Raiser v. San Diego County et al, No. 3:2019cv00751 - Document 200 (S.D. Cal. 2021)
Court Description: ORDER Granting 132 Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendants. Signed by Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel on 7/8/21. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(dlg)
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Raiser v. San Diego County et al Doc. 200 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 AARON RAISER, Case No.: 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC Plaintiff, 12 13 v. 14 SAN DIEGO COUNTY, et al., ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS Defendants. 15 [ECF Nos. 132, 133, 185, 186] 16 Before this Court are Motions for Summary Judgment, one collectively filed by the 17 18 Defendants, and the other filed by Plaintiff, Mr. Aaron Raiser (“Plaintiff” or “Mr. 19 Raiser”) who is litigating pro se. ECF Nos. 132, 133. Upon consideration of the moving 20 documents and the case record, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary 21 Judgment, and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 A. Procedural History 24 Mr. Raiser filed the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on July 9, 2019, which is 25 the operative pleading in the instant matter. ECF No. 9. In general, the FAC alleged that 26 Defendants—consisting of Defendant San Diego County and sheriff deputies of the 27 28 1 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC Dockets.Justia.com 1 County who were initially unidentified—were liable for the following: (1) a violation of 2 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) based on unreasonable search and seizure under the 3 Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, (2) false imprisonment, and (3) the Tom 4 Bane Civil Rights Act (the “Bane Act”). Upon expedited discovery that was limited to 5 identifying the sheriff deputies, it was eventually revealed that the sheriff deputies at 6 issue were Detectives Steven Fealy, Ryan Murphy, and Scott Rossall. Mr. Raiser served 7 these Detectives. See ECF Nos. 34, 35, 48. 8 9 While discovery of the sheriff deputies’ identities was ongoing, the Court granted San Diego County’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 12, which argued that San Diego 10 County cannot be liable for any of the Section 1983 claims. See ECF No. 27. But after 11 the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against San Diego County and 12 permitted Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint, see id. at 14, 1 Mr. Raiser 13 never amended the FAC. Accordingly, the remaining causes of action in the FAC are: 14 (1) three independent Section 1983 claims against Detectives Fealy, Murphy, and Rossall 15 (the remaining First to Third Causes of Action), (2) a false imprisonment claim against 16 Detective Rossall and San Diego County (Fourth Cause of Action), and (3) a Bane Act 17 claim against Detective Rossall and San Diego County (Fifth Cause of Action). 18 On February 16, 2021, the parties filed their respective Motions for Summary 19 Judgment. See ECF Nos. 132, 133. After the Court granted multiple extension requests 20 filed by Mr. Raiser, the parties eventually filed their corresponding Oppositions on April 21 16, 2021, ECF Nos. 164, 165, and their respective Reply briefs on April 30, 2021, ECF 22 Nos. 167, 168. 23 /// 24 25 26 27 28 1 References to specific page numbers in a document filed in this case correspond to the page numbers assigned by the Court’s Electronic Case Filing (“ECF”) system. 2 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC 1 Mr. Raiser also ex parte moved to file a sur-reply, asserting that Defendants raised 2 “new” arguments in their Reply briefs. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 172, 177. In addition, Mr. 3 Raiser amended the summary judgment documents, specifically moving to file a separate 4 Evidentiary Objection and an Amended Response to Defendants’ Statement of 5 Undisputed Facts. See ECF Nos. 185, 186. Ultimately, the Court has reviewed and 6 considered all of Mr. Raiser’s documents in deciding the issues in this Order. 7 B. 8 At issue are three separate incidents Mr. Raiser experienced with different sheriff 9 deputies. Mr. Raiser is homeless and lives out of his vehicle, a white 2015 Dodge Dart. Relevant Facts 10 See ECF No. 132-2 at 5, 13 (Dep. Mr. Raiser). During each incident, Mr. Raiser had 11 parked his vehicle, and was approached by the Detectives who had never interacted with 12 Mr. Raiser before. Whenever he interacts with the police, he attempts to record all of 13 these interactions “to get an accurate representation of what happened.” Id. at 7–8. 14 There were common observations about Mr. Raiser’s vehicle that are worth noting 15 upfront. First, during the three incidents that form the basis of his complaint, the back 16 windows of the vehicle had been left down and mosquito screens were in place instead. 17 See id. at 26–27, 54–55. Second, the inside of the vehicle was full of Mr. Raiser’s 18 “stuff.” See id. at 56. Defendants have provided still-shots of body-worn camera 19 footage, see, e.g., ECF No. 132-2 at 88, one of which is depicted below: 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC 1 1. 2 The First Incident (Detective Fealy) On April 29, 2017 at about 6:57 p.m., Mr. Raiser parked his car in a cul-de-sac 3 situated to the side of a road near Fallbrook, California, near the exit for Mission Avenue 4 off the I-15 Freeway. See ECF No. 132-2 at 22; ECF No. 164-1 at 2 (Plaintiff’s 5 Undisputed Material Facts and Defendants’ Response Thereof (“Pl.’s UF”) No. 1). The 6 area is rural, with “no houses around per se.” ECF No. 186-3 at 2 (Defendants’ 7 Undisputed Material Facts and Plaintiff’s Amended Response Thereof (“Defs.’ UF”) No. 8 2). Near the area is a gate or fence (or as Mr. Raiser stated in deposition “like a gate, like 9 an old farm gate”), beyond which lies private property. See id. at 2–3 (Defs.’ UF Nos. 4, 10 7). During the deposition, Mr. Raiser described the area as “dilapidated” and “desolate,” 11 with “nobody around to bother.” ECF No. 132-2 at 24. On the evening of the incident, 12 no other cars were around within 100 yards of that area. See id. at 26. 13 Detective Fealy has been a law enforcement officer for San Diego County for 14 nearly 5 years. ECF No. 132-2 at 59. He was on patrol in Fallbrook, California on the 15 day at issue. See ECF No. 186-3 at 3 (Defs.’ UF No. 6). And at approximately 6:57 p.m. 16 during his patrol, Detective Fealy saw Mr. Raiser and Mr. Raiser’s vehicle in the location 17 discussed above. See id. (Defs.’ UF No. 7). Data from the California Law Enforcement 18 Telecommunications System (“CLETS”), presented by Mr. Raiser, indicates that 19 Detective Fealy ran a vehicle/license plate check at 6:57 p.m. See ECF No. 180 at 13. 20 As stated in his Declaration, Detective Fealy found Mr. Raiser and Mr. Raiser’s 21 vehicle suspicious for two main reasons. First, based on his “experience and knowledge 22 of the area,” Detective Fealy stated it is “unusual” to find individuals seated in their 23 parked cars in that location. 2 ECF No. 132-2 at 59. According to Detective Fealy, the 24 25 26 27 28 2 It is noted that Mr. Raiser raised multiple evidentiary objections. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 165-1, 185-2, 186-2. To the extent that the objected-to evidence is admissible and relied on, the Court overrules the objections. To the extent that the objected-to evidence is not 4 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC 1 location where Plaintiff parked is “frequently the setting of criminal activity, including 2 theft from the surrounding agricultural properties, gang graffiti, and littering.” Further, 3 Detective Fealy stated that the location is known to be a place where individuals dump 4 stolen vehicles, or where individuals pull off the road to use drugs or alcohol while in the 5 vehicle. Id. at 60; see also ECF No. 165-8 at 6–7 (Resp. Special Interrog. No. 15). 6 Second, Detective Fealy observed that Mr. Raiser’s vehicle was “filled with what 7 appeared to be trash.” See ECF No. 186-3 at 6; see also ECF No. 132-2 at 60, 63–65 8 (Detective Fealy’s Declaration and the supporting photographic evidence of the vehicle 9 as Attachment A). Detective Fealy’s observation made him think Mr. Raiser’s vehicle 10 was a stolen vehicle “because individuals who steal cars often dump the vehicle along 11 with other items they no longer need.” See ECF No. 132-2 at 60. 