Bui v. Golden Biotechnology Corporation, No. 5:2013cv04939 - Document 36 (N.D. Cal. 2014)

Court Description: ORDER granting 30 Motion to Dismiss. GBC Taiwan is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The hearing scheduled for 8/22/2014 is VACATED. Signed by Judge Edward J. Davila on 8/14/2014. (ejdlc1S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/14/2014)

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Bui v. Golden Biotechnology Corporation Doc. 36 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 SAN JOSE DIVISION United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 LYNNE A. BUI, 11 12 13 14 15 Plaintiff, v. GOLDEN BIOTECHNOLOGY CORPORATION, a New Jersey Corporation, and GOLDEN BIOTECHNOLOGY CORPORATION, a Taiwan Corporation, 16 Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No.: 5:13-CV-04939-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS [Re: Docket No. 30] 17 Presently before the Court is Defendants Golden Biotechnology Corporation, a New Jersey 18 Corporation (“GBC New Jersey”) and Golden Biotechnology Corporation, a Taiwan Corporation’s 19 (“GBC Taiwan”) (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Lynne A. Bui’s 20 (“Plaintiff”) Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). Docket 21 Item No. 30. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1332. Per Civil 22 Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds the matter suitable for decision without oral argument. Having 23 fully reviewed the parties’ briefing and for the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ 24 Motion. The hearing scheduled for August 22, 2014 is VACATED. 25 I. Background 26 This action involves an employment agreement between GBC New Jersey and Plaintiff. 27 28 Plaintiff resides in Santa Clara, California. Pl.’s Compl. 1, Docket Item No. 1. Plaintiff is a 1 Case No.: 5:13-CV-04939-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS Dockets.Justia.com 1 licensed physician who owns and operates a medical clinic in Santa Clara and is involved in the 2 treatment of cancer patients. Id. at 2. GBC New Jersey is a U.S. subsidiary of GBC Taiwan. Id. at 3 3. GBC Taiwan is a Taiwanese corporation, founded in 2002 to develop drugs for purposes 4 including the treatment of cancer and atherosclerosis. Decl. of Alex Liu (“Liu Decl.”) ¶ 3, Docket 5 Item No. 30-1. GBC Taiwan subsequently formed GBC New Jersey to headquarter its efforts to 6 enter the U.S. market. Id. ¶ 4. GBC New Jersey maintains one office in Jersey City, New Jersey. 7 Id. ¶ 5. Neither GBC Taiwan nor GBC New Jersey has sold or marketed any product in the U.S. 8 See id. ¶ 6. Around January 28, 2013, Plaintiff entered a two-year employment agreement with GBC 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 New Jersey to serve as GBC New Jersey’s chief medical officer. Pl.’s First Am. Compl. Ex. A at 11 1, Docket Item No. 21 (Employment Agreement). Five months later, due to an unexpected lack of 12 funding, GBC New Jersey terminated Plaintiff’s employment; Plaintiff advised GBC New Jersey 13 that doing so would constitute a breach of the employment agreement. Pl.’s Compl. at 4, Dkt. No. 14 1. Two weeks later, GBC New Jersey sent Plaintiff a letter stating that her termination was due to 15 the “unsatisfactory results of [her] project proceeding and job duty performance.” Id. On October 24, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging a breach of contract against GBC 16 17 New Jersey. Pl.’s Compl. at 1, Dkt. No. 1. On March 31, 2014, Plaintiff filed a First Amended 18 Complaint, adding GBC Taiwan as a defendant to the action on the basis that GBC New Jersey 19 served as the alter ego of GBC Taiwan. See Dkt. No. 21. On April 24, 2014, Defendants filed the 20 instant Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint for a lack of personal jurisdiction, pursuant to 21 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). Dkt. No. 30. 22 23 II. Legal Standard Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) allows a party to file a motion to dismiss when 24 there is a lack of personal jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). There are two limitations that 25 restrict a court’s power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant: the 26 constitutional principles of due process and the applicable state personal jurisdiction rule. Sher v. 27 Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1360 (9th Cir. 1990). The Ninth Circuit has held that because 28 2 Case No.: 5:13-CV-04939-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 1 California’s personal jurisdictional rule is “co-extensive with the outer limits of due process,” 2 personal jurisdictional inquiries under California law are constrained solely by constitutional 3 principles. Id. at 1360–61; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10. 4 The Supreme Court has held that constitutional due process is met when a nonresident defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state such that “maintenance of the suit 6 does not offend traditional conceptions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. 