O.L.M. v. United States of America et al, No. 3:2022cv00507 - Document 7 (S.D. Cal. 2022)
Court Description: ORDER Granting 5 Unopposed Motion to Dismiss and Sua Sponte Remanding Action. The Court GRANTS the United States' Motion (ECF No. 5 ) and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE this action as to the United States. The remainder of this action is remande d to the Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Diego. Signed by Judge Janis L. Sammartino on 6/16/2022. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service and Certified copy of order sent to Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Diego.) (tcf)
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O.L.M. v. United States of America et al Doc. 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 O.L.M., by and through her Guardian ad Litem, ALMA FLORES, 15 16 17 ORDER GRANTING UNOPPOSED MOTION TO DISMISS AND SUA SPONTE REMANDING ACTION Plaintiff, 13 14 Case No.: 22-CV-507 JLS (WVG) v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; SCRIPPS HEALTH; EDEN PEREZ, M.D.; and DOES 1–100, (ECF No. 5) Defendants. 18 19 Presently before the Court is the United States of America’s (the “United States”) 20 Motion to Dismiss (“Mot.,” ECF No. 5). No opposition to the Motion has been filed. For 21 the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS the United States’ Motion both pursuant to 22 Civil Local Rule 7.1(f)(3)(c) and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and sua sponte 23 REMANDS the remainder of this action to state court. 24 BACKGROUND 25 On November 4, 2021, Plaintiff, by and through her guardian ad litem, initiated the 26 instant action in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Diego, 27 alleging a single claim of professional negligence against Scripps Health; Mythanah Dinh, 28 D.O.; San Ysdiro Health; Jennifer Colleen Trujillo, D.O.; Eden Perez, M.D.; Abiade 1 22-CV-507 JLS (WVG) Dockets.Justia.com 1 Christopher Short, M.D.; Azita Aslian, M.D.; Scott Edward Musinski, M.D.; and unnamed 2 Doe defendants. See generally ECF No. 1-2 (“Compl.”). On April 13, 2022, the United 3 States removed the action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 233(c) on the basis that San Ysidro 4 Health and its employed or licensed physicians Mythanah Dinh, D.O.; Jennifer Colleen 5 Trujillo, D.O.; Abiade Christopher Short, M.D.; Azita Aslian, M.D.; and Edward Musinski, 6 M.D. (collectively, the “FTCA Defendants”), are covered by the Federal Tort Claims Act 7 (the “FTCA”). See generally ECF No. 1. The United States filed a Notice of Substitution, 8 see ECF No. 2, and Amended Notice of Substitution, see ECF No. 3, pursuant to which the 9 Court issued an Order of Substitution of the United States in place of the FTCA 10 11 Defendants, see ECF No. 4. Thereafter, the United States filed the instant Motion. DISMISSAL PURSUANT TO CIVIL LOCAL RULE 7.1(f)(3)(c) 12 The Ninth Circuit has held that, pursuant to a local rule, a district court may properly 13 grant a motion to dismiss for failure to respond to a motion. See generally Ghazali v. 14 Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming dismissal for failure to file timely 15 opposition papers where plaintiff had notice of the motion and ample time to respond). 16 Here, a local rule allows the Court to grant the Motion. Civil Local Rule 7.1(f)(3)(c) 17 provides: “If an opposing party fails to file [an opposition] in the manner required by Civil 18 Local Rule 7.1.e.2, that failure may constitute a consent to the granting of a motion or other 19 request for ruling by the court.” Unless the Court orders otherwise, pursuant to Civil Local 20 Rule 7.1(e)(2), an opposition must be filed 14 days prior to the noticed hearing. The 21 hearing for the present Motion was set for May 26, 2022, at 1:30 p.m.; thus, any opposition 22 was due on May 12, 2022. 23 In determining whether to dismiss an action, the court is required to weigh several 24 factors: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need 25 to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy 26 favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 27 sanctions.” Ghazali, 46 F.3d at 53 (quoting Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 28 (9th Cir. 1986)). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that the first and fourth factors cut in 2 22-CV-507 JLS (WVG) 1 opposite directions. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999) (first 2 factor always weighs in favor of dismissal); Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 3 401 (9th Cir. 1998) (fourth factor always weighs against dismissal). Therefore, the Court 4 considers the substance of factors two, three, and five. 5 Here, the second factor weighs in favor of dismissal. The Court must manage its 6 docket to ensure the efficient provision of justice. Plaintiff had notice of the Motion yet 7 failed to file a timely opposition. Plaintiff has not provided any excuse for her failure to 8 timely file an opposition to the present Motion. The Court cannot continue waiting for 9 Plaintiff to take action, and a case cannot move forward when the plaintiff fails to defend 10 her case. Further, Plaintiff is represented by an attorney and nonetheless has failed to 11 comply with the rules of procedure. See Holt v. I.R.S., 231 Fed. App’x. 557, 558 (9th Cir. 12 2007) (holding court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing action for failure to file an 13 opposition and rejecting plaintiff’s contention that the district court should have warned 14 her of the consequences of failing to file an opposition). 15 As to the third factor, the Court finds no risk of prejudice to Defendants if it 16 dismisses the United States from this matter. In fact, the United States has requested the 17 dismissal. Thus, this factor also weighs in favor of dismissal. As to the fifth factor, where 18 the plaintiff does not oppose dismissal, it is “unnecessary for the Court to consider less 19 drastic alternatives.” 20 ODW(SK), 2016 WL 4581402, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2016). Still, the Court did employ 21 the less drastic alternative of giving notice to the Parties that no opposition had been filed. 22 On May 20, 2022, the Court filed an Order vacating the hearing on the Motion and taking 23 the matter under submission. See ECF No. 6. In that Order, the Court noted that no 24 opposition had been filed. See id. Still, Plaintiff filed no opposition. This factor therefore 25 weighs in favor of dismissal as well. Rodriguez v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, No. 2:16–CV–5962– 26 Finding that the Ghazali factors weigh in favor of granting the United States’ 27 unopposed Motion, the Court GRANTS the United States’ Motion pursuant to Civil Local 28 Rule 7.1(f)(3)(c). 