Bartnick et al v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company
Filing
78
ORDER: Denying 54 Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Claims and Scheduling Order for Good Cause. Granting 56 Defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Companys Motion for Summary Judgment. Denying as moot 59 Defendant's Motion for San ctions for Plaintiffs' Failure to Participate in Rule 26(f) Conference and Violation of Court's Orders. Denying as moot 64 Plaintiffs' Motion for Rule 26(c) Protective Orders. By Magistrate Judge Michael J. Watanabe on 3/7/2013.(mjwcd)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 12-cv-03208-MJW
WILLIAM BARTNICK and
LAURA LARKINS BARTNICK,
Plaintiff(s),
v.
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY,
Defendant(s).
ORDER REGARDING
(1) PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO AMEND CLAIMS AND
SCHEDULING ORDER FOR GOOD CAUSE
(DOCKET NO. 54);
(2) DEFENDANT STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(DOCKET NO. 56);
(3) DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS FOR PLAINTIFFS’ FAILURE TO
PARTICIPATE IN RULE 26(F) CONFERENCE AND VIOLATION OF COURT’S
ORDERS (DOCKET NO. 59); and
(4) PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR RULE 26(C) PROTECTIVE ORDERS
(DOCKET NO. 64)
Entered by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Watanabe
This matter is before this court for disposition upon consent of the parties
pursuant to an Order of Reference Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (docket no. 73) entered
by the Honorable R. Brooke Jackson.
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Now before the court are the following four motions: (1) Plaintiffs’ Motion to
Amend Claims and Scheduling Order for Good Cause (docket no. 54); (2) Defendant
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no.
56); (3) Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions for Plaintiffs’ Failure to Participate in Rule
26(f) Conference and Violation of Court’s Orders (docket no. 59); and (4) Plaintiffs’
Motion for Rule 26(c) Protective Orders (docket no. 64). The court has reviewed the
subject motions (docket nos. 54, 56, 59, 64), the responses (docket nos. 60, 61, 71),
and the reply (docket no. 70). In addition, the court has taken judicial notice, pursuant
to Fed. R. Evid. 201, of the court’s file and the Arapahoe County District Court case
captioned: William Bartnick and Laura Bartnick v. City of Englewood, et al., case no.
09-cv-2198 [hereinafter state case]. Further, the court has considered applicable
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and case law. The court now being fully informed
makes the following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The court finds:
1.
That as I have previously found and have advised the pro se
Plaintiffs, I have jurisdiction over the parties and over the Plaintiffs’
breach of contract and bad faith claims ONLY based upon the
removal from the Arapahoe County District Court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1441(a),1446(a), and 1332;
2.
That venue is proper in the state and District of Colorado;
3.
That each party has been given a fair and adequate opportunity to
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be heard;
4.
That this case has a tortured history in the state case in the
Arapahoe County District Court. See docket no. 1, 1-1 through 148, inclusive;
5.
That in November 2007, the Plaintiffs were contacted by the City of
Englewood and notified of several complaints from their neighbors
that they were operating the South Pearl Street property that they
owed as a boarding house. Plaintiffs were eventually prosecuted
by the City of Englewood for running an illegal boarding house and
running a boarding house without permits;
6.
That after being convicted of running an illegal boarding house and
running a boarding house without permits in the City of Englewood
Municipal Court, the Plaintiffs filed the state case on September 9,
2009, against the City of Englewood, City of Englewood Judge
Vincent Ross Atencio, City Mayor Robert McCaslin, a number of
Plaintiffs’ neighbors, and numerous other city employees. See
docket 1-4. It should be noted that the original complaint named 14
defendants. One of the neighbors sued in that case, Chris Carman,
was insured by Defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Company
[hereinafter Defendant]. On March 15, 2010, the state court [Judge
Wheeler] dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ claims against Ms. Carman.