7 Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). In applying the minimum contacts analysis, a court may 8 exercise either general or specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 9 248 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2001). When the defendant’s activities in the forum state are 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 5 substantial, continuous and systematic, a court may exercise general jurisdiction over the 11 defendant, even if the cause of action is unrelated to defendant’s contacts with the forum. Id. at 12 923. A defendant may also be subject to specific jurisdiction if the defendant “has sufficient 13 contacts with the forum state in relation to the cause of action.” Sher, 911 F.2d at 1361 (citations 14 omitted). 15 When faced with a personal jurisdiction challenge by the defendant, the plaintiff bears the 16 burden of proof to show that jurisdiction is appropriate. Love v. Associated Newspapers, Ltd., 611 17 F.3d 601, 608 (9th Cir. 2010). When a motion to dismiss is based on written materials without an 18 evidentiary hearing, a plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts. Id. In 19 this context, a prima facie showing means that the plaintiff has produced sufficient admissible 20 evidence, that if believed, would establish personal jurisdiction. China Tech. Global Corp. v. 21 Fuller, Tubb, Pomeroy & Stokes, No. 05-CV-1793-JW, 2005 WL 1513153, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 22 27, 2005) (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has also held that a district court shall accept as 23 true uncontroverted allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 24 plaintiff. Love, 611 F.3d at 608; Sher, 911 F.2d at 1361. In doing so however, the court need not 25 assume the truth of mere conclusory allegations. China Tech. Global Corp., 2005 WL 1513153, at 26 *1 (citing Nicosia v. De Rooy, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 1999)). 27 28 3 Case No.: 5:13-CV-04939-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 1 2 III. Discussion GBC Taiwan moves for dismissal on the basis that personal jurisdiction is improper in 3 California because Plaintiff cannot establish either general or specific jurisdiction over GBC 4 Taiwan. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl. at 3–4, Dkt. No. 30. In response, Plaintiff puts forth 5 two arguments in her Opposition, that (1) because GBC New Jersey is either an alter ego or agent 6 of GBC Taiwan, GBC New Jersey’s failure to challenge personal jurisdiction constitutes a waiver 7 that may be imputed to GBC Taiwan; and (2) GBC Taiwan has sufficient minimum contacts with 8 California to support personal jurisdiction. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl., 9 Docket Item No. 33. The Court turns to both arguments. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 a. Whether GBC New Jersey’s Waiver may be Imputed to GBC Taiwan The Ninth Circuit has recognized that because “directors and officers holding positions with 12 a parent [company] and its subsidiary can and do ‘change hats’ to represent the two corporations 13 separately, despite their common ownership,” a parent’s mere ownership of a subsidiary does not 14 confer personal jurisdiction over the parent. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d at 925–26 (citing United 15 States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 69 (1998)). A parent may be involved in its subsidiary’s 16 activities to the extent a “parent investor status” is maintained, which may include monitoring the 17 subsidiary’s performance, supervising the subsidiary’s finance and capital budget decisions, and 18 articulating general policies and procedures of the subsidiary. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d at 926 19 (citing Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 72). The Ninth Circuit has held that a subsidiary’s contacts may be 20 imputed to the parent either when the alter ego exception is met, or when an agency relationship 21 exists between the parent and subsidiary. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d at 926. 22 i. Whether GBC New Jersey is an Alter Ego of GBC Taiwan 23 Plaintiff alleges that because GBC New Jersey is an alter ego of GBC Taiwan, GBC New 24 Jersey’s failure to challenge personal jurisdiction is imputed to GBC Taiwan, effectively waiving 25 GBC Taiwan’s rights to raise a jurisdictional challenge. Pl.’s First Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 21. 