J.R. et al v. Lakeport Unified School District et al, No. 3:2018cv06211 - Document 53 (N.D. Cal. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART KELSEYVILLE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT'S MOTION TO DISMISS by Judge William Alsup [granting in part and denying in part 33 Motion to Dismiss]. Motion for leave to amend complaint due by 1/14/2019. (whasec, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/21/2018)
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J.R. et al v. Lakeport Unified School District et al Doc. 53 1 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 12 J.R., a minor, by and through her parent and Guardian ad Litem, S. Ringer, and O.G., a minor, by and through his parent and Guardian ad Litem, A. Valdenegro, Plaintiffs, 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 No. C 18-06211 WHA v. LAKEPORT UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; KELSEYVILLE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART KELSEYVILLE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT’S MOTION TO DISMISS Defendants. / INTRODUCTION In this action brought by a parent against a school district, the district moves to dismiss. The district's motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. STATEMENT Plaintiffs O.G. and J.R., both minors under the age of eighteen, bring this action against 24 defendants Kelseyville Unified School District and Lakeport Unified School District under 25 several legal theories. Plaintiff J.R. has not made any allegations against Kelseyville Unified 26 School District. As such, this order only addresses plaintiff O.G.’s allegations against 27 28 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Kelseyville Unified School District. The following is taken from the allegations set forth in 2 plaintiffs’ first amended complaint (Dkt. No. 22). For the Northern District of California United States District Court 3 Plaintiff O.G. is a male student with special needs, who was twelve years old at the 4 time the alleged harassment began. Plaintiff O.G. alleges that while he was a student at 5 Terrace Middle School in the Lakeport Unified School District, he was bullied and sexually 6 harassed by “Bully,” a fellow student.* Throughout the 2014–2015 school year, plaintiff 7 alleges he was grabbed, pinned against school walls and fences, was called “gay” and a “little 8 girl,” and was repeatedly sodomized in the school’s restroom during recess. Plaintiff’s 9 disability and fear of Bully prevented him from reporting the abuse until the end of the school 10 year. As soon as plaintiff disclosed the abuse to his mother, she reported it to Terrace Middle 11 School. The principal, however, did not respond until the end of the summer and took no 12 further action. As a result of Lakeport Unified School District's failure to take any corrective 13 action, plaintiff transferred to Mountain Vista Middle School in the Kelseyville Unified School 14 District at the beginning of the 2015–2016 school year (First Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 21–23, 25–27). 15 Before his first day at Mountain Vista Middle School, plaintiff’s mother informed the 16 school principal at the time that plaintiff had transferred schools because of Bully’s abuse. 17 Plaintiff thrived at his new school. In the fall of 2016, however, Bully was transferred to 18 Mountain Vista Middle School from Terrace Middle School. By then, the principal to whom 19 plaintiff’s mother had spoken about the prior harassment plaintiff suffered was no longer 20 employed at Mountain Vista and a new principal had been hired. Plaintiff has not alleged that, 21 at the time of Bully’s transfer, his mother contacted the new principal to inform him of Bully’s 22 prior harassment (FAC ¶¶ 35, 41). 23 Upon Bully’s transfer to Mountain Vista, he immediately began taunting plaintiff, 24 stating “O.G, O.G., remember me?” Plaintiff alleges that Bully also stalked him in the halls, 25 pinned him against a wall and called him “gay,” and grabbed him then poked him in the anus 26 on the outside of his clothing (FAC ¶¶ 35, 40). 27 28 * For the purposes of this order, “Bully” refers to the harassing minor. The complaint does not allege Bully’s legal name. 2 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 1 Once plaintiff’s mother found out Bully was attending Mountain Vista Middle School 2 and had resumed harassing plaintiff, she contacted the new school principal and pulled plaintiff 3 out of school. Plaintiff’s mother met with the principal and the school’s individualized 4 education plan (IEP) team to explain how the ongoing abuse was affecting plaintiff. Plaintiff’s 5 mother told both the principal and the IEP team that she had informed the predecessor 6 principal at Mountain Vista about the abuse plaintiff suffered at Terrace Middle School and 7 how that ultimately led to his transfer to Mountain Vista in the fall of 2015. Plaintiff’s mother 8 expressed concern that plaintiff was, once again, showing signs of fear and emotional 9 deterioration as a result of Bully’s harassment (FAC ¶¶ 35, 41–42). 10 Mountain Vista’s principal informed plaintiff’s mother that the school was unable to 11 completely protect plaintiff from Bully. The principal also stated that because Bully resided 12 within Kelseyville Unified School District and plaintiff did not, Bully was the district’s 13 priority, and not plaintiff. Plaintiff’s mother responded by permanently removing plaintiff 14 from Mountain Vista Middle School (FAC ¶¶ 44–44). 15 Plaintiff commenced this action against Kelseyville Unified School District in the 16 Superior Court for the County of Lake on October 11. Kelseyville Unified School District 17 removed this action to this Court on federal question removal grounds (Dkt. No. 1). 