See docket no. 44-2 at p. 5 captioned Order Re: Outstanding
Motions III. The state court [Judge Wheeler] found that the claims
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against Ms. Carman were frivolous, and Ms. Carman was awarded
attorney fees against the Plaintiffs. Thereafter, Defendant
substituted into the state case to collect the attorney’s fees and
costs that were awarded to Ms. Carman since Defendant provided
a defense for Ms. Carman against the Plaintiffs’ claims in the state
case. See docket no. 44-4 regarding Order Re: Defendant
Carman’s Motion to Substitute Party in the state case. Also see
docket no. 44-3 regarding Order Re: Motion for Attorneys’ Fees Carman in the state case. In a nutshell, the state court [Judge
Wheeler] allowed Defendant to substitute as the real party in
interest for Ms. Carman on October 11, 2010, and the state court
[Judge Wheeler] awarded attorney’s fees and costs in favor of Ms.
Carman in the amount of $6,766.45 and against the Plaintiffs on
May 7, 2010;
7.
That on November 1, 2012, the Plaintiffs filed a pleading in the
state case captioned “Rule 106 Application for Order to Show
Cause.” See docket no. 1-5. This pleading was later interpreted by
the state court [Judge Wheeler] as a Motion to Assert Claims
Against State Fire and Casualty Company [Defendant]. See docket
no. 1-9;
8.
That on November 7, 2012, the state court [Judge Wheeler]
entered his Order Re: Plaintiffs’ Motion to Add Counterclaim
(docket no. 1-9). In this Order, the state court [Judge Wheeler]
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found that the Plaintiffs had advanced colorable claims against
Defendant for breach of contract and bad faith arising from a losses
that occurred in May 2007 as a result of water damage that
occurred at property owned by the Plaintiffs and ordered Defendant
to file an Answer on or before November 30, 2012. However, the
state court [Judge Wheeler] also found that the Plaintiffs’ claims
against Defendant for breach of contract and bad faith were wholly
unrelated to the issues presented in the existing state case [i.e.,
case no. 09-cv-2198], and, therefore, he severed the Plaintiffs’
claims against Defendant for all purposes from any issues
then before the state court. See docket no. 1-9, p. 2-3;
9.
That on November 29, 2012, the state court [Judge Wheeler]
dismissed all remaining defendants in the state case as a sanction
for the Plaintiffs’ failure to appear for their depositions. See docket
no. 1-32. Furthermore, other defendants had already been
dismissed on other grounds previously. See state court record
(docket nos. 1, 1-3). Therefore, as of November 29, 2012, the only
remaining issues before the state court [Judge Wheeler] were (1)
State Farm’s [Defendant’s] collection of its award of attorney’s fees
and costs associated with the Plaintiffs’ state case against Ms.
Carman and (2) the Plaintiffs’ recently-pled claims against State
Farm [Defendant] for breach of contract and bad faith;
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10.
That the Notice of Removal was filed timely by Defendant with this
court on December 7, 2012. See docket no. 1. In its Notice of
Removal, Defendant provided a short and concise statement
regarding the grounds for removal. Defendant demonstrated in its
Notice of Removal that the parties are diverse and that the
jurisdiction amount contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1332 has been met.
Therefore, this court has diversity jurisdiction over this case [i.e.,
Plaintiffs’ breach of contract and bad faith claims];
11.
That Rule 56(a) provides that summary judgment shall be granted
“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A party seeking summary judgment
bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the
basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings,
depositions, interrogatories, and admissions on file together with
affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of
genuine issues for trial.” Robertson v. Board of County Comm’rs of
the County of Morgan, 78 F. Supp.2d 1142, 1146 (D. Colo. 1999)
(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Mares v.
ConAgra Poultry Co., 971 F.2d 492, 494 (10th Cir. 1992)). “Once a
properly supported summary judgment motion is made, the
opposing party may not rest on the allegations contained in the
complaint, but must respond with specific facts showing the
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existence of a genuine factual issue to be tried. . . . These facts
may be shown ‘by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in
Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings by themselves.’” Southway
v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 149 F. Supp.2d 1268, 1273 (D. Colo.
