plaintiff's testimony and the objectively supported medical opinions in the record. Taken in total, it is apparent that the AU rejected Plaintiff's subjective complaints concerning her alleged limitations after thoroughly evaluating the evidence in the record. See Watson v. Heckler, 738 F.2d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (concluding that the AL's consideration of objective medical findings, the claimant's pain 10 killers, failure to timely seek treatment, daily activities, inconsistent statements, and demeanor were sufficient to discredit disabling nature of the claimant's pain). Clearly articulated credibility findings such as these, which are supported by substantial evidence, will not be disturbed by a reviewing court. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1562. Given the absence of credible support for the severity of her claims and the AL's clearly articulated reasons for discrediting the claims, Plaintiff's subjective complaints concerning her limitations were properly discredited. Next, the Court turns to the errors Plaintiff did raise. B. The ALJ Properly Evaluated the Medical Evidence As to the first argument addressed by Plaintiff, she argues that the AILJ failed to properly evaluate the medical evidence in Plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff's over-arching argument is that the AU failed to consider whether Plaintiff was disabled for a closed period.' In support of this error, Plaintiff argues that because she under went two surgeries between March 2, 2004 and February 17, 2006, she was disabled for, at least, a closed period. Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that because the AU reached conflicting conclusions from the same studies/records, he did not consider pertinent medical information. Finally, Plaintiff argues that the AIJ improperly relied upon the opinion of a non-examining state agency physician. The AU's finding that Plaintiff was not disabled because she could perform her past In a "closed period" case, the decision maker determines that a new applicant for disability benefits was disabled for a finite period of time which started and stopped prior to the date of his decision. Pickett v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 288, 289 n.l (11th Cii. 1987). Typically, both the disability decision and the cessation decision are rendered in the same document. 11 relevant work is supported by substantial evidence. Concerning Plaintiff's degenerative disc/joint disease of the cervical and lumbar spine, the AU found: The medical evidence shows that claimant has a significant medical treatment history for degenerative disc/joint disease of the lumbar spine 1-4-5 and L5S1 (Exhibit B-2F/37B) with L5-S 1 herniated nucleus pulposus (I{NP), statuspost microdiscectomy (Exhibit B-2F/39) degenerative disc/joint disease of the cervical spine C5-6 and C6-7 (Exhibit B-2F/37A), status post fusion (Exhibit B-2F/43), and depressionldysthymia (Exhibits B-1 F/39, B-3F/5 and B-8F/7). The objective evidence substantiates the claimant's musculoskeletal impairment. Lumbar and cervical spine MRIs conducted on March 2, 2004, show L5-S 1 disc protrusion and bilateral facet hypertrophy with slight effect upon the thecal sac as well as mild disc protrusion with moderate hypertrophy at L4-5(Exhibit B-2F137B). Also shown was moderate disc protrusion and osteophytic spurring at C6-7 with mild to moderate effect upon the cord as well as a smaller disc protrusion at C5-6 (Exhibit B-2F/37A). R. 22. 1. Alleged Disability Due to Two Surgeries The Court turns first to Plaintiff's argument that the AU should have considered whether Plaintiff was disabled for a closed period of twelve months or longer, due to her spinal problems. (Pl.'s Br., pp. 10-13). Plaintiff maintains that the AILJ should have considered whether she was disabled between March 2, 2004, the date Plaintiff's MRI reflected cervical and lumbar problems, through February 17, 2006, a date after Plaintiff's second spinal surgery. Qd. at 14). Plaintiff states that "even a cursory review of the evidence clearly shows two spinal surgeries in a span of less that 12 months, accompanied by two abnormal MRI's from March 2004 to July 2005" establishes Plaintiff's disability within that closed period of time. (Id. at 15). SSI may be awarded for any period in which an individual is unable to engage in 12 substantial gainful activity for a continuous period of at least twelve months. 20 CFR § 416.905(a), 416.909. An individual who files an application for SSI must prove that she is disabled. 20 CFR § 416.912. Here, the crux of Plaintiff's argument is that because she required two surgeries, she was disabled. Plaintiff states that the "All's focus when assessing [her] complaints of pain and limitation associated with spinal problems clearly show that he never considered a closed period of disability." at 13). Additionally, Plaintiff argues that the All's decision clearly does not contain any meaningful discussion concerning whether Plaintiff was disabled either before and/or shortly after her spinal surgeries. (jj at 13-14). Initially, the Court notes that Plaintiff's argument that her surgeries indicate that she was disabled is misguided. As noted by Defendant, the mere fact that Plaintiff had two surgeries does not establish that she was disabled or had any functional limitations. Osborn v. Barnhart, 194 Fed. App'x 654, 661 (11th Cit 2006). "[T]he claimant bears the burden of proving that he is disabled, and, consequently, [s]he is responsible for producing evidence in support of [her] claim," Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a)). Plaintiff can carry this burden by showing that she has an impairment or combination of impairments that limit her physical and/or mental ability to perform basic work activities. 