Jones v. Mabus, No. 1:2011cv00148 - Document 24 (M.D. Ga. 2013)
Court Description: ORDER granting 17 Motion for Summary Judgment. It is hereby Ordered and Adjudged that Plaintiff shall take nothing by her Complaint and Judgment shall be entered in favor of Defendant. Ordered by Judge W. Louis Sands on 8/29/2013. (bcl)
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Jones v. Mabus Doc. 24 IN TH E U N ITED STATES D ISTRICT COU RT FOR TH E MID D LE D ISTRICT OF GEORGIA ALBAN Y D IVISION KAREN J ONES, Plaintiff, v. RAY MABUS, Secretary of the Navy, Defendant. : : : : : : : : : : CASE NO.: 1:11-CV-148 (WLS) ORD ER Presently pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summ ary J udgm ent (Doc. 17). For the following reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Sum m ary J udgm ent (Doc. 17) is GRAN TED . I. PROCED U RAL H ISTORY Plaintiff filed a Com plaint in the above-captioned m atter on October 25, 20 11, asserting claim s for a hostile work environm ent on the basis of race and sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as am ended at 42 U.S.C. § 20 0 0 e et seq. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff was em ployed with at the Marine Corps Logistics Base from March 13, 20 0 0 to February 16, 20 11. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff states that her supervisor Raym ond J ones (Caucasian) discrim inated against her because she is African Am erican and a wom an. (Id.) On J anuary 22, 20 13, Defendant m oved for sum m ary judgm ent on all of Plaintiff’s claim s. (Doc. 17.) In accordance with the Court’s procedures governing notice to pro se plaintiffs, the Court issued an order, on J anuary 23, 20 13, directing Plaintiff to file a response in opposition to Defendant’s m otion. (Doc. 18.) Plaintiff was noticed 1 Dockets.Justia.com that she would be required to respond in opposition to Defendant’s m otion “with affirm ative affidavits, depositions, docum ents[, and] rely with specificity upon evidence that is part of the record.” (Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiff was further noticed that “[i]f a party fails or refuses to file any m aterials in opposition to a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent, a FIN AL judgm ent m ay be rendered against that party if otherwise appropriate under the law. In that event, th e re w o u ld be n o trial o r an y fu rth e r p ro ce e d in gs .” (Id. at 2.) Despite this adm onition, on March 7, 20 13, well after the twenty-one-day deadline set forth by the Court, Plaintiff filed a letter with the Court stating that she did not know what a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent “m ean[s],” and requesting that the Court “give [her] the opportunity to have a trial.” (Doc. 19.) On March 7, 20 13, Defendant filed a Reply, stating that Plaintiff’s “Response” shows that there are no triable issues of fact. (Doc. 20 .) On March 18, 20 13, the Court entered another Order inform ing Plaintiff that her March 7, 20 13 letter was not a “proper response to Defendant’s Motion.” (Doc. 21.) Plaintiff was given another opportunity to file a response in opposition to Defendant’s Motion. (Id.) On March 27, 20 13, Plaintiff filed another letter to the Court. (Doc. 22.) Therein, she stated that “the evidence is in [her case] showing discrim ination and a Hostile Work Environm ent.” (Id.) Plaintiff states that “the things that [she] was going through at work m ade [her] emotional [sic] distress and [she] began to suffer from depression and anxiety. [She] had to see [sic] psychologist and was put on m edication.” (Id.) Plaintiff provided no facts or record evidence. (See id.) On April 2, 20 13, Defendant filed another Reply, wherein which it alleged that Plaintiff has failed to identify specific evidence supporting her claim s of discrim ination. (Doc. 23.) 2 The briefing for Defendant’s Motion for Sum m ary J udgm ent has concluded, and the Court finds that Defendant’s Motion for Sum m ary J udgm ent is ripe for review. II. Su m m ary Ju d gm e n t Stan d ard A. Fe d e ral Ru le o f Civil Pro ce d u re 56 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, sum m ary judgm ent is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and adm issions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any m aterial fact and that the m oving party is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). An issue is “genuine” if the quantum and quality of proof necessary to support liability under the claim is raised. Allen v. Ty son Foods, 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997). A fact is “m aterial” if it hinges on the substantive law at issue and it m ight affect the outcom e of the nonm oving party’s claim . Anderson v. Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Allen, 121 F.3d at 646. A judgm ent is appropriate “as a m atter of law” when the nonm oving party has failed to m eet its burden of persuading the Court on an essential elem ent of the claim . See Cleveland v. Policy Managem ent Sy s. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 80 4 (1999); Celetox, 477 U.S. at 323. The m ovant bears the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of m aterial fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The m ovant can m eet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of m aterial fact or by showing or pointing out to the district court that the nonm oving party has failed to present evidence in support of som e elem ent of its case on which it bears the ultim ate burden of proof. See id. at 322-24. Once the m ovant has m et its burden, the nonm oving party is required “to go beyond the pleadings” and identify “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324. To avoid sum m ary judgm ent, the nonm oving party m ust do 3 m ore than sum m arily deny the allegations or ‘show that there is som e m etaphysical doubt as to the m aterial facts.” Matsuhita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). On a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent, the Court m ust view all the evidence and all factual inferences drawn therefrom in the light m ost favorable to the nonm oving party and determ ine whether that evidence could reasonably sustain a jury verdict. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; Allen, 121 F.3d at 646. However, the Court m ust grant sum m ary judgm ent if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the m ovant is entitled to sum m ary judgm ent as a m atter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). B. Lo cal Ru le 56 Local Rule 56 requires the following from a respondent to a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent: The respondent to a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent shall attach to the response a separate and concise statem ent of m aterial facts, num bered separately, to which the respondent contends there exists a genuine issue to be tried. Response shall be m ade to each of the m ovant's num bered m aterial facts. All m aterial facts contained in the m oving party's statem ent which are not specifically controverted by the respondent in respondent's statem ent shall be deem ed to have been adm itted, unless otherwise inappropriate. M.D. Ga. R. 56. Here, Defendant properly filed a summ ary judgm ent along with a statem ent of undisputed facts, as is required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of this Court. (See Docs. 17, 17-1.) Plaintiff did not, however, file the required responsive statem ent of facts. Therefore, because Plaintiff failed to properly dispute Defendant’s m aterial facts as is required by the Local Rules, all of Defendant’s m aterial facts provided in its Statem ent of Material Facts (Doc. 17-1) are deem ed adm itted by operation of Local Rule 56. Although the Court is nevertheless required to m ake an 4 independent review of the record before deciding Defendant’s Motion for Sum m ary J udgm ent, see United States v. Delbridge, No. 1:0 6-cv-110 , 20 0 8 WL 1869867, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 22, 20 0 8) (WLS) (concluding that Eleventh Circuit precedent does not allow a district court to grant a sum m ary judgm ent based on default), it m ust be noted, however, that “[t]here is no burden upon the district court to distill every potential argum ent that could be m ade based upon the m aterials before it on sum m ary judgm ent.” Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunm ar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995). III. RELEVAN T FACTU AL BACKGROU N D The following facts are derived from the Com plaint (Doc. 1), Defendant’s Answer (Doc. 10 ), and Defendant’s Statem ent of Undisputed Facts (Doc. 17-1), which was subm itted pursuant to Local Rule 56; and the record in this case. Where relevant, the factual sum m ary also contains undisputed and disputed facts derived from the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure m aterials on file, and any affidavits, all of which are construed in a light m ost favorable to Plaintiff as the nonm oving party. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Plaintiff was em ployed at the Marine Corps Logistics Base as a Housekeeper assigned to the Housing Brach, Live Oak Lodging Section, Installation and Environm ent Division. (Doc. 17-1 ¶ 1.) The Housing Section had seven em ployees during Plaintiff’s em ploym ent: two African Am erican, four Caucasian, and one Asian. (Doc. 17-6 at 47.) Plaintiff’s first-level supervisor was Ms. Shou Chung a/ k/ a “Mona” Evans (Asian fem ale). (Id. ¶ 3.) Raym ond J ones (Caucasian) was Plaintiff’s second-level supervisor. (Id. ¶ 3.) Sue Kear was Plaintiff’s third-level supervisor, above J ones. (Id.) The chain of com m and above Kear was Herbert Sm igelski followed by Frederick Boone. (Id. ¶ 12.) 5 Plaintiff alleges that, during her em ploym ent, J ones subjected her and other em ployees to a hostile work environm ent on the basis of race and sex from Novem ber 20 0 9 to May 20 10 . (Doc. 17-1 ¶ 4.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that J ones m ade racial and dem eaning com m ents towards her and other em ployees in the presence of other staff and coworkers during the subject period. (Id.) Som e of Plaintiff’s com plaints include alleging that: 1) J ones asked Plaintiff and coworkers how his “gals” were doing; 2) J ones stated that pieces of furniture in guest room s were classified as defective when they were not so that they could be provided to a new em ployee for personal use; 3) J ones told em ployees that “it’s Ray’s way or No Way”; 4) J ones told em ployees that they could not talk to Kear, his superior, threatening to fire anyone who did on the spot; 5) J ones would go behind em ployees and m ess up room s already cleaned or tell the em ployee that the room was not cleaned properly; 6) J ones cursed at em ployees during m eetings and threatened to term inate them ; 7) J ones hid in closets to see what em ployees were discussing; 8) J ones told Plaintiff and another fem ale coworker that he would “whip” them , m aking a m otion with his hand and a whip noise with his m outh; and 9) J ones once stuck two fingers up on the sides of his head like horns on the devil and said m y horns are up and it will not be a good day.1 (Doc. 17-1 ¶ 5(a)-(v); Doc. 17-2 at 36-46.) Plaintiff com plained to Kear about the “gals” com m ent. (Doc. 17-1 ¶ 14.) After receiving this Com plaint, Kear counseled J ones on his use of the term “gal.” (Id.) Plaintiff also com plained to Kear that white em ployees were treated m ore leniently or indulgently. (Id. ¶ 19.) Kear investigated this com plaint and was unable to verify any 1 For the sake of brevity, the Court will not list every com plaint alleged by Plaintiff, though the Court has reviewed all com plaints about J ones’s behavior m ade by Plaintiff. 6 preferential treatm ent. (Id.) Plaintiff also com plained to Kear about the whipping gesture and noise. (Id. ¶ 20 .) Kear took this com plaint to Sm igelski, who gave J ones a verbal warning about the whipping gesture. (Id. ¶ 22.) After the warning, J ones apologized to Plaintiff for the whipping gesture. (Id. ¶ 23.) Plaintiff told Sm igelski she was satisfied with this apology. (Id.) Sm igelski also held a m eeting with all of the em ployees without supervisors present. (Id. ¶ 20 .) At the m eeting, Sm igelski “received no indication that there was a racially or sexually discrim inatory com ponent to their com plaints.” (Id.) [Sm igelski] perceived the com plaints were related to work.” (Id.) “Rather, In response to com plaints about J ones from Evans and another fem ale em ployee about J ones, Sm igelski asked com m and to conduct an investigation around April 20 10 . (Id. ¶ 21.) The investigation concluded that “Ray J ones was guilty of using inappropriate language and behavior but found that to be a factor of poor judgm ent and lack of proper m anagem ent skills rather than m alice or any discrim inatory intent.” (Id. ¶ 31.) As a result of the investigation, J ones was term inated effective October 18, 20 10 for a) using insulting, abusive, or obscene language to or about other