Broussard v. GameStop, Inc., No. 5:2016cv06075 - Document 31 (N.D. Cal. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING 8 DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION. Signed by Judge Edward J. Davila on 8/31/2017. The Clerk shall close this file. (ejdlc2S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/31/2017)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 13 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 14 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 15 SAN JOSE DIVISION 16 17 ANGELENA BROUSSARD, Case No. 5:16-cv-06075-EJD Plaintiff, 18 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION v. 19 20 GAMESTOP, INC., Re: Dkt. No. 8 Defendant. 21 22 23 Defendant GameStop, Inc. moves to compel Plaintiff Angelina Broussard to arbitrate her 24 claims. Because Broussard’s claims fall within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement, 25 GameStop’s motion will be GRANTED. 26 27 28 Case No.: 5:16-cv-06075-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION 1 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 GameStop hired Broussard in 2009. Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Compel Arbitration 3 (“Opp’n”) 1, Dkt. No. 9. GameStop operated a dispute-resolution program called “GameStop 4 C.A.R.E.S.” to arbitrate disputes between GameStop and its employees. Id.; Def.’s Mot. to 5 Compel Arb. (“Mot.”) 2, Dkt. No. 8. When she was hired, Broussard signed a document 6 acknowledging that she had received the rules of the GameStop C.A.R.E.S. program. Opp’n 1–2; 7 Mot. 2–3. She was given sixty days to opt out, but she did not do so. Mot. 3. 8 9 10 In 2014, GameStop updated its associate handbook but did not change the rules of the arbitration process. Mot. 2–3. Broussard acknowledged receipt of the updated handbook and again agreed to the GameStop C.A.R.E.S. rules. Id. United States District Court Northern District of California 11 GameStop terminated Broussard’s employment in August 2015. Opp’n 2. Broussard filed 12 her complaint in this Court on October 20, 2016, bringing claims for (1) disability discrimination 13 in violation of Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a); (2) failure to engage in the interactive process in 14 violation of Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(n); (3) failure to accommodate disability in violation of Cal. 15 Gov’t Code § 12940(m); (4) failure to prevent discrimination in violation of Cal. Gov’t Code 16 § 12940(k); (5) interference under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act in violation 17 of Cal. Gov’t Code § 12945.2; and (6) wrongful termination in violation of public policy. 18 Compl. ¶¶ 29–114, Dkt. No. 1. 19 II. LEGAL STANDARD 20 Under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), written arbitration agreements “shall be valid, 21 irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the avoidance 22 of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). The FAA “leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a 23 district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to 24 arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed.” Chiron Corp. v. Ortho 25 Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. 26 Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985)). A district court’s role is limited to determining (1) whether the 27 parties agreed to arbitrate and, if so, (2) whether the claims at issue are within the scope of that 28 Case No.: 5:16-cv-06075-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION 2 1 agreement. Id. If the party seeking arbitration meets these two requirements, the court must 2 compel arbitration. 9 U.S.C. § 4; Chiron, 207 F.3d at 1130. If a contract contains an arbitration clause, the clause is presumed to be valid. AT&T 3 4 Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986). “[A]ny doubts concerning 5 the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Three Valleys Mun. 6 Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 1991). The party opposing 7 arbitration has the burden of showing that an arbitration clause is invalid or otherwise 8 unenforceable. Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 15 Cal. 4th 951, 972 (1997). Nonetheless, “arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to 9 arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” AT&T, 475 U.S. at 648 (quoting 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)). General contract law 12 principles govern the interpretation and enforcement of arbitration agreements. First Options of 13 Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995). 14 III. 15 DISCUSSION Broussard argues that GameStop’s arbitration agreement is invalid because it is 16 procedurally and substantively unconscionable. As discussed below, the Court finds that the 17 agreement is valid. 18 A. 19 Broussard argues that the agreement is procedurally unconscionable because GameStop 20 gave her the relevant documents “without giving her the opportunity to review them.” Opp’n 5. 21 The agreement is “oppressive,” she argues, because “GameStop never provided Broussard the 22 GameStop C.A.R.E.S. arbitration program’s terms and conditions prior to seeking her 23 acknowledgement.” Id. at 6. 24 Procedural Unconscionability However, Broussard signed a document in 2009 stating that she agreed to resolve disputes 25 under GameStop C.A.R.E.S. instead of in court. Def.’s Reply in Support of Mot. to Compel Arb. 26 (“Reply”) 2, Dkt. No. 13 (“I am agreeing that all workplace disputes or claims, regardless of when 27 those disputes or claims arose, will be resolved under the GameStop C.A.R.E.S. program rather 28 Case No.: 5:16-cv-06075-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION 3 1 than in court.”). At the same time, Broussard also received a document summarizing the 2 GameStop arbitration process. Id. at 2–3. 