Canderlario vs Vazquez,etal, No. 2:2007cv00001 - Document 51 (S.D. Ga. 2009)
Court Description: ORDER denying 31 Motion for Summary Judgment; sustaining 50 Objection/ Motion re: 46 Report and Recommendations. Signed by Judge Anthony A. Alaimo on 3/25/2009. (csr)
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Canderlario vs Vazquez,etal Doc. 51 In the attiteb Otateg 3D19;trtCt couda for the 'outtjerntrttt of e,D PN 3: 38 orta. &unuttk ibiion JOSE M. ICANDELARIO, CIVIL ACTION P1intiff, JERRY C. FORSYTH, JR., Senior Officer, Defendant. NO. CV207-01 ORDER P1intiff, Jose M. Candelario, filed the above-captioned case against Defendant, Jerry C. Forsyth, Jr., asserting an equal protection claim and a First amendment retaliation claim pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Aaents, 403 U.S. 38, 391-97 (1971). The Magistrate Judge entered a report and recommendation, which suggested that Forsyth's motion for summary judgment should be granted. Presently before the Court are Candelario's objections to the report. Because genuine issues of material tact remain in dispute as to Candelario's claims, his objections will be SUSTAINED. BACKGROUND Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to AO 72A (Rev. 8!82) Dockets.Justia.com Plainti f, as the Court must on a summary judgment motion, the facts are as follows. Candelario, who is now incaroe ated at the federal prison in Coleman, Florida, filed this cae challenging certain conditions of his confinement while he was incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Jesup, Georgia. On or about February 6, 2006, Candelario was housed in the CA nit at the Jesup prison. According to Plaintiff, on February 16, 2006, Defendant segregated the unit television rooms Jtn his housing area based on race. The evidence adduced by Candelario shows that Forsyth directed that the TV room dedicated to sports programs was for blacks only, and that the general-viewing TV room was for whites only. It is undisputed that, during the time period relevant to this dispute, whites were in the minority in the CA unit. According to the evidence adduced by Plaintiff, Defendant provided segregated TV viewing rooms because the white inmates needed to be able to watch TV programs of their choice without being outvoted by black and/or Latino inmates. As a rsu1t of this policy, Candelario contends that he was subjected to invidious discrimination, and that whites received better treatment. Cride1ario also asserts that Forsyth retaliated against 2 AO 72A (Rev. 8/82) him forcomp1aining about this racial segregation by having him traisferred to a different housing unit within the prison. I It is undisputed that, on February 18, 2006, Cande1aio was transferred to the CB unit, within a day after Cande1aio sought to file an internal grievance against Forsyth SUMMARY . JUDG14ENT STANDARD Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides for summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions, answers to ifterroatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) . Facts are "'material" if they could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law. Andersoi v. Libert y Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. V. enith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), and must draw "11 justifiable inferences in his favor[, ]" Uriited States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 3 AO 72A (Rev. 8182) internal quotation marks omitted). Unless it is in response to a specific threat to security or discipline, government-enforced racial segregation in prison violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "Since Brown V. Board of Educatin . , it is unmistakably clear that racial discriination by governmental authorities in the use of public facilities cannot be tolerated." Washington v. Lee, 263 P. Supp. 327, 331 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aif'd, 390 U.S. 333, 333-34 (1968); 42 U.S.C. § 2000b-2; 28 C.F.R. § 551.90; UnitedStates v. Wyandot County, 480 F.2d 969, 970-71 (10th Cir. 19:73); Sockwell v. Phelps, 20 F. 3d 187, 189-92 (5th Cir. 1994) In the report and recommendation, the Magistrate Judge explained that Plaintiff could not recover on his equal p ro t ecti on claim unless he proved that he was similarly situat d with other inmates who received better treatment, and that the discrimination was based on race. Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944, 946-47 (11th Cir. 2001) . 