BENTON v. CRANE MERCHANDISING SYSTEMS INC, No. 1:2012cv00185 - Document 38 (M.D. Ga. 2013)
Court Description: ORDER denying 29 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Corrected Amended Complaint.Ordered by U.S. District Judge W. Louis Sands on 11/19/13 (wks)
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BENTON v. CRANE MERCHANDISING SYSTEMS INC Doc. 38 IN TH E U N ITED STATES D ISTRICT COU RT FOR TH E MID D LE D ISTRICT OF GEORGIA ALBAN Y D IVISION STANLEY BENTON, Plain tiff, v. CRANE MERCHANDISING SYSTEMS, INC., Defen dan t. : : : : : : : : : : Case No.: 1:12-CV-18 5 (WLS) ORD ER Presen tly pen din g before the Court is Defen dan t Cran e Merchan disin g Systems, In c.’s Motion to Dism iss Plain tiff’s Corrected Am en ded Complain t an d Memoran dum of Law (Doc. 29). Based on the followin g, Defen dan t’s Motion to Dism iss Plain tiff’s Corrected Am en ded Com plaint an d Mem orandum of Law (Doc. 29) is D EN IED . BACKGROU N D On December 5, 20 12, Plain tiff filed th e in stan t Complain t allegin g disability discrimination an d retaliation. (See Doc. 1.) On J an uary 7, 20 13, Defen dan t filed Motion to Dism iss or Tran sfer Ven ue. (Doc. 5.) Plain tiff filed an Am en ded Complain t on J un e 29, 20 13. (Doc. 28.) In his Am en ded Com plain t, Plain tiff alleges th at Defen dan t discrimin ated again st him due to an actual or perceived disability in violation of the Am erican s with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1210 2, et seq. (Id. at ¶ 7.) On March 28, 20 12, Plain tiff filed a charge of discrimin ation with the Equal Em ploym ent Opportunity Com m ission (“EEOC”) in Atlanta, Georgia. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Plain tiff alleges that on October 5, 20 12 Defen dan t directed Plain tiff n ot to work or drive un til further notice and “advised Plain tiff to file for FMLA an d Sh ort Term Disability.” 1 Dockets.Justia.com (Id.) Plain tiff claims th at th ese action s constituted retaliation in violation of the ADA. (Id. at ¶ 27.) On J uly 3, 20 13, Defen dan t filed Motion to Dism iss Plain tiff’s Corrected Am en ded Complain t. (Doc. 29.) On August 5, 20 13, the Court issued an Order fin din g Defen dan t’s earlier Motion to Dism iss moot because an Am en ded Complain t had been filed, an d den yin g th e Motion to Tran sfer Ven ue. (Doc. 36.) Plain tiff filed a Respon se to Motion to Dism iss Corrected Am ended Complain t (Doc. 33) and the deadlin e to file a reply h as passed with out such a filing. (See generally Docket.) AN ALYSIS A. Mo tio n to D is m is s Sta n d a rd Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) perm its a party to assert by m otion th e defen se of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be gran ted. A motion to dismiss un der Rule 12(b)(6) should n ot be gran ted un less the plain tiff fails to plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible, an d n ot merely just conceivable, on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Tw om bly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (20 0 7). “Dism issal for failure to state a claim is proper if the factual allegation s are n ot ‘en ough to raise a righ t to relief above the speculative level.’ ” Edw ards v . Prim e, In c., 60 2 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 20 10 ) (quoting Rivell v. Private Health Care Sy s., In c., 520 F.3d 130 8 , 130 9 (11th Cir. 20 0 8 )). “Stated differen tly, the factual allegation s in th e complain t must ‘possess en ough heft’ to set forth ‘a plausible en titlemen t to relief.’ ” Id. (quoting Fin. Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. Stephen s, In c., 50 0 F.3d 1276, 1282 (11th Cir. 20 0 7)). “The thresh old of sufficiency that a complain t must meet to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is … ‘exceedin gly low.’ ” Acosta v. W atts, 281 F. App’x 90 6, 90 8 (11th Cir. 20 0 8) (quotin g An cata v. Prison Health Servs., In c., 769 F.2d 70 0 , 70 3 (11th Cir. 1985)). 2 Wh ile the Court must con duct its an alysis “acceptin g th e allegation s in th e complain t as true an d construin g th em in the ligh t most favorable to th e Plain tiff,” Hill v. W hite, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 20 0 3), in evaluating the sufficien cy of a Plain tiff’s pleadin gs, the Court must “m ake reason able in feren ces in Plain tiff’s favor, ‘but we are n ot required to draw Plain tiff’s inferen ce.’ ” Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 20 0 9) (quotin g Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., In c., 416 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 20 0 5)). The Suprem e Court instructs th at wh ile on a Motion to Dism iss “a court must accept as true all of th e allegation s con tain ed in a Com plain t,” this prin ciple “is in applicable to legal con clusion s,” wh ich “must be supported by factual allegation s.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (20 0 9) (citin g Tw om bly , 550 U.S. at 555, for the proposition th at courts “are n ot boun d to accept as true a legal con clusion couch ed as a factual allegation ” in a com plain t.) In the postTw om bly era, “[d]etermin in g whether a complain t states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a con text-specific task that requires the reviewin g court to draw on its judicial experien ce an d com m on sen se.