2001), aff’d, 328 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir. 2003). However, “[i]n order to
survive summary judgment, the content of the evidence that the
nonmoving party points to must be admissible. . . . The nonmoving
party does not have to produce evidence in a form that would be
admissible at trial, but ‘”the content or substance of the evidence
must be admissible.”’ . . . Hearsay testimony that would be
inadmissible at trial cannot be used to defeat a motion for summary
judgment because ‘a third party’s description of a witness’
supposed testimony is “not suitable grist for the summary judgment
mill.”’” Adams v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 233 F.3d
1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 2000).
“Summary judgment is also appropriate when the court concludes
that no reasonable juror could find for the non-moving party based
on the evidence presented in the motion and response.” Southway,
149 F. Supp.2d at 1273. “The operative inquiry is whether, based
on all documents submitted, reasonable jurors could find by a
preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a
verdict. . . . Unsupported allegations without ‘any significant
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probative evidence tending to support the complaint’ are insufficient
. . . as are conclusory assertions that factual disputes exist.” Id.;
Robertson, 78 F. Supp.2d at 1146 (citing Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); quoting White v. York Int’l
Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1995)). “Evidence presented
must be based on more than ‘mere speculation, conjecture, or
surmise’ to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Southway,
149 F. Supp.2d at 1274. “Summary judgment should not enter if,
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving
party and drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor, a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for that party.” Id. at 1273;
12.
That as this court has previously found, the only claims before this
court are the Plaintiffs’ breach of contract and bad faith claims
arising from water damage that occurred in May 2007 at property
owned by the Plaintiffs;
13.
That in diversity actions, such as this case, the state statutes of
limitations apply. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Boellstorff, 540
F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 2008);
14.
That under Colorado law, “[a] cause of action for breach of any
express or implied contract . . . shall be considered to accrue on the
date the breach is discovered or should have been discovered by
the exercise of reasonable diligence.” § 13-80-108(6), C.R.S. See
Cahill v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 610 F.3d 1235, 1240 (10th
9
Cir. 2010) (“Under Colorado law a claim accrues when ‘the plaintiff
knows, or should know, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, all
material facts essential to show the elements of that cause of
action.’”) (quoting Miller v. Armstrong World Indus., 817 P.2d 111,
113 (Colo. 1991));
15.
That a breach of contract claim is governed by Colorado’s threeyear statute of limitations. § 13-80-101(1)(a), C.R.S.;
16.
That a common law bad faith claim premised upon breach of an
insurance contract is government by Colorado’s two-year statute of
limitations applicable to tort claims. Alarcon v. American Family
Ins. Group, 2010 WL 2541131, at *3 (D. Colo. June 18, 2010); Cork
v. Sentry Ins., 194 P.3d 422, 427 (Colo. App. 2008). Such a claim
“accrues when both the nature of the injury and its causes are
known or should be known through the exercise of reasonable
diligence.” Vaccaro v. American Family Ins. Group, 275 P.3d 750,
756 (Colo. App. 2012). Accrual of such a claim has been held to
occur when an insurer refuses to pay under a policy as requested
by its insured. See Cork, 194 P.3d at 427-28;
17.
That under Colorado law, Plaintiffs bear the burden of
demonstrating that the statutes of limitations should be tolled. See
Crosby v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 251 P.3d 1279, 1283
(Colo. App. 2010);
18.
That the undisputed evidence shows that the Plaintiffs notified
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Defendant of the water loss in May 2007;
19.
That the undisputed evidence shows that the Plaintiffs submitted a
complaint dated September 25, 2007, to the Colorado Division of
Insurance (Docket No. 56-2 at 22-23) expressing their concerns
regarding Defendant’s denials of portions of their water loss claim
and allegations of unwarranted delays in the resolution of their
water loss claim;
20.
