Jackson v. Cooper Lighting LLC, No. 1:2011cv00067 - Document 40 (M.D. Ga. 2013)
Court Description: ORDER granting in part and denying in part 32 Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement and Motion For Sanctions. Defendant's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement is granted and Defendant's Motion For Sanctions is denied. The Court orders the parties to file necessary dismissal documents not later than 5/2/13.Ordered by Judge W. Louis Sands on 4/10/13 (wks)
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Jackson v. Cooper Lighting LLC Doc. 40 IN TH E U N ITED STATES D ISTRICT COU RT FOR TH E MID D LE D ISTRICT OF GEORGIA ALBAN Y D IVISION TOMMY J ACKSON, Plain tiff, v. COOPER LIGHTING, LLC, Defen dan t. : : : : : : : : : : Case No. 1:11-CV-0 67 (WLS) ORD ER Curren tly pen din g before the Court is Defen dan t’s Motion to En force Settlemen t Agreemen t an d Motion for San ction s (Doc. 32). On J an uary 28, 20 13, the Court heard argumen ts from the respective sides regardin g these motion s. At the hearin g, the Court also h eard from Plaintiff an d his counsel regarding Plaintiff’s counsel’s Motion to Withdraw. (Doc. 47.) The Court gave Plain tiff un til February 11, 20 13, to obtain n ew coun sel. By letter dated February 27, 20 13, Plain tiff in formed th e Court that he was un able to fin d counsel. (Doc. 39.) Plain tiff stated th at a poten tial attorn ey in formed h im th at it would be h ard to vacate the settlem en t in light of what was said in h is deposition.1 (Id.) Plain tiff then requested that the Court, in its discretion , make a decision on Defen dan t’s Motion to En force Settlemen t Agreemen t. (Id.) Accordingly, th e Court finds that Defen dan t’s Motion to En force Settlemen t Agreemen t an d Motion for San ction s are ripe for review. In his deposition, Plaintiff stated that he did not believe race was a factor in Defendant’s decision not to promote him . (Dep. of Tomm y J ackson, 122:1-123:18.) 1 1 Dockets.Justia.com A. Mo tio n to En fo rce Se ttle m e n t Un der Georgia law, a Court’s review of a motion to en force a settlemen t agreem en t is similar to the an alysis that a Court un dertakes in reviewin g a motion for sum m ary judgm en t. Cohen v. Dekalb Cn ty . Sch. Dist., No. 1:0 9-cv-1153, 20 0 9 WL 4261161, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 25, 20 0 9) (citin g Ballard v. W illiam s, 223 Ga. App. 1, 1 (1996)). Th us, applyin g state con tract law, the Court determ in es whether th e movan t has shown “that the docum ents, affidavits, deposition s an d other eviden ce in the record reveal th at th ere is n o eviden ce sufficien t to create a jury issue on at least on e essen tial elemen t of the plain tiff’s case.” Ballard, 223 Ga. App. at 1 (citations om itted). J ust as it does durin g summary judgmen t, the Court “m ust draw all disputed factual in feren ces in the light most favorable to th e n on -movin g party.” Cohen , 20 0 9 WL 4261161 at *4. Based on th e represen tations of th e parties, th e Court fin ds th at Defen dan t’s Motion should be gran ted. Here, th e record reflects that th e oral agreemen t of th e parties—to settle Plain tiff’s case in exchan ge for $ 50 0 —was memorialized on th e record in Plain tiff’s presence. (See Doc. 32 at 2.) Specifically, coun sel for Defen dan t stated on th e record th at “the coun sel have reached an agreemen t to resolve th is matter. Th e term s are a paym en t of $ 50 0 to Erika Goodm an in exchan ge for Mr. J ackson ’s execution of a Stan dard Con fiden tial Settlemen t an d Release Agreemen t, which in cludes a dism issal with prejudice of the pen din g lawsuit.” (Id.) In response, Ms. Goodm an stated “each side will bear their own fees an d costs and th at th e $ 50 0 bein g paid for the cost of th e litigation .” (Id. at 2-3.) On e of th e corn erston es of Georgia law on settlemen t agreemen ts is th e fact th at “an attorn ey of record h as apparen t authority to en ter in to an agreem en t on beh alf of h is clien t an d th e agreemen t is en forceable again st the clien t by other settlin g parties.” 