Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe, No. 3:2022cv00479 - Document 5 (S.D. Cal. 2022)

Court Description: ORDER Granting 4 Ex Parte Motion For Leave to Serve a Third-Party Subpoena Prior to a Rule 26(f) Conference. Signed by Magistrate Judge Allison H. Goddard on 5/2/2022. (hmw)

Download PDF

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 STRIKE 3 HOLDINGS, LLC, Case No.: 3:22-cv-00479-JO-AHG Plaintiff, 12 13 v. 14 JOHN DOE subscriber assigned IP address 70.95.208.143, 15 ORDER GRANTING EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO SERVE A THIRD-PARTY SUBPOENA PRIOR TO A RULE 26(f) CONFERENCE Defendant. 16 [ECF No. 4] 17 18 19 Before the Court is Plaintiff Strike 3 Holdings, LLC’s (“Plaintiff”) Ex Parte 20 Application for Leave to Serve a Third Party Subpoena Prior to a Rule 26(f) Conference. 21 ECF No. 4. No defendant has been named or served, and so no opposition or reply briefs 22 have been filed. For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s ex parte 23 application. 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 On April 8, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant “John Doe,” who is 26 allegedly a subscriber of Spectrum and assigned Internet Protocol (“IP”) address 27 70.95.208.143. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 5. Plaintiff Strike 3 Holdings, LLC, is the owner of 28 numerous adult motion pictures, which Plaintiff distributes through adult websites and 1 3:22-cv-00479-JO-AHG 1 DVDs. Id. at ¶¶ 2–3. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant is committing “rampant and wholesale 2 copyright infringement” by downloading, recording, and distributing copies of Plaintiff’s 3 copyrighted motion pictures without authorization through the use of the BitTorrent file 4 distribution network. Id. at ¶¶ 4, 19–30. 5 In the instant motion, Plaintiff seeks leave to conduct early discovery prior to the 6 mandated Rule 26(f) conference to learn Defendant’s identity. ECF No. 4. Specifically, 7 Plaintiff seeks an order permitting it to serve a third-party subpoena under Federal Rule of 8 Civil Procedure 45 on Spectrum, the Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) who leased the IP 9 address belonging to Defendant John Doe, which would require Spectrum to supply the 10 name and address of its subscriber to Plaintiff. ECF No. 4-1 at 7–8.1 Through service of 11 the third-party subpoena, Plaintiff seeks only “the true name and address of Defendant.” 12 Id. at 8. Additionally, Plaintiff represents to the Court that it will only use this information 13 to prosecute the claims made in its Complaint. Id. 14 II. 15 A party is generally not permitted to obtain discovery without a court order before 16 the parties have conferred pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f). FED. R. CIV. 17 P. 26(d)(1). However, courts make exceptions to allow limited discovery after a complaint 18 is filed to permit the plaintiff to learn the identifying information necessary to serve the 19 defendant. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 577 (N.D. Cal. 1999); 20 see, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Doe, No. C-08-3999-RMW, 2008 WL 4104207, at *2 21 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2008) (noting, in an infringement case, that “a plaintiff cannot have a 22 discovery planning conference with an anonymous defendant[,]” thus, limited expedited 23 discovery would “permit the [plaintiff] to identify John Doe and serve the defendant, 24 permitting this case to go forward.”). LEGAL STANDARD 25 26 27 28 1 Due to discrepancies between original and imprinted page numbers, page numbers for docketed materials cited in this Order refer to those imprinted by the court’s electronic case filing system. 2 3:22-cv-00479-JO-AHG 1 Consistent with this generally recognized exception to Rule 26(f), the Ninth Circuit 2 has held that “‘where the identity of the alleged defendant[] [is] not [] known prior to the 3 filing of a complaint[,] the plaintiff should be given an opportunity through discovery to 4 identify the unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the 5 identities, or that the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds.’” Wakefield v. 6 Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 7 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980)). 