Collins v. Astrue
Filing
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ORDER. ORDERED that this case is AFFIRMED, and the case is TERMINATED by Judge Wiley Y. Daniel on 03/25/13. (jjhsl, )
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Senior Judge Wiley Y. Daniel
Civil Action No. 11-cv-02742-WYD
JUDY A. COLLINS,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on review of the Commissioner’s decision that
denied Plaintiff’s claim for supplemental security income payments. For the reasons
stated below, this case is affirmed.
I.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Plaintiff protectively applied for supplemental security income [“SSI”] in July
2009, alleging disability beginning on January 8, 2009. (Transcript [“Tr.”] 119.) Her
application was denied (id. 57), and she requested a hearing before an ALJ. (Id. 75). A
hearing was held on July 16, 2010, at which Plaintiff, her attorney, and a vocational
expert appeared. (Id. 26-54).
On July 22, 2010, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled (Tr. 1725). Specifically, the ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since July 24, 2009, her application date. (Tr. 19). At step two, the ALJ
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found Plaintiff’s depressive disorder was a severe impairment. (Id.) At step three, the
ALJ determined Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
met or equaled an impairment listed at 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1. (Id. 13-14).
The ALJ then turned to Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity [“RFC”]. He
determined that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform a full range of work at all exertional
levels with the following nonexertional limitations: “routine and repetitive, entry-level,
minimally stressful work, requiring no contact with the general public and only superficial
interpersonal contact with coworkers and supervisors.” (Tr. 20.) He also determined
that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to
cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the
intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms are not fully credible to the
extent they are inconsistent with the” RFC. (Id. 23.)
Based on the RFC assessment, the ALJ found at step four that Plaintiff could not
perform her past relevant work. (Tr. 24.) At step five, the ALJ found based on the
vocational expert’s testimony that Plaintiff could do other work that exists in the national
economy in significant numbers, and was therefore not disabled within the meaning of
the Act. (Id. 24-25).
Plaintiff requested review by the Appeals Council. On August 22, 2011, the
Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (Tr. 3-8.) In doing so, the Council
noted that it considered the additional information submitted to it, but found it did not
provide a basis for changing the ALJ’s decision. (Id.) Plaintiff timely requested judicial
review, and this appeal followed.
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Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons to reject
the medical evidence and testimony of Plaintiff which was consistent with the medical
records. More specifically, she claims that the ALJ improperly assessed her subjective
symptom testimony in assessing her RFC in that he did not follow the two-step process
required by law to assess Plaintiff’s pain and subjective symptoms. Accordingly, she
asserts that the case should be remanded due to application of incorrect legal
standards by the ALJ and because the ALJ’s conclusions are not supported by specific
evidence. I address Plaintiff’s arguments below.
II.
ANALYSIS
A.
Standard of Review
A Court’s review of the determination that a claimant is not disabled is limited to
determining whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standard and whether
the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Hamilton v. Sec. of Health and
Human Servs., 961 F.2d 1495, 1497-98 (10th Cir. 1992). Substantial evidence is
evidence a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Brown
v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 1194, 1196 (10th Cir. 1990). “It requires more than a scintilla of
evidence but less than a preponderance of the evidence.” Gossett v. Bowen, 862 F.2d
802, 804 (10th Cir. 1988).
“Evidence is not substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record
or constitutes mere conclusion.” Musgrave v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1371, 1374 (10th Cir.
1992). Further, “if the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal test, there is a ground for
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reversal apart from substantial evidence.” Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1487
(10th Cir. 1993).
B.
Whether the ALJ’s Credibility Decision Is Supported by Substantial
Evidence
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate her testimony. She notes
in that regard that where the record supports the existence of a medical condition that is
reasonably likely to produce the subjective symptom, and no evidence of malingering
exists, the Commissioner has the burden of articulating reasons for rejecting the
claimant's testimony regarding her subjective symptoms. In this case, Plaintiff argues
that the ALJ failed to articulate any rationale sufficient to demonstrate Plaintiff was
anything other than credible. Indeed, she contends that his decision is void of any
rationale as to why the ALJ ignored and disregarded her testimony.
Turning to my analysis, “[c]redibility determinations are peculiarly the province of
the finder of fact” and the court “will not upset such determinations when supported by
substantial evidence.’” Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995) (quotation
omitted). “However, ‘[f]indings as to credibility should be closely and affirmatively linked
to substantial evidence and not just a conclusion in the guise of findings.’” Id.