12 Based on those two reasons, Detective Fealy stated that he suspected Mr. Raiser 13 had committed, was in the process of committing, or was about to commit a criminal 14 offense. See id. In the Declaration, Detective Fealy listed possible criminal offenses of: 15 “use of narcotics, theft, trespassing, dumping a stolen vehicle, drug use in public, 16 drinking in public, graffiti, or littering.” Id. 17 Detective Fealy thereafter pulled his car near Mr. Raiser. Id.; see also ECF No. 18 132-2 at 22. At his deposition, Mr. Raiser stated that he started his car, “attempted to 19 drive off,” but then Detective Fealy said to stop the car. ECF No. 132-2 at 22. Shortly 20 /// 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 referenced in this Order, the Court overrules the objections as moot. See generally Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing how at summary judgment, courts do not focus on the admissibility of the evidence’s form but its contents). As just one illustrative example, Detective Fealy’s professional experience is highly relevant notwithstanding Mr. Raiser’s protests, for it sets the basis for his “reasonable suspicions” as further discussed infra pages 19–20 of this Order. 5 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC 1 after stopping Mr. Raiser, another officer (who is not a party to this lawsuit) joined 2 Detective Fealy. ECF No. 186-3 at 7 (Defs.’ UF No. 20). 3 Mr. Raiser audio-recorded and transcribed his interactions with Detective Fealy. 4 Id. (Defs.’ UF No. 21). The Court makes note of some of the interactions that Mr. Raiser 5 transcribed: 6 7 Mr. Raiser: Is it legal to be hear? [sic] Detective Fealy: Well its [sic] suspicious over here. We got alot [sic] of drug activity. People come over here… 8 9 ... 10 11 12 Mr. Raiser: I’m not breaking any laws. Detective Fealy: You are loitering around a place you don’t need to be loitering around. Mr. Raiser: I’ve got to exist somewhere guy, where do you want me to go? Detective Fealy: What’s your name boss? Mr. Raiser: Do you want my ID. Detective Fealy: Yeah, that’s fine. Do you have a name? Mr. Raiser: Do your background check and let me go. 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 ... 22 23 24 Detective Fealy: So what are you doing here right now? Mr. Raiser: Its [sic] a Saturday, I’m just looking for someplace [sic] to hang out. Do some work. Detective Fealy: Well, we have alot [sic] of people come out here up to no good. 25 26 27 28 6 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC 1 Mr. Raiser: [Y]ou guys have got to be aggressive, that’s cool, I don’t mind you guys do that, I get stopped… Detective Fealy: [Y]ou are in the driver’s seat, leaning back… inside the car. I want to make sure the car is not stolen… 2 3 4 5 6 ECF No. 165-6 at 1–2, 4. As part of the interaction, Detective Fealy went to do a background check based on 7 the driver’s license that Mr. Raiser provided, while the other officer stayed with Mr. 8 Raiser. See ECF No. 132-2 at 60–61; ECF No. 186-3 at 8–9 (Defs.’ UF No. 23); ECF 9 No. 165-6 at 6–10. CLETS data, as presented by Mr. Raiser, indicates that Detective 10 Fealy ran the background check at 7:03 p.m. See ECF No. 180 at 13–17. Mr. Raiser, in 11 his Declaration, states that he observed Detective Fealy “appearing to be on his cell 12 phone.” ECF No. 165-2 at 8. However, Detective Fealy denied any cellphone use, ECF 13 No. 165-8 at 1–2 (Resp. Special Interrog. No. 1), and Mr. Raiser did not produce any 14 concrete evidence validating his observation. See ECF No. 110; ECF No. 180 at 8–11 15 (inferring cellphone usage only based on time lapses in the CLETS data). 16 Detective Fealy also took notes in his personal notebook, such as Mr. Raiser’s 17 name, identity, and “that I [Detective Fealy] came out here to talk to you [Mr. Raiser] to 18 see what you were up to, your [sic] chillin over here…” ECF No. 165-6 at 10–11. 19 Afterwards, Detective Fealy said the following as he let Mr. Raiser go: “uhh, this is not a 20 rest area, so do your business and whatever you need to do, but, people come over here 21 and do drugs and steal avocodos [sic], [Mr. Raiser flags as inaudible] check out who you 22 are . . . .” Id. at 11. 23 The entire interaction Mr. Raiser had with Detective Fealy lasted about 10 minutes 24 and 14 minutes at most. ECF No. 164-1 at 2 (Pl.’s UF Nos. 1, 2); ECF No. 186-3 at 9–10 25 (Defs.’ UF No. 26). Mr. Raiser does not dispute the fact that both officers were 26 “reasonably friendly” with him. ECF No. 186-3 at 8 (Defs.’ UF No. 22). 27 28 7 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC 1 2 2. The Second Incident (Detective Murphy) On August 1, 2017, Mr. Raiser parked his vehicle around Escondido, California. 3 See ECF No. 132-2 at 43–45; see also ECF No. 165-1 at 13 (representing that he parked 4 his vehicle “under a tree at the corner of Leisure Lane and Old Castle”). The area is a 5 “farm land” with “intermittent houses,” where “[a]cross the street is a golf course.” See 6 ECF No. 132-2 at 43–45; ECF No. 165-9. At that time, no other cars were parked around 7 him. See ECF No. 132-2 at 46. 8 9 A person, who Mr. Raiser described at his deposition as “probably a neighbor,” noticed Mr. Raiser. Id. at 43. The person “drove by and turned around and drove by 10 again.” Id. at 45. During his deposition, Mr. Raiser further explained that he was 11 “[p]robably bothering the neighbor so [he] took off.” Id. at 43. 12 Detective Murphy, a law enforcement officer of San Diego County for 12 years, 13 was on patrol in and around the area at the time with another officer (who is not a party to 14 this lawsuit). ECF No. 132-2 at 67. The two officers received a dispatch in which 15 someone called concerning “a suspicious person” located in Leisure Lane and Old Castle 16 Road. The dispatch stated that the subject does not live in the area and “reclined his seat 17 and avoided eye contact.” The dispatch also stated that “[t]he vehicle is a White 18 unknown make or model that has broken windows.” See ECF No. 132-2 at 84; ECF No. 19 165-12 at 1. 20 Detective Murphy responded to the dispatch and call. See ECF No. 132-2 at 68. 21 Eventually he spotted Mr. Raiser near Gordon Hill Road and Old Castle Lane. Id. 22 Detective Murphy concluded that Mr. Raiser was the “suspicious person,” based on the 23 description of the car that the caller provided (“a white vehicle with what appeared to be 24 ‘broken windows’”). Id. Further, Detective Murphy in his Declaration stated that he 25 suspected Mr. Raiser was in the process of committing or planning to commit a criminal 26 offense such as burglary or home theft. This was because according to Detective 27 28 8 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC 1 Murphy, he has responded to concerned-citizen calls as a law enforcement officer, and 2 based on that experience, “[he] know[s] that residents of neighborhoods know their 3 communities and often properly identify individuals who are out-of-place and 4 suspicious.” Id. at 67–68. As an example, Detective Murphy described an experience 5 where a concerned citizen reported a suspicious person from outside of the neighborhood, 6 and based on that report, law enforcement interrupted a residential burglary. Id. at 68. 7 It is disputed what happened immediately after Detective Murphy spotted Mr. 8 Raiser. Mr. Raiser claims that he first noticed Detective Murphy only after Mr. Raiser 9 had already started to pull onto Old Castle from Gordon Hill Road. See ECF No. 165-2 10 at 9. In contrast, Detective Murphy states that “Mr. Raiser saw me and began driving his 11 car so as to avoid me.” ECF No. 132-2 at 68. According to his declaration, Detective 12 Murphy detained Mr. Raiser based on the dispatch information received, observations 13 made in responding to the dispatch, and Mr. Raiser’s evasive behavior. Id. 14 During the detention, Mr. Raiser provided his driver’s license to Detective 15 Murphy, and Detective Murphy conducted the background check. After running the 16 background check, Detective Murphy let Mr. Raiser go. See ECF No. 165-11. Before 17 letting Mr. Raiser go, Detective Murphy also commented on the appearance of Mr. 18 Raiser’s vehicle. Specifically, Mr. Raiser audio-recorded and transcribed his interactions 19 with Detective Murphy, and his transcript indicates that the following exchange occurred: 20 Detective Murphy: If you lived in a caul-de-sac [sic] in the middle of a suburban area people would still probably call on you given the way your car looks, they can’t see into it, like what’s going on with this car, it looks bizarre. [Y]ou know what I mean. Mr. Raiser: [Y]eah, yeah, yea. 21 22 23 24 25 /// 26 27 28 9 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC 1 Detective Murphy: 2 [Y]ou do that to keep the mosquitos out at night? If the cops pull you over to detain you for that it would help if you would explain that. 3 4 5 ECF No. 165-11 at 5. Mr. Raiser provided inconsistent statements on how long the incident lasted. In 6 responding to Defendants’ statements of undisputed material facts, he states: “The entire 7 interaction lasted at least 11 minutes.” ECF No. 186-3 at 18 (Defs.’ UF No. 45). Yet in 8 his own statement of undisputed material facts, he stated that Detective Murphy 9 “detained Plaintiff for about 8 minutes.” ECF No. 164-1 at 3 (Pl.’s UF Nos. 5, 6). Of 10 course, Defendants’ position is also inconsistent, since they expressed that they do not 11 dispute Plaintiff’s statement on the detainment lasting 8 minutes, but then in their own 12 statement, they stated the detainment lasted 11 minutes. Compare id., with ECF No. 186- 13 3 at 18. What the parties do agree, however, is that Mr. Raiser “remained in his car for 14 the entirety of his interaction with Detective Murphy,” and that Detective Murphy did not 15 verbally threaten him. ECF No. 186-3 at 18 (Defs.’ UF Nos. 46, 47). 16 17 3. The Third Incident (Detective Rossall) On March 29, 2018, Mr. Raiser was heading south to Escondido and eventually 18 pulled off, around the west side of the I-15 Freeway. See ECF No. 132-2 at 10. He 19 parked “out in the country, no houses, no nothing,” where the “[c]losest house” was 20 “maybe a quarter mile away.” Id. at 11. 21 Detective Rossall has been a law enforcement officer for San Diego County for 9 22 years. ECF No. 132-2 at 71. He was on patrol in Escondido that day. ECF No. 186-3 at 23 20 (Defs.’ UF No. 51). And according to his Declaration, at approximately 11:23 a.m. 24 that day, Detective Rossall saw from the freeway Mr. Raiser sitting in his vehicle in the 25 area discussed above. See ECF No. 132-2 at 71. Detective Rossall’s Declaration further 26 states: “Mr. Raiser’s vehicle, though appearing to me to be a relatively new car, seemed 27 28 10 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC 1 to be damaged and filled with a large quantity of items. With regard to damage, the back 2 two windows appeared to have been broken or otherwise altered. I later learned that the 3 rear two windows were covered by screens. The vehicle was also abnormally full with 4 voluminous, miscellaneous items.” Id. at 72. Detective Rossall provided a still photo of 5 his body-camera footage, in which he states that the photo accurately reflects what Mr. 6 Raiser’s vehicle looked like at the time. See id. at 72, 88 (Exhibit G). 7 Detective Rossall declared he has experience and knowledge of the area where Mr. 8 Raiser parked the vehicle, based on his work as a law enforcement officer. Further, he 9 stated he has extensive experience regarding stolen vehicle recovery, as he has won 10 awards for aiding in the recovery of stolen vehicles. See id. at 71–72. According to 11 Detective Rossall, the vehicle’s appearance made Detective Rossall suspect that Mr. 12 Raiser was dumping a stolen vehicle, specifically because the car appeared new yet also 13 appeared to have the windows broken, which are considered “typical indications” of 14 stolen vehicles. The vehicle being full “with voluminous, miscellaneous items” gave him 15 further suspicion the vehicle was being dumped, since according to him “[i]ndividuals 16 who steal cars often dump the vehicle along with other items they no longer need.” See 17 id. at 72. Also, Detective Rossall’s Declaration states that the location at issue is “where 18 individuals have previously dumped stolen vehicles,” as the place “is secluded and 19 relatively close to the freeway,” making it easy for individuals to dump the vehicle to 20 avoid detection and flee. See id. Detective Rossall declared that all of these facts, taken 21 together, caused him to suspect that Mr. Raiser was in the process of committing, or 22 planning to commit, a criminal offense such as dumping a stolen vehicle. See id. 23 Ultimately Detective Rossall detained Mr. Raiser for about 2 minutes. See ECF 24 No. 164-1 at 3 (Pl.’s UF No. 8); ECF No. 186-3 at 24 (Defs.’ UF No. 66). During this 25 time, Mr. Raiser held up his driver’s license so that Detective Rossall could read it from 26 where he was standing. ECF No. 165-2 at 11; see also ECF No. 165-13 at 2. Detective 27 28 11 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC 1 Rossall stated that he ran the license plate information without leaving the side of Mr. 2 Raiser’s car. ECF No. 132-2 at 73. After determining that the vehicle was not stolen, 3 Detective Rossall told Mr. Raiser he was free to leave. Id. 4 It is undisputed that Mr. Raiser remained seated in his vehicle during the entirety 5 of the interaction with Detective Rossall, and that Detective Rossall did not use any 6 physical force, nor did Detective Rossall make any verbal threats. See ECF No. 186-3 at 7 24 (Defs.’ UF Nos. 68–70). 8 4. Damages 9 At his deposition, Mr. Raiser described the damages from the three incidents as the 10 “loss of freedom and the accompanying mental, emotional trauma, frustration.” See ECF 11 No. 132-2 at 18–19, 41, 52. According to him, the value of his damages is “priceless.” 12 Mr. Raiser does not claim out-of-pocket expenses or medical care costs. See id. at 20, 41, 13 52. Mr. Raiser also does not claim he was late for work or lost a job due to the incidents. 14 See id. at 52–53. 15 II. 16 LEGAL STANDARD “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 17 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 18 of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material when it “might affect the outcome of 19 the suit.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 20 The initial burden of establishing the absence of any genuine issues of material fact 21 falls on the moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The 22 movant can satisfy this burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence that negates an 23 essential element of the non-moving party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating that the non- 24 moving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that 25 party’s case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322–23. 26 /// 27 28 12 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC 1 Once the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the non-moving party cannot 2 rest on the mere allegations or denials of its pleading. The non-moving party must “go 3 beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to 4 interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a 5 genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324. The non-moving party may meet this requirement by 6 presenting evidence from which a reasonable jury could find in its favor, viewing the 7 record as a whole, in light of the evidentiary burden the law places on that party. See 8 Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221–22 (9th Cir. 1995). 9 In determining whether there are any genuine issues of material fact, the court 10 must “view[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Fontana 11 v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). In addition, cross- 12 motions for summary judgment are decided independently. Fair Hous. Council of 13 Riverside Cty., Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001). 14 III. DISCUSSION 15 Even constructing the evidence most favorable to Plaintiff, Defendants are entitled 16 to summary judgment. In each of the three instances, the Detectives had a reasonable 17 basis to conduct a brief, non-intrusive 2- to 14-minute investigatory stop. In the first and 18 third incident, the appearance of Mr. Raiser’s vehicle, combined with the location of 19 where the vehicle was parked, gave sufficient basis for reasonable suspicion, especially 20 given the Detectives’ experience and familiarity with the area. In the second incident, 21 Detective Murphy was responding to a dispatch call, where the details in the call matched 22 Mr. Raiser and his vehicle. Thus, the second investigatory stop was reasonable given the 23 dispatch. Regarding state law claims, the undisputed facts negate any liability, for Mr. 24 Raiser failed to establish essential elements of the claims such as force, threat, 25 intimidation, or coercion. With no valid state law claims against Detective Rossall, 26 Defendant San Diego County also holds no vicarious liability. 