20 CFR § 404.920(c). "The 'severity' ofamedically ascertained disability must be measured in terms of its effect upon ability to work, and not simply in terms of deviation from purely medical standards of bodily perfection or normality." McCruter v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 1544, 1547 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Higgs v. Bowen, 880 F.2d 860, 863 (6th Cit 1988) (persuasively noting that a diagnosis of a 13 condition says nothing about the condition's severity). As such, Plaintiff cannot solely rely on her two surgeries as a means by which to establish that she is disabled. Furthermore, as discussed herein, a review of the evidence shows that Plaintiff was not disabled for any time during the entire relevant period. 2. Evaluation of the Medical Evidence Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ noted that the "objective medical evidence substantiates [Plaintiff's] musculoskeletal impairment." (Pl.'s Br., p. 12). Plaintiff argues that despite those findings by the ALT, he improperly - using the same 2004 reports that led the doctors to perform two surgeries - discounted Plaintiff's complaints of pain limitation associated with the spinal problems. ad. at 13). Plaintiff argues that although the AU stated that Plaintiff's spinal complaints were confirmed and that she had undergone "significant" medical treatment for the condition, the AU, from the same evidence, determined that Plaintiff's complaints of pain and limitation were not credible. Plaintiffs argument on this point fails. Plaintiff argues that the ALT' s focus when assessing her complaints of pain and limitations associated with the spinal problems clearly show that he never considered a closed period of disability. Plaintiff states that apart from the diagnostic testing cited above, the ALJ only points to a single physical therapy session from January 2007 and Plaintiff's complaints of pain and limitations from March 2007. (Ii). As previously noted in Part III A, the AU concluded that the objective evidence substantiates Plaintiff's severe musculoskeletal impairment. However, the AILJ also concluded that the objective evidence did not substantiate the degree of limitation alleged 14 by Plaintiff. Therefore, the ALJ did properly evaluate Plaintiff's impairments using the 2004 reports that led the doctors to perform two surgeries, but be discredited her allegations concerning her complaints of limitations. Concerning her complaints of limitations, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ only pointed to a single physical therapy session from January 2007 and Plaintiff's complaints of pain and limitations from March 2007. However, the Court notes that in making his determination concerning Plaintiff's spinal conditions, the AU considered Exhibits B-21 7/3713, B-2F/39, B-217/37A, B-2F/43, B-1F/39, B-117/39, B-3F/5, and B-817/7. R. 22. Therefore, the AU reviewed medical records from March 2,2003 through February 28,2006. R. 313,401, 402, 404, 409, 424-27. Specifically concerning her credibility, the AIJ stated he considered Plaintiff's testimony as well as her mother's and Exhibit B-I F. 6 R. 25. A review of Exhibit 13-1E shows that the ALJ reviewed Plaintiff's disability appeal report dated April 19, 2005, Plaintiff's functional reports dated February 9, 2005 and August 10, 2004, Plaintiff's disability reports dated March 31, 2004, July 20, 2004, and September 30, 2004, and Plaintiff's work history report dated July 20, 2004. R. 113-21. Although Plaintiff argues that the ALT only pointed to a single physical therapy session from January of 2007 and Plaintiff's complaints of pain and limitations from March of 2007 in determining her subjective pain, (Pl.'s Br., p. 13), the record clearly establishes otherwise. Therefore, the ALJ evaluated the medical evidence and simply determined that Plaintiff's complaints concerning her limitations were not credible. 3. Reliance on the Opinion of a Non-Examining State Agency Physician 'Plaintiff's credibility was thoroughly discussed in Part HI A. 15 The Court turns next to Plaintiff's argument that the ALJ did not base his opinion on substantial evidence because he gave greater weight to the state agency consultant, Dr. Gorge Lee Cross, and used his opinion, which Plaintiff maintains is incomplete, to improperly discredit the opinion of Dr. Sandra Gibbs, Plaintiff's primary care provider. (Pl.'s Br., pp. 14-15). Plaintiff points out that Dr. Cross rendered his opinion in 2004, and therefore, his opinion could not have taken into consideration the records concerning Plaintiff's second shoulder surgery, i.e., medical records from May 31, 2005, July 14, 2005 and August 29, In the Eleventh Circuit, a treating physician's opinion must be given substantial weight. Hilisman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179, 1181(11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). Refusal to give a treating physician's opinion substantial weight requires that the Commissioner show good cause. Scbnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987). "The [Commissioner] must specify what weight is given to a treating physician's opinion and any reason for giving it no weight, and failure to do so is reversible error." MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986). The Commissioner, however, is not obligated to agree with a medical opinion if the evidence tends toward a contrary conclusion. Srvock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 835 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam). Indeed, a treating physician's opinion may be properly discounted if it is unsupported by objective medical evidence, is merely conclusory, or is inconsistent with the physician's medical records. Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997); Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F,2d 580, 583-84 (llthCir. 1991). Here, Plaintiff argues that the state agency doctor, Dr. Cross, who rendered his 16 opinion on January 4, 2005, could not have considered any medical records from May 31, 2005, July 14, 2005, August 29, 2005, nor the post-surgical limitations described by Plaintiff's surgeon. (j). Therefore, Plaintiff argues that it was improper to use Dr. Cross's opinion to discredit the opinion of Dr. Gibbs. Specifically, Plaintiff states, "For the AL! to have given "greater weight" to an opinion that pre-dated clinical evidence of significant cervical and lumbar abnormalities, both of which required surgical intervention, does not logically justify the decision's rationale that the state agency opinion should be used as a basis for the decision because Dr. []Gibbs (the family physician) did not provide a functionby-function assessment of what made [Plaintiff] disabled." (Pl.'s Br., p. 15). Dr. Cross's January 4, 2005 opinion stated that Plaintiff could occasionally lift 20 pounds, and frequently lift 10 pounds. R. 444. He also determined that Plaintiff could stand and/or walk (with normal breaks) for a total of about 6 hours in an 8-hour work day. R. 444. Dr. Cross further determined that Plaintiff could sit (with normal breaks) for a total of 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. He also determined that Plaintiff had no limitations for pushing and/or pulling (including operation of hand and/or foot controls). R. 444. On the other hand, Dr. Gibbs simply submitted a letter stating Plaintiff "is currently disabled and is not able to work. Any assistance that you can provide would be greatly appreciated. Thanks in advance for you help. Please call or write if there is any additional information needed." R. 274. In assigning the weight provided to the physicians' opinion, the ALJ considered the opinion of Dr. Gibbs, but discounted her opinion because she did not provide a function -byfunction assessment per 20 CFR § 416.913 as to what she thinks makes claimant "disabled." 17 R. 26. The ALJ afforded greater weight to the opinion of Dr. Cross who determined that Plaintiff can perform a range of light exertional work activities.' R. 26. Thus, the AU concluded that Dr. Cross's opinion concerning Plaintiff's functional capacity is substantiated by the medical findings. R. 26. The Court finds that the AU properly discounted the conclusory, uncorroborated assessments of Dr. Gibbs. Moreover, the other medical evidence of record supported the AU's decision to discount Dr. Gibbs' opinions and her findings of limitations on Plaintiff's abilities for work. The ALJ properly relied on the opinion of Dr. Cross. To the extent that Plaintiff argues that Dr. Cross did not take into consideration the medical records/evidence concerning Plaintiff's second surgery, Plaintiff's argument is unavailing. The crux of Plaintiff's argument is that the AU failed to consider whether Plaintiff was disabled for a closed period of time between March 2, 2004, the date Plaintiff's MRI reflected cervical and lumbar problems, through February 17, 2006. However, Dr. Cross's opinion corroborates the AL's determination that Plaintiff was capable of light work. Furthermore, Dr. Cross's opinion was rendered on January 4, 2005, a time within the purported closed period Plaintiff claims she was disabled. Thus, there was no error in the All's interpretation of the medical opinions of record. 71t is noteworthy that according to Social Security Ruling 96-6p, findings of fact made by State agency medical and psychological consultants regarding the nature and severity of an individual's impairments must be treated as expert opinion evidence of a nonexamining source at the AU and AC levels of administrative review. Although Ails are not bound by the findings of state agency doctors, "they may not ignore these opinions and must explain the weight given to the opinions in their decisions." SSR 96-6p. This responsibility to address the opinions of state agency doctors is also codified at 20 C.F.R. § 41 6.927(f)(2)(i). 18 In sum, Plaintiff must establish that she is disabled. 