(quotations omitted). The findings must enable the court to be able to determine the
weight the ALJ gave to the claimant’s statements and the reasons for that weight. SSR
96-7p, 1996 WL 347186 (July 2, 1996).
When a claimant complains of pain or other subjective symptoms, the Social
Security Administration requires that these symptoms be evaluated under a two-step
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analysis. SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at 2 (July 2, 1996); see also 20 C.F.R. §
404.1529. In this two-step analysis, the Commissioner must first determine whether
there is an underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairment that could
reasonably be expected to produce the individual's pain or other symptoms. SSR 967p, 1996 WL 374186, at 2. The ALJ found that Plaintiff satisfied the first step. (Tr. 23.)
In the second step, the Commissioner must evaluate “the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of the individual's symptoms to determine the extent to which the
symptoms limit the individual's ability to do basic work activities.” Id. In so doing, the
ALJ must consider all the evidence, both objective and subjective. Musgrave v.
Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1371, 1376 (10th Cir. 1992).
In the case at hand, the ALJ found at the second step that Plaintiff’s “statements
concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects” of the complained of
symptoms are not fully credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the” RFC. (Tr.
23.) He also stated that Plaintiff’s “complaints and assertions were exaggerated, were
not credible. . . .” (Id.) These statements allow me to determine the weight the ALJ
gave to Plaintiff’s statements; however, I must determine if the ALJ gave adequate
reasons for that weight.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ relied on the lack of objective medical evidence in
the record to substantiate her complaints of pain, and argues that the ALJ did not
properly consider her testimony and subjective complaints of symptoms. While I agree
that the ALJ relied heavily on the lack of objective medical evidence in the record (see
Tr. 21-23), this is not all that he relied on. The ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s testimony and
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noted, among other things, that she “alleged that she lies down all day, that her knees
get red and swollen”, “that she has gastrointestinal pain”, that she “has severe
depression. . . . and complains of suicidal ideation”. (Tr. 23.)
The ALJ then proceeded to a discussion of the pertinent factors required to be
analyzed at the second step. In addition to “the medical data. . ., any other objective
indications of the degree of pain, and subjective accounts of the severity of the
claimant’s pain”, the ALJ should consider such factors as “a claimant’s persistent
attempts to find relief for h[er] pain and h[er] willingness to try any treatment prescribed,
regular use of crutches or a cane, regular contact with a doctor, . . . the possibility that
psychological disorders combine with physical problems. . . the claimant’s daily
activities, and the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication.” Luna v.
Bowen, 834 F.2d 161, 163-66 (10th Cir. 1987); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3).
In this case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “denied any pain relief from her
medications, but admittedly still takes them all, with no side effects of significance”, that
she “denied any activity other than laying down all day”, and that Plaintiff’s “selfassessment was for standing 20 minutes, walking 1 block, lifting 8 pounds, and sitting
20 minutes.” (Tr. 23.) The ALJ found that her complaints were exaggerated and not
credible. The ALJ also noted as grounds for his credibility finding that Plaintiff “has
required no intensive pain regimen or therapy, and there is no psychogenic etiology for
purported pain either.” (Id. 24.) Further, he found that “there are no medical side
effects and mental status is benign and fully compatible with competitive remunerative
work”, that Plaintiff admitted at the hearing that her psychotropic medications usually
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help, that Plaintiff’s “work history is poor and she has little motivation to enter the
competitive workforce” and that there is no evidence of a cognitive pain disorder. (Id.)
He concluded with respect to the period at issue that “there has been no lasting
exhibition of sustained symptoms or objective pathology consistent with greater
limitations than found herein.” (Id.)
I find no error with the ALJ’s credibility analysis. He applied the appropriate legal
test and discussed the pertinent factors in conjunction with his analysis of Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints in her testimony. Further, he set forth the specific evidence that
he relied upon in evaluating Plaintiff’s credibility. See Qualls v. Apfel, 206 F.3d 1368,
1372 (10th Cir. 2002) (finding an ALJ properly rejected a claimant’s subjective
statements where he identified the specific evidence relied upon in evaluating credibility,
and that a “formalistic factor-by-factor recitation of the evidence” is not required).
Accordingly, his credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence and must be
affirmed.
III.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, it is
ORDERED that this case is AFFIRMED, and the case is TERMINATED.
Dated March 25, 2013
BY THE COURT:
s/ Wiley Y. Daniel
Wiley Y. Daniel
Senior United States District Judge
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