8 A party who requests early or expedited discovery must make a showing of good 9 cause. See Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 273, 275–76 (N.D. Cal. 10 2002) (applying “the conventional standard of good cause in evaluating Plaintiff’s request 11 for expedited discovery”). Good cause is established through a balancing test “where the 12 need for expedited discovery, in consideration of the administration of justice, outweighs 13 the prejudice to the responding party.” Id. at 276. To determine whether “good cause” 14 exists to permit expedited discovery to identify John Doe defendants, district courts in the 15 Ninth Circuit consider whether the plaintiff (1) “identif[ies] the missing party with 16 sufficient specificity such that the Court can determine that the defendant is a real person 17 or entity who could be sued in federal court”; (2) “identif[ies] all previous steps taken to 18 locate the elusive defendant” to ensure that plaintiff has made a good faith effort to identify 19 the defendant; and (3) “establish[es] to the Court’s satisfaction that plaintiff’s suit against 20 defendant could withstand a motion to dismiss.” Columbia Ins., 185 F.R.D. at 578–80. 21 Additionally, the plaintiff should demonstrate the discovery will likely lead to identifying 22 information that will permit service of process. Id. at 580. These factors are considered to 23 ensure the expedited discovery procedure “will only be employed in cases where the 24 plaintiff has in good faith exhausted traditional avenues for identifying a civil defendant 25 pre-service, and will prevent use of this method to harass or intimidate.” Id. 26 III. 27 Plaintiff contends that there is good cause for this Court to allow expedited 28 DISCUSSION discovery. ECF No. 4-1 at 11–17. For the reasons stated below, the Court agrees. 3 3:22-cv-00479-JO-AHG 1 a. Identification of Missing Party with Sufficient Specificity 2 To satisfy the first prong, Plaintiff must identify Defendant with enough specificity 3 to enable the Court to determine that Defendant is a real person or entity who would be 4 subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. Columbia Ins., 185 F.R.D. at 578. District courts 5 in this circuit have determined “a plaintiff identifies Doe defendants with sufficient 6 specificity by providing the unique IP addresses assigned to an individual defendant on the 7 day of the allegedly infringing conduct, and by using ‘geolocation technology’ to trace the 8 IP addresses to a physical point of origin.” 808 Holdings, LLC v. Collective of December 9 29, 2011 Sharing Hash, No. 12cv186 MMA-RBB, 2012 WL 12884688, at *4 (S.D. Cal. 10 May 4, 2012); see Openmind Solutions, Inc. v. Does 1-39, No. C-11-3311-MEJ, 2011 WL 11 4715200, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011) (concluding that plaintiff satisfied the first factor 12 by identifying the defendants’ IP addresses and by tracing the IP addresses to a point of 13 origin within the State of California); Pink Lotus Entm’t, LLC v. Does 1-46, No. C-11- 14 02263, 2011 WL 2470986, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2011) (same). Other courts have 15 concluded that merely identifying the IP addresses on the day of the alleged infringement 16 satisfies this factor. 808 Holdings, 2012 WL 12884688, at *4 (collecting cases). 17 Here, Plaintiff has identified the Doe Defendant with sufficient specificity. First, in 18 support of the present motion, Plaintiff provided a Declaration by David Williamson, an 19 independent contractor hired by Plaintiff as an Information Systems and Management 20 Consultant ECF No. 4-2 at 2–15 (“Ex. A”). In that role, Mr. Williamson testifies he 21 “oversaw the design, development, and overall creation of the infringement detection 22 system called VXN Scan[,] which [Plaintiff] both owns and uses to identify the IP 23 addresses used by individuals infringing Plaintiff’s movies via the BitTorrent protocol.” 24 Ex. A at ¶ 40. Mr. Williamson’s Declaration explains the VXN Scan system in detail, which 25 involves, in part, the development of a proprietary BitTorrent client that emulates the 26 behavior of a standard BitTorrent client by repeatedly downloading data pieces from peers 27 within the BitTorrent network that are distributing Plaintiff’s movies. Id. at ¶¶ 52–55. Mr. 28 4 3:22-cv-00479-JO-AHG 1 Williamson testifies that another component of the VXN Scan system is the PCAP 2 2 Recorder / Capture Card, which is able to record the IP addresses connecting to the 3 Proprietary Client and sending the infringed copies of Plaintiff’s movies to the Proprietary 4 Client through the BitTorrent network. Id. at ¶¶ 57–59. Not only does a PCAP contain the 5 IP addresses used in the network transaction, it also records the port number and BitTorrent 6 client used to accomplish each transaction, and the “Info Hash” associated with the 7 infringing computer file, which reflects the metadata of the particular underlying .torrent 8 file being shared without authorization. Id. at ¶¶ 61–62. The PCAP Capture Card records 9 PCAPs in real time and is able to record perfect copies of every network packet received 10 by the Proprietary Client. Id. at ¶ 65. Although this Order touches only on two of the 11 components of the VXN Scan system, Mr. Williamson’s 81-paragraph Declaration sets 12 forth additional in-depth details of all five components of the system, providing the Court 13 a thorough understanding of how the system reliably pinpoints the IP addresses used by 14 individuals infringing Plaintiff’s movies and verifies the infringement. 