2 Brum below v. Northern Propan e Gas Co., 251 Ga. 674, 674 (1983). Th is auth ority eman ates from th e con tract between th e attorn ey an d his clien t, an d, in th e absen ce of express restriction s on this authority, the authority m ay be con sidered plen ary by the Court an d opposing parties. Id. Therefore, “an attorn ey’s con sen t to the agreem en t is bindin g on h is client.” W on g v. Bailey , 752 F.2d 619, 621 (11th Cir. 1985) (citin g Ston e Mountain Confederate Monum ental Assoc. v. Sm ith, 170 Ga. 515, 521 (1930 )). Here, Plain tiff does n ot dispute that Ms. Goodman consen ted to the settlemen t in his presen ce; rath er he argues that it was his understan din g th at Ms. Goodman was merely en terin g in to a separate, n on bin din g settlemen t agreem en t to satisfy h er fees, an d that h e would be free to con tinue pursuin g his case with a separate attorn ey. However, Plain tiff’s in terpretation of th e terms of th e settlemen t agreemen t is in con sisten t with written record of th e agreem en t. In Plain tiff’s presen ce, Ms. Goodman con sen ted to th e terms of th e settlemen t agreemen t. There is n o evidence th at Plain tiff verbally expressed h is desire to reserve his right to con tinue th e litigation , n otwithstan din g th is agreemen t. In fact, th e record reflects th at Plain tiff said n othin g as Ms. Goodman an d Ms. Born a con firmed the oral agreemen t. Further, there is n o eviden ce to reflect th at an yon e in th e room had an y reason to believe that Ms. Goodman was n ot actin g on Plain tiff’s beh alf when she accepted the settlemen t terms. Plain tiff’s subjective un derstandin g of the settlemen t agreemen t, n ot divulged to an yon e else, is simply in sufficien t to fin d th at an en forceable agreemen t does n ot exist. Im portan tly, th e record is devoid of an y eviden ce demon stratin g a lack of assen t on Plain tiff’s part. Un der Georgia law, the en forcemen t of a settlemen t agreemen t requires that the agreemen t “m eet the same requisites of form ation an d en forceability as an y oth er con tract.” W on g, 752 F.2d at 621 (citin g McKie v. McKie, 213 Ga. 582, 583 3 (1957)). Accordin gly, the Court must determ in e wheth er there was a meetin g of the min ds as to the terms of the con tract. Id. (citin g O.C.G.A. § 13-3-2). “Assen t to the terms of an agreemen t can be im plied from the circum stan ces, an d con duct incon sisten t with a refusal of th e terms raises a presum ption of assen t upon which the other party can rely.” Id. (citing Sm ith v. Horn buckle, 140 Ga. App. 8 71, 8 75 (1977)). Aside from Plain tiff’s represen tation s to the Court regardin g his belief that the settlemen t agreem en t would have n o bin din g effect as to h im, there is n o oth er eviden ce of h is refusal to assen t to the settlemen t terms regardin g his claim. Th e record reflects that both Ms. Goodman an d Ms. Born a believed th at th ey h ad Plain tiff’s assen t to th e agreem en t when they con firmed th e settlemen t agreemen t’s term s. (See Doc. 32 at 2.) Thus, the Court does n ot fin d an absen ce of a m eetin g of th e m in ds. Fin ally, the fact th at Plain tiff did n ot sign the agreemen t does n ot ch an ge th e Court’s fin din g that the parties reached an agreem en t to settle. Th e oral agreemen t between th e parties, in Plain tiff’s presence, is sufficien t for fin din g th ere existed an agreem en t. Poulous v. Hom e Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n , 192 Ga. App. 50 1, 50 2 (1989) (“Th at th e settlemen t agreemen t was oral rath er th an written h as n o bearin g on its en forceability. Un der Georgia law, (a) defin ite, certain an d un ambiguous oral con tract of settlemen t of a pen din g cause of action is a valid an d bindin g agreemen t.”) (addition al citations an d quotations om itted); Clough Marketing Servs., In c. v. Main Lin e Corp., 313 F. App’x 20 8, 211 (11th Cir. 20 0 8) (“The later draftin g of [a] written settlemen t agreemen t ‘may h ave been a con dition of the perform an ce but it was n ot an act n ecessary’ for th e parties to reach an agreemen t to settle.”) (quotin g Pourreza v. Teel Appraisals & Advisory , In c., 273 Ga. App. 880 , 883 (20 0 5)). 