Martinez v. Mann Packing Co, Inc, No. 5:2012cv02122 - Document 21 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
Court Description: ORDER granting 12 Motion to Remand by Judge Edward J. Davila (ejdlc4, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/18/2012)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Martinez v. Mann Packing Co, Inc Doc. 21 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 SAN JOSE DIVISION 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 JUAN MARTINEZ, on behalf of himself and on ) behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) MANN PACKING CO. INC., a California ) corporation; and DOES 1-50, inclusive ) ) Defendants. ) Case No.: 5:12-CV-02122-EJD ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND [Re: Docket No. 12] Before the court is Plaintiff Juan Martinez’s (“Plaintiff”) motion to remand this action to the Superior Court of Monterey County. Plaintiff contends that a remand is proper because his claims are rooted in state law and do not substantially depend on interpretation of his collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). Defendant Mann Packing Co., Inc. (“Defendant”) argues that federal subject matter jurisdiction is proper because Plaintiff’s claims are inextricably intertwined with the CBA, and thus are completely preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185. The court finds that the claims are not preempted, and GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to remand. 27 28 1 Case No.: 5:12-CV-02122-EJD ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND Dockets.Justia.com 1 I. 2 Background Plaintiff filed this suit on February 17, 2012 in the Superior Court of Monterey County, 3 Case No. M116476, on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated individuals. The 4 complaint alleges six statutory causes of action: 5 1. Failure to compensate for all hours worked, in violation of Cal. Labor Code § 204; 6 2. Failure to pay overtime wages, in violation of Cal. Labor Code § 510(a) and IWC 7 Wage Order 4-2001(3)(A)(1), 8 Cal. Code Regs. § 11040; 8 3. Failure to provide meal and rest periods in violation of California Labor Code §§ 9 226.7 and 512 and applicable IWC wage orders; United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 4. Failure to pay wages due and waiting time penalties in violation of California Labor 11 Code §§ 201-203; 12 5. Failure to properly itemize pay stubs in violation of California Labor Code §§ 13 226(a) and 226(e); and 14 6. Violation of California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. 15 Defendant removed the case to this court, claiming federal question jurisdiction. Specifically, 16 Defendant argued that Plaintiff’s claims are preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management 17 Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185, because they require substantial interpretation of the 18 collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) governing Plaintiff’s employment. Plaintiff then filed 19 this motion for remand. 20 21 II. Legal Standard A defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court if the action could have been 22 filed originally in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. A plaintiff may seek to have a case remanded to 23 the state court from which it was removed if the district court lacks jurisdiction or if there is a 24 defect in the removal procedure. 28 U .S.C. § 1447(c). The removal statutes are construed 25 restrictively so as to limit removal jurisdiction. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 26 108–09 (1941). The Ninth Circuit recognizes a “strong presumption against removal.” Gaus v. 27 Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal quotations omitted), and doubts as to 28 2 Case No.: 5:12-CV-02122-EJD ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND 1 removability are resolved in favor of remanding the case to state court. Matheson v. Progressive 2 Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003). The Defendant bears the burden of 3 showing that removal is proper. Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004). 4 5 III. Discussion Defendant argues that it properly removed this action because Plaintiff’s claims are 6 completely preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA. That section supplies federal jurisdiction 7 over “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing 8 employees in an industry affecting commerce[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The Supreme Court has 9 expanded the preemptive scope of Section 301 to cases for which resolution “is substantially United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 dependent upon analysis of the terms of [a CBA.]” Allis–Chambers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 11 220 (1985). 12 A state-law claim is preempted by Section 301 if it is “either based upon a collective- 13 bargaining agreement or dependent upon an interpretation of the agreement. Ramirez v. Fox 14 Television Station, 998 F.2d 743, 748 (9th Cir. 1993). When, as here, the complaint does not 15 allege breach of a collective bargaining agreement, courts must conduct a two-part inquiry to 16 determine whether Section 301 preempts Plaintiff’s claims: 17 First, the court must ask “whether the asserted cause of action involves a right conferred 18 upon an employee by virtue of state law, not by a CBA.” If the answer is no, then the claim 19 is preempted by 301. If the answer is yes, then the court must ask whether the claim is 20 “substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.” If the answer is 21 yes, then the claim is preempted by 301; if the answer is no, then “the claim can proceed 22 under state law.” 23 Rodriguez v. Pac. Steel Casting Co., No. 12-cv-00353, 2012 WL 2000793 at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 24 2012) (internal citations omitted), (citing Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th 25 Cir. 2007)). 26 27 28 3 Case No.: 5:12-CV-02122-EJD ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND 1 1. Plaintiff’s Claims Involve State Law Rights 2 First the court must determine whether Plaintiff’s claims are based on rights given by state law. Courts must consider “the legal character of a claim, as ‘independent’ of rights under the 4 collective-bargaining agreement, (and not whether a grievance arising from ‘precisely the same set 5 of facts’ could be pursued). Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 123 (1994) (internal citations 6 omitted). Here, Plaintiff’s claims rely clearly on rights created by state law. Plaintiff made no 7 mention of the CBA or violation of the CBA in his complaint. Instead, Plaintiff based each of his 8 six causes of action solely on California statutes and regulations. In doing so, Plaintiff has 9 demonstrated that the rights he relies on exist independently of his CBA. The Ninth Circuit has 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 3 held that when employees base their claims “on the protections afforded them by California state 11 law, without any reference to expectations or duties created by the [CBA],” then the claim is not 12 subject to preemption. Valles v. Ivy Hill Corp., 410 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2005). The court 13 finds that Defendant has failed to prove that Plaintiff’s claims satisfy the first step of the Burnside 14 test. As a result, Section 301 preemption is improper under this step. 15 2. Plaintiff’s Claims are not Substantially Dependent on Interpretation of the CBA 16 Having determined that Plaintiff’s claims arise from rights created by state law, the court 17 must now consider whether Plaintiff’s state law claims are substantially dependent on an 18 interpretation of the CBA. See Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1059. Section 301 preempts a state law 19 claim only if the court must interpret the CBA in order to resolve it. Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1060. 20 “The plaintiff's claim is the touchstone for this analysis; the need to interpret the collective 21 bargaining agreement must inhere in the nature of the plaintiff's claim.” Detabali v. St. Luke's 22 Hosp., 482 F.3d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). The claim must be 23 so “inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract” that the court 24 would be required to interpret the CBA. Allis–Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985). 25 The issues in this case are whether Plaintiff was appropriately paid for his time donning and 26 doffing required protective equipment, and whether the donning and doffing cut in to Plaintiff’s 27 30-minute meal breaks and 10-minute rest breaks. Plaintiff contends that his claims can be 28 4 Case No.: 5:12-CV-02122-EJD ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND 1 resolved by consulting paystubs, wage statements, time cards, and statements from class members, 2 without referencing the CBA. Defendant argues that because the CBA governs aspects of 3 Plaintiff’s employment related to donning and doffing, meal and rest breaks, and pay, that the CBA 4 must not only be referenced, but also interpreted, in order to resolve the claims. 5 Defendant argues that Firestone v. So. Cal. Gas Co. is particularly applicable. 219 F.2d 6 1063 (9th Cir. 2000). Firestone presented the question of whether plaintiffs received a “premium 7 wage rate” for overtime worked. The court determined that it must conduct a complex calculation, 8 requiring interpretation of the CBA, in order to determine whether plaintiffs were paid a premium 9 rate. Firestone, 219 F.2d at 1065-66. Plaintiff argues that Gregory v. SCIE, LLC is more readily United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 applicable. 317 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2003). In Gregory, the plaintiff alleged that defendant had 11 violated the California Labor Code and several Wage Orders by failing to pay him for overtime 12 work at premium wage rates. There, the Ninth Circuit found that because the plaintiff’s claim was 13 based entirely on state law and there was no dispute over the CBA terms or their interpretation, that 14 Section 301 did not preempt the claim. 15 This court agrees that the issues in this case are more similar to those presented in Gregory. 16 Like the plaintiff in that case, Plaintiff here alleges that he was not paid for all hours and overtime 17 hours worked, and was not given sufficient meal and rest periods Therefore, the issue “is not how 18 overtime rates are calculated but whether the result of the calculation complies with California 19 law.” Gregory at 1053 (emphasis in original). Defendant points to numerous provisions of the 20 CBA, including sections governing management rights, work rules, safety, clothing and equipment, 21 rest breaks, adjustment of breaks, overtime rate, daily recall, minimum work hours, wage rates for 22 combination jobs, out of classification work, and wage rates, to support its argument that the CBA 23 must be consulted “to determine the rate at which Plaintiff was to be paid, the amount of time he 24 must be compensated for, and the various safety and health policies that applied to his 25 employment.” Opp’n at 10:22-24, Dkt. No. 13. Despite these citations, Defendant has not 26 presented sufficient evidence to show that the court will be required to interpret a complex scheme 27 in the CBA, or even that the terms of the CBA are ambiguous. “[M]ere consultation of the CBA's 28 5 Case No.: 5:12-CV-02122-EJD ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND 1 terms, or a speculative reliance on the CBA will not suffice to preempt a state law claim.” Humble 2 v. Boeing Co., 305 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 3 255 F.3d 683, 691–92 (9th Cir. 2001) (“alleging a hypothetical connection between the claim and 4 the terms of the CBA is not enough to preempt the claim: adjudication of the claim must require 5 interpretation of a provision of the CBA. A creative linkage between the subject matter of the 6 claim and the wording of a CBA provision is insufficient ....”). Additionally, Defendant alleges that the CBA must be interpreted because in some 8 instances it provides for rights greater than state law requirements. That the CBA may expand the 9 rights granted by state law is of no import, because Plaintiff alleges only violation of California 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 7 statute. Furthermore, the Complaint does not seek damages for any violation of rights under the 11 CBA, but rather only for violations of the California Labor Code. 12 Defendant has failed to meet its burden of showing that the court must interpret the CBA in 13 order to resolve Plaintiff’s claims. Because the claims and the CBA are not “inexplicably 14 intertwined,” Section 301 preemption does not apply. The court therefore GRANTS Plaintiff’s 15 motion to remand. 16 17 18 19 IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the court REMANDS this action to the Monterey County Superior Court. The clerk shall CLOSE this matter. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 Dated: September 18, 2012 22 _________________________________ EDWARD J. DAVILA United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28 6 Case No.: 5:12-CV-02122-EJD ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