26 When alleging an alter ego exception, the plaintiff must prove “(1) that there is such unity of 27 interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the two entities no longer exist[,] and (2) 28 4 Case No.: 5:13-CV-04939-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 1 that failure to disregard their separate entities would result in fraud or injustice.” Unocal Corp., 2 248 F.3d at 926 (citing Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 591 3 (9th Cir. 1996)). As to the first prong, a plaintiff must show that the parent company exercises 4 such high degree of control that the subsidiary is reduced to “mere instrumentality.” Unocal Corp., 5 248 F.3d at 926 (citations omitted). This prong may be satisfied when a parent uses the subsidiary 6 “as a marketing conduit” to shield itself from liability, when the parent dictates every facet of the 7 subsidiary’s daily operations, or when the subsidiary is undercapitalized. Id. at 926–27 (citations 8 omitted). This is a difficult burden for a plaintiff to overcome. In Unocal Corp., the Ninth Circuit 9 held that the plaintiff failed to make a sufficient showing of an alter ego exception, even when the United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 plaintiff alleged that (1) the parent was involved in its subsidiaries’ divestments and capital 11 expenditures, (2) the parent formulated general business policies and strategies of its subsidiaries, 12 (3) the parent provided loans and financing to its subsidiaries, (4) the parent maintained 13 overlapping directors and officers with its subsidiaries, and that (5) the subsidiaries were 14 undercapitalized. Id. at 927. 15 Looking at the first prong in this case, Plaintiff argues that a unity of interest and ownership 16 exists mainly because GBC Taiwan exercised a high degree of control in the management of GBC 17 New Jersey. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Alex Liu, the chief executive officer and chairman 18 of GBC Taiwan initiated contact, solicited employment, and negotiated Plaintiff’s employment 19 terms and responsibilities, and that throughout employment, Plaintiff reported to Mr. Liu and 20 received support from Charles Wang, the vice president of GBC Taiwan. Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. to 21 Dismiss Am. Compl. at 4–5, Dkt. No. 33. Even though Mr. Liu serves as chief executive officer 22 and chairman to both GBC New Jersey and GBC Taiwan, Ninth Circuit precedent has firmly 23 allowed officers holding positions with both a parent and its subsidiary to “change hats,” i.e., 24 separately represent the corporations. Liu Decl. ¶ 1, 8, Dkt. No. 30-1; Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d at 25 925–26 (citations omitted). A review of the employment agreement at issue shows that the 26 agreement explicitly states that the agreement is between GBC New Jersey and Plaintiff; there is 27 no mention of GBC Taiwan or the term “Taiwan” in the agreement. Pl.’s First Am. Compl. Ex. A 28 5 Case No.: 5:13-CV-04939-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 1 at 1, Dkt. No. 21 (Employment Agreement). Similar to the plaintiff’s failure to present evidence 2 that the parent corporation dictated the daily operations of its domestic subsidiary in Unocal Corp., 3 Plaintiff here has not presented evidence that GBC Taiwan dictates the daily operations of GBC 4 New Jersey, but rather has only provided a conclusory statement alleging that GBC Taiwan 5 “dictates every facet of [GBC New Jersey’s] business—from broad policy decisions to routine 6 matters of day-to-day.” Pl.’s First Am. Compl. at 5, Dkt. No. 21. Further, although Plaintiff 7 alleges that GBC New Jersey is undercapitalized, Plaintiff has provided no support for the 8 proposition. See Pl.’s First Am. Compl. at 6, Dkt. No. 21; Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss Am. 9 Compl. at 4–6, Dkt. No. 33. While a district court draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 plaintiff when determining a motion to dismiss, the court need not assume mere conclusory 11 allegations to be true. Sher, 911 F.2d at 1361; Nicosia, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 1097. The Court thus 12 finds that Plaintiff has not satisfied the first prong of the alter ego exception. The Court also notes 13 that Plaintiff did not discuss the Ninth Circuit’s second prong of the alter ego exception test—that 14 failure to disregard separate entities of the parent and subsidiary would result in fraud or injustice. 15 See Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl. at 4–6, Dkt. No. 33. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not 16 established that GBC New Jersey is the alter ego of GBC Taiwan and GBC New Jersey’s failure to 17 challenge personal jurisdiction may therefore not be imputed to GBC Taiwan on this basis. 18 19 ii. Whether GBC New Jersey is an Agent of GBC Taiwan The Ninth Circuit has set forth a two-prong test to determine whether an agency 20 relationship exists between a parent and its subsidiary. First, the plaintiff must show that the 21 subsidiary “performs services that are sufficiently important to the foreign [parent] corporation that 22 if it did not have a representative to perform them, the [parent] corporation’s own officials would 23 undertake to perform substantially similar services.” United States v. Pangang Grp. Co., Ltd., 879 24 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 25 920–21 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d on other grounds by Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014)). 26 Second, the plaintiff must show that the parent exercises a measure of control over the subsidiary. 