PATTERSON v. USA - Document 16

P A T T E R S O N v. USA D o c . 16 In the United States Court of Federal Claims N o. 08-6C Filed: November 5, 2008 * * * * * * * * * * * D e fe n d a n t. * * * * * * * * Ru le 12(b)(6); Title VII Settlement Agreement; Substantive Right to M on ey Damages TRESLY N C. PATTERSON Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, W. Pruitt Ashworth, Dallas, Texas, for plaintiff. Carrie A. Dunsmore, United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Commercial Litigation Branch, Washington, D.C., for defendant. O P I N I O N AND ORDER P la in tif f filed a complaint alleging breach of a settlement agreement arising from h e r claim of workplace discrimination. The issue before this court is defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. We deny defendant's motion for the reasons set f o rth below. BACKGROUND P la in tif f is as an Equal Opportunity Specialist in the Dallas office of the D e p a rtm e n t of Education. She filed a Title VII action in April 2002, alleging workplace d is c rim in a tio n based on race, sex, mental disability, physical disability, and reprisal. See 4 2 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2000). The Department settled plaintiff's claim for $ 40,000 a n d the assurance that it would follow normal procedures in considering future raises. The September 2003 settlement agreement provides that "[a]ll standard operating p ro c e d u re s will apply to when and how the complainant will be eligible and considered Dockets.Justia.com  for advancement to her next career ladder promotion to grade 12." Compl. ¶ 8. The a g re e m e n t also states that any alleged breach by the Department would be resolved by an E E O C administrative appeal procedure. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504. P la in tif f filed a second complaint with the Department's Equal Employment Office in February 2005, alleging that a one-year delay in her promotion breached the settlement a g re e m e n t. The Equal Employment Office initially agreed that the Department of E d u ca tio n had breached the settlement agreement; it granted Ms. Patterson a monetary a w a rd in March 2005. Later, the EEO rescinded that award on the grounds that it did not h a v e authority to award money damages. Ms. Patterson appealed to the EEOC. The E E O C ruled that plaintiff had not shown she was qualified for the grade increase and d e n ie d her appeal in March 2006. Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Northern District of Texas. The district court d is m is s e d her claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the Court of F e d e ra l Claims was the only forum with jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's claim for breach of a settlement agreement. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Patterson v. Spellings, 249 F. App'x 9 9 3 (5th Cir. 2007). The basis for the Fifth Circuit's decision was that plaintiff had a lle g e d only a breach of contract, not a Title VII claim Ms. Patterson sued in this court for breach of her settlement agreement. The G o v e rn m e n t asserts that the complaint does not establish a claim because the settlement a g re e m e n t does not contemplate monetary damages for its breach. It also argues that p la in tif f 's contract forecloses judicial review because it mandates an administrative d is p u te process. DISCUSSION A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when the facts a s s e rte d do not entitle plaintiff to a legal remedy. Perez v. United States, 156 F.3d 1366, 1 3 7 0 (Fed. Cir. 1998). See also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2 0 0 7 ) (stating that "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are tru e (even if doubtful in fact)"). Defendant contends that plaintiff fails to state a claim because the settlement a g re e m e n t does not provide money damages for its breach. See Ransom v. United States, 9 0 0 F.2d 242, 244 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that a contract must "entitle the plaintiff to m o n e y damages in the event of the government's breach of that contract"); Phillips v. U n ite d States, 77 Fed. Cl. 513, 518-19 (2007) (dismissing a claim for breach of a Title  VII settlement agreement because contract provisions could not be read to require the p a ym e n t of money for their breach). Money damages are the default remedy for breach of contract. San Juan City C o lle g e v. United States, 391 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The law presumes that d a m a g e s will be available for breach of a contract by the Government. Id.; see also S a n d e rs v. United States, 252 F.3d 1329, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that "in the area o f government contracts . . . there is a presumption in the civil context that a damages re m e d y will be available