Dannebaum v. San Diego, County of et al, No. 3:2014cv00454 - Document 38 (S.D. Cal. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER granting in part and denying in part defendants' 28 Motion for Summary Judgment. The remaining claim against the County of San Diego is dismissed. The claim against Deputy Knight is not. Signed by Judge Larry Alan Burns on 5/17/16. (kas)
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Dannebaum v. San Diego, County of et al Doc. 38 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DUSTIN DANNEBAUM, CASE NO. 14cv454-LAB (WVG) Plaintiff, 12 ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT vs. 13 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., 14 Defendants. 15 16 17 This lawsuit arises out of a physical altercation between Dustin Dannebaum and 18 correctional officers at the George Bailey Detention Facility. (Docket no. 1 at ¶¶ 2–9.) The 19 remaining defendants—the County of San Diego and Deputy Sam Knight—have moved for 20 summary judgment. (Docket no. 28.) 21 I. Factual Background 22 Dannebaum was being held at the George Bailey Detention Facility while he was 23 awaiting trial on a July 25, 2011 felony complaint. (Docket no. 29 at ¶ 5.) At the time he was 24 also on parole for a prior conviction. (Id. at ¶ 1.) The deputies approached Dannebaum’s 25 cell to deliver a meal, and Deputy Knight placed his food trays on the ground. (Id. at ¶¶ 8–9.) 26 The parties’ stories diverge on what happened after that. According to Deputy Knight, 27 Dannebaum “appeared agitated,” responded to Deputy Knight’s warnings with profanity, 28 suggested that they take their dispute “to the rec yard,” got into a fighting stance, “tensed -1- 14cv454 Dockets.Justia.com 1 up,” and when Deputy Knight attempted to restrain him, reached his hands out towards 2 Knight. (Docket no. 28 at 1; Docket no. 28-2, Exhibit B, at 24–33.) But according to 3 Dannebaum, Deputy Knight was the one acting aggressively and cussing, and began 4 beating Dannebaum up when he looked down at his food tray. (Docket no. 28-2, Exhibit A, 5 at 39–40; Docket no. 30-2, Exhibit 2, at 56.) Dannebaum also maintains that the deputies 6 created the need for force by deviating from the standard protocol of handing prisoners food 7 while they stayed in the cell. (Docket no. 30 at 9.) What is not disputed is that the 8 altercation resulted in significant injuries to Dannebaum. (Docket no. 29 at ¶ 10 (stipulating 9 that “[o]n February 29, 2012, Plaintiff Dannebaum was taken to UCSD Medical Center where 10 he was treated for a puncture wound to the cheek, laceration of the lower lip, orbital fractures 11 and bilateral nose fractures.”).) The parties also agree that Dannebaum had a history of 12 getting into fights at County jails. (Id. at ¶ 6 (stipulating that he “had been involved [in] four 13 fights with other inmates while incarcerated at various County jails.”).) 14 Dannebaum sued the County of San Diego and Deputy Knight under 42 U.S.C. 15 § 1983 for excessive force and cruel and unusual punishment. (Docket no. 1; Docket no. 16 36.) Dannebaum stipulated to the dismissal of his second cause of action, so only his 17 excessive force claim remains. (Docket no. 28-2, Exhibit A, at 5–6.) The defendants’ 18 summary judgment motion argues: (1) Dannebaum’s claims against the County fail because 19 he hasn’t established liability under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 20 U.S. 658 (1978); (2) his excessive force claim fails because he hasn’t established 21 “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”; and (3) Deputy Knight is entitled to qualified 22 immunity. (Docket no. 28.) 23 II. Legal Standard 24 Summary judgment is appropriate where the evidence shows “there is no genuine 25 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 26 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of 27 informing the court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those portions of the 28 pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of -2- 14cv454 1 material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). All reasonable 2 inferences from the evidence are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. 3 Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242 (1986). Where the moving party doesn't bear the 4 burden of proof at trial, it is entitled to summary judgment if it can demonstrate that “there 5 is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. 6 If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party 7 opposing the motion, who must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 8 for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Summary judgment is warranted if a party “fails to 9 make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s 10 case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. 11 A genuine issue of fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 12 verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A fact is material if it “might 13 affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id. 14 III. Discussion 15 A. 16 A municipality is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if it maintains a policy or custom that 17 18 19 20 21 Municipal Liability results in a violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. There are three ways to show a policy or custom of a municipality: (1) by showing a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity; (2) by showing that the decision-making official was, as a matter of state law, a final policymaking authority whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy in the area of decision; or (3) by showing that an official with final policymaking authority either delegated that authority to, or ratified the decision of, a subordinate. 22 23 Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks 24 omitted). Dannebaum proceeds under the third theory, arguing that the County is liable 25 under Monell because it ratified the deputies’ conduct by failing to discipline them. (Docket 26 no. 30 at 4–6.) But “a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose 27 liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an 28 existing, unconstitutional municipal policy.” City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, -3- 14cv454 1 823–24 (1985). And “a single failure to discipline is insufficient to make out a claim for 2 liability under 422 U.S.C. § 1983.” Wallace v. City of Santa Rosa, 2013 WL 4675354, at *2 3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2013) (collecting cases). Since Dannebaum bases his Monell claim on 4 a single failure to discipline, he doesn’t state a viable claim against the County of San Diego. 