15 Second, Plaintiff also provided a declaration by Patrick Paige, a computer forensics 16 expert retained by Plaintiff to analyze and retain forensic evidence captured by the VXN 17 Scan system. ECF No. 4-2 at 18–22 (“Ex. B”). Mr. Paige explains that VXN Scan recorded 18 numerous BitTorrent computer transactions with IP address 70.95.208.143 in the form of 19 PCAPs, and that he reviewed the PCAP to confirm that it evidences a recorded transaction 20 with that IP address on March 27, 2022 at 02:20:19 UTC involving the IP address 21 uploading a piece or pieces of a file corresponding to the hash value that is unique to one 22 of Plaintiff’s movies. Ex. B. at ¶¶ 13–19. 23 Third, Plaintiff provided a declaration by Susan Stalzer, one of Plaintiff’s employees 24 who verified that each digital file that the Proprietary Client received through its 25 transactions with IP address 70.95.208.143 is a copy of one of Plaintiff’s copyrighted 26 27 28 2 PCAP stands for “Packet Capture.” Ex. A at ¶ 58. 5 3:22-cv-00479-JO-AHG 1 works, by viewing the unauthorized motion pictures corresponding with the file hashes 2 side-by-side with Plaintiff’s original movies. ECF No. 4-2 at 24–26 (“Ex. C”); see also 3 ECF No. 1-2 (Exhibit A to the Complaint, listing the hash values of the 27 torrent files 4 received by the Proprietary Client from the IP address 70.95.208.143). Mr. Paige testified 5 that based on his experience in similar cases, Defendant’s ISP, Spectrum, is the only entity 6 that can correlate the IP address 70.95.208.143 to its subscriber to pinpoint Defendant’s 7 identity. Ex. B at ¶ 28. 8 Finally, Plaintiff provides a declaration by Emilie Kennedy, Plaintiff’s in-house 9 General Counsel. ECF No. 4-2 at 28–30 (“Ex. D”). Ms. Kennedy explains that after 10 Plaintiff received infringement data from VXN Scan identifying IP address 70.95.208.143 11 as infringing its works, the IP address was automatically input into Maxmind’s Geolocation 12 Database on April 1, 2022, which traced the IP address location to San Diego, California, 13 within this Court’s jurisdiction. Ex. D. at ¶¶ 4–5. Plaintiff has since repeated the trace 14 through the Geolocation Database twice more, prior to filing the Complaint and prior to 15 filing the present Motion, confirming the IP address continues to trace to this District. Id. 16 at ¶¶ 6–7. The Court is satisfied that these multiple geolocation traces over the course of 17 two months indicating that the Defendant is located in this District are reliably accurate. 18 Based on all of the information above, the Court concludes Plaintiff provided a 19 sufficient showing that it seeks to sue a real person subject to the Court’s jurisdiction. 20 Likewise, if Plaintiff obtains the identifying information from the ISP for the subscriber 21 assigned the IP address at issue, the information sought in the subpoena would likely enable 22 Plaintiff to serve Defendant. Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff satisfied the “sufficient 23 specificity” threshold. 24 b. Previous Attempts to Locate Defendant 25 Next, Plaintiff is required to describe all steps taken to identify the Doe defendant in 26 a good-faith effort to locate and serve them. Plaintiff states that it attempted to locate 27 Defendant by searching for Defendant’s IP address using online search engines and other 28 web search tools. ECF No. 4-1 at 14–15. Plaintiff also reviewed numerous sources of 6 3:22-cv-00479-JO-AHG 1 authority such as legislative reports, agency websites, informational technology guides, 2 etc. regarding whether it is possible to identify such a defendant by other means, and 3 extensively discussed this issue with its computer investigators and cyber security 4 consultants. Id. at 14. Despite these diligent efforts, Plaintiff was unable to identify any 5 means of obtaining the identity of Defendant other than through subpoenaing the 6 information from the ISP. Id.; see also Ex. B at ¶ 28. Thus, the Court finds Plaintiff has 7 shown it has made a good-faith effort to identify and locate Defendant before resorting to 8 filing the instant motion. 9 c. Whether Plaintiff Can Withstand a Motion to Dismiss 10 Lastly, Plaintiff must establish it could survive a motion to dismiss. See FED. R. CIV. 11 P. 12(b); Columbia Ins., 185 F.R.D. at 579. To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to 12 state a claim upon which relief can be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual 13 matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. 14 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 15 (2007)). To present a prima facie case of copyright infringement, Plaintiff must show: (1) 16 ownership of a valid copyright; and (2) that Defendant violated the copyright owner’s 17 exclusive rights under the Copyright Act. Range Road Music, Inc. v. East Coast Foods, 18 Inc., 668 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 2012). In addition, for direct infringement Plaintiff is 19 required to show causation by Defendant. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 847 F.3d 657, 20 666 (9th Cir. 2017). 21 Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint clearly alleges that Plaintiff owns a valid copyright in 22 the works at issue, which are registered with the United States Copyright Office. See ECF 23 No. 1 at ¶¶ 43, 44, 47, 50.3 And again, Ms. Stalzer attests that she reviewed the files 24 25 26 27 28 3 Exhibit A to the Complaint, which shows the hash values of the purportedly infringing movies downloaded from the IP address 70.95.208.143, also contains the United States Copyright Office registration information of the works that correspond with those hash files. ECF No. 1-4. 7 3:22-cv-00479-JO-AHG 1 correlating to the hashes identified in Exhibit A to the Complaint and confirmed that they 2 are “identical, strikingly similar or substantially similar” to Strike 3’s original copyrighted 3 Works. Ex. C at ¶¶ 7–11; ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 35–36. Plaintiff’s Complaint also alleges 4 Defendant used BitTorrent to copy and distribute the copyrighted works without 5 authorization, and that the infringement was continuous and ongoing. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 4, 6 19–30, 33–36, 45–46. Thus, Plaintiff’s Complaint has stated a claim for copyright 7 infringement against the Doe Defendant sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. 8 Additionally, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to show it could withstand a motion to 9 dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or a motion for improper venue, because 10 Defendant’s IP address was traced to a location in this District. Accordingly, the Court 11 concludes Plaintiff has met the third prong necessary to establish good cause for granting 12 early discovery. 13 IV. 14 For the reasons set forth above, and for good cause shown, the Court GRANTS 15 Plaintiff’s ex parte application for leave to serve a subpoena prior to a Rule 26(f) 16 conference. ECF No. 4. However, the Court is cognizant of the potential embarrassment of 17 being identified in this type of case and “shares the growing concern about unscrupulous 18 tactics used by certain plaintiffs, especially in the adult film industry, to shake down the 19 owners of IP addresses.” Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1-5, No. 12-Civ-2950-JPO, 2012 WL 20 2001968, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2012). Anticipating and sharing these concerns, Plaintiff 21 invites the Court to issue a protective order establishing procedural safeguards if the Court 22 finds such procedures appropriate. ECF No. 4-1 at 18. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS 23 as follows: CONCLUSION 24 1. Plaintiff shall attach a copy of this Order to any subpoena. 25 2. Plaintiff may serve the ISP with a Rule 45 subpoena commanding the ISP to 26 provide Plaintiff with only the true name and address of the Defendant to 27 whom the ISP assigned an IP address as set forth on Exhibit A to the 28 8 3:22-cv-00479-JO-AHG 1 Complaint. The ISP is not to release the Defendant’s telephone number or 2 email address. 3 3. Within fourteen (14) calendar days after service of the subpoena, the ISP shall 4 notify the subscriber that his or her identity has been subpoenaed by Plaintiff. 5 The ISP must also provide a copy of this Order along with the required notice 6 to the subscriber whose identity is sought pursuant to this Order. 7 4. The subscriber whose identity has been subpoenaed shall have thirty (30) 8 calendar days from the date of such notice to challenge the disclosure of his 9 or her name and contact information by filing an appropriate pleading with 10 this Court contesting the subpoena. A subscriber who moves to quash or 11 modify the subpoena may proceed anonymously as “John Doe,” and shall 12 remain anonymous until the Court orders that the identifying information may 13 be released. 14 5. If the ISP wishes to move to quash the subpoena, it shall do so before the 15 return date of the subpoena. The return date of the subpoena must allow for 16 at least forty-five (45) days from service to production. If a motion to quash 17 or other challenge is brought, the ISP shall preserve the information sought 18 by Plaintiff in the subpoena pending resolution of such motion or challenge. 19 6. Plaintiff may only use the information disclosed in response to a Rule 45 20 subpoena served on the ISP for the purpose of protecting and enforcing 21 Plaintiff’s rights as set forth in its Complaint. If Defendant wishes to proceed 22 anonymously, Plaintiff may not release any identifying information without a 23 court order allowing the release of the information. 24 25 26 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: May 2, 2022 27 28 9 3:22-cv-00479-JO-AHG

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.