Schutza v. RNL Automotive, LLC et al, No. 3:2015cv01405 - Document 9 (S.D. Cal. 2015)
Court Description: ORDER denying 5 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Judge M. James Lorenz on 9/14/2015. (sjt)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Schutza v. RNL Automotive, LLC et al Doc. 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 SCOTT SCHUTZA, 11 Case No. 15-cv-1405 L (JLB) Plaintiff, 12 13 ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF NO. 5] v. 14 RNL AUTOMOTIVE, LLC, 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 Pending before the Court is Defendant’s fully briefed motion to dismiss. The 19 Court finds this motion suitable for determination on the papers submitted and 20 without oral argument. See Civ. L.R. 7.1(d.1). For the following reasons, the Court 21 DENIES the motion. 22 // 23 // 24 // 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 // –1– 15cv1405 Dockets.Justia.com 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 This Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) action arises from Plaintiff 3 Scott Schutza’s (“Mr. Shutza”) allegation that Defendant RNL Automotive, LLC 4 (“RNL”) violated the ADA by not installing and providing hand controls for Mr. 5 Schutza to test drive a vehicle. RNL now moves to dismiss all claims, and Mr. 6 Shutza opposes. 7 8 9 II. LEGAL STANDARD Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 10 The court must dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim upon which 11 relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 13 732 (9th Cir. 2001). The court must accept all allegations of material fact as true and 14 construe them in light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cedars-Sinai Med. 15 Ctr. v. Nat’l League of Postmasters of U.S., 497 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2007). 16 Material allegations, even if doubtful in fact, are assumed to be true. Bell Atl. Corp. 17 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). However, the court need not “necessarily 18 assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of 19 factual allegations.” Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 20 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). In fact, the court does not need to 21 accept any legal conclusions as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 22 “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not 23 need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of 24 his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 25 recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 26 (internal citations omitted). Instead, the allegations in the complaint “must be enough 27 to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. Thus, “[t]o survive a motion 28 to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to –2– 15cv1405 1 ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing 2 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 3 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 4 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard is not 5 akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 6 defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of 7 law either for lack of a cognizable legal theory or for insufficient facts under a 8 cognizable theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th 9 Cir. 1984). 10 Generally, courts may not consider material outside the complaint when ruling 11 on a motion to dismiss. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 12 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990). However, documents specifically identified in the 13 complaint whose authenticity is not questioned by parties may also be considered. 14 Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1080 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995) (superseded by statutes on 15 other grounds). Moreover, the court may consider the full text of those documents, 16 even when the complaint quotes only selected portions. Id. It may also consider 17 material properly subject to judicial notice without converting the motion into one 18 for summary judgment. Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994). 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 –3– 15cv1405 1 III. DISCUSSION The ADA Requires an Automobile Dealership that Offers Test 2 A. 3 Drives to Install Vehicle Hand Controls to Allow Test Drives by 4 Individuals with Disabilities if Installation is Readily Achievable 5 Defendant’s first claims that “installation of vehicle hand controls is not 6 required under the ADA statutory scheme.” (MTD 4, ECF No. 5-1.) Defendant 7 points out that other courts in this District have agreed with this argument. However, 8 the Department of Justice has weighed in on this issue, and made it clear that an 9 automobile dealership that offers tests drives must install vehicle hand controls to 10 allow test drives by individuals with disabilities if installation is readily achievable. 11 Brief for the Department of Justice as Amicus Curiae, Karczewski v. K Motors, Inc, 12 et al., No. 15-55588 (9th Cir. filed September 4, 2015). 13 This Court must answer two questions when it reviews an “agency’s 14 construction of the statute which it administers.” Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 15 Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). First, the Court must 16 determine if Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. Because 17 the intent of Congress is not clear here, as evidenced by the parties’ arguments and 18 district court opinions cited in the briefs, the Court must move to the next question. 19 See id. at 842-43. The Court must determine if the agency’s position on the issue is 20 “based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. In Chevron, the Supreme 21 Court has explained the importance of deference to an implementing agency: “We 22 have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive 23 department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the 24 principle of deference to administrative interpretations.” Id. at 844. Further, 25 Department of Justice regulations interpreting the ADA should be given controlling 26 weight unless they are “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 27 statute.” Bay Area Addiction Research and Treatment, Inc. v. City of Antioch, 179 28 F.3d 725, 732, n. 11 (“BAART”) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844). There is –4– 15cv1405 1 nothing to suggest that the regulations here are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly 2 contrary to the statute. After reviewing the DOJ brief in the Karczewski case, this Court is convinced 3 4 that Defendant’s argument is without merit. The Court finds that DOJ’s 5 interpretation of the ADA is based on a permissible construction of the statue and 6 the DOJ’s interpretation of the supporting regulations are not “arbitrary, capricious, 7 or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendant’s 8 motion to the extent it suggests that installation of vehicle hand controls is not 9 required under the ADA statutory scheme. Plaintiffs’ Allegations that Installation of Vehicle Controls is 10 B. 11 “Readily Achievable” are Sufficient 12 Defendant next argues that Plaintiff fails to plead a prima facie case because 13 he fails to establish that installing vehicle hand controls is “easily accomplishable 14 and without much difficulty or expense.” (MTD 7 (citing 28 C.F.R. §36.301(a) 15 (defining a removal of an architectural barrier as readily achievable if it is “easily 16 accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense.”).) 