27 28 13 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC 1 In reaching the above conclusion, the Court has rejected the Defendants’ challenge 2 that Mr. Raiser failed to comply with the Chambers Rules in submitting his Separate 3 Statement of Undisputed Facts. The Court finds that any alleged violation was de 4 minimis. More importantly, the Court prefers to rule on the merits. See Chambers Rules 5 3 (discussing how the “Separate statements are merely used as an aid to assist the Court 6 in pinpointing the material facts”). See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (discussing that the 7 procedural rules “should be construed, administered . . . to secure the just, speedy, and 8 inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding”). 9 The Court also did not consider Mr. Raiser’s litigation history, some cases where 10 he prevailed and some he did not. The Court finds no rationale for Defendants to present 11 Mr. Raiser’s long record of lawsuits other than to undermine his credibility, a factual 12 matter that the Court is not in position to consider at summary judgment. 13 At the same time, it is important to dispel Mr. Raiser’s reliance on litigation history 14 as well. Specifically, while he argues that each case showed how officers “unlawfully 15 detained Plaintiff, or worse,” ECF No. 165 at 7, many times the opposite was the case. 16 See, e.g., Raiser v. Los Angeles Cty. Sheriff, 698 F. App’x 415 (9th Cir. 2017) (affirming 17 the lower court’s summary judgment against him); Raiser v. City of Los Angeles, No. 18 B255525, 2015 WL 5610411 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2015) (same). At minimum, the 19 litigation history does not allow the Court to generalize in favor of either party. 20 In addition, while Mr. Raiser argues that this lawsuit is “identical in most ways” to 21 Raiser v. City of Vista, No. 3:14-cv-02263-CAB-WVG (S.D. Cal. June 29, 2016), Dkt. 22 No. 58 (the case where he prevailed), the factual circumstances are significantly different. 23 To start, the officers in Vista were not responding to a citizen call, which already 24 distinguishes Vista from the second incident (further discussed infra Section III.A.3 of 25 this Order). The court in Vista was also primarily wary of the officers’ inference that the 26 parking lot of the shopping center was a “high crime area.” See id. at 1, 5. The court’s 27 28 14 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC 1 wariness stemmed from the fact that describing an area as such “can easily serve as a 2 proxy for race or ethnicity.” Id. at 5 n.1 (quoting United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 3 F.3d 1122, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000)). But as Defendants pointed out concerning the first and 4 third incidents, the Detectives in this lawsuit were not referencing an area as “high crime” 5 based on the area’s demography. Instead, it was the isolated, unpopulated nature of the 6 area that drew the officer’s suspicion because that is typically where suspects dump their 7 stolen vehicles. Cf. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1138–39 (“In this case, the ‘high 8 crime’ area is in an isolated and unpopulated spot in the middle of the desert. Thus, the 9 likelihood of an innocent explanation for the defendants’ presence and actions is far less 10 than if the stop took place in a residential or business area.”). The suspected offense, 11 inferred from the location of where Plaintiff was at the time and the appearance of the 12 vehicle, was fundamentally different. 13 A. 14 The Court concludes that none of the incidents amounts to a Section 1983 Section 1983 Claims 15 violation. To prevail on a Section 1983 claim, “a plaintiff must show both (1) 16 deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) 17 that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” 18 Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nevada, 649 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations 19 omitted). At issue is the first element, in which Mr. Raiser argues the sheriff deputies 20 deprived his right secured by the Fourth Amendment. 21 But in each incident, there was no deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights. The 22 Court addresses each incident separately because they correspond to different 23 Defendants. However, they all face the same problem. There is no evidence Mr. Raiser 24 can point to which could lead a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that either the officers’ 25 suspicions were unreasonable, or that the stops lasted longer or were more intrusive than 26 what was necessary. Ultimately the appearance of Plaintiff’s vehicle, combined with the 27 28 15 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC 1 particular location at which Mr. Raiser was staying, allowed officers to formulate 2 reasonable suspicions. And once the officers apprehended him, the interactions lasting 3 anywhere from 2 minutes to 14 minutes were not unreasonable. 4 1. 5 The Fourth Amendment and Terry Stops “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 6 against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” U.S. Const. 7 amend. IV. “The Fourth Amendment prohibits ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ by 8 the Government, and its protections extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or 9 vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 10 (2002) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 11 417 (1981)). The Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states by virtue of the 12 Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53 13 (1967) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)). 14 The dispute in this matter is whether the Detectives’ investigatory stops were 15 reasonable. Investigatory stops (also referred to as “Terry stops”) are reasonable if (1) 16 the officer had a reasonable suspicion that the person seized was engaged in criminal 17 activity, or other conduct justifying investigation (such as a traffic infraction); and (2) the 18 length and scope of the seizure was reasonable. See Manual of Model Civil Jury 19 Instructions for the District Courts of the Ninth Circuit § 9.21 (2017 ed., last updated 20 Dec. 2020); see also United States v. Washington, 490 F.3d 765, 774 (9th Cir. 2007) 21 (permitting reasonable suspicion over a person who “is about to commit” a crime as 22 well); cf. Terry, 392 U.S. at 23–27; Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 (discussing reasonable 23 suspicion); Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354–55 (2015) (discussing scope 24 and length). Ultimately, “‘Terry accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent people. 25 Indeed, the Fourth Amendment accepts that risk’ as well.” Gallegos v. City of Los 26 /// 27 28 16 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC 1 Angeles, 308 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 2 126 (2000)). 3 a. 4 Reasonable Suspicion “The reasonable-suspicion standard is not a particularly high threshold to reach.” 5 United States v. Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013). “Although . . . a 6 mere hunch is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal activity need not 7 rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a 8 preponderance of the evidence standard.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Arvizu, 534 9 U.S. at 274). See generally United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1989) (discussing 10 how the level of objective justification need only be “minimal”). 11 Rather, “to form a reasonable suspicion, an officer must have ‘specific, articulable 12 facts which, together with objective and reasonable inferences, form the basis for 13 suspecting that the particular person detained is engaged in criminal activity.’” Liberal v. 14 Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064, 1077 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 15 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2000)). Accordingly, courts determine whether the defendant 16 officer had a “particularized and objective basis” for suspecting criminal activity. See 17 Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d at 1078 (citations omitted). 18 In reviewing the officer’s reasonable suspicion, courts consider the “totality of the 19 circumstances.” Id. This presents two implications. First, a plaintiff cannot rely on a 20 “divide-and-conquer analysis” because even though each of the suspect’s acts may be 21 innocent in itself, collectively they may amount to warranting further investigation. See 22 id. (citations omitted); see also United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 968 (9th Cir. 23 2013). Second, officers may “draw on their own experience and specialized training to 24 make inferences . . . about the cumulative information available to them that might well 25 elude an untrained person.” Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d at 1078. 