27 Pangang Grp. Co., 879 F. Supp. 2d at 1059. Here, Plaintiff has not presented a prima facie case 28 6 Case No.: 5:13-CV-04939-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS that GBC New Jersey is an agent of GBC Taiwan because Plaintiff has merely alleged in a 2 conclusory and concise manner without additional factual allegations, that but for the existence of 3 GBC New Jersey, GBC Taiwan would have performed the activities and carried out its plans for 4 clinical trials and FDA approval in the U.S. Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl. at 6, Dkt. 5 No. 33. The main reason GBC Taiwan formed GBC New Jersey was to headquarter its efforts to 6 enter the U.S. market. Liu Decl. ¶ 4, Dkt. No. 30-1. Accordingly, the Court finds that because 7 Plaintiff has not made a sufficient showing that GBC New Jersey is an agent of GBC Taiwan, GBC 8 New Jersey’s failure to challenge personal jurisdiction may not be imputed to GBC Taiwan. 9 b. Whether GBC Taiwan has Sufficient Minimum Contacts with California 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 Plaintiff also alleges that GBC Taiwan has sufficient minimum contacts with California to 11 support personal jurisdiction. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl. at 5, 7–8, Dkt. No. 12 33. The Ninth Circuit has held that personal jurisdiction inquiries under California law are co- 13 extensive with the constitutional principles of due process. Sher, 911 F.2d at 1360–61; Cal. Civ. 14 Proc. Code § 410.10. Constitutional due process is met when the nonresident defendant has 15 sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316. In assessing a 16 nonresident defendant’s minimum contacts, a court may exercise either general or specific 17 jurisdiction over the defendant. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d at 923. 18 i. General Jurisdiction 19 The parties do not appear to seriously dispute that this Court does not have general 20 jurisdiction over GBC Taiwan, as Plaintiff has not countered with arguments in response to 21 Defendants’ argument that no grounds exist for general jurisdiction over GBC Taiwan. See Pl.’s 22 Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 33; Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl. at 4, Dkt. 23 No. 30. The Ninth Circuit has held that general jurisdiction applies only when a defendant’s 24 contacts with California are “continuous and systematic” to the point the contacts “appropriate 25 physical presence,” allowing the defendant to be haled into court for any action. King v. Am. 26 Family Mut. Ins. Co., 632 F.3d 570, 579 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Without more, 27 Plaintiff’s arguments do not meet this burden to establish general jurisdiction. 28 7 Case No.: 5:13-CV-04939-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 1 2 ii. Specific Jurisdiction The Supreme Court has held that a court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant when the suit “arises out of or relates to actions by the defendant himself that are 4 purposefully directed toward forum residents, and where jurisdiction would not offend ‘fair play 5 and substantial justice.’” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (citations 6 omitted). The Ninth Circuit has established a three-part test to determine specific jurisdiction: (1) 7 the defendant must purposefully direct his activities to the forum or to a resident thereof, or must 8 purposefully avail himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, invoking the 9 benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must arise out of or relate to defendant’s forum- 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 3 related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable. CollegeSource, Inc. v. 11 AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). If a plaintiff meets the 12 first two prongs, the burden shifts to the defendant in the third prong to make a compelling 13 showing that an exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable. Id. 14 1. Purposeful Availment 15 The first prong refers to methods of purposeful availment and purposeful direction. A court 16 typically applies a “purposeful availment” analysis in cases of contract dispute, asking whether the 17 defendant has “performed some kind of affirmative conduct which allows or promotes the 18 transaction of business within the forum state.” Id. at 1077 (citations omitted); Schwarzenegger v. 19 Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802–03 (9th Cir. 2004). In cases of tortious conduct, a court 20 typically applies a “purposeful direction” analysis, considering the effects of the defendant’s 21 conduct. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802–03. Here, because Plaintiff’s sole cause of action goes 22 to an alleged breach of contract, the Court will apply a purposeful availment analysis. 23 Generally, a contract in and of itself does not establish minimum contacts with a forum 24 state. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478. A court must consider factors surrounding the contract, such 25 as whether there were any prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, the terms of 26 the contract, and the parties’ course of dealings. Id. at 478–79. In Unocal Corp., the Ninth Circuit 27 determined that the contacts between the parent and its subsidiary were insufficient to constitute 28 8 Case No.: 5:13-CV-04939-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS purposeful availment of the benefits and protections of California because (1) the contracts were 2 entered through negotiations by fax, phone, or meetings in Asia, France and Bermuda, (2) the 3 contract specified that the law of England, Bermuda or Burma was the governing law, and (3) all 4 contracts made no mention of California. 248 F.3d at 924 (citing to McGlinchy v. Shell Chemical 5 Co., 845 F.2d 802, 816 (9th Cir. 1988)). Here, Plaintiff alleges GBC Taiwan demonstrated 6 purposeful availment by seeking out Plaintiff, a doctor licensed in and educated by California, who 7 owned and operated a business of providing services to support clinical trials for cancer patients in 8 California. Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 33. Similar to Unocal Corp., 9 Plaintiff’s employment agreement at issue was negotiated and entered through phone and largely 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 email. Decl. of Lynne A. Bui (“Bui Decl.”) in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss Attach. 1, Docket Item 11 No. 33-1. The employment agreement makes no mention of GBC Taiwan but rather, explicitly 12 states that the agreement is between GBC New Jersey and Plaintiff, and further specifies that the 13 applicable governing law is the law of New Jersey. Pl’s First Am. Compl. Ex. A at 1, 3, Dkt. No. 14 21. None of the “major job duties” defined in the agreement require Plaintiff to perform her duties 15 in California; the agreement merely specifies that Plaintiff is employed as “the [c]hief [m]edical 16 [d]octor in [the] United States.” Id. Ex. A at 1. Finally, in performing Plaintiff’s employment 17 duties, neither GBC New Jersey nor GBC Taiwan utilized a clinic owned or operated by Plaintiff. 18 Liu Decl. in Reply to Pl.’s Opp’n ¶ 9, Docket Item No. 35. Accordingly, in considering the factors 19 surrounding the employment agreement, the Court finds that the parties’ course of dealings, prior 20 negotiations, the contract terms, and contemplated future consequences do not show that GBC 21 Taiwan’s contacts with California constituted purposeful availment. 22 23 2. Claims Arising Out of, or Related to Forum Activities Turning to the second requirement for specific jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit has applied a 24 “but for test.” Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d at 924. Specifically, the court considers whether the 25 plaintiff’s claims would have arisen but for the foreign parent corporation’s contacts with the 26 forum state. Id. (citations omitted). As discussed supra, the Court finds that aside from the fact 27 that Plaintiff happens to reside in California, GBC Taiwan has almost no contacts with California. 28 9 Case No.: 5:13-CV-04939-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 1 Accordingly, Plaintiff has not satisfied the two-prong requirement to establish specific jurisdiction; 2 the Court will grant the Motion to Dismiss. 3. Reasonableness 3 Turning to the final requirement, because the Court has already found that Plaintiff has not 4 5 met the Ninth Circuit’s required burden in establishing specific jurisdiction, no further analysis is 6 necessary. 7 IV. Plaintiff has requested in her Opposition that should the Court determine that personal 8 9 Plaintiff’s Request for Transfer jurisdiction is lacking, a transfer of the matter to a New Jersey court would be appropriate, pursuant United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl. at 9, Dkt. No. 33. Under 28 11 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a district court may transfer any civil matter to any other district or division 12 where it might have been brought, but in doing so, the moving party bears the burden of showing 13 that transfer will serve the purposes of convenience of parties and witnesses, as well as the interests 14 of justice. Jaffe v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., No. 06-CV-3903-TEH, 2008 WL 2782713, at *1 15 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 2008) (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 16 279 (9th Cir. 1979)). Should Plaintiff wish to do so, Plaintiff may file a motion to transfer venue 17 with the Court and make the appropriate showing. 18 19 V. Conclusion The Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction over GBC Taiwan is 20 GRANTED. For the foregoing reasons, GBC Taiwan is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE so 21 that Plaintiff may pursue her claims in the correct forum. The hearing scheduled for August 22, 22 2014 is VACATED. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED 24 Dated: August 14, 2014 25 26 _________________________________ EDWARD J. DAVILA United States District Judge 27 28 10 Case No.: 5:13-CV-04939-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

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