Anderson v. Jamba Juice Company, No. 4:2012cv01213 - Document 44 (N.D. Cal. 2012)

Court Description: ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND re 23 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Jamba Juice Company. Signed by Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers on 8/24/12. (fs, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/24/2012) Modified on 8/27/2012 (fs, COURT STAFF).

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Anderson v. Jamba Juice Company Doc. 44 1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 6 7 8 KEVIN ANDERSON, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, 9 Plaintiff, 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 13 Case No.: 12-CV-01213 YGR ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION OF DEFENDANT JAMBA JUICE COMPANY WITH LEAVE TO AMEND vs. JAMBA JUICE COMPANY, Defendant. 14 15 Plaintiff filed this putative class action against Defendant Jamba Juice Company (“Jamba 16 Juice”), alleging that it falsely represented that its smoothie kits are “All Natural,” when they are 17 not. Plaintiff brings four claims, alleging violations of: (1) California’s Unfair Competition Law, 18 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq. (“UCL”); (2) California’s False Advertising Law, Cal. 19 Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500 et seq. (“FAL”); (3) the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, 20 Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750 et seq. (“CLRA”); and (4) the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 21 2301 et seq. (“MMWA”). 22 Jamba Juice has filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, (Dkt. No. 23 22 (“FAC”)), on two grounds: First, Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action, under the MMWA, fails 24 because the “All Natural” statement on the smoothie kits did not establish a written warranty. 25 Second, Plaintiff only purchased the smoothie kits in two of the five flavors, and therefore, he lacks 26 standing to bring claims based on products he never purchased. 27 28 Having carefully considered the papers submitted and the pleadings in this action, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART the Motion to Dismiss, and Dockets.Justia.com 1 DISM MISSES Plain ntiff’s Fourth Cause of Action WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.1 h A H 2 I. BACKG GROUND 3 Jamba Ju is a lead uice ding health food and bev f verage retaile (FAC ¶ 2 It has retail locations er. 2). 4 that offer fruit smoothies, fr resh squeezed juices, tea as/lattes, and snacks. (Id ¶¶ 2, 13.) Jamba Juice d d. e 5 o umer at-hom products, including fr me rozen novelt bars and a ty at-home smo oothie kits also offers consu 6 (“sm moothie kits” (Id. ¶¶ 2, 14.) Defen ”). , ndant’s smoo othie kits are at issue in t case. (I ¶ 2.) e this Id. Jamba Ju uice’s smoot kits are prominently labeled as “ thie y “All Natural and are av l,” vailable in 7 8 five flavors: Ma ango-a-go-g Strawberr Wild, Caribbean Pas go, ries ssion, Orang Dream M ge Machine, and 9 Razzmatazz. (Id ¶ 12.) By labeling its smoothie ki as “All N d. y its Natural,” Jam Juice has been able mba s harge a price premium for its smooth kits, whi cost abou $4.39 each (Id. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff e f hie ich ut h. to ch 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 alleg that the smoothie kit are not “A Natural,” and contain the followin unnatural ges s ts All n ng lly 12 proc cessed, synth hetic and/or non-natural ingredients: ascorbic ac steviol g : cid, glycosides, x xanthan gum m, 13 and citric acid. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 21-24.) 2 14 In Decem mber 2011, Plaintiff Kev Anderson purchased Jamba Juice Mango-a P vin n d e’s a-go-go and 15 Razzmatazz smo oothie kits. (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff relie on the rep P ed presentations that the sm moothie kits 16 were “All Natur when he made his pu e ral” e urchase. Th “All Natur represen he ral” ntation was m material to 17 Plaintiff’s decision to buy th smoothie kits, and he paid a price premium fo the Jamba Juice he e or a 18 smo oothie kits th he would not have pa had the tr facts bee disclosed to him. (Id.) Plaintiff hat aid rue en 19 filed this action on behalf of himself and a class of c d f d consumers w purchased one or mo of who ore 20 Defe fendant’s smoothie kits, which Plaint alleges w w tiff were falsely labeled as “A Natural” despite the All ” 21 inclu usion of the unnaturally processed, synthetic sub s bstances, or substances c created via c chemical 22 proc cessing. 