18 The complaint alleges the following claims against Kelseyville Unified School District: 19 (1) negligence under Section 815.2(a) of the California Government Code; (2) violation of 20 Section 220 of the California Education Code; (3) deliberate indifference under Title XI; 21 (4) disability discrimination under the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; 22 and (5) disability discrimination under the Unruh Civil Rights Act and Disabled Persons Act. 23 Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of general damages, specific damages, compensatory damages, 24 punitive damages, injunctive relief, statutory interests, costs, and attorney’s fees. Kelseyville 25 Unified School District now moves to dismiss the federal claim. 26 On October 18, defendant Lakeport Unified School District moved to stay this action in 27 its entirety, pending the California Supreme Court’s decision in Big Oak Flat-Groveland 28 Unified School District v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. App. 5th 403 (2018), cert. granted, 419 P.3d 3 1 534 (June 13, 2018) (No. S247975). A December 21 order stayed plaintiffs’ state law claims 2 against Lakeport Unified School District, and stayed, sua sponte, plaintiff O.G.’s state law 3 claims against Kelseyville Unified School District. As such, this order only reaches plaintiff 4 O.G.’s federal claims against Kelseyville Unified School District. This order follows full 5 briefing and oral argument. ANALYSIS For the Northern District of California United States District Court 6 7 1. MOTION TO DISMISS. 8 To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim 9 to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 10 A claim has facial plausibility when it pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 11 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 12 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court may generally consider 13 only allegations in the pleadings, attached exhibits, and matters properly subject to judicial 14 notice. The court accepts well-pled factual allegations in the complaint as true and construes 15 the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & 16 Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2008). Conclusory allegations or 17 “formulaic recitation of the elements” of a claim, however, are not entitled to the presumption 18 of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681. 19 A. 20 Peer-to-Peer Harassment Claim Under Title IX. Plaintiff alleges he suffered severe harassment based on his deviation from gender 21 norms in violation of Title IX (FAC ¶ 112). Under Title IX, a school district can be held liable 22 for peer-to-peer harassment where: (1) a student is subject to harassment “that is so severe, 23 pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the 24 educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school”; (2) the school district has actual 25 knowledge of the harassment; and (3) the district remains deliberately indifferent to the 26 harassment. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999). Kelseyville 27 Unified School District argues that neither actual knowledge nor deliberate indifference is 28 adequately pled. 4 1 2 A school district is liable for damages for harassment under Title IX only when it has “actual knowledge” of the harassment. Davis, 526 U.S. 629 at 650. Damages may not be 4 recovered unless an official “who at a minimum has authority to address the alleged 5 discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the recipient’s behalf has actual 6 knowledge of discrimination.” Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 7 284 (1998). 9 For the Northern District of California Actual Knowledge. 3 8 United States District Court (1) The parties do not dispute that at the beginning of the 2015–2016 school year, plaintiff’s mother informed the principal at Mountain Vista at the time that plaintiff had 10 transferred schools because of the harassment he suffered at Terrace Middle School (Dkt. 11 Nos. 22, 33). So, the district was aware of the harassment at Terrace Middle School. 12 Bully transferred to Mountain Vista in the fall of 2016. This is sufficient at the pleading stage 13 to infer that the district was aware of the risk of resumption of the harassment. (2) 14 Deliberate Indifference. 15 If actual notice is provided, an official’s response is deemed “deliberately indifferent” 16 only where the response is “clearly unreasonable in light of the circumstances.” This is not a 17 mere reasonableness standard. Rather, the heightened standard of “not clearly unreasonable” 18 is more easily satisfied as a matter of law. Davis, 526 U.S. at 648–49. Davis was careful to 19 note that its holding did not mean a recipient of federal funds must “purg[e] i[ts] school of 20 actionable peer harassment or that administrators must engage in particular disciplinary action” 21 in order to avoid liability for intentional discrimination. By invoking the “deliberate 22 indifference to known acts of peer harassment” standard, the court provided school officials 23 with flexibility to respond to harassment without being “second guessed,” as long as their 24 response is not “clearly unreasonable” under the circumstances. Ibid. This order finds that 25 plaintiff adequately alleged that Kelseyville Unified School District acted with deliberate 26 indifference. 27 28 Kelseyville Unified School District argues it was not afforded an opportunity to remedy the alleged harassment because plaintiff’s mother removed him from Mountain Vista before 5 1 giving the school notice of the harassment (Dkt. No. 45 at 6). This order disagrees. 