4 For the aforemen tion ed reason s, Defen dan t’s Motion to En force Settlem en t Agreemen t is GRAN TED . B. Mo tio n fo r San ctio n s Defen dan t has moved for san ction s pursuan t to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 an d th e Court’s inh eren t powers. Th e Eleven th Circuit has observed that a district court’s authority to issue san ction s for attorn ey m isconduct under § 1927 is “either broader than or equally as broad as th e district court’s authority to issue a sanction s order under its inherent powers.” Am long & Am long, P.A. v. Denny ’s, In c., 50 0 F.3d 1230 , 1239 (11th Cir. 20 0 7). Thus, th e Court will first address whether Defen dan t is en titled to san ction s, as again st Plain tiff’s coun sel, under § 1927. If san ction s are n ot warran ted under Section 1927, th ey are n ot permissible un der th e Court’s inheren t powers “because the court’s inh eren t power to issue san ction s for vexatious conduct by attorn eys does not reach furth er than § 1927.” See id. 1. M s . Go o d m a n Un der § 1927, a Court is empowered to award costs an d fees again st “[a]n y attorn ey or other person admitted to con duct cases in an y court of th e Un ited States or an y Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedin gs in an y un reason ably and vexatiously . . . .” Th e Eleven th Circuit “ha[s] lon g h eld that the provisions of § 1927, being penal in nature, m ust be strictly construed.” Norelus v. Den ny ’s, In c., 628 F.3d 1270 , 1281 (11th Cir. 20 10 ) (addition al citation s an d quotations om itted). In order to justify an im position of sanctions, the plain language of section 1927 sets forth three requirem en ts th at must be m et: 1) an attorn ey m ust en gage in un reason able an d vexatious con duct; 5 2) such ‘un reason able an d vexatious’ con duct must multiply the proceedin gs; an d 3) the amoun t of the san ction cann ot exceed th e costs occasion ed by th e objectionable conduct. Id. Bad faith is an in dispen sable elemen t to the im position of san ctions under Section 1927. Schw artz v. Million Air, In c., 341 F.3d 1220 , 1225 (11th Cir. 20 0 3) (“‘Bad faith ’ is th e touchston e. Section 1927 is n ot about mere n egligen ce.”) To that end, “an attorn ey multiples proceedin gs ‘un reason ably an d vexatiously’ with in th e mean in g of the statute on ly when th e attorn ey’s con duct is so egregious th at it is ‘tan tamoun t to bad faith.’” Am long, 50 0 F.3d at 1239 (em phasis added). To assess bad faith, the Court looks at the attorn ey’s objective con duct. Id. at 1239-40 (“Th e term “un reason ably” necessarily connotes that the district court must compare the attorn ey's conduct against th e con duct of a “reason able” attorn ey an d make a judgmen t about wheth er th e con duct was acceptable according to som e objective stan dard. Th e term “vexatiously” sim ilarly requires an evaluation of th e attorn ey's objective con duct.”) Reckless con duct can warran t san ction s even in the absen ce of “purpose or in ten t to m ultiply proceedin gs.” Id. at 1241. The same does not hold true for n egligen t con duct, wh ich , stan din g alon e, does n ot support an award of san ction s un der § 1927. Id. Fin ally, in order to satisfy the multiplication -of-proceedin gs elemen t, the attorn ey must h ave en gaged in con duct th at leads to proceedin gs th at would n ot have been con ducted otherwise. Peterson v. BMI Refractories, 124 F.3d 1386, 1396 (11th Cir. 1997). 6 Here, Defen dan t requests that the Court san ction Plain tiff’s coun sel for the costs Defen dan t in curred in filin g its san ction s motion .2 (Doc. 32 at 11.) The facts are as follows. On or about May 11, 20 12, Ms. Goodman ’s office received a draft of th e Settlem en t Agreem en t in PDF form at. (Doc. 35 ¶ 1.) On May 21, 20 12, Ms. Goodm an requested a copy of th e agreemen t in Word form at for editin g purposes. (Id. ¶ 2.) A Word version of the agreemen t was sen t to Ms. Goodman the followin g day. (Id. ¶ 3.) Ms. Goodman admits th at she cann ot recall when she actually saw th e email con tain in g the Word version . (Id. ¶ 4.) Defen dan t con tacted Ms. Goodman ’s office twice in J uly to