4 AO 72A (Rev. /S2) Strict scrutiny applies either when the government impinges on a fundamental right o when it discriminates based on a suspect class. E.g., H4rnandez v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 281 Fed. App'x 862, 867 (11th Cir. 2008 Foid syth urges that it is irrelevant whether he stated at a priscners' "town hail meeting" that there would be a whites-nly TV room and a blacks-only TV room. Forsyth argues that any such statements were 'imprudent if made[,]" but that "[a]y stray thoughts on the subject which may have been oftered by Forsyth . . . were] not material." Dkt. No. 40 at 2 Defendant posits that his private thoughts did not matter because the prison had a policy whereby an inmate coiumitte decided TV programming. Tho Court recognizes that Defendant has presented some evidence that the TV rooms were divided by programming, not race. Yet, at this stage of the Dkt. No. 46 at 7-8. proceedings ! the Court cannot make credibility determinations, and must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Th Court finds that summary judgment is not warranted in Defndant's favor on Candelaric's equal protection claim. First, Candelario presented direct evidence that Forsyth statedthat the TV rooms would be segregated by race, and a 5 AO 72A (Rev. 8/82) reason9le factfinder could conclude that the TV rooms were in fact so segregated at Forsyth's direction. Dkt. No. 38, Exs. A-F; see also Dkt. No. 41 at 1-2. See Harris v. Ostrout 65 F.3d 912, 916-17 (11th Cir. 1995) . Accordingly, there i credible evidence of discrimination based on race. Secl ond , the Court does not find any merit in the notion that officia11y-segregated TV rooms in prison are lawful because the inmates of different races are not"similarly situated." Government-imposed racial segregation in public facilities, absent compelling justification, has been unlawful since Plessy v. Ferguson was abrogated. See 163 u. s. 537, 552 (1896) (Harian, J., dissenting) . 'Separate [pub1ic facilities are inherently unequal." Brown v. Board of Eduction, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) . There has been no suggestion in the record that there was any compelling justifiation for the segregation, or that any distinguishing factor other than race was involved. If what Candelario asserts is true, he has established an equal protection claim. Henandez is not to the contrary. There, the court noted tat the plaintiff's equal protection claim could not succeed because he had not shown that any similarly situated inmates received favorable treatment. At issue in Hernandez 6 AO 72A (Rev. 8/82) was prion officials' verbal abuse of the prisoner, and the court loted that Hernandez's claim failed because the plaintiff conceded that other inmates (presumably those of a different race or nationality) also received the same form of verbal abuse by the defendants 'just for kicks." Hernandz, 281 Fed. App'x at 867. In other words, Hernandez's claim failed because the prison officials were averred to be equal-opportunity verbal abusers. Candelario's claim is materially different. Plaintiff faults 'Defendant for treating the races differently, viz., segregating the TV rooms according to race. And although the 'separte but equal" doctrine has long been confined to the ash heap of constitutional history, Candelario further maintains that the accommodations provided to white inmates was apreciab1y better than that afforded to Hispanic and black inmates. Whether the TV rooms were segregated by the choice of the inmates, or at Forsyth's direction, is a question for the ifactf•irider to resolve. 11. Re aliation Claim [T] he gist of a retaliation claim is that a prisoner is 7 AO 72A (Rev. 8/82) pena1izd for exercising the right of free speech. . A prisoner can establish retaliation by demonstrating that the prison ^fficial's actions were the result of his having filed a grievance concerning the conditions of his imprisonment." Farrow T. West, 320 F.3d 125, 1248 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotatibn marks bmitted) . Generally, where the plaintiff has presented direct evidence of an illegal motive for the retaliation, summary judgment is inappropriate. Harris, 65 F. 3d at 917. Defendant insists that Plaintiff's retaliation claim fails because Forsyth lacked the authority to transfer Candeiario. Additionally, Forsyth asserts that the CT unit was a transitional unit that inmates were housed in until space became available in their permanently assigned units. Fosyth concedes that he can make recommendations to the ultimate decision-makers about transfers. Defendant also admits that he suggested to the "unit team"' that the prisonër be moved because the officer feared that Candelario would pe a disruptive influence, given his dissatisfaction with te TV programing in the CA unit. Dkt. No. 31, Ex. 6, IS 6-8, 1 The unt team consists of the FOl Jesup unit manager, case managers, and corectiona1 counselors. Dkt. No. 31-3 ¶ 16. 