Bush v. R.J. Donovan Warden et al, No. 3:2012cv02573 - Document 3 (S.D. Cal. 2012)
Court Description: ORDER Granting 2 Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Imposing No Partial Filing Fee and Garnishing $350 Balance From Prisoner Trust Account Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a); Dismissing Complaint For Failing to State a Claim Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b). The Secretary CDCR, or his designee, is ordered to collect from prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee owed in this case by collecting monthly payments f rom the trust account in an amount equal to 20% of the preceding month income credited to the account and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 USC 1915(b)(2). (Order electronically transmitted to Matthew Cate, Secretary CDCR). Signed by Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel on 12/5/2012. Approved form § 1983 mailed complaint toPlaintiff. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(srm)
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Bush v. R.J. Donovan Warden et al Doc. 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 ANTHONY ARTHUR BUSH, CDCR # J-85079, Civil No. Plaintiff, 13 vs. 16 17 18 19 ORDER: (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, IMPOSING NO PARTIAL FILING FEE AND GARNISHING $ 350 BALANCE FROM PRISONER’S TRUST ACCOUNT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 2]; 14 15 12cv2573 GPC (NLS) R.J. DONOVAN WARDEN; A.L. COTA; FACILITY IV LIEUTENANT; FACILITY IV CAPTAIN, (2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b) 20 Defendants. 21 22 23 Anthony Arthur Bush (“Plaintiff”), an inmate currently incarcerated at Calipatria State 24 Prison located in Calipatria, California, and proceeding in pro se, has filed this civil rights action 25 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Plaintiff has not prepaid the $350 filing fee mandated by 28 26 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant 27 to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 2]. 28 /// I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\bush.dismissal.wpd 1 12cv2573 GPC (NLS) Dockets.Justia.com 1 I. 2 MOTION TO PROCEED IFP 3 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United 4 States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28 5 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee 6 only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See 7 Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, prisoners granted leave to 8 proceed IFP remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether their 9 action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 10 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002). 11 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a 12 prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account 13 statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately 14 preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 15 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the Court must assess an initial 16 payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or 17 (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, 18 unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The 19 institution having custody of the prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of 20 the preceding month’s income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and 21 forward those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. 22 § 1915(b)(2). 23 The Court finds that Plaintiff has no available funds from which to pay filing fees at this 24 time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited 25 from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that 26 the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 27 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing 28 dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\bush.dismissal.wpd 2 12cv2573 GPC (NLS) 1 available to him when payment is ordered.”). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion 2 to Proceed IFP [ECF No. 2] and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 3 However, the entire $350 balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded 4 to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. 5 § 1915(b)(1). 6 III. 7 SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) 8 The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding 9 IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused 10 of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or 11 conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as 12 practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these 13 provisions of the PLRA, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, 14 which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who 15 are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126- 16 27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 2000) 17 (§ 1915A); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing 18 § 1915A). 19 “[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 20 allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the 21 plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2) 22 “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). In addition, the Court’s 23 duty to liberally construe a pro se’s pleadings, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 24 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. 25 Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). However, in giving liberal interpretation to a 26 pro se civil rights complaint, the court may not “supply essential elements of claims that were 27 not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th 28 Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\bush.dismissal.wpd 3 12cv2573 GPC (NLS) 1 are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id. 2 A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Liability 3 Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person 4 acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived 5 the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the 6 United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S. Ct. 2117, 2122 7 (2004); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). 8 B. Statute of Limitations 9 As an initial matter, it appears that Plaintiff’s claims fall outside the applicable statute of 10 limitations. Because section 1983 contains no specific statute of limitation, federal courts apply 11 the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 12 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004); Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004); Fink v. 13 Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1999). Before 2003, California’s statute of limitations was 14 one year. Jones, 393 F.3d at 927. Effective January 1, 2003, the limitations period was extended 15 to two years. Id. (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 335.1). The two-years limitations period, 16 however, does not apply retroactively. Canatella v. Van de Kamp, 486 F.3d 1128, 1132-22 (9th 17 Cir. 2007) (citing Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 955). 