That the undisputed evidence shows that Defendant issued various
payments to Plaintiffs with regard to this loss, including its final
payment on the claim in November 2007, and Plaintiffs did not
thereafter contact Defendant again requesting additional payment
for any claimed losses on the water loss claim;
21.
That in Defendant’s letter to Plaintiffs regarding the final payment
made on November 9, 2007, Defendant indicated that it was
agreeing to pay for additional expenses related to the 2007 water
loss as requested by Plaintiffs but was refusing to pay for other
damages Plaintiffs alleged were caused by the loss;
22.
That Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim and bad faith claim accrued
no later than November 2007 when they were informed by
Defendant that it had completed payment on Plaintiffs’ water loss
claim. At that time, Plaintiffs would have known or should have
known in the exercise of reasonable diligence all material facts
essential to show the elements of their two claims. In fact, more
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than a month earlier, Plaintiffs had complained that Defendant had
not properly handled and paid their water loss claim;
23.
That Plaintiffs thus should have commenced their bad faith claim
against Defendant no later than November 2009 and their breach of
contract claim against Defendant no later than November 2010;
24.
That the earliest the Plaintiffs commenced their breach of contract
and bad faith claims, however, was not until November 1, 2012,
when they filed a document in the state case captioned “Rule 106
Application for Order to Show Cause” (docket no. 1-5), which was
interpreted by the state court [Judge Wheeler] as a Motion to Assert
Claims Against State Fire and Casualty Company [Defendant]
(docket no. 1-9);
25.
That Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of coming forward
with facts sufficient to demonstrate that tolling is appropriate;
26.
That Plaintiffs’ claims of breach of contract and bad faith,
regardless of whether they are based upon their homeowners
policy or personal liability umbrella policy, are thus barred by the
applicable statutes of limitation;
27.
That Plaintiffs’ assertion that “the timeline of the loss incurred was
again triggered” by Defendant’s levying Plaintiffs’ bank accounts
and garnishing Mr. Bartnick’s pay check is without merit. The
Plaintiffs’ claims here regarding their water loss claim are separate
and distinct from the Plaintiffs’ state court claims that resulted in the
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garnishment and levies;
28.
That Plaintiffs’ statements in their Response regarding the Rule
26(f) meeting in this action and issues unrelated to the limited
claims before this court, i.e., garnishment of Mr. Bartnick’s wages
and issues concerning the claims heard in the state court, are
irrelevant to the summary judgment motion before the court; and
29.
That in Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend Claims and Scheduling Order for
Good Cause (docket no. 54), Plaintiffs do not specify the relief they
are seeking. To the extent they seek to amend the Scheduling
Order, such request is denied inasmuch as no Scheduling Order
has been entered in this case. To the extent they seek to amend
the Complaint, they did not detail the proposed amendments and
the reasons such amendments are necessary, and they did not
tender a proposed amended pleading with their motion.
Furthermore, it appears they may very well be seeking to add the
claims that were already dismissed in the state case. Therefore,
their motion should be denied.
ORDER
WHEREFORE, based upon these findings of fact and conclusions of law this
court ORDERS:
1.
That Defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Company’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (docket no. 56) is GRANTED. The Clerk
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shall enter judgment in favor of Defendant State Farm Fire and
Casualty Company and against Plaintiffs William Bartnick and
Laura Larkins Bartnick on all claims. Costs shall be awarded to
Defendant;
2.
That Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend Claims and Scheduling Order for
Good Cause (docket no. 54) is DENIED;
3.
That Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions for Plaintiffs’ Failure to
Participate in Rule 26(f) Conference and Violation of Court’s Orders
(docket no. 59) is DENIED AS MOOT;
4.
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Rule 26(c) Protective Orders (docket no. 64) is
DENIED AS MOOT; and
5.
That the Rule 16 Scheduling Conference set before Magistrate
Judge Watanabe on April 3, 2013, at 3:00 p.m. is VACATED.
Done this 7th day of March, 2013.
BY THE COURT
s/Michael J. Watanabe
MICHAEL J. WATANABE
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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