3 In 2014, Broussard renewed the arbitration agreement by signing a document that stated: 4 I acknowledge that I have received a copy of the Handbook and a copy of the GameStop C.A.R.E.S. Rules for Dispute Resolution. . . . The GameStop C.A.R.E.S. Rules for Dispute Resolution set forth the Company’s procedures for resolving disputes, ending in final and binding arbitration. I understand that it is my responsibility to read and familiarize myself with the information contained in both of these documents. . . . I agree that all disputes and claims covered by the GameStop C.A.R.E.S. Rules for Dispute Resolution will be resolved pursuant to such Rules rather than in court. This includes all legal, equitable, and statutory claims and all class, collective, or representative action claims in which I might be included, as described in the GameStop C.A.R.E.S. Rules for Dispute Resolution. 5 6 7 8 9 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 Id. at 3. Broussard now argues that she “never received the rules of the GameStop C.A.R.E.S. 13 program.” Opp’n 1. But she does not explain why she stated in 2009 and 2014 that she had 14 reviewed and agreed to the GameStop C.A.R.E.S. rules. GameStop notes that the relevant 15 documents were available to her, and she acknowledged that she received them. Reply 3–4. With 16 no evidence to the contrary, the Court finds that Broussard agreed to arbitrate her disputes with 17 GameStop under the GameStop C.A.R.E.S. program. 18 Broussard also argues that the agreement is procedurally unconscionable because it was 19 “imposed on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.” Opp’n 5. However, the agreement contained a provision 20 that allowed Broussard to opt out of GameStop C.A.R.E.S. within 60 days of the start of her 21 employment. Reply 4–5. As such, the Court finds that the agreement is not procedurally 22 unconscionable. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198, 1199–1200. (9th Cir. 23 2002) (finding that an employer’s arbitration agreement was not procedurally unconscionable 24 where it provided employees with a 30-day period to opt out). 25 B. 26 First, Broussard argues that the agreement is substantively unconscionable because it is Substantive Unconscionability 27 “unjustifiably one-sided.” Opp’n 7. She argues that GameStop C.A.R.E.S. “compels arbitration of 28 Case No.: 5:16-cv-06075-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION 4 1 claims that are most likely to be brought by the employees against GameStop, such as 2 discrimination, retaliation, personal injuries, breach of any express or implied contract, and other 3 tort claims.” Id. at 7. She further argues that the agreement “exempts claims that the employer is 4 most likely to bring against its employees from arbitration.” Id. However, she provides no 5 additional detail about the types of claims that are exempt from arbitration. Nor does she explain 6 why those exemptions render the agreement substantively unconscionable. 7 Second, Broussard argues that the agreement is substantively unconscionable because it 8 requires the employee to pay a $125 fee to initiate arbitration. Id. As GameStop notes, however, 9 Broussard is not required to pay this fee because she is an employee in California. Reply 7. Third, Broussard argues that the agreement is substantively unconscionable because “some 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 of the fees and costs” are recoverable only if the arbitrator “find[s] totally in [the employee’s] 12 favor.” Opp’n 7. GameStop responds that this provision applies only to the $125 fee (which 13 Broussard is not required to pay). As to awards of other fees and costs, “the arbitrator has the same 14 authority as a judge to award reasonable attorneys’ fees and other costs to [the employee].” Reply 15 8. 16 Fourth, Broussard argues that the agreement is substantively unconscionable because it 17 requires an employee to file a Notice of Intent to Arbitrate within 95 days of receiving a Right-to- 18 Sue letter (while California law allows a year to file a lawsuit). Opp’n 7. Broussard offers no 19 explanation and cites no authority showing why this deadline is improper. Moreover, the 20 GameStop C.A.R.E.S. rules make clear that the statute-of-limitations period is the same as it 21 would be under applicable California law. Reply 8 (“The Notice of Intent to Arbitrate must be 22 received within the time period allowed by law applicable to the Covered Claim at issue, just as 23 the requirement applies if you were proceeding in court.”). 24 Finally, Broussard argues that the agreement is substantively unconscionable because it 25 requires employees to waive their right to pursue class or collective actions. Opp’n 8; see also 26 Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding that a similar provision 27 violated the National Labor Relations Act). This argument is not relevant because Broussard has 28 Case No.: 5:16-cv-06075-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION 5 1 not asserted claims on a class or collective basis; she seeks only to recover on her own behalf. 2 Reply 9. 3 IV. 4 CONCLUSION Broussard’s claims are within the scope of the GameStop C.A.R.E.S. arbitration 5 agreement. See Mot. 3 (citing language from the agreement stating that it applies to claims 6 “arising out of or in any way relating to the employee’s employment, the terms or conditions of 7 employment, or an application for employment”). As such, GameStop’s motion to compel 8 arbitration is GRANTED and Broussard’s complaint is dismissed. The Clerk shall close this file. 9 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: August 31, 2017 ______________________________________ EDWARD J. DAVILA United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case No.: 5:16-cv-06075-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION 6
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