in quire about th e status of the agreemen t; th e calls yielded n o further in form ation about th e agreemen t. Ms. Goodman states th at she mistaken ly believed th at the release had been fin alized an d forwarded to Plain tiff for h is sign ature. (Id. ¶ 9.) Ms. Goodm an states th at sh e did n ot realize th e error un til she received an email from Ms. Born a, dated Novem ber 9, 20 12. (Id.) Ms. Goodman states that she then responded to the email, providin g Ms. Born a with a modified Settlemen t Agreemen t in redlin e form at on Novem ber 12, 20 12. (Id.) The fin alized draft of th e agreemen t was forwarded to Plain tiff on November 13, 20 12. (Id. ¶ 10 .) A secon d copy of th e release was forward to Plain tiff on Novem ber 28, 20 12. (Id.) On or about th e secon d week of Decem ber 20 12, Plain tiff advised Ms. Goodman that he did n ot in ten d to execute the settlemen t agreem en t. (Id.) On these facts, the Court does n ot fin d that § 1927 san ction s are warran ted. It is clear th at th e failure to prom ptly tran sm it th e settlemen t agreemen t to Plain tiff was th e 2 Defendant estim ates that it has expended $ 7,128 in fees through its six-month effort to obtain a signed version of the settlem ent agreem ent. (Doc. 32 at 11 n.4.) 7 result of an in adverten t m istake on the part of Ms. Goodm an an d h er office. Wh ile the Court un derstan ds Defen dan t’s frustration about th e breakdown in settlemen t, th e law is clear th at “m erely un in ten ded, in adverten t, an d n egligen t acts will n ot support th e im position of sanctions un der § 1927.” Jerelds v. City of Orlan do, 194 F. Supp. 2d 130 5, 1312 (M.D. Fla. 20 0 2) (citing cases). “Rather, the power to im pose sanction s under § 1927 should be exercised on ly in in stan ces of a serious and studied disregard for th e orderly processes of justice.” (Id.) So while, yes, Ms. Goodm an could h ave rem ain ed more vigilan t about the status of the settlemen t, her failure to do so, however, does n ot by itself give rise to sanction s under § 1927. See, e.g., Fox v. Palm Coast Plaza, In c., No. 0 9-80 0 97, 20 10 WL 47290 9, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 5, 20 10 ) (n otin g th at while plain tiff’s coun sel could h ave “m ove[d] more quickly to resolve th[e] litigation ,” counsel’s conduct did n ot rise to the level of bad faith). That Plain tiff might have sign ed the agreemen t h ad Ms. Goodman forwarded the agreem en t earlier does n ot chan ge the Court’s con clusion . Defen dan t’s belief to this effect amoun ts to n othin g more th an mere conjecture, an d the Court will not use such conjecture to penalize Ms. Goodman, especially in ligh t of Plain tiff’s represen tation that he n ever though t th at th e settlemen t agreem en t was in ten ded to dispose of his claim s. As to the three cases cited by Defen dan t for the proposition that Ms. Goodman ’s con duct is san ction able, th e Court finds th ese cases to be h ighly distin guishable. In Form an v. Mt. Sin ai Med. Ctr., 128 F.R.D. 591, 60 5-60 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), the Court im posed san ction s pursuan t to § 1927 for coun sel’s failure to commun icate “reason ably” with opposing counsel and the Court (a review of th e case leaves n o question as to what J udge Wood mean t by her choice of the word “reason ably”) regardin g settlemen t. In Deadw y ler v. W olksw agen of Am erica, In c., 134 F.R.D. 128, 140 (W.D.N.C. 1991), the 8 Court foun d that th e failure to communicate offers of settlem ent is th e epitom e of “bad faith .” Fin ally, in S & D Cal. Fruit Exchange, In c. v. Gurino, 783 F.2d 345, 345 (2d Cir. 1986), plain tiff’s coun sel, th rough his failure to con firm that th e case had settled, allowed the case to proceed so far th at the Secon d Circuit had already “commen ced preparation of an order treatin g the merits of the appeal.” Plain tiff’s counsel also ign ored repeated messages from defen se coun sel an d th e Court Clerk’s staff about the status of settlemen t. When the Court asked him to show cause as to why h e sh ould n ot be san ction ed, coun sel refused to even fall on the proverbial sword, in stead