20 CFR § 416.912. Plaintiff's argument that because she had two surgeries, she is disabled is insufficient to carry her burden. Additionally, the AIJ properly discredited Plaintiff's complaints concerning her limitations; as a result, he determined Plaintiff was capable of performing light work. In the process of determining her RFC, the AL! considered the entire record and properly assigned weight and credited and/or disregarded the pertinent portions of the record, including the medical opinions. Thus, based on the above analysis, the ALl's finding, that Plaintiff was not disabled for any time during that entire period, was supported by substantial evidence. When the AL's opinion is supported by substantial evidence and he or she determines that a claimant is not disabled for any time during that entire period, the ALJ does not err in failing to consider a claimant's eligibility for a closed period of disability. Jones v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 181 Fed. App'x 767, 773 (11th Cir. 2006). Therefore, as the AU determined that Plaintiff was not disabled at any time, the ALJ did not err in failing to consider Plaintiff eligibility for a closed period of disability. C. The ALJ Properly Evaluated Plaintiff's Mental Impairments and Functional Limitations Finally, Plaintiff argues that her mental impairments and functional limitations were more debilitating than the ALJ acknowledged. According to Plaintiff, the ALJ erred in affording greater weight to the opinion of Dr. Marvin Long, and discounting the opinion of Dr. Justin Huthwaite. (FL's Br., pp. 16-19). Plaintiff argues that because be did not rely on Dr. Huthwaite's opinion, the ALJ improperly determined that her mental impairment does not meet or medically equal the criteria of Listing 12.04. (j). Therefore, the Court will 19 focus on whether the ALl properly treated Dr. Huthwaite's opinion. The ALJ noted that although Plaintiff claims she experienced bipolar disorder, she was not diagnosed on either of the psychological evaluations, and no treating physician mentioned that she had bipolar disorder. R. 22, 424-27, 498-508. Dr. Long, a consulting psychologist, evaluated Plaintiff on June 11, 2001 (R. 577-81), and on March 7, 2005 (R. 424-27). As discussed by the AU, in Dr. Long's 2005 evaluation of Plaintiff, be diagnosed that Plaintiff had mixed mood disorder and dysthymic disorder. R. 22. Dr. Long noted exaggeration and inconsistencies in his evaluation ofPlaintiff, and concluded that one should be very careful and not over interpret clinical items. R. 23,426. Dr. Long further noted that Plaintiff asserted that she helped her sister clean up, sometimes cooks, occasionally drives, occasionally shops, and occasionally attends church. R. 23. Plaintiff reported to Dr. Long that she avoids all people, but she lived with her sister and other family members, she goes shopping with her sister or her mother. R. 23. Dr. Long determined that the exposure to the public has not led to any difficulties with her interacting with others or caused her to withdraw from them. Additionally, Dr. Long noted that Plaintiff gets her children off to school. R. 23. Next, according to Dr. Long, Plaintiff struggled and had some difficulty in dealing with certain tasks. He noted that she appears to have been a slow learner. R. 579. Dr. Long concluded that although Plaintiff scored lower than anticipated on some of the evaluations, she is "certainly not mentally retarded." R. 581. Dr. Huthwaite conducted a consultative examination of Plaintiff on June 26, 2007. R. 498-508. As recounted by the AU, Dr. }luthwaite stated Plaintiff indicated during the evaluation that she participated in special education beginning in the third grade due to being zi: a slow learner and having speech difficulties; Plaintiff reportedly never managed finances independently, although she believes she could do this. R. 505-06. In determining the appropriate weight given to medical opinions, as previously noted, the ALJ is required to state with particularity the weight he gave different medical opinions and the reasons therefor." Sharfarz, 825 F.2d at 279. Although the AU may reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion, Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1240 (11th Cir. 1983), failure to explain the weight given to different medical opinions is reversible error. Sharfarz, 825 F.2d at 279. Furthermore, the Commissioner's regulations require that the opinions of examining physicians be given more weight than non-examining physicians, the opinions of treating physicians be given more weight than non-treating physicians, and the opinions of specialists (on issues within their areas of expertise) be given more weight than non-specialists. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1 527(d)(1)-(2), (5). Here, the AU considered Dr. Huthwaite's opinion. R. 26. However, the AU concluded that Plaintiff "snookered" Dr. Huthwaite, and therefore, he discounted the opinion. Additionally, as noted supra Part III A, the AU noted that Plaintiff lied to Dr. Huthwaite about numerous subjects and therefore, her reporting of facts was worthless. R. 26. Therefore, the ALT provided that he gave greater weight to Dr. Long's opinion that Plaintiff would be limited to basic labor and semi-skilled jobs. R. 27. Additionally, the ALJ clearly explained his reasons for discounting Dr. Huthwaite's opinion and giving greater weight to the opinion of Dr. Long. Thus, there was no error in the AU's disregarding of Dr. Huthwaite's opinion. 21 IV. CONCLUSION In conclusion, the Court FINDS that the AL's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Accordingly, the Court REPORTS and RECOMMENDS that the Commissioner's final decision be AFFIRMED, that this civil action be CLOSED, and that a final judgment be ENTERED in favor of the Commissioner. SO REPORTED and RECOMMENDED this3 )fy of July, 2009, at Augusta, Georgia. Ij W. LEON PAAFIELD /) UNITED STATES MASTRATE JUDGE 22

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