Adobe Systems Incorporated v. Cardinal Camera & Video Center, Inc., No. 3:2015cv02991 - Document 25 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS AND TRANSFERRING CASE by Judge Jon S. Tigar granting 17 Motion to Dismiss. (wsn, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 10/7/2015)
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Adobe Systems Incorporated v. Cardinal Camera & Video Center, Inc. Doc. 25 1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ADOBE SYSTEMS INC., Case No. 15-cv-02991-JST Plaintiff, 8 v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS AND TRANSFERRING CASE 9 10 CARDINAL CAMERA & VIDEO CENTER, INC., Defendant. 11 United States District Court Northern District of California Re: ECF No. 17 Before the Court is Defendant Cardinal Camera & Video Center, Inc.’s motion to dismiss 12 13 for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue, or, alternatively, to transfer venue. For the 14 reasons set forth below, the Court finds that jurisdiction in this district is lacking and will transfer 15 the case to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 16 I. 17 BACKGROUND On June 26, 2015, Plaintiff Adobe Systems Inc. (“Adobe”) filed this action against 18 Cardinal Camera & Video Center, Inc. (“Cardinal”), raising claims of federal trademark 19 infringement, false designation of origin under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, federal trademark 20 dilution, federal copyright infringement, unlawful or unfair business practices under California 21 Business & Professions Code section 17200, and unfair competition under California common 22 law. ECF No. 1. Adobe alleges that Cardinal uses both its own website 23 (www.cardinalcamera.com) and its Amazon.com merchant account to sell unauthorized versions 24 of Adobe’s software, thereby infringing Adobe’s underlying trademarks and copyrights. Id. ¶¶ 25 26–28. Specifically, Adobe alleges that Cardinal has sold unbundled copies of Original 26 Equipment Manufacturer (“OEM”) versions of Adobe’s software in violation of Adobe’s Software 27 License Agreement (“SLA”), which forbids the sale of such software unbundled from approved 28 hardware components. Id. ¶ 22–23, 28. Dockets.Justia.com Adobe is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Delaware and has its 1 2 principal place of business in San Jose, California. Id. ¶ 1. Cardinal is a corporation organized 3 under the laws of the state of Pennsylvania and has its principal place of business in Lansdale, 4 Pennsylvania. Id. ¶ 2. Cardinal operates primarily from its six East Coast stores located in 5 Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Virginia, and North Carolina, with 88% of its sales coming from 6 these retail locations. ECF No. 17 at 5–6. The remaining 12% of Cardinal’s sales come from 7 Cardinal’s website (2% of total sales) and from Cardinal’s Amazon.com account (10% of total 8 sales). Id. at 6. All of Cardinal’s sales which have been shipped to the state of California come 9 from Cardinal’s Amazon.com account. Id. Of Cardinal’s Amazon.com sales, 12% were shipped to California. Id. As a result, 1.2% of Cardinal’s total sales are sent to California. Id. Adobe 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 alleges that its investigators purchased two unbundled versions of Adobe OEM software from 12 Cardinal’s Amazon.com account, but does not allege from where this software was purchased or 13 where it was sent. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 29–34. On August 27, 2015, Cardinal filed a motion to dismiss Adobe’s complaint for lack of 14 15 personal jurisdiction or improper venue, or, alternatively, to transfer venue, ECF No. 17, which 16 motion the Court now considers. 17 II. LEGAL STANDARD 18 Where a defendant objects to the Court’s personal jurisdiction over it pursuant to Federal 19 Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction is 20 proper. Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008). In the absence of an 21 evidentiary hearing, however, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of personal 22 jurisdiction. Id. Uncontroverted allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint must be taken as true, and 23 “[c]onflicts between the parties over statements contained in affidavits must be resolved in the 24 plaintiff’s favor.” Id. (quoting Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th 25 Cir. 2004)). 26 “Where, as here, there is no applicable federal statute governing personal jurisdiction, the 27 district court applies the law of the state in which the district court sits.” Schwarzenegger, 374 28 F.3d at 800. “Because California’s long-arm jurisdictional statute is coextensive with federal due 2 1 process requirements, the jurisdictional analyses under state law and federal due process are the 2 same.” Id. at 800–01. The relevant question, therefore, is whether nonresident defendant Cardinal 3 has “at least ‘minimum contacts’ with the relevant forum such that the exercise of jurisdiction 4 ‘does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Id. at 801 (quoting Int’l 5 Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). 6 There are two types of personal jurisdiction: “general or all-purpose” and “specific or case- 7 linked.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011). 8 General jurisdiction permits jurisdiction over a defendant even when the claims at issue do not 9 arise from or relate to activity in that forum. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 n.15 (1985). A court may assert general personal jurisdiction over defendants “when their 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home 12 in the forum State.” Goodyear, 131 S.Ct. at 2851 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317). Plaintiff 13 does not argue that the Court has general jurisdiction over Cardinal. 14 “Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, depends on an affiliation between the forum and 15 the underlying controversy, principally, activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum 16 State and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation.” Goodyear, 131 S.Ct. at 2851 (internal 17 quotation marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit has established a three-part test to determine whether 18 a court has specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant: 19 20 21 22 23 24 (1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forumrelated activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable. 25 Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. “The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two 26 prongs of the test.” Id. If the plaintiff does so, “the burden then shifts to the defendant to ‘present 27 a compelling case’ that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Id. 28 3 1 III. DISCUSSION A. Personal Jurisdiction 2 1. 3 Purposeful Direction or Purposeful Availment The first prong of the Ninth Circuit’s three-prong specific personal jurisdiction test asks 4 whether a defendant purposefully directed its activities at the forum or purposefully availed itself 5 of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 6 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004). Although the terms “purposeful availment” and “purposeful 7 direction” are sometimes used interchangeably, they represent two distinct concepts. Id. A 8 purposeful availment analysis is most often used in suits sounding in contract. Picot v. Weston, 9 780 F.3d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir. 2015). A purposeful direction analysis is most often used in cases, 10 like this one, that sound in tort. Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 1128 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying purposeful direction analysis to copyright infringement action). 12 Courts determine whether a defendant purposefully directed its actions at the forum by applying 13 the three part “effects test” from Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), which requires that “the 14 defendant allegedly must have: (1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum 15 state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.” 16 Brayton Purcell, 606 F.3d at 1128 (quoting Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et 17 L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc)). Under this test, it is not 18 sufficient that the defendant merely took action with a foreseeable effect in the forum state. 19 Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1021. 20 21 22 a. Intentional Act Adobe must first demonstrate that Cardinal committed an “intentional act.” This term has 23 a special meaning under Calder’s effects test. In this context, an “intentional act” is “an external 24 manifestation of the actor’s intent to perform an actual, physical act in the real world.” Brayton 25 Purcell, 606 F.3d at 1128. In its Complaint, Adobe alleges that Cardinal has distributed 26 unauthorized versions of Adobe’s software throughout the United States. ECF No. 1 ¶ 26–28. 27 These alleged sales constitute “intentional acts” under Calder’s effects test. Washington Shoe Co. 28 v. A-Z Sporting Goods Inc., 704 F.3d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 2012). 4 b. 1 Express Aiming 2 The second prong of the effects test requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant 3 expressly aimed its actions at the forum state. Adobe argues that personal jurisdiction exists under 4 this prong, relying heavily on Washington Shoe for the proposition that an intentional act, such as 5 willful copyright infringement, which harms a defendant known to be in the forum is alone 6 sufficient to show express aiming. 704 F.3d at 678 (“Because the harm caused by an infringement 7 of the copyright laws must be felt at least at the place where the copyright is held, we think that 8 the impact of a willful infringement is necessarily directed there as well.”) (emphasis in original); 9 see also Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that the express aiming “requirement is satisfied when the defendant is alleged to have 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 engaged in wrongful conduct targeted at a plaintiff whom the defendant knows to be a resident of 12 the forum state”). 