goin g so far as to even blame the “in adequacy of telephone service to this Court’s Clerk’s office” for h is failure to preven t the case from proceeding an y furth er on appeal. Here, Ms. Goodman merely overlooked the fact that the settlemen t had n ot been consummated; she did not arbitrarily im pede th e effectuation of settlemen t, as in Form an , fail to commun icate an offer to settle to class plain tiffs, as in Deadw y ler, or ign ore th e fact that the appellate court was still proceedin g with th e regular course of litigation , as in Gurin o. Thus, none of these cases supports an award of sanction s under Section 1927. Sin ce the Court has foun d an absence of bad faith, the Court also finds n o reason to use its inh erent powers to im pose sanction s as against Ms. Goodm an. Barnes v . Dalton , 158 F.3d 1212, 1214 (11th Cir. 1998) (“The key to un lockin g a court’s inh eren t power is a finding of bad faith .”); In re Mroz, 65 F.3d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1995) (“In vocation of a court’s inh erent power requires a findin g of bad faith.”) (citing Cham bers v. NASCO, In c., 50 1 U.S. 32, 49 (1991)). Accordingly, the Court D EN IES Defen dan t’s request for san ctions as again st Ms. Goodman . 9 2 . Pla in t iff To m m y Ja ck s o n Defen dan t also moves th e Court to san ction Plain tiff as part of th e Court’s inh eren t power. Per Defen dan t, Plain tiff multiplied the proceedin gs by “steadfastly refusin g to execute the Agreemen t despite agreein g to settle through th e discussion on the record at h is deposition , an d h is coun sel’s subsequen t acceptan ce of the Agreemen t’s terms.” (Doc. 32 at 12.) Again , while the Court un derstan ds Defen dan t’s dissatisfaction with th e way in which this case was h an dled, th e Court does n ot believe th at an award of sanction s is warranted, even against Plaintiff. Th e record reflects th at Plain tiff may h ave fallen victim to a failure to un derstan d the process of settlemen t. Although we lawyers might view Plain tiff’s belief about the settlemen t—th at the agreem en t on the record was on ly in ten ded to satisfy his lawyer’s fee so th at h e could be free to pursue his case with an other lawyer—to be un reason able, Plain tiff’s view as a laym an can n ot be easily disregarded. Th ere is n o eviden ce to reflect th at Plain tiff “acted in bad faith” or en gaged in con duct “vexatiously, wan ton ly or for oppressive reason s.” See Cham bers, 50 1 U.S. at 45-46. The on ly eviden ce before the Court reflects th at Plain tiff misun derstood th e procedures for settlemen t. Th e Court also notes that Plaintiff’s conduct partly appears m ore serious th an it is in fact because of the aforem en tion ed delay in completing an d forwardin g the fin al settlemen t documen ts. Without those facts, the Court is left with Plain tiff’s con fusion an d misunderstan din g. In this regard, the Court does n ot find th at Plain tiff’s misin terpretation of settlemen t, as misguided as it may have been , sufficien t to in voke the Court’s inh eren t powers to issue sanction s. Accordin gly, Defen dan t’s request for sanction s is D EN IED as again st Plain tiff. 10 Followin g en try of th is Order, the parties shall immediately con fer to coordin ate the execution of the settlemen t agreemen t an d exchan ge of the settlemen t con sideration of $ 50 0 . Th e Court h ereby ORD ERS th e Parties, Plain tiff Tommy J ackson , person ally, an d coun sel for Defen dan t, to file th e n ecessary dism issal documen t(s) n ot later th an Th u rs d a y, Ma y 2 , 2 0 13 . In the even t that the Parties are un able to file said documen t(s) by th at date, th ey shall instead file a written status report explain in g why said documents h ave not been filed. Plaintiff is furth er n oticed that his failure to cooperate with Defen dan t regardin g effectuation of settlemen t could result in th e Court’s im position of mon etary san ction s again st Plain tiff. SO ORD ERED , th is 10 th day of April, 20 13. / s/ W. Louis San ds TH E H ON ORABLE W . LOU IS SAN D S, U N ITED STATES D ISTRICT COU RT 11
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