Aragon v. Wagner, et al
Filing
46
ORDER granting 37 Lakewood Defendants and Defendant Kladde's Joint Motion to Stay Pending Determination of Qualified Immunity as to Defendants Wagner, Dixon, Paletta, and Kladde. All discovery in this matter is hereby STAYED pending ruling on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (Doc. Nos. 32 & 34 ). The Scheduling Conference set for 3/5/2013 and all related deadlines are VACATED. Order denying as moot 40 Lakewood Defendants and Defendant Kladde's Unopposed Joint Motion for Protective Order. By Magistrate Judge Kathleen M. Tafoya on 3/1/2013. (klyon, ) Modified on 3/1/2013 to correct judicial officer (klyon, ).
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Magistrate Judge Kathleen M. Tafoya
Civil Action No. 12–cv–02516–REB–KMT
ADRIENNE ARAGON,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHELE WAGNER, in her individual and official capacity,
ROBERT KLADDE, in his individual and official capacity
JOHN DIXON, in his individual and official capacity,
LAUREN JOHNSON, in his individual and official capacity,
KEVIN PALETTA, CHIEF OF POLICE, LAKEWOOD POLICE DEPARTMENT, in his
individual and official capacity, and
CITY OF LAKEWOOD, in its official capacity,
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter is before the court on the “Lakewood Defendants and Defendant Kladde’s
Joint Motion to Stay Pending Determination of Qualified Immunity as to Defendants Wagner,
Dixon, Paletta, and Kladde.” (Doc. No. 37, filed Feb. 19, 2013.) For the following reasons,
Defendants’ Motion to Stay is GRANTED.
In this case, Plaintiff asserts claims for relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations
of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights arising out of her arrest after Defendants’
responded to her 911 call requesting that her brother, his fiancé, and Plaintiff’s father be
removed from her home. (See generally Am. Compl., Doc. No. 26, filed Jan. 28, 2013.) In their
Motions to Dismiss, filed on February 11, 2013, Defendants argue, inter alia, that they are
entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s claims against them in their individual capacities.
(Doc. No. 32 at 18-19 [Lakewood Defs. Mot. Dismiss]; Doc. No. 34 at 13-14 [Def. Kladde Mot.
Dismiss].) at 18-19.) Accordingly, in their Motion to Stay, Defendants seek a stay of discovery
pending ruling on whether they are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s claims as
alleged.
Immunity provisions, whether qualified, absolute or pursuant to the Eleventh
Amendment, are meant to free officials from the concerns of litigation, including avoidance of
disruptive discovery. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009) (citing Siegert v. Gilley,
500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)); see also Workman v. Jordan,
958 F.2d 332, 335 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting that qualified immunity, if successful, protects an
official both from liability and the ordinary burdens of litigation, including far-ranging
discovery) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982)). As explained by the
Court in Iqbal, there are serious and legitimate reasons for this protection:
If a Government official is to devote time to his or her duties, and to the
formulation of sound and responsible policies, it is counterproductive to require
the substantial diversion that is attendant to participating in litigation and making
informed decisions as to how it should proceed. Litigation, though necessary to
ensure that officials comply with the law, exacts heavy costs in terms of
efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and resources that might otherwise be
directed to the proper execution of the work of the Government. The costs of
diversion are only magnified when Government officials are charged with
responding to [the burdens of litigation discovery].
Id. at 685.
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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly provide for a stay of proceedings.
See String Cheese Incident, LLC v. Stylus Shows, Inc., 02-CV-01934-LTB-PA, 2006 WL
894955, at *2 (D. Colo. March 30, 2006) (unpublished). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26
does, however, provide that
[a] party or any person from whom discovery is sought may move for a protective
order in the court where the action is pending . . . . The court may, for good
cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense . . . .
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Moreover,
[t]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court
to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and
effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. How this can best be done calls for
the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an
even balance.
Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936) (citing Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 760, 763 (1931)). An order staying discovery is thus an appropriate exercise of
this court’s discretion. Id.