13 The viability of this theory is doubtful, however, after the Supreme Court’s decision in 14 Walden v. Fiore, 134 S.Ct. 1115 (2014). In Walden, Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) 15 agents searched two professional gamblers (Gina Fiore and Keith Gipson) at an airport in San 16 Juan, Puerto Rico. Id. at 1119. The agents found $97,000 in cash. Id. Fiore and Gipson 17 explained that the money was their winnings from gambling in Puerto Rico. Id. After Fiore and 18 Gipson boarded their flight for Atlanta, a law enforcement official in Puerto Rico notified Atlanta 19 airport DEA agents about Fiore and Gipson and their plan to catch a connecting flight from 20 Atlanta to Nevada. Id. When Fiore and Gipson arrived in Atlanta, they were stopped and 21 searched by DEA agents who seized the cash. Id. Fiore and Gipson continued on to Nevada. Id. 22 The agent who seized the cash helped to draft an affidavit showing probable cause for the seizure, 23 but no forfeiture complaint was ever filed, and the cash was eventually returned to Fiore and 24 Gipson. Id. 25 Fiore and Gipson subsequently filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of 26 Nevada against the Atlanta DEA agent, alleging that the agent violated their Fourth Amendment 27 rights by seizing the cash without probable cause and later drafting a false affidavit justifying the 28 seizure. Id. at 1120. The district court granted the agent’s motion to dismiss the case for lack of 5 1 personal jurisdiction, and the Ninth Circuit reversed. Id. The Supreme reversed the Ninth Circuit, 2 finding that specific personal jurisdiction requires that the relationship between the defendant, the 3 forum, and the litigation “must arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant himself’ creates with the 4 forum State” and that “the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum.” 5 Id. at 1122 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475) (emphasis in original). Because the agent’s 6 challenged conduct did not have anything to do with Nevada itself, but instead was connected to 7 Nevada only because the plaintiffs happened to reside there, the Supreme Court held that the 8 Nevada district court did not have personal jurisdiction over the agent. Id. at 1125–26. As Judge Donato recently noted in Erickson v. Neb. Mach. Co., No. 15-cv-01147-JD, 2015 9 WL4089849, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2015), District courts in the Ninth Circuit are divided on 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 whether, and to what extent, Walden overruled Washington Shoe and prior Ninth Circuit law 12 regarding the express aiming prong. Compare Erickson,1 2015 WL 4089849, at *3 (concluding 13 that Walden “rejected the idea, inherent in Washington Shoe, that a defendant’s knowledge of a 14 plaintiff’s forum connections and the foreseeability of harm there are enough in themselves to 15 satisfy the minimum contacts analysis”) and Under a Foot Plant, Co. v. Exterior Design, Inc.,2 No. 16 6:14-cv-01371-AA, 2015 WL 1401697, at *4 n.1 (D. Or. Mar. 24, 2015) (suggesting that Walden 17 was irreconcilable with Washington Shoe and applying Walden) with Exobox Techs. Corp. v. 18 Tsambis,3 No. 2:14-cv-00501, 2015 WL 82886, at *5–6 (D. Nev. Jan. 6, 2015) (holding that prior 19 Ninth Circuit precedent regarding the express aiming prong is still good law because Walden was 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 In Erickson, the Northern District of California district court found that the express aiming prong was not satisfied where the alleged copyright infringement “did not involve entering California, contacting anyone in California, or otherwise reaching out to California” and any injury was “not localized in California, apart from the fact that plaintiffs are based there.” 2015 WL 4089849, at *4. 2 In Under a Foot Plant, the District of Oregon district court found that the express aiming prong was not satisfied where the alleged copyright infringer knew that the plaintiff copyright owner was located in Oregon, but where none of the defendant’s activities occurred in Oregon. 2015 WL 1401697, at *4. 3 In Exobox, the District of Nevada district court found that the express aiming prong was satisfied where the out-of-state defendant had previously filed suit against the plaintiff “in Texas with the intent to interfere with [the] business transactions” of the plaintiff, a Nevada company. 2015 WL 82886, at*5. The Exobox court distinguished Walden by noting that the defendant in that case “directed his activities at an entity that incidentally happened to be going to Nevada,” whereas the plaintiff in Exobox “chose to direct his activities to an entity known to be in Nevada.” Id. 6 1 narrowly decided and is factually distinguishable) and Leibman v. Prupes,4 No. 2:14-cv-09003, 2 2015 WL 898454, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2015) (holding that, despite Walden, the express 3 aiming requirement is still satisfied when a defendant is alleged to have engaged in wrongful 4 conduct targeted at a plaintiff whom the defendant knows to be a resident of the forum state). The 5 Ninth Circuit itself has not decided whether, and to what extent, Walden overruled prior Ninth 6 Circuit precedent. The Ninth Circuit has, however, applied Walden to hold that the express 7 aiming prong is not met where a California resident brought suit in California against an out-of- 8 state defendant for tortious interference with contract, but where none of defendant’s challenged 9 conduct had anything to do with California itself. Picot, supra, 780 F.3d at 1214–15. In so holding, the Picot court rejected plaintiff’s argument, which relied on Washington Shoe, that the 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 express aiming prong was met because the defendant targeted a California resident. Id. at 1214. 