em ployees, b) engaging in threatening and intim idating behavior towards subordinate em ployees, and c) attem pting to coerce a subordinate to give a false statem ent. (Id. ¶ 33.) J ones chose to resign to avoid term ination on October 15, 20 10 . (Id. ¶ 34.) Plaintiff filed a formal discrimination com plaint on May 11, 20 10 , with the Departm ent of Defense. (Id. ¶ 7.) The Agency issued its final decision on April 11, 20 11, determ ining that Plaintiff was not discrim inated against as alleged. (Doc. 17-6 at 4253.) As part of her com plaint, Plaintiff had alleged that J ones’s tone was harsh, he had a nasty attitude, and he curses, in addition to alleging other coarse behavior by J ones. (Id. 7 at 49.) After reviewing the evidence, the Agency found that Plaintiff’s com plaints about J ones related to his “m anagem ent style.” (Id. at 51.) The Agency pointed out that “Title VII does not protect an em ployee against adverse treatm ent due sim ply to a supervisor’s quirks or autocratic attitude.” (Id.) The Agency further stated that “Title VII is not designed to ensure that em ployees receive only fair and objective treatm ent from their supervisors. Title VII is intended only to prohibit discrim ination for specified reasons.” (Id.) Per the Agency, where the facts show that the supervisor “m istreated everyone equally” with “his inappropriate language and yelling,” a Plaintiff’s claim for sexual or racial harassm ent fails. (Id.) The Agency also concluded that, in response to the allegations of harassm ent and a hostile work environm ent, m anagem ent conducted an investigation into Plaintiff’s allegations, counseled J ones, and rem oved his from his supervisory position. (Id. at 52.) Finally, the Agency concluded that “there is no evidence that [J ones] m ade any reference to [Plaintiff] or any particular protected group.” (Id.) Thus, the Agency concluded that Plaintiff’s “claim s do not rise to the level of harassm ent based on race or sex.” (Id.) On appeal, the Equal Em ploym ent Opportunity Com m ission (“EEOC”) found that “the incidents described in the com plaint were not so severe or pervasive as to alter the term s and conditions of Com plainant’s em ploym ent. We find the evidence does not establish that Com plainant was subjected to harassm ent based on her race or sex.” (Doc. 17-7 at 7-11, 9.) The EEOC also found that the record reflects that while J ones’s “com m unication was unprofessional and unduly harsh, [his] com m ents were [not] m otivated by Com plainant’s race or sex, nor was his poor treatm ent confined to m em bers of Com plainant’s protected groups.” (Id. at 9.) On October 25, 20 11, Plaintiff filed the instant Com plaint. (Doc. 1.) 8 IV. D ISCU SSION “A hostile work environm ent claim under Title VII is established upon proof that the workplace is perm eated with discrim inatory intim idation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim 's em ploym ent and create an abusive working environm ent.” Miller v. Kenw orth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 20 0 2). Title VII is not m eant to serve as “a general civility code.” Satchel v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsborough Cnty ., 251 F. App’x 626, 630 (11th Cir. 20 0 7) (citing Oncale v. Sundow ner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998)). As such, to prove a prim a facie case of hostile working environm ent, a plaintiff m ust establish that: (1) she belongs to a protected group; (2) she was subjected to unwelcom e harassm ent; (3) the harassm ent was based upon a protected characteristic (here, race and sex); (4) the harassm ent was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the term s or conditions of em ploym ent and create a discrim inatorily abusive working environm ent; and (5) the em ployer is responsible for said environm ent under either a theory of direct or vicarious liability. Miller, 277 F.3d at 1275. Defendant has m oved for sum m ary judgm ent on the basis that the record is devoid of any evidence that “J ones said anything to evince a hostile or prejudicial attitude toward any protected group or sex,” and even if a few of J ones’s com m ents could be considered race- or sex-based harassm ent, these com m ents were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable under Title VII. (Doc. 17-8 at 7, 14.) Defendant states in plain term s that the only