23 II. L RD LEGAL STANDAR A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tes the legal s n sts sufficiency o the claims alleged in of s 24 25 the complaint. Ileto v. Gloc Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1 c I ck, 1199-1200 ( (9th Cir. 200 03). “Dismis can be ssal 26 base on the lac of a cogni ed ck izable legal theory or the absence of sufficient fa alleged under a t e f acts 27 1 28 Pur rsuant to Fede Rule of Civil Procedu 78(b) and Civil Local R 7-1(b), th Court finds this motion eral C ure Rule he appr ropriate for de ecision withou oral argum ut ment. Accordi ingly, the Cou VACATES the hearing s for Augus urt S set st 28, 2012. 2 2 1 cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 2 All allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the 3 plaintiff. Johnson v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 653 F.3d 1000, 1010 (9th Cir. 2011). To survive a motion 4 to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 5 relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 6 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). 7 Review is generally limited to the contents of the complaint and documents attached 8 thereto. Allarcom Pay Television. Ltd. v. Gen. Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 385 (9th Cir. 1995). 9 The Court may also consider a matter that is properly the subject of judicial notice without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001). Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a court may take 12 judicial notice of a fact not subject to reasonable dispute because it is generally known within the 13 trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose 14 accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 15 The parties have requested the Court take judicial notice of the First Amended Complaint 16 filed in this lawsuit, (Dkt. No. 22); the First Amended Complaint filed in Hairston v. South Beach 17 Beverage Co., Inc., CV 12-1429-JFW (C.D. Cal. May 1, 2012), (see Dkt. Nos. 23-2 & 39); an 18 exemplar of the Jamba Juice smoothie kits’ packaging at issue in this case; and a guidance 19 document from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) website, titled “FDA Basics- 20 Did you know that a store can sell food past the expiration date?” (see Dkt. Nos. 36-1 & 36-2). The 21 Court will take judicial notice of the court filings and the FDA Guidance Document. See Reyn’s 22 Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (courts “may take 23 judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record.”). Additionally, because neither 24 party contests the authenticity of the pictures of the Jamba Juice smoothie kits’ packaging, and 25 because these food product labels form the basis for Plaintiff’s allegations in the FAC, the Court 26 takes judicial notice of these materials. See Wright v. Gen’l Mills, Inc., 2009 WL 3247148 (S.D. 27 Cal. Sept. 30, 2009). 28 3 1 III. 2 3 DISCUS SSION A. WHETHER “ALL NATUR ” LANGU RAL UAGE ON PR RODUCT PAC CKAGING CO ONSTITUTES A WRITTEN WARRANTY UNDER TH MAGNUSO MOSS WARRANTY ACT? Y HE ON Plaintiff Fourth Ca f’s ause of Actio alleges th Jamba Ju on hat uice’s represe entations tha its at 4 smo oothie kits ar “All Natur violates the Magnus Moss W re ral” son Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et , §§ 5 seq., which prov vides a consu umer remedy for breach of a written warranty m y h n made in conn nection with 6 the sale of a con s nsumer produ Accord uct. ding to the FA labeling the smooth kits as “A Natural” AC, g hie All 7 crea a written warranty th the ingre ated n hat edients in the smoothie k were free of a particu type of e kits e ular 8 defe (i.e., that they were not synthetic, artificial an ect n , nd/or otherw non-natu wise ural). FAC ¶ 64. In 9 Plaintiff’s view, by failing to provide sm , moothie kits that contain only “All Natural” in ned ngredients, mba eached this written warra w anty (i.e., the smoothie k contained unnaturally processed, e kits d Jam Juice bre 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 synt thetic and/or non-natural ingredients and therefo were no defect free Id. ¶ 65. r l s, ore, ot e). 