26 /// 27 28 17 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC 1 Of course, this second implication has limits. The suspicion cannot be based on 2 “broad profiles which cast suspicion on entire categories of people without any 3 individualized suspicion of the particular person to be stopped.” United States v. Bravo, 4 295 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Sigmond-Ballesteros, 285 5 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002)). Instead, the officer’s experienced and specialized 6 inferences are permissible as long as they are “grounded in objective facts” and “capable 7 of rational explanation.” Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d at 1105. These facts must have been 8 “available to the officer at the moment of seizure.” United States v. Smith, 217 F.3d 746, 9 749 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22); cf. Torres v. Purdy, 267 F. App’x 10 590, 591–92 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing how “[plaintiff-appellant’s] behavior until the 11 moment of the seizure can be included in the determination of whether reasonable 12 suspicion existed”). 13 14 b. Length and Scope An investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary 15 to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). In 16 assessing a reasonable scope and duration of the Terry stop, “[t]he critical inquiry is 17 whether the officers ‘diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to 18 confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain 19 the defendant.’” See United States v. Torres-Sanchez, 83 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996) 20 (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985)), as amended (July 15, 1996). 21 Similarly, the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means 22 reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time. 23 See id. At the same time, the question is not whether some other less intrusive alternative 24 was available. After all, “[a] creative judge engaged in post hoc evaluation of police 25 conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the objectives of 26 the police might have been accomplished.” Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686–87. Instead, the 27 28 18 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC 1 appropriate inquiry is “whether the police acted unreasonably in failing to recognize or to 2 pursue [the other alternative].” Id. at 687; see also United States v. Phillips, 828 F. 3 App’x 456, 457 (9th Cir. 2020). 4 Determining the reasonable length and scope of the investigative stop will depend 5 on the facts and circumstances of the case. Gallegos, 308 F.3d at 991 (citing Royer, 460 6 U.S. at 500). Courts assess “the totality of the circumstances,” i.e., “the situation as a 7 whole.” Id. 8 9 2. Application to the First Incident (Detective Fealy) Applying the Terry standard to Detective Fealy’s stop, the Court concludes that 10 Detective Fealy has provided “specific, articulable” facts on why his suspicions were 11 justified. These range from the nature of the area where Mr. Raiser parked (in which at 12 one point even Mr. Raiser used terms such as “desolate,” “dilapidated” to describe the 13 area) to the undisputed appearance of Mr. Raiser’s vehicle. Mr. Raiser’s own narrative of 14 events does not alter the conclusion that, when the circumstances are construed as a 15 whole, Detective Fealy’s perception of the events justified additional investigation. 16 Further, the 10- to 14-minute investigatory stop did not last more than what was 17 necessary. Based on common sense and understanding the entire sequence of events as a 18 whole, no reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Detective Fealy’s investigatory stop 19 was beyond what was needed to dispel his reasonable suspicions. 20 21 a. Reasonable Suspicion The Court finds that Detective Fealy had formed a reasonable suspicion to detain 22 Mr. Raiser. Detective Fealy has described in extensive detail the rationale for his 23 suspicion. See ECF No. 132-2 at 59–65; ECF No. 165-8 at 6 (Resp. Special Interrog. No. 24 15). Based on his five years of experience, he personally knew the area as a place where 25 people do all kinds of illegal activities, ranging from dumping stolen vehicles, agriculture 26 theft, and drug use. Cf. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1138 (“[O]fficers are not 27 28 19 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC 1 required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the 2 circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.”); United States 3 v. Michael R., 90 F.3d 340, 346 (9th Cir. 1996) (accounting for the “trained officer’s 4 experience”). He also described how it is unusual for people to park in that area, and 5 how he became extra vigilant about people parking along roadways because he recently 6 found a subject attempting suicide in his car along the roadway (and how he saved that 7 subject due to his diligence). Further, he connected his observation of the vehicle’s 8 unusual appearance with his past experience that stolen vehicles look like Mr. Raiser’s 9 vehicle. Finally, Detective Fealy observed how Mr. Raiser started his car as soon as 10 Detective Fealy approached him. Cf. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) 11 (“[N]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable 12 suspicion.”). See generally United States v. Mattarolo, 209 F.3d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 13 2000) (considering “the time of night, the neighborhood, and the truck with the crate 14 leaving the construction site, to be sufficient to cause an experienced officer to 15 reasonably conclude that criminal activity might be in progress”). 16 These statements are not post-hoc rationalizations. They are supported by other 17 parts of the record. Two points are worth elaborating further. First, Mr. Raiser’s vehicle 18 looks unusual due to the mosquito shields that were applied to the rear windows, and the 19 inside of the vehicle looks different due to it being full of Mr. Raiser’s personal 20 belongings. This observation has been supported and corroborated by numerous people 21 (both officers and other drivers, as indicated by the second incident) and is supported by 22 pictures that the officers took at the time. Mr. Raiser provides no evidence for the Court 23 to conclude otherwise. 24 Second, Mr. Raiser indeed parked alone in a rural, “no houses around per se” area 25 which he described as “dilapidated” and “desolate,” with “nobody around to bother.” See 26 ECF No. 132-2 at 24; ECF No. 186-3 at 2 (Defs.’ UF No. 2). That area is also near a 27 28 20 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC 1 private agricultural property, separated by a gate or fence. 3 See ECF No. 186-3 at 2–3 2 (Defs.’ UF Nos. 4, 7); ECF No. 165-8 at 6 (Resp. Special Interrog. No. 15) (discussing 3 “theft from the agricultural properties located near or on Sterling View”). Indeed, when 4 letting Mr. Raiser go, Detective Fealy informed Mr. Raiser that “people come over here 5 and do drugs and steal avocodos [sic].” ECF No. 165-6 at 11. 6 Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, vehicle checks alone cannot dispel these 7 suspicions. Common sense indicates that vehicles may be stolen before they become 8 flagged as stolen, or become registered in the system as a problematic vehicle. Cf. United 9 States v. Wallace, 937 F.3d 130, 139–41 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2551 10 (2020), reh’g denied, 140 S. Ct. 2799 (2020). Thus, even if the initial license plate 11 checks come back clean, it was prudent for the officer to stop the suspect vehicle to make 12 sure that the record in the system matches the officer’s actual interaction with the driver. 13 Ultimately, Mr. Raiser consistently conflates the legality of his conduct with the 14 officer’s prerogative to be reasonably suspicious given the totality of the circumstances. 15 It does not matter that Mr. Raiser was not charged of any crime, or that he had the right to 16 “flee” or otherwise not engage with the officer. It also matters little whether Mr. Raiser 17 was entitled to have mosquito screens on his vehicle, or whether Mr. Raiser was entitled 18 to park his cars in the area at-issue. Instead, the operative concern is whether those forms 19 of conduct (which Mr. Raiser had every right to engage in), combined with the 20 surrounding circumstances and the officer’s experience, provided a reasonable suspicion 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 While Mr. Raiser challenges the descriptions of “near,” “next,” or “surrounding,” he fails to produce any evidence for the Court to conclude otherwise, only a cabined response that there is nothing indicative of agriculture “in the viewable distance.” This is far from enough for an officer to dispel a suspicion when the suspect is in a vehicle that can easily drive to/from the agricultural property, even if the final spot is not in “viewing distance” from the property. 