Goodrum v. Busby, No. 3:2011cv02262 - Document 39 (S.D. Cal. 2012)
Court Description: ORDER denying Petitioner 35 Amended Motion to Set Aside Judgment. Court finds Petitioner has failed to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances exist entitling him to relief and denies the Motion for Relief from Judgment pursuant to 60(b). Signed by Judge Irma E. Gonzalez on 10/23/2012. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service) (jah)
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Goodrum v. Busby Doc. 39 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 TONY GOODRUM, Civil No. 11 Petitioner, 12 ORDER DENYING AMENDED MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT [ECF No. 35.] vs. 13 14 11-2262 IEG (JMA) TIMOTHY E. BUSBY, Warden, 15 Respondent. 16 Petitioner, Tony Goodrum (hereinafter “Petitioner”), filed an Amended Motion for 17 18 Relief from Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) challenging the 19 Court’s dismissal of his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the present case. [ECF No. 20 35.] After reviewing Petitioner’s Motion and Respondent’s Response, the Court DENIES 21 Petitioner’s motion. 22 I. 23 PROCEDURAL HISTORY Petitioner has filed two Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant 28 U.S.C. 24 §2254 in this Court challenging his San Diego Superior Court conviction in case number 25 SCD170068. On April 23, 2007, Petitioner filed a petition in case number 07cv0752. (See 26 Petition Goodrum v. Cate, 07cv0752 IEG (JMA) Apr. 23, 2007.) While the petition was 27 pending, Petitioner filed an application for leave to file a second or successive petition with 28 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. (See Application Goodrum v. Kramer, 07-72512 (Jun. -1- 11cv2262 Dockets.Justia.com 1 22, 2007).) The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s application “without prejudice to refiling 2 should petitioner receive an unfavorable disposition of the first petition that is currently 3 pending in the district court.” (See Order Goodrum v. Kramer, 07-72512 Sep. 13, 2007.) 4 On September 6, 2008, this Court denied the petition in case number 07cv0752. (See 5 Order, Goodrum v. Cate, 07cv0752 IEG (JMA) Nov. 12, 2008 [ECF No. 31].) Petitioner 6 filed a second application for leave to file a second or successive petition with the Ninth 7 Circuit Court of Appeals on October 29, 2010, which was granted on August 31, 2011. 8 (See Application for Leave to File Successive Petition, Goodrum v. Busby, 10-73336, Oct. 9 29, 2010; Order Goodrum v. Busby 10-73336, Aug. 13, 2011.) 10 Following the Ninth Circuit’s order, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas 11 Corpus in this Court on September 23, 2011, which was amended on November 9, 2011, in 12 which he argued that he was entitled to bring new claims challenging the state court 13 conviction he previously challenged in this Court because he had newly discovered 14 evidence to support claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and sentencing error. [ECF 15 Nos. 1, 10.] On October 7, 2011, the parties were ordered by the Court to show cause as to 16 whether the claims in the Petition met the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B) for 17 filing a second or successive petition. [ECF No. 3.] On January 20, 2012, Respondent 18 filed a Response to the Order to Show Cause, and after several extensions of time, 19 Petitioner filed a Reply on April 10, 2012. [ECF Nos. 16, 24.] In his Reply, Petitioner 20 stated that he was making claims of actual innocence, in addition to his other claims raised 21 in the Petition, and contended he was entitled to move forward with this claim whether it 22 was subject to the standard for successive petitions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) or the 23 actual innocence exception enunciated in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). (Reply 9.)1 24 By Order dated June 13, 2012, the Court found that Petitioner did not satisfy the 25 requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B) for filing a second or successive petition, and 26 alternately determined that Petitioner could not proceed on his actual innocence claim 27 28 1 For ease of reference, the Court refers to the page numbers inserted by the Clerk’s office electronic filing system. -2- 11cv2262 1 under Schlup. [ECF No. 25.] The Court further denied Petitioner’s request for discovery 2 concerning law enforcement officers and denied his request for an evidentiary hearing. On 3 July 9, 2012, Petitioner filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment, which he amended with 4 leave of Court on August 10, 2012. [ECF Nos. 30, 35.] In response to Court order, 5 Respondent filed a Response to the amended motion on September 27, 2012. [ECF No. 6 38.] 7 II. 8 9 DISCUSSION The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in federal habeas corpus cases to the extent they are consistent with the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Petitions. See 28 10 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 11; Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 529 (2005). Rule 60(b) 11 provides relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: 12 (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 13 (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); 14 15 (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; 16 (4) the judgment is void; 17 18 (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or 19 (6) any other reason that justifies relief. 20 See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) (West 2012). 21 Petitioner does not specify under which subsection he brings his Rule 60(b) 22 motion, however, he claims that “extraordinary circumstances” justify the reopening of his 23 case. (Mot. 4.) It is well established under Rule 60(b)(6) that a petitioner seeking relief 24 must show “extraordinary circumstances” to justify the reopening of a final judgment. See 25 Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535. Therefore, the Court interprets the motion as seeking relief 26 under Rule 60(b)(6). Courts rarely find that extraordinary circumstances exist in the habeas 27 context. