Darryl Ransom v. Ben Curry, No. 4:2008cv03571 - Document 29 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. Signed by Judge Claudia Wilken on 9/30/09. (scc, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/30/2009)
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Darryl Ransom v. Ben Curry Doc. 29 1 2 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 4 5 DARRYL RANSOM, 6 7 8 No. CV 08-3571 CW Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS v. BEN CURRY, Warden, 9 Respondent. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 / (Docket No. 28) 11 12 13 INTRODUCTION Petitioner, a pro se state prisoner, filed this petition in 14 2007 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 15 finding by the California Board of Parole Hearings (Board) that he 16 is unsuitable for parole.1 17 petition is DENIED. 18 19 Petitioner challenges a 2005 For the reasons set forth below, the BACKGROUND In 1983, Petitioner shot and killed Arthur Bernard Chappell 20 while burglarizing Chappell's house. 21 house after killing him, and returned later that night with a 22 "crime partner" and took Chappell's stereo equipment. 23 asserts that his shooting of Chappell was an accident caused when 24 Chappell awoke and startled Petitioner. Petitioner left Chappell's Petitioner Petitioner asserts that he 25 26 27 28 1 Petitioner filed this action in the Central District of California. The action was transferred to the Northern District on the grounds that venue was proper here because Petitioner is currently housed in the Northern District in Soledad State Prison. (Docket No. 22.) Dockets.Justia.com 1 was not burglarizing the residence, but rather was trying to 2 recover PCP from Chappell, who had failed to pay Petitioner for the 3 drug. 4 In 1989, Petitioner, pursuant to a plea agreement, plead guilty to 5 second degree murder, see Cal. Pen. Code 6 The Superior Court of Los Angeles sentenced Petitioner to fifteen 7 years to life in state prison. 8 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 9 (Ans., Lodgement 3 (Transcript of Parole Hearing) at 11-12.) § 187. (Am. Pet. at 2.) (Id.) In September, 2005, the Board found Petitioner unsuitable for parole. In reaching its decision, the Board reviewed Petitioner's 10 record, including the circumstances of the commitment offense, his 11 criminal and social history, his prison disciplinary record, his 12 psychological report, his participation in self-help, and his 13 parole plans. 14 manner that was "especially cruel and callous," and which 15 "demonstrates an exceptional[ly] callous disregard for human 16 suffering." 17 the "motive for the crime was very trivial in relation to the 18 offense," in that Chappell was killed over a drug deal. 19 91-92.) 20 The Board found that the offense was carried out in (Ans., Lodgement 3 at 91.) The Board also found that (Id. at The Board expressed great concern over Petitioner's unstable 21 social history and his rather extensive criminal history. 22 social history includes his parents' separation when he was 23 thirteen, the shooting death of a brother, and his witnessing the 24 highly traumatic shooting death of a childhood friend when 25 Petitioner was ten or eleven. 26 Petitioner's criminal history, which in addition to nine adult 27 arrests (id. at 35), includes an arrest at the age of fourteen for 28 His (Id. at 20-21 & 25-26.) 2 1 assault with a deadly weapon, and detention in the California Youth 2 Authority (CYA) for his association in the gang-related killing of 3 man. 4 kidnapping of a gang member. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 5 Petitioner also served time in the CYA for his role in the (Id. at 22-24, 30-31.) The Board reviewed Petitioner's prison disciplinary history 6 and latest psychological report. 7 three serious disciplinary infractions, the last occurring in 1997, 8 most of which involved a "fight or violence," such as "[r]esisting 9 staff, fighting, [or] [c]ombat." It noted that Petitioner had (Id. at 60-61, 62, 97.) 10 Petitioner's latest psychological report, authored in 1998, states 11 that, in light of various factors including his strong family 12 support, Petitioner's "violence potential if released to the 13 community is . . . below average." 14 noted, however, that if Petitioner were to use drugs again, his 15 violence potential "would be considerably higher." 16 The Board took notice that Petitioner had a "history of anti-social 17 personality disorder." 18 (Id. at 63-64.) The report (Id. at 64.) (Id. at 63.) The Board acknowledged that Petitioner had participated 19 extensively in self-help programs, including Narcotics Anonymous 20 and anger management. 21 Petitioner had parole plans, which included offers of support from 22 his wife, and working at his uncle's trucking company. 23 57 & 65.) 24 Angeles District Attorney, who voiced his office's opposition to 25 parole. 26 parole based on the circumstances of his commitment offense, his 27 criminal history, and a need for further participation in self- 28 (Id. at 59 & 60.) It was also noted that (Id. at 56- The Board also heard from a representative of the Los (Id. at 85.) The Board found Petitioner unsuitable for 3 1 help. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 2 (Id. at 91-97.) In response to the Board's decision, Petitioner filed state 3 habeas petitions, later denied, in the California superior, 4 appellate, and supreme courts. 5 of Los Angeles issued the last reasoned decision. 6 that the Board's decision was supported by some evidence, including 7 that the commitment offense was carried out in a dispassionate and 8 calculated manner, and that Petitioner needed additional 9 institutional programming, and had a juvenile criminal history that (Pet. at 4-5.) The Superior Court 10 included murder and an unstable social history. 11 (Order of the Los Angeles Superior Court) at 1-2.) 12 That court found (Ans., Lodgement 5 As grounds for federal habeas relief, Petitioner alleges that 13 (1) the Board's decision violated his rights to due process because 14 it was not supported by some evidence and (2) the Board must 15 provide the "reciprocal benefits" promised to Petitioner in his 16 plea agreement.2 17 18 19 DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review Because this case involves a federal habeas corpus challenge 20 to a state parole eligibility decision, the applicable standard is 21 contained in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 22 1996 (AEDPA). 23 2002). McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 24 25 26 27 28 2 Petitioner has advanced several other claims--that the Board's decision was pro forma, that the Board ignored evidence in favor of a suitability finding and that the Board disregarded the sentencing matrix--which will be addressed under the Court's analysis of the first claim. 4 1 2 unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted 3 in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 4 application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by 5 the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a 6 decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the 7 facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 8 proceeding." 9 362, 412 (2000). 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California Under AEDPA, a district court may not grant habeas relief 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. A federal court must presume the correctness of the state court's factual findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 11 Where, as here, the highest state court to reach the merits 12 issued a summary opinion which does not explain the rationale of 13 its decision, federal court review under § 2254(d) is of the last 14 state court opinion to reach the merits. 15 964, 970-71, 973-78 (9th Cir. 2000). 16 court opinion to address the merits of Petitioner's claim is that 17 of the superior court. 18 II. Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d In this case, the last state Analysis 19 A. 20 Petitioner claims that the Board's decision deprived him of Due Process Claim 21 his right to due process because it was not based on "some 22 evidence" that Petitioner is not suitable for parole, i.e., that if 23 released, he poses an unreasonable risk of danger to society. 24 Pet. at 5.) 25 reliance on the circumstances of the commitment offense violates 26 due process, that the Board engaged in a pro forma review, ignored 27 the guidelines of the sentencing matrix, and failed to consider 28 (Am. Petitioner also contends that the Board's continued 5 1 2 (Id. at 5-6(B).) The United States Supreme Court has clearly established that a 3 parole board's decision deprives a prisoner of due process with 4 respect to his constitutionally protected liberty interest in a 5 parole release date if the board's decision is not supported by 6 “some evidence in the record,” or is “otherwise arbitrary.” 7 v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 8 2006) (citing Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985)). 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California evidence of parole suitability. Sass When assessing whether a state parole board's suitability 10 determination was supported by “some evidence,” the court's 11 analysis is framed by the statutes and regulations governing parole 12 suitability determinations in the relevant state. 13 at 1128. 14 California law to determine the findings that are necessary to deem 15 a prisoner unsuitable for parole, and then must review the record 16 to determine whether the state court decision constituted an 17 unreasonable application of the “some evidence” principle. 18 Sass, 461 F.3d Accordingly, in California, the court must look to Id. California law provides that a parole date is to be granted 19 unless it is determined “that the gravity of the current convicted 20 offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past 21 convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the 22 public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration.” 23 Cal. Pen. Code § 3041(b). 24 The California Code of Regulations sets out the factors 25 showing suitability or unsuitability for parole that the Board is 26 required to consider. 27 These include “[a]ll relevant, reliable information available,” 28 See 15 Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 2402(b). 