12 The Picot court found that such an argument was unpersuasive in light of Walden, which 13 “reinforced the traditional understanding that our personal jurisdiction analysis must focus on the 14 defendant’s contacts with the forum state, not the defendant’s contacts with a resident of the 15 forum.” Id. This Court agrees with the Erickson court that the holding in Washington Shoe cannot be 16 17 reconciled with Walden and that Walden effectively overrules Washington Shoe. See Miller v. 18 Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“[W]here intervening Supreme Court 19 authority is clearly irreconcilable with our prior circuit authority . . . district courts should consider 20 themselves bound by the intervening higher authority and reject the prior opinion of this court as 21 having been effectively overruled.); Erickson, 2015 WL 4089849, at *3. To rule otherwise would 22 essentially be to hold that “a copyright holder can always sue wherever it happens to be located.” 23 5 Patry on Copyright § 17:166.50 (online ed. 2015). Accordingly, the Court rejects Adobe’s 24 argument that Cardinal expressly aimed its conduct at California because Cardinal was “aware of 25 Adobe’s domicile in the Northern District of California and . . ., through its infringing conduct, 26 4 27 28 In Leibman, the Central District of California district court found that the express aiming prong was satisfied where the out-of-state defendant was “alleged to have sent tortious emails directly to plaintiff in an attempt to extort money from a known California resident.” 2015 WL 898454, at *9. 7 1 targeted Adobe therein.” ECF No. 19 at 9. 2 Beyond its reliance on Adobe’s presence in California and Cardinal’s alleged knowledge 3 thereof, Adobe argues that the express aiming prong is satisfied here because 1.2% of Cardinal’s 4 sales are shipped to California and because Cardinal advertises for sale and sells infringing 5 software on its website and through its Amazon.com account. ECF No. 19 at 1, 3, 10. 6 “[O]perating even a passive website in conjunction with ‘something more’—conduct directly 7 targeting the forum—is sufficient” to satisfy the “express aiming” prong. Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. 8 Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1229 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l 9 Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1020 (9th Cir. 2002)). “In determining whether a nonresident defendant has done ‘something more,’ [the Ninth Circuit has] considered several factors, including the 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 interactivity of the defendant’s website, . . . the geographic scope of the defendant’s commercial 12 ambitions, . . . and whether the defendant ‘individually targeted’ a plaintiff known to be a forum 13 resident.” Id. 14 Adobe’s Complaint, however, alleges little information about Cardinal’s website beyond 15 its bald assertion that the website is “interactive” and its allegation that the website features 16 infringing Adobe products for sale. ECF No. 1 ¶ 26; see Erickson, 2015 WL 4089849, at *4 17 (finding that conclusory allegations of a website’s interactivity are not sufficient to satisfy the 18 express aiming prong). Although Adobe argues that “it is highly likely that Cardinal has sold 19 products infringing on Adobe’s rights directly to California residents” through its website, ECF 20 No. 19 at 10, this claim is unsupported by the allegations in Adobe’s Complaint. Indeed, Adobe 21 does not even allege where the two Adobe products purchased by its investigators were shipped, 22 ECF No. 1 ¶ 29–34, and Adobe has not pleaded any facts that would suggest that any of the 1.2% 23 of Cardinal’s sales shipped to California were, in fact, Adobe products, much less infringing 24 Adobe products. Moreover, Adobe admits that Cardinal’s website has a “broad and indiscriminate 25 scope,” ECF No. 19 at 10, supporting a finding that Adobe’s website is not targeted at California. 26 Mavrix Photo, 647 F.3d at 1231 (“Not all material placed on the Internet is, solely by virtue of its 27 universal accessibility, expressly aimed at every state in which it is accessed.”). Finally, as in 28 Erickson, Adobe does not allege that Cardinal’s website “contained content tailored for California 8 1 residents.” 2015 WL 4089849, at * 4. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Adobe has not 2 sufficiently alleged that Cardinal’s website directly targets California. The 1.2% of Cardinal’s sales shipped to California are likewise unhelpful to Adobe 3 4 because they too show no purposeful direction. “[R]andom, fortuitous, or attenuated” contacts 5 with individuals in the forum are insufficient to support personal jurisdiction. Walden, 134 S.Ct. 6 at 1123 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475); Picot, 780 F.3d at 1212. The Ninth Circuit has held 7 that a sale into the forum is not a substantial contact where it “involved the forum state only 8 because that is where the purchaser happened to reside.” Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1019. District 9 courts have extended this principle to cases involving multiple sales entering the forum simply because the purchasers happened to live in the forum. See Imageline, Inc. v. Hendricks, No. CV 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 09-1870 DSF (AGRx), 2009 WL 10286181, at *3, 5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2009) (holding that 12 “Defendant has not purposefully directed sales into California in a sufficient manner to allow it to 13 be sued over those sales in California,” despite the fact that 10% of Defendants’ sales, comprising 14 1,071 transactions over an approximately eight-year period, were made to California residents); 15 Control Solutions, Inc. v. MircoDAQ.com, Inc., No. 3:15-cv-748-PK, 2015 WL 5092593, at *7 16 (D. Or. Aug. 26, 2015) (finding no personal jurisdiction over defendant with 1.6% of total sales 17 directed at the forum). Adobe has not alleged or provided evidence of purposeful direction 18 beyond the 1.2% of sales that happen to go to purchasers in California through Cardinal’s 19 Amazon.com account. Adobe does not allege that Cardinal advertises in California, markets 20 products specifically intended for a California audience, or in any other way directs its sales 21 activities to California. The Court finds that these sales do not establish express aiming at the 22 forum.5 Because Adobe has failed to establish that Cardinal expressly aimed its conduct at 23 Even if Adobe were able to show express aiming, it has not shown that its claim “arises out of” Cardinal’s forum-related activities. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. The Ninth Circuit “measure[s] this requirement in terms of ‘but for’ causation.” Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. August Nat. Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2000). As discussed above, Adobe has not alleged that Cardinal has sold Adobe products, much less infringing Adobe products, to California residents. Adobe claims that Cardinal sent its investigators infringing Adobe software, but does not say where the investigators received the software. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 29–34. Although Cardinal admits to sending 1.2% of its sales to California, there is no reason to believe that any of the products making up the 1.2% of sales are infringing Adobe products. Thus, Adobe has failed to establish that its claims arise out of Cardinal’s contacts with the forum. See Erickson, 2015 WL 4089849, 9 5 24 25 26 27 28 1 California, the Court grants Cardinal’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.6 2 B. Jurisdictional Discovery 3 Adobe requests leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery. ECF No. 19 at 24. The decision 4 whether to grant jurisdictional discovery is typically within the discretion of the district court. 5 Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Exp. Co., 556 F.2d 406, 430 n.24 (9th Cir. 1977). “[W]here 6 pertinent facts bearing on the question of jurisdiction are in dispute, discovery should be allowed.” 7 American West Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877 F.2d 793, 801 (9th Cir. 1989). However, 8 “where a plaintiff’s claim of personal jurisdiction appears to be both attenuated and based on bare 9 allegations in the face of specific denials made by the defendants, the Court need not permit even limited discovery.” Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1160 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 Terracom v. Valley Nat. Bank, 49 F.3d 555, 562 (9th Cir. 1995)). In its request for jurisdictional 12 discovery, Adobe argues that Cardinal’s records “may . . . indicate direct sales and shipments of 13 infringing Adobe-branded products directly to California consumers.” ECF No. 19 at 24. The 14 Court finds that these “purely speculative allegations of attenuated jurisdictional contacts” are 15 insufficient to warrant jurisdictional discovery and therefore denies Adobe’s request. Getz v. 16 Boeing Co., 654 F.3d 852, 860 (9th Cir. 2011). 17 C. Venue and Transfer 18 Because the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over Cardinal, the Court declines to 19 address whether venue in this District is proper. “Once a Court determines that it lacks personal 20 jurisdiction, it may dismiss the case or, in the interest of justice, transfer the case under 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1406(a).” Wickline v. United Micronesia Dev. Ass’n, Inc., No. C 14-00192 SI, 2014 WL 22 2938713, at *9 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2014). The Eastern District of Pennsylvania has personal 23 jurisdiction over Cardinal, as Cardinal’s principal place of business is within the district, and 24 neither party disputes that the case could have been brought there in the first place. 28 U.S.C. § 25 26 27 28 *4 (applying “but for” test and finding that plaintiff failed to show that its claims arose out of defendant’s contact with the forum). 6 Because the Court has determined that Adobe fails the express aiming prong, the Court need not examine the remaining elements to determine whether specific personal jurisdiction is lacking for alternative reasons. See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 807 n.1. 10 1 1406(a) (“The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division 2 or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or 3 division in which it could have been brought.”). Accordingly, the Court finds that it would be in 4 the interest of justice to transfer the action to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 5 CONCLUSION 6 For the foregoing reasons, the court grants Cardinal’s motion to dismiss for lack of 7 personal jurisdiction. The clerk is directed to transfer this case to the United States District Court 8 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 13 Dated: October 7, 2015 ______________________________________ JON S. TIGAR United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11
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