18 Unlike the length of the limitations period, however, “the accrual date of a § 1983 cause 19 of action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.” Wallace v. 20 Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); Hardin v. Staub, 490 U.S. 536, 543-44 (1989) (federal law 21 governs when a § 1983 cause of action accrues). “Under the traditional rule of accrual ... the tort 22 cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitation begins to run, when the wrongful act or 23 omission results in damages.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 391; see also Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 955 24 (“Under federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the 25 injury which is the basis of the action.” ). 26 Here, Plaintiff raises claims that occurred between October of 2008 to January 30, 2009. 27 (See Compl. at 1.) This was the time frame that Plaintiff was housed at the Richard J. Donovan 28 Correctional Facility (“RJD”) for a period of time so that he could appear for an evidentiary I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\bush.dismissal.wpd 4 12cv2573 GPC (NLS) 1 hearing in San Diego. Thus, Plaintiff would have reason to believe that his constitutional rights 2 were violated four years ago. Id.; see also Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 955. However, Plaintiff did 3 not file his Complaint in this case until October 22, 2012, which exceeds California’s statute of 4 limitation. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 335.1; Jones, 393 F.3d at 927. Plaintiff does not allege 5 any facts to suggest how or why California’s two-year statute of limitations might be tolled for 6 a period of time which would make his claims timely. 7 While prisoners normally receive an additional two years of tolling of their claims due 8 to their incarceration, Plaintiff is serving a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. In 9 support of his claims, Plaintiff addresses his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus that he filed in 10 Bush v. Pliler, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 01cv0142 J (NLS). A court “‘may take notice of 11 proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those 12 proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 13 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); see 14 also United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 15 248 (9th Cir. 1992). In California, this tolling provision applies only to plaintiffs “imprisoned 16 on a criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence of a criminal court for a term of less 17 than for life.” Jones, 393 F.3d at 927 (citing CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 352.1(a)). In Plaintiff’s 18 Petition, Plaintiff acknowledges that he is serving a sentence of life without the possibility of 19 parole. Bush v. Pliler, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 01cv0142 J (NLS) (ECF No. 1 at 1.) 20 Thus, because Plaintiff is serving a life sentence, he is not entitled to the extra two years of 21 statutory tolling. This means that he has two years from the date by which he claims his 22 constitutional rights were violated to file this action. In Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, 23 those dates range from October of 2008 to January of 2009. 24 Generally, federal courts also apply the forum state’s law regarding equitable tolling. 25 Fink, 192 F.3d at 914; Bacon v. City of Los Angeles, 843 F.2d 372, 374 (9th Cir. 1988). Under 26 California law, however, a plaintiff must meet three conditions to equitably toll a statute of 27 limitations: (1) he must have diligently pursued his claim; (2) his situation must be the product 28 of forces beyond his control; and (3) the defendants must not be prejudiced by the application I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\bush.dismissal.wpd 5 12cv2573 GPC (NLS) 1 of equitable tolling. See Hull v. Central Pathology Serv. Med. Clinic, 28 Cal. App. 4th 1328, 2 1335 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Addison v. State of California, 21 Cal.3d 313, 316-17 (Cal. 1978); 3 Fink, 192 F.3d at 916. Here, however, Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts which, if proved, 4 would support the equitable tolling of his claims. See Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 5 1273, 1277 (9th Cir. 1993). 6 C. Respondeat Superior claims 7 Plaintiff names the RJD Warden, Associate Warden, Facility Lieutenant and Facility 8 Captain as Defendants in this matter but fails to set forth any specific factual allegations with 9 regard to these Defendants in the body of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Thus, it appears that Plaintiff 10 seeks to hold these Defendants liable in their supervisory capacity. However, there is no 11 respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437- 12 38 (9th Cir. 1993). Instead, “[t]he inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on 13 the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged 14 to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) 15 (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976)). In order to avoid the respondeat superior 16 bar, Plaintiff must allege personal acts by each individual Defendant which have a direct causal 17 connection to the constitutional violation at issue. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th 18 Cir. 1989). 19 Supervisory prison officials may only be held liable for the allegedly unconstitutional 20 violations of a subordinate if Plaintiff sets forth allegations which show: (1) how or to what 21 extent they personally participated in or directed a subordinate’s actions, and (2) in either acting 22 or failing to act, they were an actual and proximate cause of the deprivation of Plaintiff’s 23 constitutional rights. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). As currently pleaded, 24 however, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to set forth facts which might be liberally construed to 25 support an individualized constitutional claim against any of the named Defendants. 26 D. Access to Courts 27 Plaintiff alleges that his right to access to the courts has been denied because prison 28 officials interfered with his attempts to file a temporary restraining order. (See Compl. at 23-24.) I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\bush.dismissal.wpd 6 12cv2573 GPC (NLS) 1 Prisoners do “have a constitutional right to petition the government for redress of their 2 grievances, which includes a reasonable right of access to the courts.” O’Keefe v. Van Boening, 3 82 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1996); accord Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995). 4 In Bounds, 430 U.S. at 817, the Supreme Court held that “the fundamental constitutional right 5 of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing 6 of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate 7 assistance from persons who are trained in the law.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). 8 To establish a violation of the right to access to the courts, however, a prisoner must allege facts 9 sufficient to show that: (1) a nonfrivolous legal attack on his conviction, sentence, or conditions 10 of confinement has been frustrated or impeded, and (2) he has suffered an actual injury as a 11 result. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353-55 (1996). An “actual injury” is defined as “actual 12 prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing 13 deadline or to present a claim.” Id. at 348; see also Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794, 796 (9th Cir. 14 1994); Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 1989); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1093 15 (9th Cir. 1996). 