6 1 such as, 2 the circumstances of the prisoner's social history; past and present mental state; past criminal history, including involvement in other criminal misconduct which is reliably documented; the base and other commitment offenses, including behavior before, during and after the crime; past and present attitude toward the crime; any conditions of treatment or control, including the use of special conditions under which the prisoner may safely be released to the community; and any other information which bears on the prisoner's suitability for release. Circumstances which taken alone may not firmly establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to a pattern which results in finding of unsuitability. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 Id. 12 Circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole include 13 the nature of the commitment offense and whether “[t]he prisoner 14 committed the offense in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel 15 manner.” 16 victims, whether "[t]he offense was carried out in a dispassionate 17 and calculated manner,” whether the victim was “abused, defiled or 18 mutilated during or after the offense,” whether “[t]he offense was 19 carried out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally callous 20 disregard for human suffering,” and whether “[t]he motive for the 21 crime is inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense.” 22 Id. 23 are a previous record of violence, an unstable social history, 24 previous sadistic sexual offenses, a history of severe mental 25 health problems related to the offense, and serious misconduct in 26 prison or jail. 27 28 Id. at (c). This includes consideration of the number of Other circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole Id. Circumstances tending to support a finding of suitability for 7 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 parole include no juvenile record, a stable social history, signs 2 of remorse, that the crime was committed as a result of significant 3 stress in the prisoner's life, a lack of criminal history, a 4 reduced possibility of recidivism due to the prisoner's present 5 age, that the prisoner has made realistic plans for release or has 6 developed marketable skills that can be put to use upon release, 7 and that the prisoner's institutional activities indicate an 8 enhanced ability to function within the law upon release. 9 (d). Id. at In a recent decision, the California Supreme Court stated 10 that due process is denied when "an inquiry focuse[s] only upon the 11 existence of unsuitability factors." 12 1181, 1208 (2008). 13 In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th Applying these legal principles to the instant matter, the 14 Court concludes that Petitioner has not shown that the Board's 15 decision violated his right to due process. 16 Board's decision was supported by "some evidence." 17 the commitment offense, there is evidence to support the Board's 18 determination that the killing of Chappell was carried out in a 19 manner that was "especially cruel and callous" and that 20 "demonstrates an exceptional[ly] callous disregard for human 21 suffering." 22 while armed, Petitioner, displeased that Chappell had not paid him 23 for some drugs, illegally entered Chappell's residence at night 24 while Chappell slept, to reclaim the packet of drugs, and during 25 this burglary shot him to death. 26 Petitioner intended to retrieve his property by stealth, as shown 27 by his entering at night when Chappell was asleep and unprotected, 28 (Ans., Lodgement 3 at 91-92.) In other words, the First, as to The record shows that, These facts indicate that 8 1 and that he was prepared to use deadly force, as his use of the gun 2 indicates. 3 retrieve drugs also supports the Board's finding that the crime was 4 trivial in relation to the offense. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 5 The fact that Petitioner was prepared to use force to Second, contrary to Petitioner's assertion that the Board 6 violated due process by its continued reliance solely on the 7 circumstances of the commitment offense (Am. Pet. at 5(A)), the 8 record indicates that the Board relied on other factors, such as 9 Petitioner's criminal and social history, his psychological report, 10 and his prison disciplinary history. 11 that Petitioner had nine adult arrests and several serious juvenile 12 offenses on his record, and that he had an unstable social history. 13 His psychological report stated that he had an anti-social 14 personality disorder. 15 three serious disciplinary infractions, which included acts of 16 violence. 17 on the circumstances of the commitment offense as the sole basis 18 for denying parole can, over time, raise due process concerns. 19 Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 916 (9th Cir. 2003). 20 cases, indefinite detention based solely on an inmate's commitment 21 offense, regardless of the extent of his rehabilitation, will at 22 some point violate due process, given the liberty interest in 23 parole that flows from the relevant California statutes." 24 Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 854 (9th Cir. 2007). 