Willerding, v. Steger, et al.,
Filing
32
ORDER Denying 28 Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Judge John L. Kane on 3/27/13.(sgrim)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge John L. Kane
Civil Action No. 12-cv-00995-JLK
KELLY WILLERDING,
Plaintiff,
v.
RICHARD E. STEGER and HTC EXPRESS, INC.,
Defendants.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, DOC. 28
Kane, J.
Before me is Plaintiff Kelly Willerding’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
for Defendant’s Affirmative Defense of Sudden Emergency, Doc. 28. To begin, I note
that the designation of Ms. Willerding’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is now
misleading. The title of the motion and its attendant filings implicate by caption the
doctrine of “sudden emergency,” which, as both parties acknowledge, the Tenth Circuit
recently abolished in Bedor v. Johnson, 292 P.3d 924, 925 (Colo. 2013).
Nevertheless, Ms. Willerding contends the doctrine’s abolition does nothing to
change the essence of the ruling its Motion asks me to make, namely, whether
Defendants prevail on the issue that the brake loss at issue in this action was the
Defendants’ legal responsibility and of the Defendants’ making. Accordingly, Ms.
Willerding implores my continued consideration of the matter without the trappings of
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the “doctrine of sudden emergency” label. Ms.Willerding urges me per Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(f)(2) to find that Defendants did not exercise reasonable care in the maintenance or
operation of the truck and that they are responsible for the loss of its brakes. Regardless
of how the substantive issues are categorized, there are genuine disputes of material fact
such that I DENY Ms. Willerding’s Motion.
FACT SNYOPSIS
While traveling westbound on I-70 in wintertime, professional truck driver
Defendant Steger lost control of his commercial tractor-trailer owned by Defendant HTC
Express, Inc. and struck the vehicle in which Ms. Willerding was riding as a passenger.
The collision caused Ms. Willerding’s vehicle to spin out of control and crash, allegedly
injuring her. Defendants allege Mr. Steger lost control because his truck’s brakes failed.
Defendants generally agree that brake failure caused the accident, but the parties dispute
the cause of the brake failure, with Ms. Willerding arguing, among other theories, that
Mr. Steger failed to properly maintain and adjust his brakes and/or that he lost his brakes
due to improper speeding and Defendants arguing that the brakes failed due to some
event outside of either Defendant’s making.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only where “there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), applied in Hagelin for President Committee v. Graves, 25 F.3d 956,
959 (10th Cir.1994). In applying this standard, I must construe the factual record and
draw reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing
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summary judgment. Blue Circle Cement, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 27 F.3d 1499,
1503 (10th Cir.1994).
The moving party carries the burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that it
is entitled to judgment. Baker v. Board of Regents, 991 F.2d 628, 630 (10th Cir.1993).
Once the moving party shows it is entitled to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the
nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial
as to those dispositive matters for which it carries the burden of proof. Kendall v.
Watkins, 998 F.2d 848, 850 (10th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1120, GET CITE
(1994). The nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but must set
forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial, relying on the types of evidentiary
materials contemplated by Rule 56. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Weisman, 27 F.3d
500, 503 (10th Cir.1994) (applying Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).
The relevant inquiry is whether the evidence presents a “sufficient disagreement to
require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a
matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505,
2511–12, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
DISCUSION
Plaintiff’s Reply, Section II, reveals that certain so-called “Undisputed Facts,” are,
in fact, actively and genuinely disputed by the parties. The parties contest issues
fundamental to determining liability in this action, such as whether Mr. Steger checked
his brakes before the incident or was going the speed limit when the collision occurred.
Critically precluding an entry in either party’s favor on summary judgment is that each
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party offers a different theory of causation as to why Mr. Steger’s brakes were
inoperable. These inquiries are fact-driven and unamenable to summary judgment
resolution. The parties’ drastically different views as to why the truck’s brakes
malfunctioned are likely best resolved by way of expert testimony about truck mechanics.
CONCLUSION
Because this case presents genuine disputes of material fact, Ms. Willerding
is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, I DENY Plaintiff’s Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment on Defendants’ Affirmative Defense of Sudden
Emergency, Doc. 28.
DATED:
March 27, 2013
BY THE COURT:
/s/John L. Kane
U.S. Senior District Judge
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