21 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC 1 to detain Mr. Raiser. See Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1130–31 (citing Sokolow, 490 2 U.S. at 10). Here, Mr. Raiser attempts to dispute every suspicion that Detective Fealy has 3 raised.4 However, the Court concludes that there are no genuine disputes as to the facts 4 which, in combination, establish reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Raiser. 5 b. Length and Scope 6 The Court also finds that Detective Fealy’s investigatory stop did not extend more 7 than what was necessary, both in terms of length, scope, and focus. Cf. Haynie v. Cty. of 8 Los Angeles, 339 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing how a 25- to 35-minute 9 traffic stop prompted by a citizen’s report was reasonable to perform pat down search, to 10 search vehicle, and to interview driver). As discussed supra Section III.A.1.b, the 11 operative standard is whether the seizure lasted longer than necessary to confirm or dispel 12 the suspicion. See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354. While Defendants rely on United States 13 v. Turvin, 517 F.3d 1097, 1101–02 (9th Cir. 2008) to validate their de minimis analysis, 14 Turvin has little, if any, precedential value in the wake of the Supreme Court decision in 15 Rodriguez.5 See United States v. Landeros, 913 F.3d 862, 867 (9th Cir. 2019) (“As 16 Turvin’s reasonableness standard cannot be reconciled with the holding of Rodriguez, 17 Turvin is no longer binding precedent.”). Landeros observed that Rodriguez had at least 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4 Mr. Raiser also takes great lengths deconstructing every word Detective Fealy said in deciding to stop him, but what Detective Fealy told Mr. Raiser matters very little in the Court’s analysis of reasonable suspicion. An officer need not tell the individual the real reason for the stop. United States v. Magallon-Lopez, 817 F.3d 671, 675 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that an officer may lie to the individual about the Terry stop’s basis); cf. United States v. Chavez, No. 1:19-CR-00226-DAD, 2021 WL 75237, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2021) (“The fact that the alleged traffic violation is a pretext for the stop is irrelevant, so long as the objective circumstances justify the stop.”). 5 Defendants’ citation to case law from other jurisdictions does not persuade the Court either. Of note, all of them pre-date Rodriguez. 22 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC 1 partially abrogated Turvin. Turvin held that a police officer did not transform a lawful 2 traffic stop into an unlawful one when, without reasonable suspicion, he took a break 3 from writing a traffic citation to ask the driver about a methamphetamine laboratory and 4 obtain the driver’s consent to search his truck. See 517 F.3d at 1098. Rodriguez squarely 5 rejected this conclusion and “requires that a traffic stop may be extended to conduct an 6 investigation into matters other than the original traffic violation only if the officers have 7 reasonable suspicion of an independent offense.” 575 U.S. at 357. 8 But even after declining to consider any durations that are automatically justified, 9 the Court still finds the length and scope of Detective Fealy’s stop reasonable. The 10 record indicates that no part of Detective Fealy’s interactions went beyond the initial 11 basis for a Terry stop. Detective Fealy ran a vehicle check, asked Mr. Raiser as to why 12 he was parked in the area, asked about his identity, ran a background check, and jotted 13 down the events in his notebook. Cf. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355 (“Typically [ordinary] 14 inquiries involve checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding 15 warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of 16 insurance.”). There is no indication that Detective Fealy delayed the stop in order to 17 advance some other independent investigation. 18 Mr. Raiser submits that Detective Fealy prolonged the stop by being on his 19 cellphone for a minute. Yet the only evidence Mr. Raiser has is his own declaration 20 saying so. Cf. ECF No. 132-2 at 8 (discussing in deposition how people’s memories are 21 unreliable). No part of Plaintiff’s recorded transcript indicates that Detective Fealy was 22 on his cellphone, and no part of the CLETS data discusses Detective Fealy using his 23 cellphone other than Mr. Raiser’s conjectures of what could have happened based on the 24 CLETS time entries and Mr. Raiser’s conclusory remarks on time lapses. See ECF No. 25 180 at 8–11. In fact, Detective Fealy explicitly denied using his cellphone at the time, 26 see ECF No. 165-8 at 1–2 (Resp. Special Interrog. No. 1), and even after an extensive 27 28 23 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC 1 discovery effort, Mr. Raiser was unable to obtain any proof regarding Detective Fealy’s 2 cellphone use. See ECF No. 110. 3 More importantly, this factual dispute is not material. Even if the Court accepts 4 Mr. Raiser’s statement that Detective Fealy was using his cellphone, Plaintiff still failed 5 to establish that Detective Fealy was using his cellphone for a reason extrinsic to the 6 investigatory stop. This is an “essential element” to Mr. Raiser’s argument that the 7 detention was more than necessary, and with no proof that Detective Fealy used his 8 cellphone for non-investigatory purposes, the use of the cellphone itself (for one minute) 9 cannot be grounds to determine that Detective Fealy’s conduct was unreasonable. 10 Mr. Raiser also takes issue with Detective Fealy asking unnecessary questions and 11 jotting down notes. See ECF No. 186-3 at 10–11. Specifically, Mr. Raiser claims that 12 asking about one’s arrest, probation/parole, or warrant record constitutes an unnecessary 13 question. The Court disagrees. After all, the reasonable suspicion was grounded in the 14 fact that Mr. Raiser was potentially engaged in criminal activity. Cf. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. 15 at 355 (discussing how inquiries on “whether there are outstanding warrants against the 16 driver” are considered ordinary). Also, as part of inquiring about Mr. Raiser’s identity, it 17 makes sense that Detective Fealy found it necessary to jot down the information he 18 obtained. Regarding Detective Fealy’s question on whether Mr. Raiser smoked, 19 Detective Fealy explicitly mentioned that he saw a cigarette butt and wanted to make sure 20 it was not from Mr. Raiser. See ECF No. 165-6 at 10; cf. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 357–58 21 (requiring inquiries to be “independently supported by individualized suspicion”). 22 Further, to the extent that one of Detective Fealy’s suspicions of Mr. Raiser concerned 23 drug use in an isolated location, this specific question did not exceed the bounds of 24 reasonable inquiries. 25 /// 26 27 28 24 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC 1 3. Application to the Second Incident (Detective Murphy) 2 In the second incident, Detective Murphy was responding to a dispatch, in which 3 the description provided for a suspect matched the profile of Mr. Raiser and his vehicle. 4 The Court concludes that the call from the concerned citizen, by itself, was insufficient to 5 establish reasonable suspicion because the calls vaguely alluded to suspicious behavior 6 without specifically articulating any (potential) illegal activity. At the same time, 7 Detective Murphy clearly had a duty to investigate based on the details of the dispatch, 8 especially given his personal experience and knowledge of local residents providing aid 9 in stopping neighborhood criminal activities. Based upon the information provided by 10 the dispatch and Detective Murphy’s independent follow-up observations of Mr. Raiser 11 and his vehicle, an investigatory stop of Mr. Raiser was reasonable. And contrary to Mr. 12 Raiser’s assertions, the questions asked by Detective Murphy were cabined to what was 13 necessary—to make sure that Mr. Raiser was not engaged in criminal activity. 