8. A0 72A (Rev. 8182) To the contrary, Plaintiff maintains that Defendant asked CndeThrio why he had filed a grievance against him, and to1 Plaintiff that Candelario would be moving to the CB unit bsed on the grievance. According to Plaintiff, Defendart told him to "pack all your stuff to CB nit cell 608[.] [,1 you are moving [S]ince you want to file a [grievaice] against met,] you[ I re] out of here." Dkt. No. 38, Ex. A ¶ 6. The Court concludes that this is direct evidence of a retaliatory motive by Forsyth for the transfer decisioli. Harris, 65 F.3d at 917. Carde1ario asserts that Forsyth had him transferred to the CB unit by telling the unit team, falsely, that he was, and would continue to be, a disruptive influence in the C unit. 1aintiff submits that it was not a coincidence that bed spabe "became available" in his "permanent housing unit" within .a day of the filing of his grievance. Id. at ¶ 10. Candelario also denies that the C1 unit was an overflow or transitional unit. Plaintiff has presented declarations from two fellow inmates, which provide support for Plaintiff's claim that the CA unit was used to house prisoners permanently. According to the declaration of Albert Davis, he was transferred to the CA unit on February 2, 2004 Prison staff told Davis at that time that the AO 72A (Rev. 8J2) was necessitated because of a shortage of staff. Davis stayed in the unit until he was transferred to the low security federal prison facility in Coleman, Florida, in Septembr 2007. Dkt. No. 38, Ex. B. ja 2-3. Innate Marc Russ provided a declaration along the same lines, stating that he stayed in the FB unit, which Defendant also stated was a temporary or transitional unit, until his transfer to the Coleman facility in January 2008. Dkt. No. 38, Ex. C ¶ 3. Moreover, Plaintiff has presented evidence from several prisoners that no official ever told them that either the FB unit or the CA unit were overflow or transit:ional units.2 In . reply brief, he refines his submission about he CA unit being temporary housing. Forsyth now maintains that the unit may not have been used for transitional housing as to all inmates housed there, but that it was so used for some of the inmates. Defendant then specu1tes that '[p]erhaps as to those other inmates, bed space n the unit to which they were to be transferred did not open up for some time, or never opened up." Dkt. No. 40 2 As Defndant notes, there is no requirement that correctional officers explain to inmates every reason for their every action. However, P]aintif's evidence is admissible and tends to show that Defendant's explanation that the CA unit was "transitional housing" may not be worthy of credence. 10 AO 72A (Rev. 8/82) at 5-6. The Court recognizes that Forsyth may be able to convinc the factfinder based on such an argument, but Defendaiit's shifting rationales provide a sufficient basis for a fctfinder to reject such explanations as pretextual. Defendant suggested that summary judgment was proper as to the retaliation claim because Forsyth lacked the authority to traiksfer any inmate. The Court concludes that a requirement of "unfettered discretion" on the part of the defendant 16 inconsistent with the law of prison retaliation. Defendant admits that his suggestion was taken into account by the unit team, and there is no evidence that any other fctors, beyond Forsyth's recommendation, factored into the transfer decision. Dkt. No. 31-4 at 14. Indeed, the individual who Forsyth asserts made the transfer decision, Correctional Counselor David Daniels, has filed a declaration stating that he told Candelario that 's he was being moved because he was causing problems with the TV." Dkt. No. 40, Ex. 9, Daniels Deol. ¶ 7; see Dkt. No. 40 at S. Daie1s stated that this occurred after Candelario told Daniei that he wanted to file a grievance against Forsyth, and th4t the transfer took place when 'Cande1ario received his ad inistrative remedy [form] from me." Id. ¶91 6-7. All of thi occurred within a day of Candelario expressing a 11 AO 72A (Rev. 8182) desire o file a grievance against Forsyth. A reasonable factfiner could conclude that Candelario was transferred because he filed a grievance against Forsyth. Actionable retaliation does not depend on the defendant having tinbridled or ultimate authority himself to discipline or transfer the plaintiff. Indeed, Forsyth's brief recognizes as much, where Defendant states that the inmate must show only that his exercise of his constitutional rights was a substantial or motivating factor for the retaliation, citing Gattis v. Brice, 136 7.3d 724, 726 (11th Cir. 1998) See Dkt. No. 31-3 at 12. The Eleventh Circuit made this point clear in Harris, where 4he court found actionable retaliation based on the correctional officer filing allegedly false "disciplinary vio1atons" against the prisoner, even though the ultimate decisi3n to discipline the prisoner rested with the prison disciplinary review board. 