12 Jamba Ju argues that Plaintiff MMWA claim must b dismissed because th phrase uice t f’s be d he 13 “All Natural” do not fit within the stat l oes w tute’s definit tion of a “wr ritten warran nty.” The M MMWA 14 defines a written warranty as follows: n a 15 any writt affirmati of fact or written pro ten ion omise made in connectio with the s on sale of a cons sumer produ by a supp uct plier to a buy which relates to the n yer nature of the e material or workman nship and aff ffirms or prom mises that su material or workman uch l nship is defect free or will meet a spec t cified level o performan over a sp of nce pecified perio of od time. 16 17 18 15 U.S.C. § 230 U 01(6)(A). Plaintiff maintains th the langu f hat uage “All Na atural” on th smoothie k he kits’ labels “ “relates to 19 20 the nature of the material” and is a writt affirmati of fact or promise as to the qualit and n e a ten ion r ty 21 cont tents of the product–that the smoothie kits are “d p t defect free.”2 Relying u ” upon court de ecisions 22 inter rpreting the California Commercial Code, Plaint argues th courts ha found tha the C tiff hat ave at 23 lang guage “All Natural” can create a war N rranty. See P Opp’n 6 (citing V Pl’s 6-7 Vicuna v. Alex Foods, xia 24 Inc., Case No. C-11-6119 PJH, 2012 WL 1497507, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27 2012); In re Ferrero C W 7, 25 g., upp. 7 2 Jamba Juice points out, these cases a e are Litig 794 F. Su 2d 1107 (S.D. Cal. 2011)). As J 26 2 27 28 The Court agree with Plaintiff that “defec free” and “ es ct “specified leve of perform el mance over a s specified od re ases ish warranty unde the MMWA. Because P er Plaintiff’s perio of time” ar separate ba to establi a written w claim is under the “defect free” theory, the representation does not ne a tempora element to e m e n eed al establish a writt warranty. ten 4 1 inapposite because Plaintiff’s warranty claim is under the MMWA, which defines written warranty 2 differently than does California state law.3 Jamba Juice argues that the language “All Natural” on 3 the smoothie kits’ labels does not constitute a written warranty within the meaning of the MMWA. 4 The Court agrees. District Courts have held consistently that labeling a product “All Natural” is not a “written 5 warranty” under the MMWA. See Astiana v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., C-11-2910 EMC, 7 2012 WL 2990766 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 20, 2012) (claim that food product is “natural” describes product 8 but does not give assurance that product is defect free and therefore does not create warranty); 9 Littlehale v. Trader Joe’s Co., C-11-6342 PJH, Dkt. No. 48, (N.D. Cal. Jul. 2, 2012) (statements 10 “Pure Natural” and “All Natural” are “mere product descriptions,” not “affirmations or promises 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 6 that the products are defect free”); Larsen v. Nonni’s Foods, LLC, C-11-05188 SI, Dkt. No. 41 12 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 14, 2012) (“All Natural” and “100% Natural” are not written warranties promising 13 that food products are defect free because “this Court is not persuaded that being ‘synthetic’ or 14 ‘artificial’ is a ‘defect.’”); Hairston v. South Beach Beverage Co., Inc., 2012 WL 1893818 (C.D. 15 Cal. May 18, 2012) (representations that beverage was “all natural with vitamins” “are product 16 descriptions rather than promises that Lifewater is defect-free or guarantees of specific performance 17 levels.”). The Court finds the reasoning in these cases persuasive. The statement “All Natural” is a general product description rather than a promise that the 18 19 product is defect free. See Larsen, supra, C-11-05188 SI, Dkt. No. 41 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 14, 2012) 20 (rejecting claim that the use of synthetic ingredients in food labeled “all natural” rendered that food 21 defective, reasoning the “deliberate use of [synthetic] ingredients does not comport with the plain 22 meaning of the word ‘defect.’”). A product description does not constitute a written warranty under 23 the MMWA. See Littlehale, supra, C-11-6342 PJH, Dkt. No. 48, (N.D. Cal. Jul. 2, 2012) (“To 24 accept plaintiffs’ argument [that the statement “All Natural” promises the product is defect free] 25 would be to transform most, if not all, product descriptions into warranties against a defect, and 26 3 27 28 Plaintiff also cites In re McDonald’s French Fries Litig., 503 F. Supp. 2d 953, 958 (N.D. Ill. 2007), which did involve a breach of written warranty claim under the MMWA. That case, however, addressed only whether privity of contract is required for a warranty claim under the MMWA. The district court did not address whether advertising french fries as safe for consumption by individuals with food allergies created a warranty. 