14 15 a. Reasonable Suspicion The Court finds that Detective Murphy too had formed a reasonable suspicion to 16 detain Mr. Raiser, based on the dispatch from a citizen call and the follow-up 17 investigation. As a starting point, the Court declines to conclude that the call on its own 18 provided adequate grounds for reasonable suspicion. To rule on this basis, the call must 19 (1) “exhibit sufficient indicia of reliability,” and (2) “provide information on potential 20 illegal activity serious enough to justify a stop.” United States v. Vandergroen, 964 F.3d 21 876, 879 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing United States v. Edwards, 761 F.3d 977, 983 (9th Cir. 22 2014)). 23 The first element, reliability, is not necessarily the concern. In determining 24 reliability, courts consider a variety of factors, such as: (1) “whether the tipper is known, 25 rather than anonymous,” (2) “whether the tipper reveals the basis of his knowledge,” (3) 26 “whether the tipper provides detailed predictive information indicating insider 27 28 25 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC 1 knowledge,” (4) “whether the caller uses a 911 number rather than a non-emergency tip 2 line,” and (5) “whether the tipster relays fresh, eyewitness knowledge, rather than stale, 3 second-hand knowledge.” Id. at 879–80; see also United States v. Williams, 846 F.3d 4 303, 309 (9th Cir. 2016) (discussing similar factors, such as: (1) eyewitness knowledge, 5 (2) whether the police corroborated the tip, (3) whether the caller used the 911 system, 6 and (4) whether the caller reported a specific and potentially ongoing crime).6 7 Most of the factors align in Detective Murphy’s favor. The caller was not 8 anonymous.7 See ECF No. 132-2 at 84. The caller was an “insider” too. See id. at 67 9 (commenting on “an individual who was outside of the local area”); ECF No. 165-11 at 10 2–3. Also, the call was based on eyewitness observation, not relaying a second-hand 11 knowledge. See, e.g., ECF No. 165-12 at 1. And the police were able to corroborate the 12 descriptive tip, since Detective Murphy indeed identified Mr. Raiser as a male, not living 13 in the area, and driving a white vehicle with what could look like broken windows. See 14 ECF No. 132-2 at 84; ECF No. 165-12 at 1. 15 Other factors gravitate towards Mr. Raiser. There is no evidence the call was from 16 a 911 emergency line. And the dispatch records are not descriptive or specific. No part 17 of the transcribed records describes any specific criminal activities, even after there is a 18 specific inquiry on “what the subject is doing that is suspicious.” See ECF No. 165-12 at 19 1; see also ECF No. 132-2 at 84 (indicating that the Computer Aided Dispatch reports, 20 21 22 23 24 6 Mr. Raiser cites to a different Williams opinion, 837 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2016), but this opinion was amended and superseded on denial of rehearing en banc. The apposite case is the one discussed above, 846 F.3d 303. 7 25 26 27 28 While Mr. Raiser protests that the redaction prevents the caller from being “identified or identifiable,” this does not raise a genuine issue of material fact. It is evident that there is a specific address and phone number assigned to the caller. See ECF No. 132-4 (affirming the veracity of the document and discussing how the redactions are typical). 26 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC 1 also referred to as Background Event Chronology, are also silent on any specific criminal 2 activity). While Detective Murphy informed Mr. Raiser at the investigatory stop that 3 “People called me today because they believed you were casing houses,” ECF No. 165- 4 11 at 3, there is no additional evidence to support this statement. 5 Ultimately the Court still concludes that considering the “totality of the 6 circumstances,” Vandergroen, 964 F.3d at 880; Williams, 846 F.3d at 308, the call 7 exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability. Even viewing the evidence in favor of Mr. 8 Raiser, at least five factors (identifiable person, basis, insider knowledge, eyewitness 9 knowledge, and officer corroboration) weigh in favor of Detective Murphy against three 10 (911 emergency line, detailed information, and specific and potentially ongoing crime) 11 which favor Mr. Raiser. 12 As to the second element, however, the call fails to “provide information on 13 potential illegal activity serious enough to justify a stop.” Vandergroen, 964 F.3d at 879. 14 Certainly, burglary or home theft is an illegal activity serious enough to justify a stop. 15 See Cal. Penal Code § 459 (burglary). But the dispatch record lacks sufficient detail on 16 how any suspicious behavior and the appearance of the car may logically be connected to 17 burglary. “The ‘absence of any presumptively unlawful activity’ from a tip will render it 18 inadequate to support reasonable suspicion.” Vandergroen, 964 F.3d at 881. Such is the 19 case here. The only observations made in the call/dispatch is that the person looks 20 suspicious, he reclined his seat and avoided eye contact, and his vehicle has broken 21 windows. ECF No. 165-12 at 1. No part of these direct a fact-finder to conclude that the 22 person at issue will commit burglary. Cf. United States v. Jackson, No. 4:19-CR-00010- 23 JD-1, 2020 WL 6047235, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2020) (declining to find that the tip 24 informed potentially illegal conduct when the only information provided was that smoke 25 was coming from the car). 26 /// 27 28 27 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC 1 But finding that the call on its own did not provide reasonable suspicion does not 2 end the matter. “After receiving the information provided by the tipster, the officers 3 would have been delinquent had they not driven over . . . to investigate the situation.” 4 Williams, 846 F.3d at 310; accord Williams v. City of Tempe, No. CV-17-02161-PHX- 5 SMB, 2019 WL 2905091, at *4 (D. Ariz. July 5, 2019), aff’d sub nom. Williams v. 6 Albertsons Companies LLC, 822 F. App’x 579 (9th Cir. 2020); cf. Jackson, 2020 WL 7 6047235, at *1 (ruling in favor of the officer regardless of deciding that the phone tip 8 alone did not generate reasonable suspicion); Haynie, 339 F.3d at 1075 (“As stated by the 9 district court, ‘[plaintiff’s] detention was lawful because of the suspicion created by the 10 citizen’s call.’”). Detective Murphy has specifically declared that, based on his 12 years 11 of experience, he knows that neighborhood residents “often identify individuals who are 12 out-of-place and suspicious.” See ECF No. 132-2 at 67–68. In fact, Detective Murphy 13 personally experienced an incident in which a citizen report allowed law enforcement to 14 interrupt a residential burglary. See id. at 68. Based on his law enforcement experience, 15 his interaction with citizen calls, and his observations, it was reasonable for Detective 16 Murphy to stop a vehicle that matched the descriptions provided in the dispatch.8 17 Mr. Raiser attempts to distinguish between “broken windows” and “appearance” 18 thereof. Observations made by countless other officers confirm that when viewed in 19 passing, the car windows appear to be broken. In fact, Detective Murphy specifically 20 explained that one of the reasons for stopping the vehicle was based on its appearance. 21 See ECF No. 165-11 at 5 (“[Y]ou do that to keep the mosquitos out at night? If the cops 22 pull you over to detain you for that it would help if you would explain that.”). The case 23 24 8 25 26 27 28 This also explains Detective Murphy’s representation that “People called me [Detective Murphy] because they believed you [Mr. Raiser] were casing houses, they thought you were suspicious.” ECF No. 165-11 at 3. At worst, whether Detective Murphy was true to his representation or was fabricating the excuse is irrelevant, as discussed supra note 4. 28 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC 1 provided by Mr. Raiser, Sialoi v. City of San Diego, 823 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 2016), 2 actually helps the Defendants. Unlike Sialoi, it is undisputed that Mr. Raiser stayed in his 3 car and that Detective Murphy did not threaten him. Cf. id. at 1231 (“[O]nce the officers 4 discovered that the item in G.S.’s hand was a mere toy, the officers violated clearly 5 established law and acted wholly unreasonably in using extreme force to disrupt a 6 peaceful birthday party for a seven-year-old girl . . . .”). And after dispelling his 7 suspicions, Detective Murphy let Mr. Raiser go. See ECF No. 165-11. 