65 F.3d at 916-17; see also 60 Am. Jur. 2d Penal & Correctional Institutions § 137 (May 2008 Supp.) (citing numerous cases for the proposition that an inmate need only show a"causal connection" between the inmate's complaint and the retaliatory act). the factfinder credits the evidence adduced by Plaintiff, it could find that his transfer was ordered in 12 AO 72A (Rev. 8/82) retaliation for the prisoner's decision to file a grievance against Officer Forsyth, not for any legitimate penological objectie. Whether Caridelario was in fact disruptive and warranted transfer for that reason is a disputed question of fact. In addition, whether Candelario was transferred becausebed space became available on February 18, 2006, or because li Candelario filed a grievance, is not amenable to surnmary . disposition. 111. Ou1ified Immunity "[G]o vernment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly estab1ihed statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) In evaluating a qualified immunity defense., the Court considers whether the plaintiff's rights were violated at all, and whether the law was clearly established at the time of the violation. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) In[January, the U.S. Supreme Court abandoned the rigid "order f battle" in qualified immunity oases, which required 13 AO 72A (Rev. 8/82) the twoHstep inquiry to proceed in the order described above. District courts now have the disor ion to decide a case based oi whether the law is clearly 3stablished, and leave the que$tion of whether there was a crnstitutional violation at all nanswered. Pearson v. Calla 129 S. Ct. 808, 816- 22 (200). In. this case, the Court has already found that, if Caridelario's evidence is credited by the jury, Forsyth violated the Constitution's equal protection clause by implementing a policy whereby the TV viewing rooms were segregated by race. Plaintiff's evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to him, also shows that he was retaliated against by Forsyth for filing a grievance against the ofiicer. O'Rourke v. Hayes, 378 F.3d 1201, 1206 (11th Cir. 2004) (the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party in considering whether there is qualified immunity). With respect to whether the law was clearly established, "the salient question . . . is whether the state of the law in [February 2006] gave [Forsyth] fair warning that [his] allege treatment of [Candelario] was unconstitutional." Hope v Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). The Supreme Court 14 AO 72A (Rev. V82) has cautioned against requiring that the prior law be clearly hh-I in cases with "fnndamentallv similar" factual scenaris. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 270-71 (1997).! "[O] fficials can still be on notice that their r-,mriirH r1t established law even in novel factual circumstances." Hope, 536 U.S. at 741. "[C] learly established" for purposes of qualified immunity means that "[t] h e contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified inununity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but is to say that in light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent." Anderso Frl v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (citations omitted) ThCourt concludes that the relevant law was cieariy established in February 2006. Clearly established law barred racial segregation in prison, absent extraordinary circumstances, long before that date. There is no evidence that there was a compelling need for the segregation, and any reasonb1e officer would have known that such segregation was not lawful. Lee v. Washin g ton, 390 U.S. 333, 333-34 (1968); BEA U.S.C. § 2000b-2. Likewise, a reasonable prison official should have known 15 AO 72A (Rev. 8/82) that itl was unlawful to retaliate against an inmate for filing 4 grievance against the prison official, even if the officia could only influence the retaliatory decision, and did noti have the ultimate authority to carry out the retalia4ion. The Eleventh Circuit's 1995 decision in Harris served s fair warning of such liability. 65 F.3d at 916-17. Therefore, Forsyth is not entitled to qualified immunity for his conduct. CONCLUS ON Forthe reasons described above, Candelario's objections are SUSTAINED. Forsyth's motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Dkt. No. 31. SO ORDERED, this 25th day of March, 2009. JUDGE, UNIT STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DI TRICT OF GEORGIA 16 AO 72A (Rev. 8/82)
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