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. B. An alys is i. D is a bility D is crim in a tio n Th e Am ericans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) is a federal statute th at prohibits employers from discrimin atin g against people with certain disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 1210 1(b)(1). To state a cause of action under th e ADA, the Plain tiff must allege that he has a disability recogn ized by th e ADA, is qualified, with or without reason able accommodation , to perform the essen tial function s of his job, an d suffered an adverse employmen t action due to his disability. See 42 U.S.C. 12112(a); Doe v. Dekalb Cn ty . School Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1445 (11th Cir. 1998). 3 Un der th e ADA, “[t]h e term ‘disability’ m ean s … (A) a ph ysical or m ental im pairm ent th at substantially lim its on e or m ore m ajor life activities of such in dividual; (B) a record of such im pairm en t; or (C) bein g regarded as h avin g such an impairm en t.” 42 U.S.C. § 1210 2(1). A person is “ ‘regarded as having … an im pairm ent [protected by the ADA]’ if the in dividual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action proh ibited [by th e ADA] because of an actual or perceived physical or m en tal im pairm en t[, th at is n ot tran sitory or min or,] wheth er or n ot th e im pairmen t limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.” 42 U.S.C. § 1210 2(3). “[I]n order to constitute a disability un der the ADA, th e im pairmen t … must substan tially limit a major life activity.” Pritchard v. S. Co. Servs., 92 F.3d 1130 , 1132 (11th Cir. 1996). To “substan tially lim it the ability to work, [th e disability] must ‘significan tly restrict[] … the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad ran ge of jobs in various classes as com pared to th e average person h avin g comparable train in g, skills an d abilities.” Id. at 1133 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630 .2(j)(3)(I)). Accordin g to Plain tiff’s Am en ded Complain t, Plain tiff “was in volved in an autom obile acciden t while on the job [in March 20 0 0 ], workin g for Defen dan t [an d as a result] suffered severe in juries an d con tinues to suffer from m edical con ditions related to th is in jury.” (Doc. 28 at ¶ 8.) Plain tiff asserts th at, as a result of th e injury, his “doctors released h im to limited duty of workin g n o more than forty h ours per week.” (Id.) Sin ce that time, Defen dan t has allegedly required Plain tiff to work hours in excess of th is limitation , th reaten ed Plain tiff with termin ation , “h eld [Plain tiff] to a differen t stan dard than comparable employees due to his actual or perceived disability,” and den ied Plain tiff of a prom otion in favor of less qualified em ployees who are n ot disabled or n ot perceived to be disabled. (Id. at ¶¶ 6-9.) 4 Defen dan t argues that Plain tiff’s discrimination claim should be dism issed because Plain tiff has failed to “sufficien tly allege[] that h e was disabled or that [Defen dan t] perceived him as bein g disabled [an d] that h is medical con dition s preven ted h im from performin g an y major life activities.” (Doc. 29 at 4.) Plain tiff asserts that no “requirem ent h as been set forth that plaintiffs specifically iden tify m edical conditions constituting disabilities.” (Doc. 33 at 3.) Plaintiff claims th at he did not specifically iden tify his m edical condition “for reason s of person al privacy.”1 (Id.) Although Plain tiff’s Am ended Complain t does n ot specifically allege th at h e suffered from a disability th at “substan tially limits on e or more … major life activities,” see 42 U.S.C. § 12132, Plain tiff n eed n ot plead facts that would be required for a prim a facie case on a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent. See Sw ierkiew icz v. Sorem a N.A., 534 U.S. 50 6, 511 (20 0 2). The Court fin ds that it is reason able to in fer th at th e car acciden t in which Plaintiff was involved caused injuries that substantially lim it on e or m ore major life activities. Th is con clusion is buttressed by Plain tiff’s allegation that his doctors instructed th at h e n ot work m ore than forty h ours per week. Plain tiff “has also alleged th at Defen dan t took action again st h im because it perceived him to be disabled.” (Doc. 33 at 4.) Plain tiff argues, an d the Court agrees, that discrimin ation for a perceived disability may be action able even where the person does n ot in fact suffer from that disability. See Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cn ty ., Fla. v . Arlin e, 480 U.S. 273, 282 (1987); W illiam s v. Motorola, In c., 30 3 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. In support of his position that he need not specifically allege his medical condition for privacy reasons, Plain tiff cites Blackw ood v . Arc of Madison Cnty ., Inc., No. CV-12-S-100 0 -NE, 20 12 WL 5932451 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 26, 2012), as a case “on all fours” with the instant matter. (Doc. 33 at 4.) That case, however, does not explicitly address the extent of the plaintiff’s allegations. See id. at *2. Instead, in a footnote, the court stated that “Plaintiff does not state the nature of her condition(s).” Id. at n.7. However, Plaintiff points to no direct authority to suggest that he can put his m edical condition at issue and then claim he need not disclose that condition due to privacy concerns. 