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535; see Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 613-14 28 (1949) (Court determined extraordinary circumstances warranted relief from judgment -3- 11cv2262 1 where petitioner’s failure to defend himself in de-naturalization proceedings was due to his 2 serious illness, incarceration, and lack of funds to hire a lawyer); compare Ackerman v. 3 United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199-200 (1950) (relief from judgment denied because 4 petitioner was not in jail, had funds to defend himself, was tried and yet inexcusably 5 neglected to appeal.) A petitioner may not use a motion for relief from judgment to 6 circumvent the restraints on successive petitions to launch another attack on the state 7 conviction, and instead the motion must only challenge the integrity of the previous habeas 8 proceedings. See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532. Petitioner argues that he is entitled to relief because the Court erroneously held that 9 10 his admission to the act of justifiable homicide was an admission of guilt similar to the 11 petitioner’s admission of guilt in Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2008), which 12 barred him from moving forward with his actual innocence claim under Schlup v. Delo, 513 13 U.S. 298 (1995). (Mot. 5- 6, 18.) Petitioner contends that his case is distinguishable from 14 Johnson because justifiable homicide is not a degree of criminal homicide, the crime with 15 which he was charged, unlike the situation in Johnson where petitioner admitted guilt of 16 kidnapping, which was the crime with which he was charged. Therefore, Goodrum 17 contends the Court’s reliance on Johnson was in error. (Id. at 5-6, 9.) Goodrum further 18 argues that under Schlup the Court was required to determine what reasonable, properly 19 instructed jurors would do in light of all the evidence, but instead, the Court “merely made 20 findings of what the incorrectly instructed jury found,” and did not resolve his instructional 21 challenges beforehand. (Id. at 18.) It appears Goodrum contends that the Court did not 22 consider all the evidence he produced in support of his claim of actual innocence, 23 specifically statements from witnesses Howard Herring, Lloyd Griffin, Paulina Griffin, 24 Millard Egan, and Lorraine Murray that contradicted their trial testimony, and additional 25 evidence supporting his claim that various police officers committed misconduct. (Id. at 26 10, 13-14.) 27 // 28 // -4- 11cv2262 1 Respondent counters that the Court correctly held that Petitioner’s new evidence did 2 not meet the Schlup standard because the evidence did not sufficiently demonstrate his 3 innocence. (Response 6.) Although Respondent concedes that Petitioner did not admit guilt 4 of an unlawful act, as did the petitioner in Johnson, Respondent argues that it makes no 5 difference to the outcome here because the Court “correctly determined that Goodrum’s 6 new evidence did not meet the Schlup standard.” (Id. at 7.) 7 Respondent is correct. The Court’s conclusion that Petitioner was not allowed to 8 benefit from Schlup’s actual innocence equitable exception was appropriately based on its 9 consideration of all the evidence, old and new, from which it determined that Petitioner 10 failed to show that it was “more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 11 convicted him in light of the new evidence.” See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. However, 12 Petitioner argues that the Court relied on Johnson in adjudicating his actual innocence 13 claim, and correctly notes that his case is not analogous to Johnson, because there the 14 petitioner conceded his guilt of the crime of kidnapping, with which he was charged, and 15 here, Petitioner did not concede his guilt of the charged crime.2 16 In a follow-up to its Schlup analysis, the Court stated “[j]ust as the petitioner in 17 Johnson, Petitioner here has admitted his guilt and therefore, fails to demonstrate he 18 suffered a miscarriage of justice.” (See Order 19 in Goodrum v. Busby, 11cv2262 IEG 19 (JMA) [ECF No. 25.]) As indicated above, the Court did not rely on Johnson in 20 determining that Petitioner could not pass through the Schlup portal to pursue his actual 21 innocence claim. Instead, the Court found that Petitioner did not show that his was the 22 “extraordinary case” provided for by Schlup, in which a petitioner can put forth a credible 23 assertion of his innocence and cast doubt upon the contrary finding of guilt. Schlup, 513 24 U.S. at 321. “To ensure that the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception would 25 26 27 28 2 Petitioner has consistently maintained that he acted in self-defense when he shot the victim and that this act was not criminal because justifiable homicide can include claims of self-defense under California Penal Code §197(2) which states “Homicide is ... justifiable when committed by any person in any of the following cases . . . When committed in defense of habitation, property, or person, against one who manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a felony, or against one who manifestly intends and endeavors, in a violent, riotous or tumultuous manner, to enter the habitation of another for the purpose of offering violence to any person therein.” Cal. Penal. Code §197(2). -5- 11cv2262 1 remain ‘rare’ and would only be applied in the ‘extraordinary case,’ while at the same time 2 ensuring that the exception would extend relief to those who were truly deserving, this 3 Court explicitly tied the miscarriage of justice exception to the petitioners’ innocence.” 