Friedman v. Albertson's, LLC et al, No. 3:2014cv00828 - Document 14 (S.D. Cal. 2015)

Court Description: ORDER Denying Defendant's Ex Parte Application To Modify Scheduling Order (Re Dkt # 12 ). Signed by Magistrate Judge Nita L. Stormes on 7/30/2015. (mdc)

Download PDF
Friedman v. Albertson's, LLC et al Doc. 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Plaintiff, 12 13 14 Case No.: 14-CV-828 WQH (NLS) SCOTT FRIEDMAN, v. ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S ALBERTSON’S, LLC, et al., EX PARTE APPLICATION TO Defendant. MODIFY SCHEDULING ORDER 15 (Dkt. No. 12) 16 17 18 Before the Court is Defendant Albertson’s, LLC’s (“Defendant”) Ex Parte 19 Application to Modify the Scheduling Order. (Dkt. No. 12.) Defendant seeks to extend 20 the deadline for rebuttal expert designations and the deadline for the close of expert 21 discovery. Plaintiff Scott Friedman (“Plaintiff”) opposes the application. (Dkt. No. 13.) 22 For the reasons explained below, the Court DENIES Defendant’s request to modify the 23 Scheduling Order. 24 I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND 25 On August 8, 2014, the Court entered a Scheduling Order regulating discovery 26 and other pretrial proceedings. (Dkt. No. 10.) In that Order, the Court set deadlines for, 27 inter alia, the time to designate experts (March 13, 2015), the time to exchange rebuttal 1 14-CV-828 WQH (NLS) Dockets.Justia.com 1 expert designations (March 27, 2015), and the time to complete expert discovery (June 12, 2 2015). (Id., ¶¶ 3, 6.) The Court’s Scheduling Order directed the parties to review the 3 chambers’ rules for the assigned judges to the matter. (Id., ¶ 15.) The Court also instructed 4 that the dates and times set forth in the Order would not be modified except for good cause 5 shown. (Id., ¶ 17.) 6 a. The Initial and Rebuttal Expert Designation Deadlines 7 In March of 2015, the parties stipulated to continue the initial designation and 8 rebuttal designation dates. In April of 2015, the parties then stipulated again, via email, to 9 continue those dates. The parties stipulated to extend the initial expert designation date to 10 April 20, 2015 and the rebuttal designation date to May 4, 2015. 11 The parties made their initial expert designations by their agreed upon 12 continued deadline. Neither party made rebuttal expert designations. At some point after 13 the deadline expired, defense counsel realized that Defendant may need to retain a rebuttal 14 expert. Defense counsel attests he did not properly calendar the rebuttal expert deadline 15 because it was agreed to via email. (Dkt. No. 12-1 at ¶ 6.) More than two weeks after the 16 parties’ stipulated rebuttal designation deadline expired, counsel for Defendant made 17 several requests to Plaintiff to stipulate to allow him to designate a rebuttal expert, which 18 Plaintiff declined. (Id., Exh. C.) 19 b. The Close of Expert Discovery Deadline 20 On or about June 2, 2015, counsel for Defendant asked Plaintiff’s counsel to 21 stipulate to extend the Court-imposed deadline to complete expert discovery due to the 22 parties’ agreement to extend the designation and rebuttal deadlines. (Dkt. No. 12-1 at ¶ 7, 23 Exh. D.) Plaintiff declined. The next day, counsel for Defendant noticed the depositions 24 for two of Plaintiff’s experts for June 12, 2015, which was the last date to complete expert 25 discovery. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Plaintiff informed Defendant that the notices were not timely and 26 did not provide sufficient notice, such that the experts would not appear for their 27 depositions. The depositions did not go forward. 2 14-CV-828 WQH (NLS) 1 Nearly a month later, on July 8, 2015 and on July 10, 2015, counsel for 2 Defendant again asked to depose Plaintiff’s experts, to which Plaintiff refused. (Dkt. No. 3 12-1 at ¶ 8; Dkt. No. 13 at 2-3.) Defendant thereafter filed this ex parte application on July 4 22, 2015. 5 II. DISCUSSION 6 The Court begins its discussion with an excerpt from the Ninth Circuit’s 7 opinion in Wong v. Regents of the University of California, 410 F.3d 1052, 1060, 1062 (9th 8 Cir. 2005), about the policy supporting enforcement of court scheduling orders: In these days of heavy caseloads, trial courts ... routinely set schedules and establish deadlines to foster the efficient treatment and resolution of cases. Those efforts will be successful only if the deadlines are taken seriously by the parties, and the best way to encourage that is to enforce the deadlines. Parties must understand that they will pay a price for failure to comply strictly with scheduling and other orders, and that failure to do so may properly support severe sanctions and exclusion of evidence... 9 10 11 12 13 14 Disruption to the schedule of the court and other parties is not harmless. Courts set such schedules to permit the court and the parties to deal with cases in a thorough and orderly manner, and they must be allowed to enforce them, unless there are good reasons not to. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Id. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4) requires a showing of good cause before modifying a pretrial motion or schedule. “Rule 16(b)’s ‘good cause’ standard primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). Good cause exists if the party can show that the schedule “cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.” Id. Additionally, “carelessness is not compatible with a finding of diligence and offers no reason for a grant of relief. … If that party was not diligent, the inquiry should end,” and the motion to modify should not be granted. Id.; see also Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. Cal. 2002) (no abuse of discretion in 3 14-CV-828 WQH (NLS) 1 denying a motion to modify the scheduling order where the party did not demonstrate 2 diligence in complying with the dates set by the district court).1 3 As an initial matter, the Court notes that the parties should have filed their 4 stipulations to extend the deadlines as joint motions with the Court because stipulations are 5 not binding upon the Court unless they are approved. See Civ. L.R. 7.2 (“Except as 6 otherwise provided, stipulations must be recognized as binding on the court only when 7 approved by the judge”). Moreover, Defendant’s ex parte application is untimely. The 8 Magistrate Judge’s Chambers Rule III provides that “[w]hether made by joint motion or ex 9 parte application, any request to continue [a] … scheduling order deadline … must be 10 made in writing no less than seven (7) calendar days before the affected date.” (bold in 11 original). 