5 1 plain ntiffs have not articulate any limiting principle to convince the court ot n ed e e therwise.”). Therefore, 2 the language “A Natural” on the smoothie kits’ lab did not c l All o bels create a writ warranty within the tten y 3 mea aning of the MMWA. M 4 Based on the foregoi analysis, the Court G RANTS the motion to di n ing , ismiss Plain ntiff’s claim 5 for breach of wr b ritten warran under the Magnuson Moss Warra nty e anty Act WI LEAVE TO AMEND ITH 6 to th extent som other bas may exist for this clai he me sis t im. 7 B. 8 WHETHER PLAINTIFF HAS STANDIN TO BRING CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF NG G PURCHASERS OF FLAVO PLAINTI DID NOT BUY? ORS IFF T Standing under Artic III and th UCL, FAL and CLRA requires th a plaintif has g cle he L, A hat ff 9 suff fered an injur ry-in-fact. Lujan v. Defe L fenders of Wi Wildlife, 504 U 555, 56 (1992); Bo U.S. 60 ower v. 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 AT& Mobility, LLC, 196 Cal. App. 4th 1545, 1554 &T C h 4-56 (Cal. Ct App. 2011 4 In additi to the t. 1). ion 12 inju ury-in-fact re equirement, standing und the UCL, FAL and C s der , CLRA, requires that a pla aintiff “has 13 lost money or pr roperty” as a result of th defendant ’s alleged co he onduct. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 14 §§ 17204, 17535 Cal. Civ. Code § 1780 1 5; 0(a). Jamba Ju argues that Plaintiff does not ha standing to bring cla uice t f ave g aims on beha of alf 15 16 purc chasers of sm moothie kit flavors he did not buy: S f Strawberries Wild, Carib bbean Passion and n, 17 Oran Dream Machine. (F nge M FAC ¶ 28.) Plaintiff only alleges tha he purchas Mango-a P y at sed a-go-go and 18 Razzmatazz smo oothie kits. (Id. ¶ 12.) Thus, Jamba Juice argue that Plaint T a es tiff’s claims as to the 19 awberries Wi Caribbea Passion, and Orange D ild, an a Dream Machine smooth kits shoul be hie ld Stra 20 dism missed for la of jurisdi ack iction and fo failure to s or state a claim because Pla m aintiff has fa ailed to 21 alleg that he pu ge urchased tho three smo ose oothie kit pro oducts, let a alone that he suffered any injury y 22 from them. m ties ze ct this have diverged on the issu of whether d ue The part recogniz that distric courts in t circuit h 23 24 a pla aintiff has st tanding to br ring claims on behalf of consumers w purchas similar, b not o who sed but 25 iden ntical produc See Don cts. nohue v. App Inc., F Supp. 2d , 11-CV-0 ple, F. 05337 RMW 2012 WL W, 26 1657 7119, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2012 (noting di ( M 2) ivergence an collecting cases). Pla nd g aintiff argues s 27 28 4 To establish Art ticle III standing, a plaintif must satisfy three eleme ff y ents: (1) injury y-in-fact; (2) causation; and (3) redressability. Lujan, supra, 504 U.S. at 560-61 . s U 6 1 that he has standing to represent a class of consumers with regard to a product he did not purchase 2 so long as his claims are based on the “‘same core factual allegations and causes of action.’” Pl’s 3 Opp’n 10.5 Defendant argues that this case is more similar to the Johns v. Bayer Corp., No. 09- 4 1935 DMS, 2010 WL 476688 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010) (purchaser of One A Day Men’s Health 5 Formula vitamin product lacks standing to sue on behalf of purchasers of One A Day Men’s 50+ 6 Advantage vitamin product), which held that a plaintiff “cannot expand the scope of his claims to 7 include a product he did not purchase.” The “critical inquiry [in these cases] seems to be whether there is sufficient similarity 8 9 between the products purchased and not purchased.” Astiana, supra, C-11-2910 EMC, 2012 WL 2990766, at *11 (different flavors of ice cream carried under different brand names, Edy’s/Dreyer’s 