conclusion to be drawn from Plaintiff’s com plaint is that “Ray J ones was a boorish m oron in his handling of his em ployees (which cost him his job . . .) but he was a boorish m oron without reference to the race or 9 sex of the em ployees and his conduct fell well short of creating a hostile environm ent.” (Id. at 6.) At the risk of insulting som eone the Court has never m et, the Court concludes that it agrees with Defendant’s assessm ent of the evidence. While the record dem onstrates am ple evidence of im polite, rude, and insensitive behavior on the part of J ones, the evidence does not reflect that there were any racial or sexual com ponents to J ones’s particular brand of “m anagem ent.” The facts reflect that J ones treated all em ployees in an intolerable m anner, behavior that ultim ately led to his discharge. Thus, aside from her unsupported assertion that she was discrim inated against based on race and sex, Plaintiff has failed to present evidence showing that J ones’s conduct constituted harassm ent m otivated by her race or sex. Even if, arguably, a few of J ones’s isolated com m ents could be considered raceor sex-related, none of the conduct identified by Plaintiff constitutes harassm ent sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the term s or conditions of her employm ent. Im portantly, the fourth elem ent of a hostile work environm ent claim contains both an objective and a subjective com ponent. Miller, 277 F.3d at 1276. Thus, for harassing conduct to be actionable under the “sufficiently severe or pervasive” prong, the “behavior m ust result in both an environm ent that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive and an environm ent that the victim ‘subjectively perceives to be abusive.” Id. (internal quotations and alterations om itted). When evaluating the objective severity of the harassm ent under the fourth prong, the Court considers: (1) the frequency of the conduct; (2) the severity of the conduct; (3) whether the conduct is physically threatening or hum iliating, or a m ere offensive utterance; and (4) whether the 10 conduct unreasonably interferes with the em ployee's job perform ance. Id. (citations om itted). The record reflects that Plaintiff was only referred to as a “gal” once, and, sim ilarly, the “whip” incident only took place once.2 As such, these com m ents fall very short of being “frequent,” or sufficiently severe or pervasive, see infra n.2. As to all other allegedly offending behavior, the Court finds it to be race- and gender-neutral, albeit boorish. It is well established that “rude, insulting, and insensitive” conduct that “fall[s] m ore in the category of epithets or boorish behavior . . . [is] not actionable under Title VII.” MackMuham m ad v. Cagle’s Inc., 379 F. App’x 80 1, 80 5 (11th Cir. 20 10 ). Additionally, “Title VII . . . does not operate as a general ban on yelling, swearing, scream ing and other rude or offensive behavior.” Mosley -Colem an v. Potter, No. CV 30 9-0 33, 20 0 9 WL 1811552, at *3 (S.D. Ga. J une 24, 20 0 9). Therefore, after construing the facts in the light m ost favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish the third or fourth elem ents of a prim a facie claim of hostile work environm ent—that she was subject to harassm ent that was based upon her race or sex and that there was race- or sex-based harassm ent sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the term s and conditions of her em ploym ent. Accordingly, Defendant has dem onstrated its entitlem ent to sum m ary judgm ent as to Plaintiff’s Com plaint. CON CLU SION For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Sum m ary J udgm ent (Doc. 17) is GRAN TED . It is hereby ORD ERED AN D AD JU D GED that Plaintiff shall taking 2 These are the only two com m ents that the Court finds even arguably im plicate race or sex. The Court concludes, however, that although these com m ents were offensive to Plaintiff, they were neither severe nor would they be considered particularly offensive to a reasonable person under the circum stances in which they were uttered. 11 nothing by her Com plaint (Doc. 1), and JU D GMEN T shall be entered in favor of Defendant. SO ORD ERED , this 29 th day of August, 20 13. / s/ W. Louis Sands TH E H ON ORABLE W . LOU IS SAN D S, U N ITED STATES D ISTRICT COU RT 12
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