12 Here, Defendant brings its ex parte application more than 117 days after the 13 parties’ deadline to designate rebuttal experts originally expired. Even accepting the 14 parties’ stipulated extended rebuttal designation deadline, Defendant filed its ex parte 15 application more than 79 days after that deadline expired, and more than 62 days after 16 defense counsel realized he inadvertently missed the deadline. Defendant’s ex parte 17 application was also filed more than 40 days after the expert discovery deadline expired. 18 Moreover, Defendant failed to demonstrate good cause for its belated motion 19 to modify the scheduling order, particularly in light of defense counsel’s lack of diligence. 20 As the Ninth Circuit instructed, “[c]arelessness is not compatible with a finding of 21 diligence,” and thus defense counsel’s mis-calendaring of the parties’ rebuttal designation 22 23 1 24 25 26 27 Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B) likewise permits a court, for good cause, to extend the time to act when the failure to meet the deadline was the result of excusable neglect. Defendant did not move to extend the deadlines under Rule 6, and did not address the factors set forth in the Supreme Court decision Pioneer Invs. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd., 507 U.S. 380, 392 (1993), for determining excusable neglect. The Court nonetheless considered the Pioneer factors and finds the circumstances in this case do not justify extending the time. Regardless, even if Defendant had demonstrated excusable neglect, Defendant still has not established good cause to justify modifying the schedule for the reasons explained in this order. 4 14-CV-828 WQH (NLS) 1 deadline militates against a finding of good cause. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609; see also Wei 2 v. State of Hawaii, 763 F.2d 370, 372 (9th Cir. 1985) (discussing Rule 4(j) of the Federal 3 Rules of Civil Procedure and holding that the inadvertent failure to calendar a deadline did 4 not constitute excusable neglect or good cause). 5 attests he met and conferred in late May of 2015 with Plaintiff’s counsel once he realized 6 he missed the deadline, this does not explain why Defendant waited until late July to bring 7 this issue before the Court ex parte. Likewise, although defense counsel 8 Defendant also did not provide any sufficient explanation as to why it delayed 9 for more than a month after the close of expert discovery to seek to modify that deadline. 10 Defendant was apprised in early June that Plaintiff would not stipulate to extend the close 11 of fact discovery, and Defendant could have timely moved the Court for an order modifying 12 the schedule before that deadline expired. Defendant was also apprised in early-to-mid 13 June that Plaintiff would not produce its two experts for depositions on June 12, 2015, i.e., 14 the last date to complete expert discovery. Even though Defendant attests he attempted to 15 meet and confer again on July 8, 2015 and July 10, 2015 about deposing Plaintiff’s experts, 16 this still leaves an unexplained month-long delay between the expiration of the deadline 17 and conferring with opposing counsel, plus a nearly two week delay from Defendant’s last 18 meet-and-confer discussion with Plaintiff’s counsel and the filing of the ex parte 19 application. In sum, Defendant has not demonstrated diligence in complying with the dates 20 set by the Court, in complying with the parties’ own stipulated extended deadlines, or in 21 promptly requesting modification once it became apparent that compliance was not 22 possible. 23 Defendant nonetheless asserts good cause exists to modify the Scheduling 24 Order because expert discovery is not yet complete and Defendant would be prejudiced if 25 it cannot designate a rebuttal expert or depose all of Plaintiff’s experts. (Dkt. No. 12.) 26 Neither of these arguments, however, explain why Defendant could not meet the 27 Scheduling Order’s timeline despite an exercise of due diligence. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 5 14-CV-828 WQH (NLS) 1 609 (“good cause” requires a showing that, even with the exercise of due diligence, they 2 cannot meet the timetable). Indeed, as explained above, Defendant has displayed a lack of 3 diligence, which is incompatible with a finding of good cause. The fact that Defendant did 4 not finish deposing all of Plaintiff’s experts by the close of fact discovery, and did not 5 timely designate a rebuttal expert, are due to Defendant’s own lack of diligence and lack 6 of compliance with Court rules. As such, the circumstances presented here do not warrant 7 modifying the schedule. 8 III. CONCLUSION 9 Defendant has not established good cause to modify the Scheduling Order. 10 Accordingly, for the aforementioned reasons, Defendant’s ex parte application to modify 11 the Scheduling Order is DENIED. 12 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 30, 2015 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 6 14-CV-828 WQH (NLS)

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.