16 Here, Plaintiff has failed to alleged any actions with any particularity that have precluded 17 his pursuit of a non-frivolous direct or collateral attack upon either his criminal conviction or 18 sentence or the conditions of his current confinement. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355 (right to 19 access to the courts protects only an inmate’s need and ability to “attack [his] sentence[], directly 20 or collaterally, and ... to challenge the conditions of [his] confinement.”). In addition, Plaintiff 21 must also describe the non-frivolous nature of the “underlying cause of action, whether 22 anticipated or lost.” Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). 23 In short, Plaintiff has not alleged that “a complaint he prepared was dismissed,” or that 24 he was “so stymied” by any individual defendant’s actions that “he was unable to even file a 25 complaint,” direct appeal or petition for writ of habeas corpus that was not “frivolous.” Lewis, 26 518 U.S. at 351; Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416 (“like any other element of an access claim[,] ... 27 the predicate claim [must] be described well enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous’ test and to show 28 that the ‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more than hope.”). While Plaintiff claims I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\bush.dismissal.wpd 7 12cv2573 GPC (NLS) 1 he was unable to file a temporary restraining order, his allegations are devoid of any claim that 2 he was unable to file a complaint, appeal or petition for writ of habeas corpus. Therefore, 3 Plaintiff’s access to courts claims must be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which 4 section 1983 relief can be granted. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446. 5 E. Fourteenth Amendment 6 Plaintiff also claims that the RJD’s administrative grievance procedure violates his right 7 to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. (See Compl. at 4-6.) The Fourteenth 8 Amendment provides that: “[n]o state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 9 without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. “The requirements of procedural 10 due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth 11 Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 12 (1972). State statutes and prison regulations may grant prisoners liberty or property interests 13 sufficient to invoke due process protection. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). 14 To state a procedural due process claim, Plaintiff must allege: “(1) a liberty or property interest 15 protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the government; [and] (3) lack 16 of process.” Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2000). 17 However, the Ninth Circuit has held that prisoners have no protected property interest in 18 an inmate grievance procedure arising directly from the Due Process Clause. See Ramirez v. 19 Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 869 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]nmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement 20 to a specific prison grievance procedure”) (citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 21 1988) (finding that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment creates “no legitimate 22 claim of entitlement to a [prison] grievance procedure”)); accord Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 23 (4th Cir. 1994) (1995); Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993). 24 In addition, Plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to show that prison official 25 deprived him of a protected liberty interest by allegedly failing to respond to his prison 26 grievances in a satisfactory manner. While a liberty interest can arise from state law or prison 27 regulations, Meachum, 427 U.S. at 223-27, due process protections are implicated only if 28 Plaintiff alleges facts to show that Defendants: (1) restrained his freedom in a manner not I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\bush.dismissal.wpd 8 12cv2573 GPC (NLS) 1 expected from his sentence, and (2) “impose[d] atypical and significant hardship on [him] in 2 relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995); 3 Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff pleads nothing to suggest how 4 the allegedly inadequate review and consideration of his inmate grievances resulted in an 5 “atypical” and “significant hardship.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff 6 challenges the procedural adequacy of inmate grievance procedures, his Complaint fails to state 7 a due process claim. 8 Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a section 1983 claim 9 upon which relief may be granted, and is therefore subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 10 §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). The Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to amend 11 his pleading to cure the defects set forth above. Plaintiff is warned that if his amended complaint 12 fails to address the deficiencies of pleading noted above, it may be dismissed with prejudice and 13 without leave to amend. 14 III. 15 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 16 Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 17 1. 18 19 Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 2] is GRANTED. 2. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his 20 designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee 21 owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty 22 percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court 23 each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 24 ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 25 ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION. 26 3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Matthew Cate, 27 Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502, 28 Sacramento, California 95814. I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\bush.dismissal.wpd 9 12cv2573 GPC (NLS) 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: 2 4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 3 §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A(b) and as barred by the applicable statute of limitations. However, 4 Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date this Order is “Filed” in which 5 to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted above. 6 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to the superseded 7 pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in 8 the Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 9 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which 10 relief may be granted, it may be dismissed without further leave to amend and may hereafter 11 be counted as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177- 12 79 (9th Cir. 1996). 13 5. 14 Plaintiff. 15 The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a court approved form § 1983 complaint to IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 17 DATED: December 5, 2012 18 HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 I:\Chambers Curiel\Civil - Odd\bush.dismissal.wpd 10 12cv2573 GPC (NLS)
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