upon the breach of an agreement"); Taylor v. United States, 73 F e d . Cl. 532, 545 (2006) (noting that the "contract itself does not need to be moneym a n d a tin g because money damages are the default remedy for a breach of contract."). But see, e.g., Phillips, 77 Fed. Cl. at 518-19 (holding that breach of a duty to seek re a s s ig n m e n t for plaintiff did not "create a substantive right to money damages"). Phillips involved a settlement agreement that resulted from a Title VII d isc rim in a tio n claim, as here. 77 Fed. Cl. at 514. However, the provision allegedly b re a c h e d was the Agency's promise to attempt to find plaintiff a position with a d v a n ce m e n t potential in a different division within the agency. The trial court held that th e promise to seek reassignment could not be "construed to create a substantive right to m o n e y damages." Id. at 519. Ms. Patterson seeks damages for the Agency's alleged b re a ch of a promise that "[a]ll standard operating procedures will apply to when and how th e complainant will be eligible for advancement to her next career ladder promotion to g ra d e 12." Compl. ¶ 8. Thus, the remedy in this context is money. Plaintiff's damages w o u ld be the difference between what she was paid and what she would have been paid h ad she been promoted earlier. The Government argues that the administrative procedure referenced in the s e ttle m e n t agreement is the exclusive remedy available to plaintiff for breach of her s e ttle m e n t agreement. See Doe v. United States, 513 F.3d 1348, 1355-56 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (h o ld in g that a procedure established by collective bargaining agreement was the e x c lu s iv e process available to employees where the dispute was "grievable"). The Doe court held that rights granted to government employees by a collective b a rg a in in g agreement "that are subject to the grievance procedure are not rights that an e m p lo ye e can enforce by suit in the Court of Federal Claims." Id. at 1355. In Doe, the g rie v a n ce process was the "exclusive procedure available" to employees covered by the a g re e m e n t. Id. This precluded all access to the federal courts for redress. T h e settlement agreement in this case provides that federal regulations would " g o v e rn as to the processing of a claim of an alleged breach of the agreement by the  Agency." 1 See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504.2 These are procedural matters that do not exclude a n employee's access to federal courts. See Greenhill v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 786, 7 9 2 (2008) (distinguishing the administrative dispute resolution process in a Title VII s e ttle m e n t agreement from the collective bargaining agreement in Doe). The settlement a g re e m e n t in Greenhill stated that the plaintiff "must" pursue its complaint with the a g e n c y's Equal Employment Office and follow the process detailed in 29 C.F.R. § 1 6 1 4 .5 0 4 . Id. The court held that this provision did not preclude an action for damages in this court because the mandatory language applied only if the plaintiff chose to pursue its claim administratively. Id. CONCLUSION Plaintiff's breach of contract claim falls within our Tucker Act jurisdiction. Ms. P a tte rs o n 's allegations exceed the level of mere speculation, and they state a claim upon w h ic h relief may be granted. T h e administrative process is not plaintiff's exclusive remedy in this case. The s e ttle m e n t agreement instructs plaintiff that an administrative claim must be pursued a c c o rd in g to the federal regulation cited, if she chooses to pursue her claim administratively. It does not foreclose an action in this court. Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is DENIED. The parties w ill contact chambers to jointly propose a time for a status conference to take place during th e week of November 10 to discuss further proceedings in this case. s / R o b e r t H. Hodges, Jr. Robert H. Hodges, Jr. Judge 1 Although the settlement agreement was not attached to the complaint, the court must consider documents incorporated by reference when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2509 (2007). Plaintiff includes excerpts from the settlement agreement in the complaint. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504(a) provides that: "If the complainant believes that the agency has failed to comply with the terms of a settlement agreement or decision, the complainant shall notify the EEO Director, in writing, of the alleged noncompliance within 30 days of when the complainant knew or should have known of the alleged noncompliance." Complainants may then file an appeal with the EEOC if unsatisfied with the agencies resolution of the alleged noncompliance. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504(b). 2