25 while the circumstances of the commitment offense may in the future 26 cease to have probative value on the issue of Petitioner's 27 suitability for parole, they are, at present and combined with 28 Specifically, the Board noted Also, while in prison, Petitioner committed It is true that a parole authority's continued reliance 9 See "[I]n some Irons v. In the instant matter, United States District Court For the Northern District of California 1 other factors, "some evidence" to support the Board's decision. 2 Third, contrary to Petitioner's assertion that the Board 3 merely engaged in a pro forma review of his parole suitability (Am. 4 Pet. at 5), the record indicates that the Board thoroughly examined 5 Petitioner's entire record, took into account the specific 6 circumstances of his social and criminal history, asked relevant 7 questions, and reached a decision after an individualized study of 8 Petitioner's record. 9 Fourth, Petitioner contends that the Board ignored the 10 guidance provided by California's Sentencing Matrix when reaching 11 its decision. 12 assertion, the Board is under no duty to apply the matrix once it 13 has determined that a prisoner is unsuitable for parole. 14 Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1069, 1071 (2005). 15 (Am. Pet. at 6(A).) Contrary to Petitioner's In Re Fifth, Petitioner's assertion that the Board failed to 16 consider factors in favor of a finding of suitability (Am. Pet. at 17 6) is without merit. 18 such parole suitability factors as Petitioner's plans for parole 19 and his participation in self-help programming. 20 The record shows that the Board did consider Based on this record, the Court concludes that Petitioner has 21 not shown that the Board's decision violated his right to due 22 process. 23 constitutional rights, the state court's adjudication of the matter 24 did not result in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 25 unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or 26 that resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 27 determination of the facts. 28 Because the Board's decision did not violate his Accordingly, Petitioner's due process 10 1 2 B. 3 Petitioner claims that the Board violated his plea agreement 4 by failing to give him the "reciprocal benefits" promised to him, 5 that is, the granting of parole. 6 United States District Court For the Northern District of California claims are denied. Plea Agreement Claim (Am. Pet. at 6(B).) Plea agreements are contractual in nature and subject to 7 contract law standards of interpretation. 8 1198, 1207 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 9 670, 677-78 (1997)). In re Ellis, 356 F.3d Thus, a petitioner is entitled to habeas 10 relief if he or she enters into a plea agreement with a state 11 prosecutor, and the prosecutor breaches the agreement. 12 Ignacio, 263 F.3d 965, 969-70 (9th Cir. 2001). Gunn v. 13 Petitioner's claim is without merit because he has received 14 the reciprocal benefit of his plea agreement, that is, a shorter 15 sentence. 16 years to life by pleading to second degree murder, rather than a 17 sentence of life imprisonment without parole or death if he had 18 been convicted at trial. 19 with first degree murder, Cal. Pen. Code § 187, while in the 20 commission of a robbery, first and second degree burglary, id. §§ 21 460 and 190.2(a)(17), and a firearm enhancement, id. § 12022.5. 22 (Ans., Lodgement 2 at 1.) 23 his agreement, and has admitted as much. 24 Petitioner indicated that he was pleading guilty "to take advantage 25 of a plea bargain." 26 27 28 Specifically, Petitioner received a sentence of fifteen The information had charged Petitioner Petitioner has received the benefit of In his plea agreement, (Ans., Lodgement 10 at 2.) Petitioner's sentence allows for the possibility of parole, provided that he meets the requirements for a finding of parole 11 1 suitability. 2 decision that Petitioner did not meet the requirements for a 3 finding of parole suitability is supported by some evidence. 4 this record, Petitioner has not shown that the Board's denial of 5 parole is a breach of his plea agreement. 6 As discussed above, the Court finds that the Board's Petitioner's claim is denied. 7 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. Petitioner's motion to submit a letter brief (Docket No. 28) 11 is GRANTED. 12 This order terminates Docket No. 28. 13 The Court deems the letter brief as properly filed. The Clerk of the Court shall terminate all pending motions, 14 enter judgment and close the file. 15 costs. 16 17 Each party shall bear his own IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: 9/30/09 CLAUDIA WILKEN United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 On 12 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 2 3 DARRYL RANSOM, Case Number: CV08-03571 CW 4 Plaintiff, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 5 v. 6 BEN CURRY et al, 7 Defendant. / 8 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 12 I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court, Northern District of California. That on September 30, 2009, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office. 13 14 17 Darryl Ransom CDC E-40704 Correctional Training Facility-Central FW-315-Low P O Box 689 Soledad, CA 93960-0689 18 Dated: September 30, 2009 15 16 19 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13
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