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 and Haagen-Daz, sufficiently similar where same wrongful conduct applied).6 If there is a 12 sufficient similarity between the products, any concerns regarding material differences in the 13 products can be addressed at the class certification stage. Id.; Donohue, supra, 2012 WL 1657119, 14 at *6 (allowing plaintiff to represent a class of persons who purchased different but similar products 15 reasoning that “questions of whether common issues predominate and whether plaintiff can 16 adequately represent absent class members, [are] issues that are better resolved at the class 17 certification stage.”). Here, Plaintiff is challenging the “All Natural” labeling of Jamba Juice at-home smoothie 18 19 kits, which comes in a variety of flavors Mango-a-go-go, Strawberries Wild, Caribbean Passion, 20 Orange Dream Machine, and Razzmatazz. There is sufficient similarity between the products 21 5 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff cites Wang v. OCZ Techn. Group, Inc., 276 F.R.D. 618, 632-33 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (denying motion to strike claims with respect to computer models plaintiffs did not purchase; more appropriate to resolve issue on Rule 12(b) motion or on class certification motion); Carideo v. Dell Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1134 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (standing under Washington state law for products not purchased where causes of action and factual allegations were the same); and Hewlett-Packard v. Super. Ct., 167 Cal. App. 4th 87, 8991 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (denying writ to vacate order certifying class of computer purchasers for lack of community of interest where class included models of computers plaintiff had not purchased). 6 Compare with Carrea v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., C-10-01044 JSW, 2011 WL 159380 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2011), aff’d, 2012 WL 1131526 (9th Cir. Apr. 5, 2012) (plaintiff had standing to bring claim as to Defendant’s Original Vanilla Drumstick ice cream product he purchased but not as to the Dibs products because he did not allege that he purchased Dibs or otherwise suffered any injury or lost money or property with respect to those products); Larsen, supra, C-11-05188 SI, Dkt. No. 41 (purchasers of cookies, juices, cinnamon rolls, and biscuits did not have standing to bring claims as to crescent rolls they did not purchase). 7 1 purc chased (Man ngo-a-go-go and Razzma atazz smooth kits) and the products not purcha hie ased 2 (Strawberries Wild, Caribbe Passion, and Orange Dream Mac W ean e chine smoothie kits) bec cause the 3 me isrepresentat tion was on all of the sm moothie kit re egardless of flavor; all sm f moothie kits s sam alleged mi 4 are labeled “All Natural,” an all smoot kits cont l nd thie tain allegedl non-natural ingredient (xanthan ly ts 5 gum ascorbic acid and steviol gycoside Therefor the Court finds that P m, es). re, t Plaintiff has standing, to 6 brin claims on behalf of pu ng urchasers of smoothie kit flavors he did not buy, and the Cou has t urt 7 subj matter ju ject urisdiction over such cla o aims. Based on the foregoi analysis, the Court DENIES the M n ing , Motion to Di ismiss for la of ack 8 9 10 stan nding. IV. LUSION CONCL United States District Court Northern District of California 11 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GR r fo t RANTS IN PA ART the Mot tion to Dism miss. 12 Plaintiff Fourth Ca f’s ause of Actio for breach of warrant under the Magnuson M on h ty Moss 13 14 15 War rranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 et seq is DISMIS SED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 1 q., No later than Septem mber 14, 2012, Plaintiff shall file eit f ther (i) a sec cond amende complaint ed t or (i a notice th he intend to proceed on the Firs Amended Complaint. ii) hat ds d st 16 Within 21 days of th filing of th above, De 2 he he efendant sha file a resp all ponse. 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 19 Date: August 24, 2012 2 __ __________ ___________ __________ __________ YVON GONZAL ROGERS NNE LEZ UNITED ST TATES DISTR RICT COURT JUDGE T 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8

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