1 5 20 0 2). For th e reason s men tion ed above, Plain tiff has alleged facts that are sufficien t to survive a motion to dism iss as to his claim that h e was discrimin ated again st based on a perceived disability. ii. Re ta lia tio n Cla im To establish a claim for retaliation , Plain tiff must allege th at h e en gaged in statutorily protected activity, he suffered a materially adverse action , an d th ere was a casual relation between th e protected activity an d the adverse action . Penaloza v. Target Corp., No. 13-10 446, 20 13 WL 58280 0 8, *2 (11th Cir. Oct. 31, 20 13) (citin g Goldsm ith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1277 (11th Cir. 20 0 8)). “[A] m aterially adverse action is on e that ‘m ight have dissuaded a reason able worker from m akin g or supportin g a charge of discrim in ation .’ ” Hall v. Dekalb Cn ty . Gov’t, 50 3 F. App’x 781, 789 (11th Cir. 20 13) (citin g Burlin gton N. & Santa Fe Ry . Co. v. W hite, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (20 0 6)). As to the causation elemen t, Plain tiff “m ust establish that his … protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.” U. of Tex. S.W . Medical Cen ter v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (20 13). Plain tiff claims th at he filed a charge of discrimin ation with th e EEOC in Atlan ta, Georgia on March 28, 20 12. (Doc. 28 at ¶ 11.) On October 5, 20 12, Defen dan t allegedly advised Plain tiff that he was n ot to work or drive un til further n otice, an d advised Plain tiff to file for FMLA leave an d short term disability. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that h e filed for leave an d disability, but “those requests were den ied, as Plain tiff is, in fact, able to work.” (Id.) Plain tiff claims that he was n ot allowed to work from October 8, 20 12 th rough February 18, 20 13, an d received n o pay or com pensation durin g that tim e. (Id. at ¶ 12.) 6 Defen dan t argues that Plain tiff’s retaliation claim should be dismissed because “Plain tiff fails to plead sufficien t facts to demon strate eith er a materially adverse employmen t action or any causal relation between his charge an d th e alleged adverse employmen t action .” (Doc. 29 at 5.) Plain tiff argues th at Defen dan t’s in sisten ce th at Plain tiff n ot return to work an d n ot be paid for such absence amoun ts to a suspension without pay an d is sufficien tly adverse. (Doc. 33 at 5-6.) Also, Plain tiff asserts that h e properly pleaded causation by allegin g that, followin g the charge of discrim in ation he filed with the EEOC, he was told “n ot to work or drive un til further n otice, effective immediately, an d advised Plain tiff to file for FMLA leave an d sh ort term disability.” (Doc. 28 at ¶ 11.) Th e Court fin ds that Defen dan t’s alleged con duct qualifies as materially adverse. An action is materially adverse if “it well might have ‘dissuaded a reason able worker from m akin g or supportin g a charge of discrim in ation .’ ” Burlington , 548 U.S. at 68 . Here, Plain tiff alleges th at he was suspen ded without pay for 10 3 days. (See Doc. 28 at ¶ 12.) Th is alleged suspen sion m eets the stan dard for m aterial adversity. See Burlin gton, 548 U.S. at 72. Also, the Court finds that Plain tiff has alleged a sufficien t causal n exus between the alleged materially adverse employmen t action an d th e charge of discrimin ation . Th e Court n otes that Defen dan t cited to cases that h eld that temporal proxim ity, stan din g alon e, is n ot sufficien t for a prim a facie case. However, as stated above, Plain tiff n eed n ot plead facts that would be required for a prim a facie case on a motion for summary judgm en t. See Sw ierkiew icz, 534 U.S. at 511. Also, Plain tiff alleges more th an mere temporal proxim ity. Plain tiff claims th at Defen dan t told Plain tiff “n ot to work or drive un til furth er n otice [an d] to file for FMLA and short term disability.” (Doc. 28 at ¶ 11.) 7 By in structin g Plain tiff “to file for FMLA an d short term disability,” Defen dan t specifically ackn owledged Plain tiff’s disability. This in struction allegedly cam e less th an on e year followin g th e EEOC charge. The men tion of Plain tiff’s disability coupled with temporal proxim ity ren ders reason able the in feren ce that th e in struction s stemmed from th e EEOC ch arge. As such, the Court fin ds th at Plain tiff has sufficien tly alleged causation under the ADA. CON CLU SION Based on the foregoin g, Defen dan t’s Motion to Dism iss Plain tiff’s Corrected Am en ded Com plain t an d Mem orandum of Law (Doc. 29) is D EN IED . SO ORD ERED , this 19 th day of Novem ber, 20 13. / s/ W. Louis Sands W . LOU IS SAN D S , JU D GE U N ITED STATES D ISTRICT COU RT 8
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