2 Taking plaintiff’s allegations as true, the complaint contains sufficient facts to show that 3 plaintiff’s mother put the school on notice of the alleged harassment, and the school, in turn, 4 told plaintiff’s mother that by virtue of living in the district, Bully was its priority, and not 5 plaintiff. It is therefore understandable that plaintiff’s mother felt she had no choice but to 6 keep plaintiff from experiencing further harm by not returning him to school. As such, 7 Kelseyville Unified School District’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Title IX claim is DENIED. For the Northern District of California United States District Court 8 B. ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims. 9 In the amended complaint, plaintiff alleges Kelseyville Unified School District 10 discriminated against him and denied him equal access to educational benefits by acting with 11 deliberate indifference to pervasive and offensive “peer disability harassment” in violation of 12 the ADA (FAC ¶ 121). Plaintiff also alleges a violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 13 Act of 1973 based on the same conduct. Both the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 14 Act prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability. Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 15 (9th Cir. 2002). Under the ADA, plaintiff must plausibly allege that he is a “qualified 16 individual with a disability” and that Kelseyville Unified School District denied him benefits 17 or services “by reason of” his disability. See Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 18 (9th Cir. 2001); 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Under the Rehabilitation Act, plaintiff must do the same, 19 except that the denial must have been “solely by reason” of his disability. Furthermore, to 20 state a claim for money damages under either statute, plaintiff must allege intentional 21 discrimination, which can be met by a showing of “deliberate indifference,” which requires 22 “both knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is substantially likely, and a failure 23 to act upon that the 24 likelihood.” Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1138. 25 Here, the parties do not dispute that plaintiff is a “qualified individual with a disability” 26 under both statutes. Plaintiff has alleged that he suffers from autism and has an IEP (FAC ¶ 1). 27 Plaintiff, however, has not alleged that he was denied benefits or services by Kelseyville 28 Unified School District by reason of his disability, much less “solely by reason” of his 6 1 disability. Instead, plaintiff alleges in conclusory fashion that Bully’s “peer disability 2 harassment” was so pervasive as to deprive him of “full and equal access” to education 3 benefits offered by Kelseyville Unified School District (FAC ¶ 121). Yet, the complaint only 4 contains allegations of harassment based on plaintiff’s gender and perceived sexual orientation, 5 and not on the basis of his disability (FAC ¶ 35). For the Northern District of California United States District Court 6 Plaintiff cites Wormuth v. Lammersville Union School Dist., 305 F. Supp. 3d 1108, 7 1124–26 (E.D. Cal. 2018), for the proposition that a school district can be held liable for 8 peer-to-peer discrimination under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act “no matter the motive” 9 so long as the harassment impeded his access to a free public education and Kelseyville 10 Unified School District failed to provide reasonable accommodations (Dkt. No. 44 at 15–16). 11 Wormuth, however, does not control. Plaintiff has failed to allege discrimination based on 12 plaintiff’s disability. As such, defendants motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims under the ADA 13 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is GRANTED. 14 2. REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE. 15 Kelseyville Unified School District has requested the undersigned take judicial notice 16 of a redacted copy of notes from plaintiff’s IEP meeting (Dkt. No. 45-1). This document 17 indicates that a number of accommodations were extended to plaintiff in order to remedy the 18 harassment and plaintiff’s mother rejected them all. Plaintiff contests the validity of these 19 notes. It is premature to get into the factual merits; we must confine our gaze to the well-pled 20 allegations in the operative complaint. Because this is not the type of document that is subject 21 to judicial notice, defendant’s request for judicial notice as to the notes from plaintiff’s IEP 22 meeting is DENIED. 23 This order does not reach plaintiff’s state law claims against Kelseyville Unified 24 School District, as such, it does not reach defendant’s request for judicial notice of plaintiff’s 25 Government Tort Claim. 26 CONCLUSION 27 For the foregoing reasons, defendant Kelseyville Unified School District’s motion is 28 GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Kelseyville Unified School District’s request for 7 1 judicial notice of plaintiff’s IEP meeting notes is DENIED. Plaintiff may file a motion to obtain 2 leave to amend his complaint and will have until JANUARY 14, 2019, to file such a motion. 3 If plaintiff so moves, he should be sure to plead his best case. Any motion should explain how 4 the proposed complaint overcomes all deficiencies. 5 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 8 Dated: December 21, 2018. WILLIAM ALSUP UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9 11 For the Northern District of California United States District Court 10 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8
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