5 B. 6 Excessive Force 1. Appropriate Standard 7 The Fourth Amendment’s standard governs § 1983 claims based on excessive force 8 during the “arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen.” Graham v. Connor, 9 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Post-arraignment detainees are entitled to the protections of the 10 Fourteenth Amendment’s Substantive Due Process Clause. Id. at 395 n.10 (1989) (citing 11 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535–39 (1979)). 12 Amendment serves as the primary source of substantive protection in cases where the 13 deliberate use of force is challenged as excessive and unjustified.” Id. (internal quotation 14 marks and ellipses omitted). Since the Eighth Amendment standard permits punishment as 15 long as it’s not cruel and unusual while the Fourteenth Amendment standard prohibits all 16 punishment, the latter is “more protective.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 535 n.16 (1979); Gary H. v. 17 Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir.1987). And “[a]fter conviction, the Eighth 18 Since Dannebaum was both a parolee and a pretrial detainee at the time of the 19 altercation, there’s a question regarding which standard applies to this case. Courts are split 20 on whether the Eighth Amendment standard applies. Some courts have held that it does. 21 See Rankin v. Klevenhagen, 5 F.3d 103, 106 (5th Cir. 1993); Leialoha v. MacDonald, 2008 22 WL 2736020, at *7 (D. Haw. July 11, 2008). Rankin reasoned that the Eighth Amendment 23 applied because the deputy’s “force was applied in an effort to preserve institutional security” 24 and “[i]t is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees for 25 the purpose of maintaining jail security.” 5 F.3d at 106. In Leialoha, a parolee was arrested 26 for a parole violation and then was killed as he tried to escape while being transported to a 27 correctional facility. 2008 WL 2736020, at *2–3. The court held that the Eighth Amendment 28 /// -4- 14cv454 1 applied because, as a parolee, the plaintiff was still serving his sentence as a convicted 2 felon. Id. at *7. 3 Others courts have declined to apply the Eighth Amendment when faced with 4 analogous facts. Turner v. White, 443 F. Supp. 2d 288, 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Towsley v. 5 Frank, 2010 WL 5394837, at *6-7 (D. Vt. Dec. 28, 2010). In Turner, the court faced a 6 question of whether to apply the Fourth Amendment standard or the Eighth Amendment 7 standard where officers allegedly used excessive force when arresting a parolee for a new 8 offense. 443 F. Supp. 2d at 294–95. Because the “the excessive force was allegedly 9 applied by officers in connection not with plaintiff’s conviction, but rather with some new 10 offense or violation they believed had been committed,” the court concluded that the Eighth 11 Amendment shouldn’t apply. Id. It reasoned that “[j]ust because an individual has been 12 convicted of a crime in the past and is on parole does not deprive him of his Fourth 13 Amendment constitutional right to be free from excessive force if arrested on another crime.” 14 Id. at 294. 15 The Court finds the reasoning of Turner more persuasive than that of Rankin and 16 Leialoha. Where a parolee is incarcerated because of a parole violation, the Court can see 17 reason to apply the Eighth Amendment standard. But where the parolee’s incarceration is 18 based on new charges that are unrelated to his prior conviction or a violation of his parole 19 terms, he’s entitled to the Fourteenth Amendment’s more protective standard. Dannebaum’s 20 incarceration had less to do with his prior conviction or his status as a parolee, and more to 21 do with the new separate crime for which he was being held. Because he was detained for 22 a crime for which he hadn’t been convicted, the Court concludes that he retains his rights 23 under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Substantive Due Process Clause. His excessive force 24 claim will be reviewed under that standard. 25 2. Fourteenth Amendment Analysis 26 Officers can’t use excessive force but may use a reasonable level of force judged 27 from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, not with the 20/20 vision of 28 hindsight. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015). The Court considers four -5- 14cv454 1 factors in resolving a due process claim alleging excessive force: (1) the need for the 2 application of force, (2) the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was 3 used, (3) the extent of the injury inflicted, and (4) whether force was applied in a good faith 4 effort to maintain and restore discipline. White v. Roper, 901 F.2d 1501, 1507 (9th Cir. 5 1990). 6 The defendants’ motion essentially contends that their facts are more persuasive than 7 Dannebaum’s. But that’s not a proper inquiry at the summary judgment stage. If a jury 8 believes Dannebaum’s account, it could reasonably conclude that force was not needed, or 9 that the force used was disproportionate to the need for force, or that Deputy Knight created 10 rather than tempered institutional discord. Because there’s a genuine dispute of material 11 facts, Deputy Knight’s motion for summary judgment on Dannebaum’s excessive force claim 12 fails. 13 C. 14 Qualified immunity shields government officials, including law enforcement officers, 15 “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 16 statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow 17 v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982). Qualified 18 immunity protects government officials from lawsuits over errors made while reasonably 19 performing their duties, whether resulting from “a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a 20 mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 21 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 22 immunity involves a two-part inquiry. Id. at 232. First the court asks, “[t]aken in the light 23 most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s 24 conduct violated a constitutional right?” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled 25 on other grounds by Pearson, 555 U.S. at 241. “Second . . . the court must decide whether 26 the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” 27 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. 28 /// Qualified Immunity Granting summary judgment on qualified -6- 14cv454 1 As explained above, Dannebaum’s allegations could support a finding of excessive 2 force. And a jury could conclude that a reasonable officer would have known that an 3 unprovoked attack on a prisoner was unlawful. Deputy Knight’s motion for summary 4 judgment on qualified immunity grounds fails. 5 IV. Conclusion 6 The defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED 7 IN PART. The remaining claim against the County of San Diego is dismissed. The claim 8 against Deputy Knight is not. 9 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: May 17, 2016 11 12 HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -7- 14cv454
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