3 22-CV-507 JLS (WVG) 1 DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 2 The Court additionally finds it appropriate to grant the United States’ Motion based 3 on this Court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal 4 Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) challenges a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Federal 5 district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction that “may not grant relief absent a 6 constitutional or valid statutory grant of jurisdiction” and are “presumed to lack jurisdiction 7 in a particular case unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” A–Z Int’l v. Phillips, 323 8 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). Rule 12(b)(1) motions may 9 challenge jurisdiction facially or factually. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 10 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). “In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations 11 contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. By 12 contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by 13 themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id. 14 “Under settled principles of sovereign immunity, the United States, as sovereign, is 15 immune from suit, save as it consents to be sued . . . and the terms of its consent to be sued 16 in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” United States v. Dalm, 17 494 U.S. 596, 608 (1990) (internal quotations omitted). “The FTCA provides a limited 18 waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United States for torts committed by federal 19 employees acting within the scope of their employment.” Nurse v. United States, 226 F.3d 20 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Valdez v. United States, 56 F.3d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 21 1995)). 22 23 24 25 26 27 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 233(c): Upon a certification by the Attorney General that the defendant was acting in the scope of his employment at the time of the incident out of which the suit arose, any such civil action or proceeding commenced in a State court shall be removed without bond at any time before trial by the Attorney General to the district court of the United States of the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending and the proceeding 28 4 22-CV-507 JLS (WVG) 1 deemed a tort action brought against the United States under [the FTCA]. 2 3 Section 2675(a) of the FTCA requires any claimant to first file a claim with the 4 appropriate federal agency and await final denial before commencing a civil action—in 5 other words, the claimant must first exhaust her administrative remedies. 28 U.S.C. 6 § 2675(a); Burns v. United States, 764 F.2d 722, 724 (9th Cir. 1985). The section 2675(a) 7 requirement “is jurisdictional in nature and may not be waived.” Jerves v. United States, 8 966 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). Actions filed prior to presentation 9 of the claim to the agency, final denial of the claim by the agency, or allowing six months 10 to elapse from the date of filing of the administrative claim fail to meet this requirement 11 and are properly dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See id. Importantly, 12 “[f]ederal jurisdiction under the FTCA is determined at the time of removal.” D.L. ex rel. 13 Junio v. Vassilev, 858 F.3d 1242, 1246 (9th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, “a prematurely filed 14 FTCA claim must be dismissed even if the plaintiff ultimately exhausts his administrative 15 remedies before ‘substantial progress’ has occurred in the case.” Id. at 1245 (citing McNeil 16 v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 110 (1993)). 17 In its Motion, the United States notes that, “[a]s of April 6, 2022, Plaintiff had not 18 presented an administrative claim to the Department of Health and Human Services.” Mot. 19 at 5 (citing id. Ex. 1). The United States provides the sworn declaration of Meredith Torres, 20 a Senior Attorney in the General Law Division, Office of the General Counsel, Department 21 of Health and Human Services, in support of this statement. See generally id. Ex. 1. 22 Accordingly, because Plaintiff has not exhausted her administrative remedies, this Court 23 lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this action. Thus, the Court GRANTS the United 24 States’ Motion and must dismiss this action as to the United States pursuant to Federal Rule 25 of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See, e.g., Mota v. Tri-City Healthcare Dist., Case No. 3:18- 26 cv-02775-AJB-NLS, 2019 WL 1546953, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2019). 27 /// 28 /// 5 22-CV-507 JLS (WVG) 1 REMAND OF REMAINDER OF ACTION 2 Having dismissed the United States from this action, only Scripps Health; Eden 3 Perez, M.D.; and the Doe defendants remain in this action. Plaintiff asserts only a single 4 state law claim against them. See generally Compl. 5 A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law 6 claims when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. 7 § 1367(c)(3); see also Albingia Versicherungs A.G. v. Schenker Int’l, Inc., 344 F.3d 931, 8 937–38, as amended 350 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that section 1367(c) grants 9 federal courts the discretion to dismiss state law claims when all federal claims have been 10 dismissed). In considering whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction, a court should 11 consider factors such as “economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” See Acri v. Varian 12 Assocs., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). 13 “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance 14 of factors . . . [points] toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state 15 law claims.” Exec. Software N. Am., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 24 F.3d 1545, 1553 n.4 (9th 16 Cir. 1994) (emphasis omitted), overruled on other grounds by Cal. Dep’t of Water Res. v. 17 Powerex Corp., 533 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2008). 18 Here, the Court concludes that considerations of judicial economy, fairness, and 19 comity weigh against this Court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Accordingly, the 20 Court REMANDS this action to the Superior Court of the State of California, County of 21 San Diego. See Medina v. United States, No. 120CV01030AWISKO, 2020 WL 6544497, 22 at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2020) (following dismissal of FTCA claims against the United 23 States, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims and 24 remanding remainder of action). 25 CONCLUSION 26 In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the United States’ Motion (ECF No. 27 5) and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE this action as to the United States. The 28 Clerk of the Court SHALL REMAND the remainder of this action to the Superior Court 6 22-CV-507 JLS (WVG) 1 of the State of California, County of San Diego. As this concludes the litigation in this 2 matter, the Clerk of the Court SHALL CLOSE the file. 3 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: June 16, 2022 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7 22-CV-507 JLS (WVG)
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