4 Schlup, 513 U.S. at 321. Evidence of innocence must be “so strong that a court cannot 5 have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial 6 was free of nonharmless constitutional error.” Id. at 316. A petitioner “must show that it is 7 more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the 8 new evidence.” Id. at 327. 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Here, the Court found, . . . none of the evidence available at trial, or contained within Petitioner’s current pleadings, meets the more lenient Schlup standard. The evidence presented . . . in consideration with that at trial, fails to show that it was more likely than not no reasonable fact-finder would have found him guilty. While there was sufficient evidence indicating a metal pipe was found beneath the victim, witnesses provided contradictory information concerning whether Stamps held the pipe as he advanced on Petitioner. (See Order 18 Goodrum v. Busby, 11cv2262 IEG (JMA) Aug. 1, 2012.) As required under Schlup, the Court reviewed the newly proffered evidence 16 including witness statements and evidence that law enforcement agents prevented witnesses 17 from testifying at trial and noted that “Petitioner has not demonstrated that the information 18 contained within Herring’s affidavit about Stamps advancing toward Petitioner with a metal 19 pipe at the time he was shot, and the alleged police department misconduct, would have 20 tipped the balance to the extent that no reasonable factinder would have found him guilty of 21 voluntary manslaughter.” (See Order 14.) The reviewing court may “consider the 22 probative force of relevant evidence that was either excluded or unavailable at trial” in 23 determining whether a petitioner has met this standard. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327-28. 24 Similar contradictory statements were considered by the jury at trial, likely lending to their 25 decision to find him guilty of voluntary manslaughter instead of murder. As the Court 26 stated, “[m]orever, the victim was shot at close range as he approached Petitioner, and the 27 jury declined to find Petitioner guilty of first or second degree murder, implicitly 28 recognizing mitigating factors including self defense in its reduction of the conviction to -6- 11cv2262 1 voluntary manslaughter.” (See Order 18 Goodrum v. Busby, 11cv2262 IEG (JMA) Aug. 1, 2 2012.) This Court concluded: “the evidence presented here, in consideration with that at 3 trial, fails to show it was more likely than not no reasonable fact-finder would have found 4 him guilty.” (Id.) It is clear that the Court properly applied Schlup when considering 5 whether Petitioner could proceed on his actual innocence claims, and its reference to 6 Johnson was not determinative of that matter. 7 Petitioner further contends that the Court did not conduct a proper analysis under 8 Schlup because it was required to make a probabilistic determination of what a properly 9 instructed jury would do when deciding if Petitioner produced sufficient evidence to erode 10 the Court’s confidence in the verdict, but here the jury was not properly instructed.3 11 Therefore, according to Petitioner, the Court’s conclusion that it had confidence in the 12 verdict was based on what the incorrectly instructed jury found. (Mot. 13, 15.) Petitioner 13 raised claims of jury instruction error in his prior writ of habeas corpus petition filed in this 14 Court in case number 07cv0752, which the Court denied on the merits on September 6, 15 2008. (See Order Adopting Report & Recommendation, Goodrum v. Cate 07cv0752 IEG 16 (JMA) [ECF No. 31.]) In that case, the Court found that the jury was properly instructed 17 on Goodrum’s theory of self-defense. To the extent Petitioner is attempting to raise a new 18 challenge to the jury instructions given during his trial, the Court will not consider this 19 argument. See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532 (A motion for reconsideration is not an 20 opportunity to circumvent the restraints on successive petitions to launch another attack on 21 the state conviction). 22 Alternatively, if Petitioner is contending that the Court did not properly apply Schlup 23 he is again mistaken. Under Schlup, “[t]he district court must make a probabilistic 24 determination about what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do, and it is 25 presumed that a reasonable juror would consider fairly all of the evidence presented and 26 would conscientiously obey the trial court's instructions requiring proof beyond a 27 28 3 Petitioner claims the jury was not properly instructed because the trial court refused to instruct the jurors regarding defense of domicile, self defense during a sudden quarrel, and improperly instructed the jury that “self defense is still a crime, voluntary manslaughter.” (Mot. 13.) -7- 11cv2262 1 reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329. In analyzing Petitioner’s claim of actual 2 innocence, the Court determined that a properly instructed jury, presented with all the 3 evidence, including Herring’s affidavit and the evidence of conflicting testimony from law 4 enforcement officials and various witnesses acquired after trial, would not have returned a 5 different verdict, finding “[t]he evidence presented here, in consideration with that at trial, 6 fails to show that it was more likely than not no reasonable fact-finder would have found 7 him guilty.” (Order 18.) Accordingly, Petitioner’s argument is without merit. 8 III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 9 For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds Petitioner has failed to demonstrate 10 extraordinary circumstances exist entitling him to relief and DENIES his Motion for Relief 11 from Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b). 12 DATED: October 23, 2012 13 ___________________________________________ 14 Hon. Irma E. Gonzalez 15 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -8- 11cv2262
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