Davis v. The Douglas County School System et al, No. 1:2014cv02192 - Document 21 (N.D. Ga. 2015)
Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER granting 8 Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr on 1/20/15. (dr)
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Davis v. The Douglas County School System et al Doc. 21 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION TONYA DAVIS as Parent and Natural Guardian, on behalf of John Doe, a Minor Child, Plaintiff, v. CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:14-CV-2192-TWT THE DOUGLAS COUNTY SCHOOL SYSTEM a political Subdivision of the State of Georgia, et al., Defendants. OPINION AND ORDER This is an action under the Am ericans with Disabilities Act. It is before the Court on the Defendants’ Motion to Dism iss for Failure to Exhaust Adm inistrative Remedies, or in the Alternative, Motion for Sum mary Judgment [Doc. 8], which is GRANTED. I. Background The Plaintiff, Tonya Davis, brings cl aims on behalf of her m inor child, John Doe, against the Douglas County School Di strict and its superintendent, Gordon T:\ORDERS\14\Davis\14cv2192\mtdtwt.wpd Dockets.Justia.com Pritz.1 John Doe is a student in Douglas County who uses a wheelchair to am bulate.2 The Plaintiff claims that her son’s school, Fairplay Middle School, is not wheelchair lleges that the wheelchair access barriers accessible.3 In her Complaint, the Plaintiff a force her son to focus on his sa fety instead of his studies.4 Based on this, the Plaintiff asserts claims under the Am ericans with Disab ilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act. Although the Plaintiff re quested that her son be transferred to another, more accessible school,5 she never requested a dueprocess hearing under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). The Defendants now move to dismiss the Plaintiff’s claim s under Fede ral Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6), or in the alternative, for summary judgment. II. Legal Standard The Eleventh Circuit has considered motions to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as motions to dismiss for lack of subject m atter jurisdiction.6 1 Compl. ¶¶ 3, 6-7. 2 Id. ¶ 11. 3 Id. 4 Id. ¶ 12. 5 Id. ¶¶ 12-15. 6 Babicz v. School Bd. of Broward Cnty, 135 F.3d 1420, 1421 (11th Cir. 1998). T:\ORDERS\14\Davis\14cv2192\mtdtwt.wpd -2- A complaint should be dism issed under Rule 12(b)(1) only where the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject m atter of the dispute. 7 Attacks on subject m atter jurisdiction come in two forms: “facial attacks” and “factual attacks.”8 Facial attacks “require[ ] the court merely to look and see if [the] plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in his complaint are taken as true for the purposes of the m otion.”9 On a faci al attack, therefore, a plaintiff is afforded safeguards similar to those provided in opposing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.10 “‘Factual attacks,’ on the other hand, challenge ‘the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits, are considered.’”11 The presumption of truthfulness does not attach to the plaintiff’s allegations. 7 12 Further, “the existence of disputed FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). 8 Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs., M.D.’s , 104 F.3d 1256, 1261 (11th Cir. 1997); Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528-29 (11th Cir. 1990). 9 , Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529 (quoting Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980)). 10 Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1981). 11 Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529 (quoting Menchaca, 613 F.2d at 511). 12 Id. T:\ORDERS\14\Davis\14cv2192\mtdtwt.wpd -3- material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.”13 III. Discussion The Plaintiff brings claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, alleging that the Defendants failed to provide a school facility accessible t o John Doe. The Defendants now move to dismiss on the ground that the Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, as required under the IDEA. The purpose of the IDEA is to ensure “that all children with disab ilities have available to thema free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, em ployment, and independent living . . . .”14 Under the IDEA, a plaintiff is required to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing a claim in federal or state court. 15 This is true even if the plaintiff brings no claims under the IDEA and instead claims only under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.16 13 Scarfo v. Ginsberg, 175 F.3d 957, 960-61 (11th Cir. 1999). 14 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). 15 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1). 16 Id.; Babicz v. School Bd. of Broward Cnty, 135 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1998). T:\ORDERS\14\Davis\14cv2192\mtdtwt.wpd -4- Here, the Plaintiff argues that she was not required to exhaust administrative remedies because her claim is not related to John Doe’s education, but rather to his access to school facilities, which, she ar gues, does not fall under the IDEA. The Eleventh Circuit, however, has found that the IDEA applies to a broad spectrum of claims – including “any m atter relating to theidentification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free and appropriate public education to such child.”17 For example, where the issue was whether a school was required to allow access to oxygen and inhalers f or children with severe asthma, the plaintiffs were required to exhaust their administrative remedies.18 Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit has found that parents must exhaust administrative remedies under the IDEA before bringing their own personal retaliaion claims, even though those claim cannot t s be brought under the IDEA.19 There is no dispute here that the Plai ntiff did not exhaust the adm inistrative remedies available, instead the P laintiff simply argues that she was not required to exhaust those rem edies. The m atter here relates to the provision of a free and 17 2007). , J.P. v. Cherokee Cnty. Bd. of Educ. 218 Fed. Appx. 911, 913 (11th Cir. 18 Babicz, 135 F.3d at 1421 n.6. 19 M.T.V. v. DeKalb Cnty. Sch. Dist. , 446 F.3d 1153, 1558 (11th Cir. 2006). T:\ORDERS\14\Davis\14cv2192\mtdtwt.wpd -5- appropriate education to John Doe, like the access to inhalers in Babicz. Because the matter relates to Doe’s education, the Plaintiff is required to exhaust administrative remedies under the IDEA. Th e Plaintiff’s claim s should therefore be dism issed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. IV. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, the Defenda Motion to Dismiss for Failure to nts’ Exhaust Administrative Remedies, or in the Alternative, Motion for Sum mary Judgment [Doc. 8] is GRANTED. SO ORDERED, this 20 day of January, 2015. /s/Thomas W. Thrash THOMAS W. THRASH, JR. United States District Judge T:\ORDERS\14\Davis\14cv2192\mtdtwt.wpd -6-
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