17 Further, Defendant suggests that the accommodation “would fundamentally alter the 18 nature of the vehicles at great expense.” (Id. at 8.) 19 There is disagreement regarding who bears the burden of proving that removal 20 of a barrier is readily achievable, and “[t]he Ninth Circuit has yet to” resolve this 21 split. Moore v. Robinson Oil Corp., 588 F. App’x 528, 529-30 (9th Cir. 2014)1; 22 Vogel v. Rite Aid Corp., 992 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1010 (C.D. Cal. 2014); Rodgers v. 23 Chevys Restaurants, LLC, No. C13-03923 HRL, 2015 WL 909763, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 24 25 26 27 28 In Moore, the Ninth Circuit’s found that an “expert's conclusory testimony, without further explanation, is insufficient to meet [the plaintiff’s] burden of production to establish that the portable restroom was readily achievable.” Id. at 530. Although explicitly denying the opportunity to establish a standard, the Ninth Circuit in Moore indicated that, at the very least, the plaintiff may have the “burden of production to establish” that removal of the barrier is “readily achievable.” Id. 1 –5– 15cv1405 1 Feb. 24, 2015). Many district courts in the Ninth Circuit follow the Tenth Circuit’s 2 burden-shifting framework2; under this approach, the plaintiff bears the initial 3 burden of production to present evidence that a suggested method of barrier removal 4 is readily achievable; if plaintiff makes this showing, the burden shifts to the 5 defendant, who bears the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding his affirmative 6 defense that a suggested method of barrier removal is not readily achievable.3 7 Rodgers, 2015 WL 909763 at *3 (string-citing courts that have followed this 8 approach). 9 The Court notes that at least one court has not followed suit, and instead held 10 that “[u]nder the ADA, defendants bear the initial burden of production as well as 11 the ultimate burden of persuasion in establishing that remediation of architectural 12 barriers in a public accommodation is not readily achievable.”4 Rodriguez v. Barrita, 13 Inc., No. C 09-04057 RS, 2014 WL 31739, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2014). Although 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 This is the burden-shifting framework articulated in Colorado Cross Disability v. Hermanson Family, Ltd., 264 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 2001). In adopting this approach, the Colorado Cross Court followed numerous district courts and looked to statutory interpretation, reasoning “that [42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)], when read in conjunction with subsection (v), places the burden on Defendant to prove the proposed architectural barrier removal is not readily achievable. Subsection (v) states that discrimination includes, ‘where an entity can demonstrate that the removal of a barrier under clause (iv) is not readily achievable, a failure to make such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations available through alternative methods if such methods are readily achievable.’ 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(v) (emphasis added). Subsection (v) clearly contemplates that the entity, rather than the plaintiff, bears the burden to demonstrate that barrier removal under subsection (iv) is not readily achievable. Read together, subsections (iv) and (v) provide an affirmative defense for an entity. Accordingly, we conclude Plaintiff must initially present evidence tending to show that the suggested method of barrier removal is readily achievable under the particular circumstances. If Plaintiff does so, Defendant then bears the ultimate burden of persuasion that barrier removal is not readily achievable under subsection (iv).” Id. at 1002–03. 2 This standard has also been followed by the Eleventh Circuit in Gathright-Dietrich v. Atlanta Landmarks, Inc., 452 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding that “the district court properly applied the burden-shifting standard enunciated in Colorado Cross”). 3 The Court notes that at least one Court has found the “architectural” nature of the alleged barrier, a failure to install hand controls, to be debatable, as detailed in Schutza v. FRN of San Diego, LLC, No. 14CV2628 JM RBB, 2015 WL 574673, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2015) (finding that plaintiff’s claims relating to installation of hand controls “do not arise out of or relate to architectural barriers existing at the facility.”). However, the parties do not raise this issue. 4 –6– 15cv1405 1 the plaintiff’s burden differs among the two standards, the defendant’s burden 2 remains constant in that “[d]efendants bear the ultimate burden of proving that 3 removal is not readily achievable.” Hubbard v. Rite Aid Corp., 433 F. Supp. 2d 4 1150, 1168 (S.D. Cal. 2006). In light of the foregoing, the Court adopts the majority 5 rule and concludes that a plaintiff bears the initial burden with respect to “readily 6 achievable” remediation of architectural barriers. 7 Regardless of who carries the burden, Mr. Schutza’s Complaint states “a claim 8 to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Regulations 9 expressly provide for “installing vehicle hand controls” as an example “of steps to 10 remove barriers,” and Mr. Schutza claims that RNL failed to install vehicle hand 11 controls and identifies that installation of vehicle hand controls is readily achievable 12 in the Complaint. 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(b)(21); (Complaint ¶¶ 16-17, ECF No. 1.) 13 Specifically, Mr. Schutza pleads that: 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 There are numerous companies that sell (and will install) vehicle hand controls that are universal in design, meaning that they can be used on any vehicle, and their installation does not render any safety features inoperable or cause any permanent modification or damage to the vehicle itself. Such hand controls are inexpensive, are widely used within the car rental agency world for temporary installation and removal, and could be easily installed by Lexus without much difficulty or expense. (Complaint, ¶¶16-17.) These allegations are sufficient to establish that the installation of hand controls is readily achievable. In light of the foregoing, the Court DENIES the motion on this ground. The motion is also DENIED with respect to Defendant’s Unruh Civil Rights Act claim, because the underlying ADA claims have not been dismissed. 26 27 28 –7– 15cv1405 1 IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER 2 The Court DENIES the motion. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 DATED: September 14, 2015 5 M. James Lorenz United States District Judge 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 –8– 15cv1405
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