8 9 b. Length and Scope Finally, the Court also concludes that the investigatory stop did not extend beyond 10 what was necessary. See id. Mr. Raiser challenges certain questions he finds as being 11 unrelated to Detective Murphy’s suspicion. The Court disagrees, as the questions were 12 part of establishing Mr. Raiser’s identity (and thus dispel him from being a criminal 13 suspect) and reconciling the appearance of Mr. Raiser’s vehicle (which was an important 14 information provided in the dispatch call). Ultimately, there is no evidence that Detective 15 Murphy extended the stop in order to advance some other independent investigation. 16 Accordingly, the Court concludes that there are no genuine issues of material facts on this 17 essential element. 18 19 4. Application to the Third Incident (Detective Rossall) Finally, the Court finds that the investigatory stop by Detective Rossall was 20 reasonable. Mr. Raiser does not protest the length and scope of the investigatory stop 21 which lasted a whole 2 minutes. The undisputed factual details indicate that Mr. Raiser 22 remained seated in his vehicle, and Detective Rossall did not use any physical force or 23 make any verbal threats. After the vehicle and license check, Plaintiff was free to go. 24 Thus, the Court focuses instead on whether Detective Rossall had reasonable 25 suspicion to stop Mr. Raiser in the first place. And for reasons similar to that discussed 26 in the first incident, supra Section III.A.2.a, he did. Detective Rossall had nine years of 27 28 29 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC 1 experience, even winning awards for aiding the recovery of stolen vehicles. See ECF No. 2 132-2 at 71–72; cf. Michael R., 90 F.3d at 346. He had personal knowledge of the 3 location “where individuals have previously dumped stolen vehicles,” particularly 4 because the area is “secluded and relatively close to the freeway.” ECF No. 132-2 at 72; 5 cf. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1138 (discussing how “relevant characteristics of a 6 location” could establish reasonable suspicion). Further, he observed that, while the car 7 appeared new, the windows looked broken and the inside was filled with voluminous, 8 miscellaneous items. These features and appearances have been corroborated by multiple 9 evidentiary sources, and Detective Rossall’s experience has directed him to identify such 10 features as those of stolen vehicles. 11 Mr. Raiser argues that Detective Rossall should have run a check against Mr. 12 Raiser’s plates which would have dispelled Detective Rossall’s suspicion in about 1 or 2 13 seconds. As further proof that Detective Rossall’s actions were unreasonable, Mr. Raiser 14 relies on a video which shows Detective Rossall inputting Plaintiff’s license plate 15 number, hitting the enter key prior to getting out of the car and not waiting for the results. 16 However, a record check for the vehicle plate which failed to report a vehicle as stolen 17 would not prove the vehicle was not stolen, given that vehicles may be stolen before they 18 are reported stolen or are identified in the system as stolen. 19 Mr. Raiser further questions Detective Rossall’s credibility and challenges 20 Detective Rossall’s ability to observe the things that he reported as to the appearance of 21 Mr. Raiser’s vehicle. However, it is undisputed that Mr. Raiser drove a vehicle with 22 mosquito screens placed in the back windows, ECF No. 132-2 at 54–55, that was filled 23 with “stuff” 24/7, see id. at 56. These appearances led Detective Rossall, as well as the 24 other officers, to opine that the vehicle’s condition appeared to be similar to stolen cars 25 that had been previously encountered. 26 /// 27 28 30 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC 1 B. 2 Mr. Raiser’s state law claims are also not convincing, with sparsely any factual State Law Claims 3 predicate to back the allegations. As a starting matter, his false imprisonment claims are 4 summarily rejected as he is wholly silent on the issue even after Defendants presented 5 reasons why the claim is invalid. Such concession constitutes waiver. See, e.g., Jenkins 6 v. Cty. of Riverside, 398 F.3d 1093, 1095 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005); Abogados v. AT&T, Inc., 7 223 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 2000). Even on the merits, the factual record shows that 8 Detective Rossall was privileged, that he did not use any force (or threatened to do so), 9 and that Mr. Raiser failed to establish damages, an essential element of the claim. 10 On claims based on the Bane Act, Mr. Raiser has failed to establish an essential 11 element to the claim, which is that Detective Rossall interfered with Mr. Raiser’s rights 12 (or attempted to) “by threat, intimidation, or coercion.” See Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1. As 13 Section I.B.3 shows, supra, it is undisputed that during the 2-minute interaction, there 14 was no physical force or verbal threats. Cf. Richardson v. City of Antioch, 722 F. Supp. 15 2d 1133, 1148 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (granting Bane Act liability because the officers were 16 “kicking in the front door, screaming . . . , roughly handling Plaintiff . . . and using a 17 taser”); Winarto v. Toshiba Am. Elecs. Components, Inc., 274 F.3d 1276, 1289 (9th Cir. 18 2001) (kicking the plaintiff). 19 In his brief Mr. Raiser alleges that “Rossall threatened Plaintiff with citation, 20 arrest, detainment and / or jail which all goes hand in hand with disobeying a police 21 order.” ECF No. 165 at 29. No part of the transcription can back this claim. See ECF 22 No. 165-13. In fact, at deposition Mr. Raiser admitted the following: 23 Q. Again, Detective Rossall never once told you he would shoot you; is that correct? A. That’s a better way to word it. Yeah, that’s accurate. Q. And he never once told you he would arrest you? 24 25 26 27 28 31 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC 1 2 A. Exactly. Q. He never once told you he would pull you from the car? A. Correct. Q. And he never once told you he would handcuff you; correct? A. Correct. 3 4 5 6 7 8 ECF No. 132-2 at 18. 9 The only fact Mr. Raiser can present is that “Rossall was in full police uniform and 10 carried a gun. He was also communicating – by carrying a gun and wearing a police 11 uniform – the threat of enforcing his orders that Plaintiff stop his car.” ECF No. 165 at 12 29. Under Mr. Raiser’s interpretation of “violence,” every interaction that someone has 13 with an armed police officer would constitute a Bane Act claim. That is not the law. See 14 Quezada v. City of Los Angeles, 222 Cal. App. 4th 993, 1008 (2014) (“The coercion 15 inherent in detention is insufficient to show a Bane Act violation.”), as modified (Jan. 28, 16 2014); Shoyoye v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 203 Cal. App. 4th 947, 960 (2012) (rejecting Cole 17 v. Doe, 387 F. Supp. 2d 1084 (N.D. Cal. 2005), and discussing how being “authorized to 18 use force” is insufficient); see also Allen v. City of Sacramento, 234 Cal. App. 4th 41, 70 19 (2015) (affirming Shoyoye, and rejecting Moreno v. Town of Los Gatos, 267 F. App’x 20 665 (9th Cir. 2008), as outdated law), as modified on denial of reh’g (Mar. 6, 2015). 21 In sum, no state law claim survives summary judgment. And because Detective 22 Rossall is not liable, there is no basis for vicarious liability against Defendant San Diego 23 County either. Cf. de Villers v. Cty. of San Diego, 156 Cal. App. 4th 238, 250 (2007). 24 IV. CONCLUSION 25 Allegations of officer misconduct directed at the homeless are a serious matter. 26 27 28 However, a close inspection of the claims made here show that the allegations of 32 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC 1 misconduct are baseless.9 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS 2 Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for 3 Summary Judgment. As none of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants survive summary 4 judgment, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close the case. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 7 Dated: July 8, 2021 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 9 23 24 25 26 27 28 Because the Court concludes that Mr. Raiser failed to allege facts sufficient to establish a violation of any constitutional right, “there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Haynie, 339 F.3d at 1078 (citation omitted). However, even if Mr. Raiser had properly alleged constitutional violations, the Court notes that it was not unreasonable for the three Detectives to conclude that their actions did not constitute a violation of Mr. Raiser’s rights. Thus, they would be entitled to qualified immunity. 33 19-cv-0751-GPC-KSC
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