Additionally, “a court may decide that in a particular case it would be wise to stay
discovery on the merits until [certain challenges] have been resolved.” 8A Charles Alan Wright,
Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2040, at 198 (3d ed.
2010). Although a stay of all discovery is generally disfavored, see Bustos v. U.S., 257 F.R.D.
617, 623 (D. Colo. 2009), a stay may be appropriate if “resolution of a preliminary motion may
dispose of the entire action.” Nankivil v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 216 F.R.D. 689, 692 (M.D.
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Fla. 2003). See also Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’r, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 804 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (“When a particular issue may be dispositive, the court may stay discovery concerning
other issues until the critical issue is resolved”). When considering a stay of discovery, this
court considers: (1) the plaintiff’s interests in proceeding expeditiously with the civil action and
the potential prejudice to plaintiff of a delay; (2) the burden on the defendants; (3) the
convenience to the court; (4) the interests of persons not parties to the civil litigation; and (5) the
public interest. See String Cheese Incident, 2006 WL 894955, at *2 (citing FDIC v. Renda, No.
85-2216-O, 1987 WL 348635, at *2 (D. Kan. 1987)).
On February 28, 2013, Plaintiff filed a response to Defendants’ Motion to Stay advising
the court that she does not oppose a stay of this case pending ruling on Defendants’ Motions to
Dismiss. (Doc. No. 42.) Therefore, any prejudice to Plaintiff’s ability to proceed expeditiously
with this case does not weigh heavily in the court’s analysis. Moreover, the court finds that any
potential prejudice to Plaintiff is outweighed by the burden on Defendants if they were forced to
proceed with discovery in spite of well-established precedent supporting a stay when an
immunity defense has been raised. Further, although qualified immunity is a potential defense
only as to Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims under § 1983, See Rome v. Romero, 225 F.R.D.
640, 643-644 (D. Colo. 2004), the Supreme Court has recognized:
It is no answer to these concerns [of avoiding disruptive discovery] to say that
discovery can be deferred while pretrial proceedings continue for other
defendants. It is quite likely that, when discovery as to the other parties proceeds,
it would prove necessary for petitioners and their counsel to participate in the
process to ensure the case does not develop in a misleading or slanted way that
causes prejudice to their position. Even if petitioners are not yet themselves
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subject to discovery orders, then, they would not be free from the burdens of
discovery.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685. As such, proceeding with discovery as to claims that are not subject to
the assertion of qualified immunity is not a permissible alternative.
The third String Cheese factor also favors a stay. Although the court has an interest in
managing its docket by seeing the case proceed expeditiously, the court finds that any
inconvenience that might result from rescheduling the docket is outweighed by the potential
waste of judicial resources that would result from allowing discovery to proceed only to have the
case subsequently dismissed in its entirety on the grounds raised in the motions to dismiss. See
Nankivil, 216 F.R.D. at 692 (a stay may be appropriate if “resolution of a preliminary motion
may dispose of the entire action.”).
Finally, neither the interest of nonparties or the public interest in general prompt the court
to reach a different result. Accordingly, on balance, the court finds that a stay of discovery is
appropriate in this case. Therefore, it is
ORDERED that the “Lakewood Defendants and Defendant Kladde’s Joint Motion to
Stay Pending Determination of Qualified Immunity as to Defendants Wagner, Dixon, Paletta,
and Kladde” (Doc. No. 37) is GRANTED. All discovery in this matter is hereby STAYED
pending ruling on Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Doc. Nos. 32 & 34). It is further
ORDERED that the Scheduling Conference set for March 5, 2013 and all related
deadlines are VACATED. The parties shall file a joint status report within seven days of a
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ruling on Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, if any portion of the case remains pending, to advise
if the Scheduling Conference should be reset. It is further
ORDERED that the “Lakewood Defendants and Defendant Kladde’s Unopposed Joint
Motion for Protective Order” (Doc. No. 40) is DENIED as moot.
Dated this 1st day of March, 2013.
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